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This dissertation is about the in/stability over time of a contract-based inter-organizational 
relationship (IOR) which existed mostly under conditions of government monopsony (MG). 
 
The MG consisted of the institutional arrangements between the NHS and Higher Education sectors 
in England for the provision of education for the NHS non-medical professional workforce. The IOR 
was between the NHS education buyer (the ‘GM’) and Middlesex University (MU). 
 
An agent-centred historical institutionalism was used as the overall approach in the inquiry. The 
main components of the approach were resource dependence theory, concepts of historical 
dependence, and events in the IOR and its institutional and organizational environments. A multi-
dimensional concept of IOR in/stability from the standpoints of the GM and MU which was grounded 
in the practices of the IOR was constructed. The inquiry traced the origins and subsequent 
development of the MG and the in/stability of the IOR over an 18 year period, 1995 - 2013. 
 
The main findings of the inquiry were:  
 
(1) The IOR originated in, and continued to exist mostly under conditions of MG 
 
(2) The IOR became less stable over time from the standpoint of MU; reductions in IOR stability 
occurred in dimensions of risk relating to the future performance of the IOR 
 
(3) Instability and threatened instability in the IOR were brought about mostly by the exercise of 
power by the GM and by the power dependence responses of MU. 
 
The thesis developed in the dissertation is that instability and threatened instability in the IOR were 
due mostly to a power imbalance in the IOR, in favour of the GM, between the GM and MU. The 
source of that power imbalance was a combination of: 
 
 The resource dependency of MU on the IOR 
 
 The conditions of MG and bilateral monopoly under which the IOR existed. 
 
 
The dissertation is concluded with a critique of MG as a technique for public sector management. 
Recommendations are made for new NHS-HE inter-sector and IOR arrangements to be established 
which take account of power imbalances and relations of mutual dependence between 
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Chapter 1    Introduction 
 
1.1 Aims, Definitions, Empirical Focus and Nature of the Research Inquiry 
 
The first aim of the inquiry is to explain the in/stability over time of a contract based inter-
organizational relationship (IOR) which existed mostly under conditions of government monopsony 
(MG).  
 
Following Hennart (2008), a contract based IOR is defined as an institution consisting in a set of 
rules, formal and informal, which define and shape the functioning of an IOR and the behaviours of 
the organizations in the IOR. 
 
IOR stability over time is defined as a condition in which an IOR maintains a sustainable performance 
from the standpoints of the organizations in the IOR. 
 
Government monopsony (MG) is defined as a condition in which the government or its agent acts as 
the single buyer of a well specified product, and where the standing of the buyer as a monopsonist is 
protected by statute or government regulation (Blair and Harrison 2010, Block and Barnett 2009, 
Stucke 2013). 
 
Power is defined as an agent’s ability to do something or to bring something about (Morriss 2002). 
‘Power over’ is defined as an agent’s ability to determine or influence the context in which power 
may be developed and exercised (Lukes 2005). ‘Power dependence responses’ are defined as 
specific types of agency activity by the organizations in the IOR, such as ‘coalition formation’, 
‘lobbying’, ‘productivity improvement’ and ‘cross-subsidisation’. Risk is defined in relation to ‘IOR 
performance risk’ as the probability and consequences that the objectives of either or both of the 
organizations in the IOR will not be achieved (Daz and Teng 2001).  
 
The focus of the inquiry was empirical and centred on the IOR between the NHS buyer for non-
medical education (the government monopsonist or ‘GM’) and Middlesex University (MU). The IOR 
was an example of a contract based IOR that existed mostly under conditions of MG. The inquiry 
traced the origins of the IOR and its subsequent development, key outcomes and performance over 
an 18 year period, 1995-2013 (‘the reference period’). 
 
The second aim of the inquiry is to contribute to policy formulation directed toward the future 
stability of IORs in the public sector, between government buyers/commissioners and non-
government suppliers, particularly in NHS-HE IORs in the provision of non-medical education.   
 
Given gaps in current theory and evidence the inquiry is exploratory in nature.  
 
1.2 Empirical Relevance of the Inquiry 
 
In 2015, there were c. 64 Higher Education organizations (‘HEIs’) in England which had IORs (under 
conditions of MG) with the GM for the provision of non-medical education. Instability in those IORs 
could potentially have material consequences not only in respect of those IORs but also at 
organization and sector levels: 
 
(i) At organization level: the income which HEIs received from their IORs with the GM typically 
ranged between 5% and 30% of their overall tuition fee income. If the income received by an HEI 






become unsustainable from the standpoint of that HEI and ultimately could have negative 
consequences for the HEI (financially and in terms of output quality) and for the survival of the IOR.1 
 
A determinant of whether a HEI’s FEC would be covered was the unit of resource or ‘national 
benchmark price’ (BMP) it received in its IOR.2 In October 2014, GM and HEI representatives reached 
an agreement that the BMP was to remain at the same level in nominal terms as it was in 2013/14 
for the period 2014-2016.3 However, this meant that an already existing shortfall of the BMP relative 
which had been estimated relative to HEIs’ average FEC was certain to grow to c. 10% - 14% by 
2016;4 beyond 2016, the GM indicated it would be seeking further real terms reductions in the BMP 
of c. 4% year on year to 2020. 
 
(ii) At HE sector level: given the number of HEIs in England with IORs in non-medical education and 
the relative importance of those IORs to HEIs, the outlook for the adequacy of the BMP to cover HEIs 
FEC had potential implications for the overall functioning of the HE sector, particularly if a significant 
number of those IORs had an unsustainable performance from the standpoint of their HEIs.   
 
(iii) At NHS sector level: the UK HE system was the main source of supply of newly qualified entrants 
to the NHS non-medical workforce.5 A disruption to that supply brought about by an unsustainable 
performance and/or failure of IORs for the provision of non-medical education potentially could 
affect the quality as well as the quantity of appropriately skilled healthcare professionals being at 
the right place at the right time in the system. In their 2013 review of the UK nursing labour market, 
Buchan et al concluded there was ‘an urgent need to address both the national security of the supply 
of nurses, and the local ability to determine evidence-based nurse staffing levels’.6    
 
1.3 Theme, Findings, Thesis, Further Research and the Potential Need for Change  
 
The theme of the inquiry concerned the exercise of power by a GM and the potential and actual 
consequences for the in/stability over time of an IOR under conditions of MG. 
 
The main findings of the inquiry were: 
 
1. The IOR investigated in the inquiry originated under conditions of MG and continued to exist 
mostly under those conditions for the whole of the reference period. 
 
2. The IOR became less stable over time from the standpoint of the supplier (MU); reductions in IOR 
stability occurred in dimensions of risk relating to the future performance of the IOR. 
 
3. From the standpoint of the buyer (GM), IOR performance stability was maintained throughout the 
reference period. This suggests that from the buyer’s standpoint, IOR performance stability can 
coexist with a reduction, from the supplier’s standpoint, in IOR stability on dimensions of risk. 
 
                                                             
1 Source: Walsh, D, and Jelfs, E. (2015) ‘Beyond BMP: Where next for the funding of nursing, midwifery and AHP 
pre-registration education in England?’ Council of Deans of Health Working Paper, February 2015. 
2 The benchmark price (‘BMP’) was the price per student fte which HEIs were paid for their education provision 
in non-medical education. The BMP was a national tariff and applied to all IORs in non-medical education in 
England. Source: Archive 28 and 29.  
3 Letter from HEE to UUK dated 14th November 2014 - Archive 72.  
4 Source: Council of Deans of Health (2014) 
5 Source: Buchan, J., Seccombe I, and O’May, F. (2013) 






4. Instability and threatened instability in the IOR over the reference period were brought about 
mostly by the exercise of power by the GM and by the power dependence responses of MU. The 
exercise of power by the GM in the IOR consisted partly of responses to events exogenous to the 
MG, especially to exogenous shocks to the MG, which occurred during the latter part of the reference 
period (2005-2009). In the last 5 years of the reference period (2008-2013), the GM also exercised 
power on its own initiative to bring about changes in the IOR as well as in the MG which were 
consequential for stability on dimensions in the IOR. 
 
The thesis developed in this dissertation is that instability and threatened instability in the IOR over 
the reference period were due mostly to a power imbalance in the IOR in favour of the GM, between 
the GM and MU. The source of that power imbalance was a combination of: 
 
 The resource dependency of MU on the IOR 
 
 The conditions of MG and bilateral monopoly under which the IOR existed. 
 
Due to the exploratory nature of the inquiry and also its empirical focus on a single case history, it is 
not being argued that the findings and thesis presented here are generally applicable to IORs under 
conditions of MG - further research would be required into other IORs under conditions of MG for 
such an argument to be evaluated. However, to the extent that the conclusions of further research 
support the thesis being presented here, then there are issues for management and policy makers to 
address regarding the stability over time of IORs under conditions of MG. These issues include the 
identification of risks to the future performance of those IORs and the actions which should be taken 
by policy makers and management to mitigate or avoid such risks. Policy changes and management 
action may be required at different levels: (i) at organization and inter-organization levels in respect 
of the IORs in non-medical education in England (ii) at NHS-HE inter-sector level in relation to the 
conditions of MG under which those IORs are currently established. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
The inquiry was focussed around the development of answers to five research questions. The overall 
research question in regard to the first aim of the inquiry was research question 4. This question 
concerned the explanation of in/stability over time in the IOR: 
 
4. Why did in/stability over time in the IOR come about? 
 
Answers to this question were sought in relation to the exercise of their powers by the organizations 
in the IOR, the sources of those powers, and the impact of events exogenous and endogenous to the 
IOR.  Answers to the overall research question were also sought in relation to the impact of historical 
processes on in/stability over time in the IOR. 
 
To facilitate the development of answers to the overall question of the inquiry, three preliminary 
questions were defined, viz.: 
 
1(i) What were the origins and initial conditions of the NHS-HE inter-sector institutional 
arrangements and of the IOR? (ii) What were the conditions of these arrangements over the 
reference period?  
 
2. What were the IOR key outcomes and consequences for IOR in/stability over the reference period 







3. How did in/stability over time in the IOR come about?        
 
The rationale for these questions was to develop answers to ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions about the 
in/stability over time of the IOR which could be used as foundations for developing answers to the 
overall research question which concerned the ‘why’. Thus, under question set 1 above an objective 
of the inquiry was to ascertain the initial conditions of the IOR, in particular to ascertain whether the 
IOR was indeed under conditions of MG. A further objective was to establish the initial conditions 
and stability states on dimensions of the IOR so these could be used as a baseline against which the 
findings about subsequent changes in the in/stability of the IOR (research question 2) could be 
plotted. The objective of question 3 was to develop an understanding of how processes and events 
impacted on the in/stability of the IOR over time. For example, in relation to events the further 
questions were set: (i) how were IOR relevant events, both exogenous and endogenous to the IOR, 
responded to by the organizations in the IOR? (ii) what were the impacts of the responses to these 
events on in/stability over time in the IOR? 
 
The overall research question in regard to the second aim of the inquiry was research question 5. 
This concerned the promotion of stability over time in IORs in the public sector, between 
government buyers/commissioners and non-government suppliers, particularly in NHS-HE IORs: 
 
5. How should conflict in principal-agent relationships such as in long term contract-based IORs, be 
managed so that sustainable outcomes from the standpoints of all relevant stakeholders are 
brought about? 
 
The rationale for this question was the general relevance of principal-agent theory (PAT) to 
government approaches to management in the public sector and the specific relevance of PAT to the 
contract-based type of IOR which was the subject of the inquiry.     
 
1.5 Approach and Theoretical Perspective 
 
The overall approach used in the inquiry was an ‘agent-centred historical institutionalism’ (Bell 
2011). The approach had several strands: (i) a power perspective (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 
Huxham and Beech 2008, Mahoney 2000) using resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003, Casciaro and Piskorski 2005) (ii) concepts of historical dependence (Page 2006) and (iii) 
concepts of gradual institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). A high level theoretical 
framework was constructed which brought together these strands. The approach was used to 
develop explanations of the in/stability over time of the IOR defined as a micro level institution 
(Hennart 2008).   
 
1.6 Data, Access, Methods and Validity 
 
Data: The database constructed in the inquiry consisted of secondary data, a substantial amount of 
which was obtained from archives in MU. These data related mainly to the 18 year period of the IOR 
and included copies of IOR contracts and contracts performance reviews; IOR student numbers data; 
communications between the GM and MU and also suppliers generally in the MG – the latter 
included GM consultation, planning and policy documents. The database also included copies of 
internal MU email communications about the IOR, including strategic and financial reviews. Data 
also included GM parent organization commissioned reports into pricing in the MG; GM and MU 
organization level data, including board reports and financial reports; and communications, reports, 







Some of the secondary data relating to the GM and MU were publicly available data, these data 
including annual reports and accounts, and strategic plans. Other publicly available data related 
mainly to sector level data about the health and higher education sectors and to data about the 
relevant professional and regulatory bodies for the health and higher education sectors. 
 
Access: The writer was a senior manager at MU with lead responsibility for the University’s IOR with 
the GM during the period 2004 – 2012. In this role the writer had full access to all of the archives at 
MU. Since 2013 the writer has been a Senior Policy Advisor to the Council of Deans of Health (CoDH); 
the writer has advised and supported the CoDH in its negotiations with HEE on the pricing of non-
medical education in England. Currently the writer is assisting CoDH in the development of a ‘new 
settlement’ between the NHS and HE sectors for the long-term funding of non-medical education in 
England. In these roles the writer has had access to further data at HE-NHS inter-sector level. 
 
Methods: A diachronic case history was used as the overall method in the inquiry. A typology based 
on the type of the IOR as a ‘unilateral contract-based’ IOR, and transaction cost theory relating to 
IORs generally, was constructed.7 The principal categories or ‘components’ of the typology were 
‘contracts’, ‘outputs’ and ‘price’. Using the typology as a framework, a descriptive history of the 
origins of the IOR and its development over the entire reference period was produced. This history, 
which was validated by IOR member checks, was subsequently used as a resource in the inquiry. 
 
A concept of IOR in/stability over time from the standpoint of each of the organizations in the IOR 
was defined; a key characteristic of this concept was the inclusion of dimensions of expected (i.e. 
future) as well as historic/current performance of the IOR. The concept was operationalised on 14 
dimensions which were grounded in the reality of the IOR and which when taken together covered 
each of the principal components of the IOR. The stability of the IOR on these 14 dimensions was 
investigated and the findings summarised on a year by year basis for each of the 14 dimensions. The 
outputs of this part of the inquiry dealt with research questions 1 and 2 (above). 
 
To enable the development of interpretations of the findings about the IOR in/stability over time 
(and thereby help to address research question 3) a conceptual framework (the ‘EEAPOC’ 
framework) was constructed. The EEAPOC framework focussed on the processes and events of the 
IOR and its environment, and brought these together with the associated movements in IOR 
stability. From this, inferences were drawn about how IOR stability impacts over time came about. 
To ensure an overall coherence of concepts and theory, the EEAPOC framework was directly based 
on the theoretical framework which had been developed in the inquiry and was an elaboration of 
the latter focussing on high level processes in the IOR and its environment. 
 
In regard to research question 4 of the inquiry, components of the theoretical framework were also 
elaborated to enable the development of explanations of the findings about IOR in/stability over 
time: the power perspective and concepts of gradual institutional change were elaborated in terms 
of different kinds of power dependence responses available to and used by the organizations in the 
IOR; historical dependence was elaborated in terms of different types and concepts of historical 
dependence. The impact on IOR stability of power dependence responses and of historical 
dependence were then inferred or identified in relation to the events in the IOR and the associated 
outcomes on IOR stability for each of the years of the IOR and on each of the 14 dimensions. 
 
Research question 5 was tackled in four parts, beginning with an outline of principal-agent theory 
(PAT) and a summary of strengths and limitations of PAT given in the literature. Next the validity of 
PAT, and the appropriateness of current government policy in using MG as a technique of public 
                                                             






sector management, is considered in the context of the main findings and conclusions of the inquiry. 
After a brief update on policy developments affecting the future of the MG, research question 5 is 
answered with a set of recommendations for future policy and management of HE-NHS IORs.   
 
Validity: Four potential threats to the validity of the findings and conclusions drawn in the research 
were identified (construct validity, data limitations, researcher bias, and reactivity). The strategies 
used to mitigate those threats included (i) use of established theory where possible (ii) use of ‘thick 
description’ of the substantive events of the IOR (iii) drawing on the expertise and knowledge of the 
writer gained from direct involvement in the IOR for half of the reference period (iv) member checks 
of the interpretations made of IOR stability impacts and (v) expert academic review. 
 
1.7 Plan of the Dissertation 
 
The first aim of the inquiry is addressed in Chapters 2 - 8. 
 
The overall approach taken in the inquiry, historical institutionalism (HI), is outlined in Chapter 2. 
Underlying concepts and alternative perspectives taken in HI are explained. Issues in HI of relevance 
to the inquiry are identified and the alternative perspectives in HI evaluated on the basis of their 
potential to resolve those issues. On the basis of this evaluation a power perspective is selected and 
developed in the inquiry. Concepts of power are defined and Foucault’s theory of power and the 
exercise of power are outlined. Within this power perspective, resource dependence theory (RDT) is 
used as the theoretical framework in the inquiry. RDT is (i) defined (ii) developed further for use in 
an HI approach and (iii) contextualised for application in the inquiry to conditions of MG and bilateral 
monopoly (Figure 1). A concept of ‘IOR stability’ is developed. The issue of stability in IOR under 
conditions of MG is considered and gaps in current theory and evidence are identified. A theoretical 
framework which drew together RDT with concepts of historical dependence and also took account 
of the environment of the IOR, which was used for developing explanations of the in/stability over 
time of the IOR is presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2). 
 
The methodology used in the research is set out in Chapter 3. This included the strategy of the 
inquiry, the overall research questions and the research procedure. A key step in the procedure was 
the development of the research findings through operationalisation of the concept of ‘IOR stability’.  
 
The use of these operational concepts was indispensible to the subsequent development of the 
interpretations and explanations of the findings of the research. Details of these constructs together 
with details of the underlying assumptions are summarised in Tables 1 and 2, and in Exhibits 1 - 5. 
 
Further steps in the research procedure concerned the interpretations and explanations of the 
research findings: a conceptual framework, based on the theoretical framework presented in 
Chapter 2, was developed for this purpose and this is presented in Chapter 3 and summarised in 
Figure 3. The development of interpretations and explanations was also helped by the use of ‘thick 
description’ of IOR events and processes including an analysis of these framed as ‘power games’. 
Chapter 3 is concluded with a consideration of the main threats to the validity of the research which 
were identified and the strategies used to mitigate those threats.  
 
The findings of the inquiry in relation to research questions 1 and 2 are presented in the following 
two Chapters, 4 and 5 respectively. In Chapter 4 the origins of the MG and also of the specific IOR 
chosen to research the dynamics and outcomes of the MG are described; these are summarised in 
Tables 5(i) - 5(v) and 6. The actual initial conditions of the MG are also described and these are 






Chapter is concluded with a consideration of the context of the IOR over the reference period and 
specifically to what extent those conditions continued to amount to conditions of MG. 
 
In Chapter 5, the key outcomes and performance of the IOR over the 18 year reference period of the 
research (1995-2013) are described. The consequences of those outcomes and performance for the 
stability over time of the IOR are assessed; these are summarised in Tables 3, 9 and 10.  
 
Answers to research question 3 and also to the overall question of the inquiry, research question 4, 
are developed and presented in Chapter 6. The analysis, interpretations and explanations of the 
stability over time of the IOR developed in Chapter 6 draw on relevant events both exogenous as 
well as endogenous to the IOR; these events are summarised in Tables 4(i), 4(ii), and 11-13; 
connections are made between these events as well as with the conditions of the MG under which 
the IOR originated and was conducted, to develop interpretations and explanations about how and 
why the impacts on the stability of the IOR over time came about. Power dependence responses of 
the GM and MU, and historical dependencies relevant to IOR stability impacts over the reference 
period are summarised in Tables 14(i) – 14(iii) and Table 15. For the last 5 years of the reference 
period (2008 – 2013), interpretations and explanations of the in/stability impacts on the IOR are 
framed as a series of 4 power games. The details of these games, including their structure, players 
and their objectives, stakes, moves and outcomes are summarised in Tables 16 – 20. 
 
In the final two sections of Chapter 6, holistic explanations are developed in response to the overall 
research question. The relationships between historical dependencies and resource dependence in 
the IOR are explained. Building on the explanations developed in the inquiry about in/stability in the 
dimensions of the IOR, an overall explanation of IOR in/stability over the reference period is 
developed. The focus in the final section of Chapter 6 is on instability and threatened instability in 
the IOR over the reference period as a whole. The explanations developed in the inquiry for all ‘U’ 
and ‘TRI’ impacts in the IOR are summarised in Table 21 and analysed in Table 22. Building on those 
explanations, an overall explanation of instability and threatened instability in the IOR over the 
reference period is developed.  
 
Summaries of the findings about the in/stability of the IOR over the reference period are presented 
in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 (i) the main conclusions drawn in response to the overall research 
question are summarised (ii) the thesis developed in the inquiry is stated (iii) a short story is told of 
the ‘journey in government monopsony’ of the IOR over the reference period.    
 
The second aim of the inquiry is addressed in Chapter 9. Findings of the inquiry about the impact of 
current government approaches on the in/stability of NHS-HE IORs in England are summarised in 
Table 23. Based on those findings and drawing on theory about markets within an overall context of 
neoliberalism, a critique of the use of MG as part of government’s approach to management of the 
public sector is presented. Focussing on the HE-NHS inter-sector institutional and IOR arrangements 
for non-medical education, and subject to further research confirming or/and further developing the 
conclusions drawn in this inquiry, recommendations are made which are aimed at the future 
stability of HE-NHS relationships. These recommendations are summarised in Table 25. 
 
Key issues and the main points of the literature relevant to the thesis are outlined in Chapter 10. A 
summary is given in Table 26 of how the inquiry contributes to that literature, particularly in regard 
to (i) the development of an agent-centred historical institutionalism using a power perspective, (ii) 
the extension of resource dependence theory to incorporate a time dimension and structural 
sources of power (iii) the development and operationalisation of a multi-dimensional concept of IOR 
in/stability over time which includes sub-dimensions of risk defined from the standpoints of the 






recommendations are made for further empirical research particularly into areas where government 
has created and used markets as an important part of its management of the public sector.  
 
Annex A to the dissertation is an account of developments in the writer’s professional practice due 
to his involvement in the DBA (HEM) programme at the University of Bath. 
 
Annex B to the dissertation is a report to the writer’s organization, the Council of Deans of Health. In 
this report the findings and conclusions of the research are summarised. Recommendations are 
made concerning HE - NHS inter-sector institutional arrangements for non-medical education - 
particularly in relation to IOR contracts and pricing - and also concerning the future funding of NHS 
non-medical workforce education. With regard to management by HEIs of the stability of their 
organizations (as distinct from the stability of their IORs), some recommendations are also made 
about an overall strategy for HEIs to manage, and perhaps also to limit, their resource dependence 






Chapter 2   Approach, Concepts, Perspectives and Issues  
 
2.0 Introduction: Selection of Approach - Assumptions and Issues 
 
Historical institutionalism (HI) was selected as the overall approach in the research inquiry. This 
selection was driven by definitions and assumptions made relating to the overall aim of the inquiry, 
and by characteristics of the HI approach which made it potentially a suitable approach. 
 
The overall aim of the inquiry was to develop explanations of the in/stability over time of a contract 
based IOR under conditions of a government monopsony’. Following Hennart (2008) et al, an IOR 
was defined as an institution consisting in a set of rules, formal and informal, which defined and 
shaped the functioning of an IOR and the behaviours of the organizations in the IOR.8 Given this 
definition and the overall aim of the inquiry, two assumptions were made: 
 
(i) It was assumed there would be two inter-connected levels of institutional analysis in the inquiry: a 
micro-institutional level relating to the IOR, and a macro-institutional level relating to the 
environment of the IOR. The environment of the IOR consisted mainly in the organizational 
environments of the organizations in the IOR and the NHS-HE inter-sector level institutional 
arrangements which took the form of a government monopsony (MG). 
 
(ii) A key characteristic of the phenomena to be studied in the inquiry involved a time dimension 
(IOR in/stability over time): the inquiry would span a 25 year history from the origins of the IOR and 
the institutional context, in particular the MG, in which it was embedded. It was assumed that an 
understanding of the history of the IOR and its institutional environment would be important to 
developing explanations of the in/stability of the IOR over that period. The issue at this point of the 
selection process concerned which institutional approach should be used - in a review of ‘new 
institutionalisms’ Peters (2012) had identified nine approaches to institutional analysis. From a 
review of the literature on new institutionalism it was concluded that HI had some characteristics 
which made it a potentially suitable approach. According to Pierson and Skocpol (2002), a distinctive 
characteristic of HI was in considering ‘critical junctures and long-term processes where others look 
only at slices of time or short-term maneuvers’; in doing this, ‘the overarching contexts and 
interacting processes’ that shaped institutions and institutional outcomes were made more visible 
and understandable.9 A further distinctive characteristic of an HI approach was in the treatment of 
time - the sequence of events as well as the contexts in which these events occurred, were equally 
important. HI approaches typically included concepts which had regard to the potential impact of 
the sequence of events on the shaping of behaviours and outcomes.  
 
Thus, it was on the basis of the assumptions outlined above that an HI approach was selected. 
However, arising from this, three issues were identified which needed to be addressed: (i) HI 
approaches have more usually been associated with explanations of institutional reproduction. In 
regard to institutional change HI approaches have focussed on exogenous change at points of 
‘critical junctures’ which have been stimulated by exogenous shocks.10 Endogenous change has 
however been relatively neglected in HI approaches.11 Given the focus in this research inquiry was 
on IOR in/stability over time the approach selected needed to be capable of generating valid 
explanations relating both to reproduction of IOR in/stability over time as well as to changes in IOR 
in/stability over time, including both exogenous and endogenously engendered change. The first 
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issue therefore was: could an HI approach be used to generate such explanations? (ii) HI approaches 
have more usually been associated with structural types of explanation of institutional change. In 
such explanations the behaviour of agents within their institutional settings has often been assumed 
to be determined by the enduring characteristics of the institution.12 In the context of this inquiry 
such an assumption would have downplayed the IOR level of analysis and would have been 
inconsistent with the ontological stance assumed in the inquiry - social constructionism ontology 
(SCO). In SCO, agents such as IOR agents are assumed to be strategic and to be capable of making 
choices over their actions.13 The second issue therefore was: could an HI approach be developed 
which was compatible conceptually with an agent-centred approach to institutional change and to 
change in IOR in/stability over time? As Peters (2012) put it: under an HI approach how is the link 
between institutions and agents (‘individuals’) to be conceptualised?14  (iii) The third issue concerned 
the relations between agents within a given institution, such as an IOR under conditions of MG. How 
were these relations to be conceptualised? What perspective on these relations was to be adopted? 
The chosen perspective also needed to be compatible with the concepts used in the inquiry of the 
links between institutions and agents. 
 
The next five sections of this Chapter are structured around a discussion of HI, concepts and types of 
historical dependence, and the issues outlined above. A concept of the stability over time of IOR 
under conditions of MG is developed and current evidence about the use of monopsony power and 
its consequences considered. In regard to the selection of the overall approach and of the 
explanatory perspective adopted in this inquiry, an argument is developed of how each of the 
identified issues can be addressed using a combination of historical dependence concepts and 
resource dependence theory, while also ensuring conceptual compatibility and theoretical 
coherence. The Chapter is concluded with a presentation of a theoretical framework which brings 
together the concepts and theories used to explain the focal empirical phenomena (in/stability over 
time of a contract- based IOR under conditions of MG) of the inquiry. 
 
2.1 Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
 
HI has been defined as an approach to studying ‘the ways in which institutions structure and shape 
behaviour and outcomes’ over time (Steinmo 2008, p.118). In an HI approach, institutions have been 
conceptualised as consisting of ‘formal and informal rules, procedures, routines, norms, and 
conventions’ (North 1990, Hall and Taylor 1996, Hay 2006, Steinmo 2008). Both the institution and 
its historical context were important: the institution was important because it was its constitutive 
and regulative rules that ‘shaped’ which agents participated in an institution and their ‘strategic 
behaviour’ (Steinmo 2008); the historical context was important for three reasons: (i) a given 
institution was at least partly the outcome of prior events and behaviours; (ii) behaviours took place 
and strategic choices were made within different contexts and on different issues. Dependent on the 
historical context of an institution, the explanations of agents’ choices and behaviour within an 
institutional field might also be different (iii) ‘agents can learn from experience’ but at the same their 
‘expectations were also moulded by the past’ (Steinmo 2008). Thus, in so far as agents’ perceptions 
of options and the strategic choices they made were influenced by their expectations then the 
historical context of the institution would also have been influential. 
 
The distinctiveness of an HI approach to institutional analysis partly lies in the argument that ‘the 
policy choices made when an institution is being formed ... will have a continuing ... influence on the 
policy far into the future’ (Peters 2012, p. 70). A common outcome of historical dependence was the 
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‘long-term reproduction of a given institutional pattern’.15 This argument about ‘historical 
dependence’16 has been developed by the (i) theorising about the origins and types of historical 
dependence (ii) development of concepts for the empirical analysis of historical dependence (iii) use 
of a variety of frameworks to explain institutional reproduction and change.  
 
2.1.1 Historical Dependence (i): Origins and Types 
 
According to Mahoney (2000) the origins of historical dependence coincided with the origins of 
institutions or institutional arrangements; these origins lay in the occurrence of prior events which 
themselves were contingent. The origins of institutions corresponded with periods of ‘critical 
junctures’ during which alternative institutional arrangements were considered and the ultimately 
favoured option was negotiated and selected. These junctures were ‘critical’ because ‘once a 
particular (institutional) option was selected it became progressively more difficult to return to the 
initial point where alternatives were still available’.17 The latter was due mainly to the historical 
dependence which arose once a new institutional arrangement had become established. 
 
In contrast to the ‘critical juncture’ period of its origin, historical dependence was usually associated 
with periods of institutional stability and reproduction, and was characterised by dependence 
processes which consisted in ‘institutional patterns or event chains’.18 From a review of the 
literature, Page (2006) identified four overall types of historical dependence processes: 
 
 Increasing returns. This was where the more a particular choice was made or action taken 
the greater its benefits or its perceived appropriateness.  
 
 Positive feedbacks. This was where consequent on a particular choice, positive externalities 
were created. Positive feedbacks were slightly different from increasing returns: ‘those 
making the choice received ‘little bonuses’ when the choice was when or about to be made, 
whereas increasing returns arose smoothly as more people made the same choice’.19  
    
 Self-reinforcement. This was where the making of a choice ‘put in place a set of forces ... that 
encouraged that choice to be maintained’.20 An example of self-reinforcement was where 
complementary institutions were created that increased attachment to the earlier 
institutional choices: here, historical dependence could ensue from the creation of negative 
externalities by the complementary institutions.21   
 
 Lock-in. This was where a particular choice or action ‘... becomes better than any other 
because a sufficient number of people have already made that choice’. 
 
In addition to the above processes, Mahoney (2000) also identified ‘reactive sequences’: these were 
characterised by ‘backlash processes’ that reacted to earlier outcomes. Whereas self-reinforcing 
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processes functioned to reinforce earlier outcomes, reactive processes functioned to transform and 
potentially reverse those earlier outcomes.   
 
2.1.2 Historical Dependence: (ii) Concepts 
 
Page (2006) noted that the concept of ‘path dependence’ had been used in the study of a wide 
range of historical phenomena but that relative to the large differences in the micro-processes which 
characterised such phenomena, the concept of ‘path dependence’ was relatively underdeveloped 
and consequently was not as useful an analytic tool as it might be. To help remedy this situation 
Page reframed the concept of path dependence as one form of historical dependence, clarified some 
‘common misunderstandings’ about the concept of path dependence, identified several different 
potential types of historical dependence processes and constructed definitions for each of those 
types. 
 
2.1.2.1 Forms of Historical Dependence 
 
Page (2006) distinguished between three different forms of ‘historical dependence’: ‘path 
dependence’, ‘phat dependence’ and ‘state dependence’.22 The concept of ‘path dependence’ was 
defined to mean ‘current and future states, actions, or decisions depend on the path of previous 
states, actions, or decisions’ (Page 2006, p. 88); ‘states’, ‘actions’, and ‘decisions’ under this 
definition have also been referred to as ‘outcomes’ or as ‘policy choices’.23 The concept of ‘path’ 
denoted the order in which the outcomes on a particular path had occurred; a given outcome was 
held to be path dependent where the previous outcomes on the path as well as the order in which 
those previous outcomes came about, were crucial. 
 
Where previous outcomes were crucial to a given outcome, but the order in which they occurred 
was not, the given outcome was defined as ‘phat dependent’. 
 
‘State dependence’ was where a path could be partitioned into a finite number of states which 
contained all of the relevant information. Transition rules governed the change in states over time. If 
the transition rule changed, and/or there were many potential states, and/or particular states 
precluded other states as the next outcome then the state dependence process would also evidence 
historical dependence.  
 
2.1.2.2 Increasing Returns and Path Dependence 
 
‘Increasing returns’ and ‘path dependence’ were often assumed to mean the same thing. However, 
Page argued, these terms referred to logically distinct concepts: path dependence might arise from 
any kind negative externality and not just from increasing returns; increasing returns was not in itself 
either sufficient or necessary for historical dependence; even where increasing returns did 
contribute to historical dependence this might be to phat dependence rather than to path 
dependence.24  
 
2.1.2.3 Sensitivity to Initial Conditions (SIC) and Early Path Dependence (EPD) 
 
These also were terms which were often conflated, but which again were different concepts. SIC was 
where future outcomes were determined by the initial conditions. Sensitivity to initial conditions 
would be evidenced where relatively small changes in the initial conditions would be reflected in 
                                                             
22 Page, S. (2006), p. 89 
23 Page< S. (2006), p. 89; Peters, B. (2012), p. 72. 






relatively large differences in the outcomes. In contrast, EPD was where early random outcomes 
shaped rather than determined future outcomes.25 
 
2.1.2.4 Historical Dependence Processes: Potentially a Variety of Types  
 
Using ball and urn models Page constructed 11 examples of different types of historical dependence 
processes. Three of these examples, which were identified as potentially useful in this research 
inquiry, are described below. These examples illustrate some of the different ways in which 
historical outcomes can shape future outcomes. In the first two examples it was the first or early 
historical outcomes which were important; in the third example it was the most recent history which 
mattered.    
 
 Example 1: ‘The Founder Process’.26 This was an ‘initial outcome-dependent’ process. In 
this process the first or initial outcome followed on a random choice made by the founder 
and all subsequent outcomes depended only on the first outcome. This process was an 
example of initial outcome dependence.27 
 
 Example 2: ‘Burden of History Process’. In this process, all outcomes along the path were 
relevant to the next outcome; however, early outcomes mattered more than later ones. 
This process was an example of early path dependence.28 
 
 Example 3: ‘A Forgetting Process’. In this process, later outcomes mattered more than 
earlier ones; this process was an example of recent path dependence.29 
 
In non-determinate systems, these examples need not be mutually exclusive: over time, both the 
form and type of historical dependence pertaining to a given object of dependence, such as the 
stability impacts of an IOR, may change. Endogenous or/and exogenous events could engender new 
forms and types of historical dependence to emerge and/or replace previous dependencies.   
 
2.1.3 Historical Dependence (iii): Explanations of Institutional Reproduction 
 
Mahoney (2000) identified four ‘dominant theoretical frameworks’ used in sociology to explain 
institutional reproduction which occurred through path dependent processes:30 
 
 Functional. Mahoney identified two versions, the ‘weak’ and the ‘strong’ functional 
explanation. In the ‘weak’ version, reproduction is explained in terms of the consequences 
of the institution. This version can be associated with any of the types of historical 
dependence processes outlined above. 
 In the ‘strong’ version, a teleological explanation of institutional reproduction is given: 
 reproduction is explained in terms of the positive function the institution performs in 
 relation to the integration/adaptation/survival ‘needs’ of a larger system, such as the 
 network of institutions in which the specific institution is embedded. The ‘functionalist logic’ 
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 of the strong version is usually associated with the identification of self-reinforcing types of 
 historical dependence processes.31 
 
 Legitimation. Institutional reproduction is explained in terms of the commonality of actors’ 
beliefs, values, conventions and scripts about what behaviours areas ‘appropriate’. This is 
expressed institution-wide, as a shared ‘logic of appropriateness’ which underpins actors’ 
actions and behaviours. Institutional reproduction under such logic occurs as the cumulative 
consequence of multiple individual actors’ actions and behaviours, either made deliberately 
(in a ‘discursive’ mode of consciousness) or made habitually (in a ‘taken for granted’ mode of 
consciousness).32 The ‘logic of appropriateness’ explanation is usually associated either with 
self-reinforcement or with increasing returns types of historical dependence processes: 
‘increasing legitimation processes are marked by a positive feedback cycle in which an initial 
precedent about what is appropriate forms a basis for making future decisions about what is 
appropriate’.33    
 
 Utilitarian. Institutional reproduction occurs through the cumulative actions and behaviours 
of individual actors. These actions or behaviours are the outcome of choices made by actors 
from a range of alternatives. Actors make assessments of the potential costs and benefits of 
alternatives and choose those actions/behaviours they believe will maximise their individual 
utility functions. In making their assessments actors will take account of their expectations 
of likely outcomes, and their attitudes to risk under conditions of uncertainty. In conditions 
of incomplete information actors may choose to ‘satisfice’, using ‘rules of thumb’ developed 
from prior experience.  In this approach institutional reproduction occurs as an outcome of 
the ‘calculus logic’ which has underpinned the individual transactions; in effect the actors 
‘choose’ to reproduce an institution, or at least the cumulative choices made by individual 
‘rational’ actors function to reproduce an institution.34 
   
 Power. In this explanation, as in the utilitarian explanation, it is assumed that rational actors 
weigh the costs and benefits of alternative actions and behaviours. However, it is also 
assumed that institutions function to distribute the costs and benefits unevenly between 
those actors, and consequently that ‘actors with different endowments of resources will 
typically have conflicting interests vis-a-vis institutional reproduction’.35 In a power 
explanation of institutional reproduction, the uneven distributions of costs and benefits is 
assumed to reflect the interests of those actors with relatively more power than other 
actors, and has been brought about by the exercise of that power.  
 
Both the utilitarian and power explanations of institutional reproduction can be associated with any 
of the types of historical dependence processes outlined above. 
 
2.2 Issues in HI (i): Explanations of Institutional Change 
   
In institutional analysis generally, ‘institutions’ have been treated ‘as relatively enduring features of 
political and social life’.36 When an assumption about institutional persistence and the argument 
about the impact of historical dependence processes are taken together, then the issue arises of 
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whether an HI approach can also be used to generate explanations of institutional change (Hay 
2006, Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Peters 2012). Can the theoretical perspectives used in HI to 
explain institutional reproduction, also be used to explain institutional change, particularly radical 
change? The answer to this question depends on the particular theoretical perspective used: 
 
 Functional. In both versions of functional explanation, institutions and the systems in which 
they are embedded are assumed to be self-regulating. In terms of an HI approach this means 
that the historic dependence processes are assumed to continue as self-reinforcing 
processes. Given this assumption, ‘institutional change usually requires an exogenous shock’ 
such that the institution no longer functions to meet the needs of the overall system.37 The 
consequence of this is to stimulate a ‘demand for change’ in/of the institution so that its 
positive functionality for the overall system is restored. However, within the functional 
theoretical framework the mechanism by which change is effected is not specified. 
 
 Legitimation. Change in this explanation is associated with changes in the values of actors 
and in what they believe to be ‘appropriate’. Given assumptions about the self-reinforcing 
nature of the historical dependence processes used to explain the stability of the institution, 
the sources of such changes are usually exogenous.38 The possibility for exogenously 
stimulated change arises from the availability of alternative cognitive frames available to the 
institutional actors outside of their institution, and which provide ‘a basis for actors to adopt 
new subjective evaluations and moral codes concerning appropriateness’.39 A further 
exogenous source of new cognitive frames is new actors to the institution who succeed in 
‘unsettling dominant practices or scripts and impose their preferred alternatives’.40 
  
 Utilitarian. Institutional change in this explanation may be associated with changes in the 
utility functions of actors and/or changes in the relative payoffs between available 
alternative behaviours; the impact of such changes might be to change or even reverse the 
force of historical dependence processes which have previously shaped actors’ behaviours. 
In marketplace institutions such changes may be stimulated either exogenously or 
endogenously, for example by increasing competitive pressures and by technological 
innovation. Learning by actors, which functions to improve their adaptive capacities and 
which enables them more effectively to mitigate risks and manage uncertainty, may also be 
a stimulus for change; for example, Weingast (2007) has argued that the HI concept of 
‘critical juncture’ can be used with a rational choice institutionalism framework to trace 
changes in actors’ ‘induced preferences’.41 In a utilitarian explanation, the mechanisms 
which might bring about radical change consist in the deliberate choices made by individual 
actors to bring about such change. To effect deliberate change at the overall institutional 
level however may require that the individual actors act collectively, e.g. in coalition.42 This is 
because changes in behaviour at the individual actor level do not necessarily translate into 
change at the overall institutional level. The sum of individual behaviours, even of changed 
behaviours, in the utilitarian explanation might function merely to maintain the equilibrium 
of the institution or to change that equilibrium only marginally. 
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 However, it is not clear in the utilitarian account of institutional change how collective 
 action would be stimulated, or what mechanisms might bring that about. Barriers or 
 constraints at both institutional and organizational levels to collective action often exist. 
 These collective action problems include differences between individual actors in their utility 
 functions, perceptions of and attitudes  toward risk, and both their ability as well as their 
 readiness to collaborate with other actors, especially where in the normal operating context 
 of the institution those other actors would be regarded as competitors.43 Typically, coalition 
 formation and operation will consist in bargaining processes in which the relevant actors will 
 seek to resolve the collective action problems. Hall (2010) has argued that issues of power 
 are ‘inescapably bound up with the resolution of such dilemmas’; the relative power of 
 actors is important here not only in relation to distributive issues but also in relation to the 
 pace and direction of (institutional) change.44 It would seem therefore where collective 
 action features in a utilitarian explanation of institutional change, ultimately such an 
 explanation partly also involves a ‘political’ or power explanation.        
 
 Power. The uneven distribution of costs and benefits between actors which is assumed in 
the power explanation of institutional reproduction ‘means that a dynamic of potential 
change is built into institutions’.45 It is assumed actors that have been disadvantaged in the 
initial distribution of resources will seek to improve their position just as those with greater 
relative power will seek at least to maintain theirs. This dynamic may eventually lead to 
institutional change which is either endogenously or exogenously stimulated. For example, 
subordinate groups of actors may eventually combine their forces and successfully challenge 
the status quo (endogenous change). Alternatively, the advantaged actors may become so 
successful in the contest over resources distribution that dominant norms of fairness in the 
society at large are perceived to be transgressed and provoke exogenous interventions in 
the institution over distribution outcomes (exogenous change).  
 
The above analysis suggests that within an overall HI approach, each of the four perspectives can be 
associated with accounts of institutional change. However there are differences between them in 
the scope of such accounts and the extent to which they can be used to ‘explain’ institutional 
change. In regard to the scope of explanations of change only the utilitarian and power perspectives 
can encompass both endogenous and exogenous sources of institutional change. Each of the four 
perspectives can be used in conjunction with concepts of ‘exogenous shocks/phenomena’ and 
‘critical junctures’ to explain institutional change; e.g. an exogenous shock can presage a critical 
juncture when for a while ideas about institutional alternatives are advocated and considered, new 
institutional arrangements established, and new historical dependence processes are subsequently 
initiated. However, beyond this there are differences between the perspectives, especially in regard 
to providing accounts of endogenously sourced institutional change and in providing accounts of the 
mechanisms of change, whether exogenous or endogenous. 
 
The functional explanation cannot be used to provide an account of endogenous change; the 
functional explanation focuses on phenomena exogenous to the institution as the stimulus of 
institutional change; however, the mechanism(s) by which such exogenous change is effected is not 
specified. The legitimation explanation mostly focuses on explanations of institutional change which 
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follow on from exogenous phenomena; under this explanation the mechanisms of change are 
usually specified (e.g. the importation of new cognitive frames via new institutional actors). 
Otherwise however, the legitimation explanation is not usually associated with explanations of 
endogenous change – assumptions in this perspective regarding the nature of institutions, in 
particular assumptions about processes of isomorphism driving the genesis and reproduction of 
‘logics of appropriateness’, have tended to focus explanations in this perspective to be about 
institutional stability rather than about institutional change.46           
 
Theoretically, it seems that the utilitarian perspective can be used to provide accounts of both 
endogenous and exogenous change. In regard to endogenous change however, we have seen in a 
utilitarian perspective the ‘collective action problem’ implies that for radical change to be effected at 
the overall institution level, a coordination between institutional actors which is unusual in both its 
level and scope, is required and which, in the nature of the substantive concerns and ends of that 
coordination, will involve power dynamics. In practice however, according to Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010), analysts adopting a utilitarian perspective have usually used a comparative statics approach 
rather than a dynamic approach such as HI. In a comparative statics approach, institutions are 
usually assumed to be self-enforcing with coordinating mechanisms that sustain particular 
equilibria.47 Consequently, although theoretically the utilitarian perspective can be used to provide 
accounts of institutional change, this has not been the usual practice. 
 
We have already seen above that a power explanation can be used within a HI approach with 
concepts of historical dependence, to provide accounts of both endogenous and exogenous 
institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) went further and argued that only a power 
perspective had the potential to provide a general model of institutional reproduction and change, 
‘particularly one which could comprehend both exogenous and endogenous sources of change’.48 
Within an HI approach, legitimation and utilitarian explanations accounts of exogenous sources of 
institutional change had been provided. However, those accounts ‘tended to fall back on a 
discontinuous model of change in which historical pathways were periodically punctuated by 
moments of agency and choice’.49 What these explanations did not usually provide were accounts of 
endogenously sourced institutional change. 
 
In a power explanation, however, the potential to provide a comprehensive account of institutional 
change was already built in to the concept of institutions, specifically that institutions were 
‘distributional instruments laden with power implications’.50 In regard to explanations of 
endogenously sourced institutional change, this potential was argued to be substantively founded: 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) contended that institutions generally had two features – ambiguity and 
discretion. These features were important because ‘matters of interpretation and implementation 
can have profound implications for resource allocations and substantive outcomes’; consequently, 
Mahoney and Thelen argued, in a power distribution context ambiguity in the rules was likely to 
remain as a ‘site of conflict’ between actors with different interests.51 These features were 
connected: ambiguity in the rules of an institution provided opportunities for actors to interpret and 
apply the rules in ways which were aligned with their interests; discretion in the application of the 
rules, in the neglect or removal of rules, and/or in the introduction of new rules, provided actors 
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with opportunities to consolidate or improve their position in the outcomes over distribution of 
resources. 
 
The impact on an institution from incremental changes in its rules and/or in their interpretation and 
application could vary. An important strength of a ‘power distributional approach’ was the potential 
to generate explanations of different types of endogenously sourced institutional change which also 
ranged in their impact over time from ‘incremental’ to ‘transformative’. For example, following 
Streeck and Thelen (2005), Mahoney and Thelen (2010) proposed a typology of endogenously 
sourced institutional change, which included transformational change (‘conversion’), breakdown and 
replacement with a new institution or institutional arrangements (‘displacement’), ‘drift’, and 
‘layering’. They also proposed a framework in which different types of institutional change could be 
explained by the characteristics of the institution (such as ‘discretion’), the characteristics of the 
political environment (such as the relative power of different groups of actors over the form of the 
institution), and the perceived interests and preferences of ‘dominant change agents’.     
 
2.3 Issues in HI (ii): Concepts Compatibility – Institutions, Agency and Historical Dependence 
 
HI approaches are commonly based on social constructionism ontology (SCO).52 In SCO as in neo-
positivism, social reality is real and knowable to some extent. However, in SCO social reality is also 
held to be a socially constructed reality and, as such, a contingent reality – a reality which is open to 
change and which may be socially reconstructed. SCO also assumes the social world is contingent; 
propositions can be developed to describe and explain that reality but these will be tentative rather 
than have the certainty of ‘laws’. 
  
Given SCO as the basis of an HI approach, the extent to which institutions, perhaps through ‘logics’ 
inherent in their structures and processes, ‘determined’ the development of those institutions and 
the behaviours of participating agents was an issue inherent in the approach. For example, some HI 
theorists have given more weight to institutions than to agency in their explanations of institutional 
change. Institutional development has been postulated to be governed by an inner logic which was 
inherent in the structure of the institution itself: a ‘dominant path’ of institutional development and 
change would emerge, often reinforced by ‘lock in effects’ on agents which were associated with 
positive outcomes for those agents from the institution’s processes.  
 
In his review of new institutionalism research, Powell (2007) noted the assumption that institutions 
functioned primarily to constrain behaviour, that they were ‘sticky’, which was a ‘commonplace’ in 
early variants of new institutionalism had been overtaken by subsequent research. Institutional 
processes had come to be seen as subject to diverse influences with the resulting ambiguity from 
such diversity providing a potential as much for differentiation as for homogenisation in a given 
organizational field; institutionalisation had come to be regarded as a political process with agency 
at the core of that process and the relative power of actors as decisive. 
 
Hay (2006) has argued that some HI approaches were also deficient in their neglect of the impact of 
ideas on institutional change.53 To remedy this, as well as a general imbalance between structure 
and agency which he asserted was prevalent in HI ‘practice’, Hay advocated a ‘constructivist 
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institutionalism’ (CI) approach in which agents’ goals and interests ‘were not a contextually given 
fact’ or simply ‘a reflection of their material and social circumstances’ but were social constructions 
which were ‘ideational’ in nature and often the result of deliberate choices.54 
 
However, Bell (2011) argued that the CI approach advocated by Hay et al potentially overstated the 
extent to which agents were strategic and understated the extent to which institutions, ‘as logically 
prior to individual agents’, might shape the choices which those agents have while also enabling and 
constraining their actions.55 Bell argued instead for a HI approach in which there was an interaction 
between ‘active and interpretative agents’ with their ‘institutional and wider structural contexts’ and 
where ‘path contingency’ rather than ‘path dependency’ might be the reality.56 In this approach (i) 
agency was shaped, but not wholly determined, by institutional environments (ii) there was no 
primacy given ‘to agents, institutions, structures or ideas ... but each (were) mutually constitutive in a 
dialectic manner’57 (iii) agents had at least some choices available to them in their institutional 
environments, whether arising from ambiguity in the rules of the institution and/or from the need 
for the interpretation of those rules in their application (iv) even where change in an institution was 
exogenously stimulated it still required agency within that institution to enact change – 
‘theoretically, no exogenous factor can in and of itself explain the specific forms that institutional 
change takes’.58 
 
It would appear from the above that the overall HI approach proposed by Bell (2011) could be 
compatible with a ‘power distributional concept’ of institutions and also compatible with the use of 
a power perspective to explain institutional change. The issue arises, however, about the extent to 
which the concept of agency used in such an approach could be compatible with the use of concepts 
of historical dependence which were outlined earlier. This issue will also be considered below in 
relation to of assumptions about ‘determinacy’ and ‘contingency’.     
 
According to Bell (2011), HI was constituted of two different approaches: a structuralist approach 
and an agent-centred approach. These approaches differed mainly in the assumptions made about 
the extent to which historical dependence processes determined subsequent institutional outcomes. 
In the structuralist approach, historical dependence processes (conceptualised mainly in terms of 
‘path dependence’) were assumed to be ‘largely determinate’ of institutional outcomes.59 For 
example, Mahoney (2000) conceptualised path dependent processes, comprising ‘institutional 
patterns or event chains’ as having ‘deterministic properties’; outcomes in a path dependent process 
resulted from prior outcomes which themselves had enfolded ‘stochastically’.60 Bell noted that this 
HI approach had been ‘rightly’ criticised for being ‘overly structuralist’; in neglecting agency the 
approach was reliant on exogenous shocks to explain institutional change and was unable to provide 
accounts of endogenously sourced institutional change.61 
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In the agent-centred HI approach, historical dependence processes were conceptualised as 
‘influencing’ or ‘affecting’ institutional outcomes. For example, according to Pierson (2000) ‘path 
dependent analyses need not imply that a particular alternative is permanently locked in following 
the move onto a self-reinforcing path’. ‘The claims in path dependent arguments are that previously 
viable options may be foreclosed in the aftermath of a sustained period of positive feedback, and 
cumulative commitments on the existing path will often make change difficult and will condition the 
form in which new branching occur’.62 However, quoting North (1990), Pierson also emphasised the 
contingency in institutional outcomes due to agent choice: ‘at every step along the way there are 
choices ... that provide ... real alternatives’.63  Sewell (1996) also argued for a contingency in the 
‘trajectories’ of paths: ‘Previous events in a sequence can influence outcomes and trajectories but not 
necessarily by inducing movement in the same direction’ - events could also function to change the 
‘logic by which consequences followed from occurrences or circumstances’.64 
 
From the above it would appear that within an agent-centred HI approach, the concept of agency 
can also be compatible with concepts of historical dependence. Could the latter also be compatible 
specifically with a power distributional approach? In advocating the latter approach Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010) suggested ‘breaking with the view’ that institutions were automatically self-
reinforcing and suggested that the assumption that institutions were subject to self-reinforcing 
processes of whatever kind should be dropped.65 While this would rule out the use of deterministic 
concepts of historical dependence, it should not preclude the use of concepts of historical 
dependence in a power distributional approach in which it was assumed the existence of such 
processes was ‘contingent’ and also assumed the extent to which such processes shaped the 
opportunities and choices available to agents, and consequently the impact of these processes as 
mediated through agency on institutional form, reproduction and change, was an empirical matter. 
 
It can also be argued that the compatibility of historical dependence concepts with an empirically 
grounded power distributional approach was further facilitated when a range of those concepts was 
used, such as the range of types of historical dependence processes outlined earlier in this chapter. 
The latter also opens up the possibility within an object of historical dependence such as the stability 
impacts of an IOR, that different forms and types of historical dependence may not only occur over 
time but may also coexist on different dimensions of the IOR.    
 
2.4 Issues in HI (iii): Concept of Agent and Relations of Power between Agents 
 
2.4.1 Concept of Agent 
 
In this research inquiry the IOR agents were the NHS education buyer/commissioner and Middlesex 
University. Given that analysis in this research inquiry was mainly at the level of the IOR and its 
environment rather than at an intra-organizational level, the concepts of organization as agent and 
of organizational agency were useful ones for this research inquiry. To meet the potential objection 
that in SCO only individuals or groups of individuals can be ‘agents’, Giddens (1984) suggested that 
the concept of ‘corporate’ or ‘organizational’ agency be used as a shorthand description of the 
outcomes of interactions between individual agents or groups of agents within the relevant 
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organization. The same also applies to the concept of organization as agent where it is assumed that 
an individual or group acts on behalf of the organization.66 
 
2.4.2 Relations of Power between Agents 
 
The power of agents relative to the power of other agents has been a recurring theme in HI. This has 
been the case in regard to explanations of institutional change and in the use of compatible 
concepts of institutions, agents and historical dependence. For example, the relative power of actors 
has been claimed to be ‘decisive’ in processes of institutionalisation (Powell 2007) and has been 
argued to be ‘important’ in regard to distribution issues (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Hall 2010) and 
also in regard to the pace and direction of institutional change (Hall 2010). In the agent-centred HI 
approach proposed by Bell (2011) the ‘duality of agents and institutions’ could also be 
conceptualised partly as involving a ‘duality of agents’: the relative power of other agents might 
function to constrain as well as to enable agency. In a power distributional concept of institutions 
the relative power of actors was also claimed to be key in the resolution of distributional issues; 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010), based their ‘theory of gradual institutional change’ on a concept of 
‘dominant change agents’ and in the exploitation by those agents of ambiguity in the rules of an 
institution and the use of their discretion in the interpretation and application of those rules. 
 
Since the relative powers of agents has been placed theoretically at the centre of an agent-centred 
HI approach,67 then it can be argued that the relations between agents should also feature as an 
important dimension in such an approach and figure prominently in explanations of institutional 
reproduction and change. Given this, how might relations between agents, particularly in terms of 
the relative powers of agents in IOR settings, be conceptualised in an agent-centred power 
distributional HI approach? This question is considered below in four parts: (1) power: concepts and 
perspectives (2) Foucault’s theory of power: nature, ubiquity and games, inequality and asymmetry 
– Foucault’s theory was selected on the basis of its potential explanatory and methodological 
relevance to the inquiry (3) sources of power and a theory of power in IOR – resource dependence 
theory was selected on the basis of its potential relevance to the explanation of the in/stability over 
time of the IOR that was the substantive focus of this research inquiry (4) IOR institutional 
environment – an institutional environment which had characteristics associated with monopsony 
was selected, also on the basis of its potential relevance to the research inquiry. 
 
2.4.2.1 Power: Concepts and Perspectives 
 
Power has been defined as ability, either to do something or to bring about something (Morriss, 
2002). The ability was exercisable at will, whether reflectively or routinely. In this research inquiry 
the focus was on political and economic power in an IOR setting, particularly on the relative power 
of IOR agents. Here the power of an IOR agent such as an organization arose partly from its relations 
to other organizations and partly from its institutional environment. Morriss (2002) defined the 
concept of political power more precisely by introducing the concept of ‘opportunity’. Only because 
an organization was situated in a particular environment, including its institutional environment and 
relations with other organizations, did it have the ‘opportunity’ to exercise its abilities. This meant 
that the social and political power of an organization was not solely a property of the organization; 
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rather it was the combination of the opportunities open to the organization (as a property of its 
environment) given the abilities of that organization.68 
 
Exercise of Power: Morriss (2002) distinguished ‘power’ from the ‘exercise of power’. While ‘power’ 
denoted some ability to do something, the ‘exercise of power’ referred to the actual deployment of 
those abilities by the agent (i.e. an action, or the bringing about of something). In their review of the 
IOR literature, Huxham and Beech (2008) identified three perspectives on the exercise of power, viz. 
‘power over’, ‘power to’ and ‘power for’; the differences between these perspectives consisted in 
how, and to what ends, power was exercised.69 
 
‘Power over’ was defined as an agent’s ability to determine or influence the context in which power 
may be developed and the situation in which it may be exercised. In ‘power over’ one agent 
dominated another agent: agent A dominated agent B so that outcomes were in the interests of A. 
Bachrach et al (1962) argued this domination could apply both to decision making on key issues 
which ‘were on the agenda’ and to potential issues i.e. whether or not some issues came on to the 
agenda at all.70 Lukes (1975, 2005) extended the concept of ‘power over’ to include the ability of an 
agent (Agent A) to ‘influence’, ‘shape’, or ‘determine’ the goals and preferences of another agent 
(Agent B) such that the latter came to perceive their interests in a particular way, a way which suited 
Agent A.71 
In a ‘power over’ perspective it was assumed that power was exercised so that the dominant agent 
would gain some benefit for itself rather than necessarily for the IOR as a whole; in this perspective 
the concern was with control.72  
 
‘Power to’ perspectives were ‘concerned with the power of an IOR to achieve its ends by helping it to 
function effectively’. 73 In this perspective the concern was with joint outcomes; to bring about these 
outcomes IOR agents may have acted in varying degrees of collaboration with each other. 
 
‘Power for’ perspectives were ‘concerned with using IOR to transfer power to another party’ 
(agent).74 An example of this would be where in a contract between the organizations in an IOR, 
there was an agreement to exchange resources from one organization to another in consideration 
for the other organization’s expertise or for the outcomes of the use of that expertise. 
 
Given the apparent differences between them, these three perspectives (‘power over’, ‘power to’ 
and ‘power for’) on the use of power in IOR have usually been taken as alternative perspectives. 
However, Huxham and Beech (2008) suggested that the three perspectives were not necessarily 
mutually exclusive: ‘an argument can be made that all three perspectives ... are at least partly rooted 
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in the power over position; it is how those with power make use of it that makes the difference’.75 
This point is developed further in the next section which deals with Foucault’s theory of power. 
 
2.4.2.2 Foucault’s Theory of Power  
 
Nature of Power: in Foucault’s theory of power ‘the term “power” designates relationships between 
partners’76 These power relationships are distinguished firstly from “capacities” which are defined as 
agents’ relations to ‘things’ - specifically their abilities to modify or use things - and secondly from 
‘relationships of communication’. While each of these relationships ‘always overlap one another, 
support one another reciprocally and use each other mutually as means to an end’, these 
relationships are different from each other: ‘power relationships have a specific nature ... certain 
persons exercise power over others’.77 Thus in so far as ‘power to’ and ‘power for’ perspectives 
outlined above consist in or are predicated upon relationships between agents then in Foucault’s 
theory of power both of these perspectives are part of a ‘power over’ perspective. However, within 
a Foucault type ‘power over’ perspective ‘ the exercise of power can be both repressive and 
productive’ from the standpoints of the relevant agents (Lukes 2005) or simultaneously ‘negative’ 
and ‘productive’ (Gaventa 2003). The exercise of power (as defined by Foucault) may result in a 
removal of options available to others but it may also result in the empowerment of others (Lemke 
2000).   
 
Ubiquity of Power and Power Games: in Foucault’s theory, power is ubiquitous: ‘power appears in 
every moment of social relations’ and ‘comes from everywhere’ (Gaventa 2003; Garland 1990). A 
manifestation of that ubiquity in human interaction is in ‘strategic games’ in which agents try to 
determine the conduct of other agents, whether directly or indirectly through structuring the 
possible field of action of others (Lemke 2000, Foucault 1988). While these games can take many 
forms, e.g. ‘ideological manipulation, rational argumentation or ... economic exploitation’ (Lemke 
2000), Foucault also argued that there were three types of power games or ‘struggles’ - against 
forms of domination or against forms of exploitation which separate individuals from what they 
produce or against forms of subjection (Foucault 1983). However, although power games were 
generally one of these three types, these types could be closely related in terms of their 
mechanisms. For example, ‘the mechanisms of subjection cannot be studied outside their relation to 
the mechanisms of exploitation and domination’ (Foucault 1983). The modes in which these power 
games are played can be ‘spontaneous’ or ‘systematised and regulated’ which follow a formalised 
“rationality” ‘which defines the teleos of action’ (Lemke 2000). An example of the latter mode is 
“Government” defined as ‘the regulation of conduct by the ... rational application of the appropriate 
technical means’ (Lemke 2000 citing Hindess 1996). 
 
Power Inequality and Asymmetry: a characteristic of power games is the potential for the initial 
relative powers of the participants (‘players’) to change during the course of a game. Thus where 
there were relative power inequalities at the outset of a game these inequalities can increase or 
decrease on particular issues and/or in particular ‘strategic situations’. A key potential outcome of 
power games is where relative inequalities of power develop to become asymmetrical relationships 
of power between the participants in the game. Such power asymmetries or ‘states of domination’ 
are where some of the game participants have, relative to other participants, little room for 
manoeuvre because their ‘margin of liberty is extremely limited’ (Lemke 2000 citing Foucault 1988). 
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However, the asymmetries of power in power games may be brought about not only as a result of 
the playing of the game’. Power asymmetry might also be present at the outset of a game and 
brought about mainly through the design of the game itself, its rules and regulations. In this regard 
government and the technologies of government can be deployed so that from the outset a game 
might be ‘rigged’ so that a state of domination becomes a highly probable outcome from the playing 
of the game. However, Foucault’s theory of power, particularly as developed in his later writings 
does not necessarily equate to a structural determinism; on the contrary, individuals are not limited 
to reacting against power, but may seek to alter power relationships in ways that expand their 
possibilities for action (Foucault 1988). Thus players might still seek to change the rules of a game 
or/and exploit differences between actual situations and those situations envisioned or specified in 
the regulations of a game, or use ambiguities in the existing rules to interpret those rules in ways 
which further their perceived interests and in so doing assert the appropriateness of particular 
actions, or use such discretion that they may have in exercising a ‘veto’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). 
 
 2.4.2.3 Sources of Power and a Theory of Power in IOR 
 
Sources of Power in IOR: In their review of research on power relationships in IOR settings generally, 
Huxham and Beech (2008) found that many sources of power, on which the power of agents relative 
to each other was based, had been identified. They categorized these sources into three types: 
 Resource needs imbalance: relative power of IOR agents was based on an imbalance in their 
respective needs for resources (e.g. skills, information, and money). 
 
 Mutual dependence: relative power of IOR agents was based on an imbalance between 
them in the ‘importance’ or ‘’centrality’ of the IOR. 
 
 Structural: relative power of IOR agents was based on the structural relationships between 
them. Structural relationships could take many different forms, such as in formally 
acknowledged authority relationships between the IOR agents, or in a formal contract 
between them in which the respective responsibilities and rights of the agents in the IOR 
were specified and which also functioned as the mechanism which governed the conduct of 
the IOR. The institutional environment of the IOR could also be an important structural 
factor in the relative power of agents, for example in regard to differences in the respective 
powers of IOR agents in different market environments, such as monopoly or monopsony.   
 
A Theory of Power in IOR: Huxham and Beech (2008) argued that these three sources of power in 
IOR settings should not be assumed to be exhaustive nor should they be assumed to be mutually 
exclusive alternatives. Rather, these sources of power should be considered ‘in combination’.78  In 
their reformulation of resource dependence theory (RDT) Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) considered 
two of these sources of power in combination; they argued ‘resource needs imbalance’ and ‘mutual 
dependence’ had been conflated as ‘interdependence’ in the original formulation of RDT by Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978, 2003). An unintended consequence of this was that although constructed as a 
theory of power-dependence relations in dyads, RDT had previously been focussed on the 
dependency of only one of the actors in a dyad; the reciprocal dependency of the other actor had 
not adequately been taken into account.79 To remedy this, Casciaro and Piskorski proposed a new 
formulation of RDT in which these two sources of power were distinguished and which in 
combination they argued could be used to explain the outcomes of dyadic relationships.80 In 
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combination these two sources of power could result in many different configurations of relative 




Figure 1 is based on Emerson’s theory of dyadic power, in which it is assumed that the power of MU 
over GM (or of GM over MU) is inversely proportional to the dependence of GM on MU (or of MU on 
GM). It is also assumed that the dependence of one actor on the other is a function of ‘resource 
criticality’ and the availability of alternative actors of ‘critical resources’. Thus MU (or GM) is 
dependent on GM (or MU) in proportion to the need of MU (or GM) for resources that GM (or MU) 
can provide and inversely proportional to the availability of alternative actors that are capable of 
providing the same resources to GM (or MU).81 In Figure 1: 
 
 The first dimension of dyadic power - ‘power imbalance’ - is defined as the difference in 
power of each actor over the other; the second dimension of dyadic power – ‘mutual 
dependence’ - is defined as the bilateral dependencies in the dyad.82 
 The level of dependence of MU on GM increases along the x axis; the level of dependence of 
GM on MU increases along the y axis. 
 Nine different potential configurations of power imbalance and mutual dependence 
between actors MU and GM are depicted. Dyads in the green shaded boxes are power 
balanced but with different levels of mutual dependence; the lowest level of mutual 
dependence is in configuration 1, the highest in configuration 9. 
 In dyads above the diagonal green shaded boxes (configurations 4, 7 and 8), power 
imbalance favours actor MU. Conversely, power imbalance favours actor GM in dyads below 
the diagonal (configurations 2, 3 and 6). 
                                                             
81 Emerson, R. (1962) 







Widening the application of RDT to IOR generally: Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) used their 
formulation of RDT to explain the incidence of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in U.S. public 
companies; they found support for their hypotheses that M&A (‘constraint absorption’) were less 
likely the greater the power imbalance between organizations, and more likely the greater the level 
of mutual dependence. However, Casciaro and Piskorski also noted that the potential application of 
RDT was wider than M&A and could include the range of arrangements by which organizations 
sought to control their external environment through IOR to achieve ‘partial constraint absorption’ 
e.g. via long term contracts, joint ventures, and strategic alliances.83    
 
Increasing the Scope of RDT - Time: Huxham and Beech (2008) suggested that RDT arguments could 
be ‘taken much further’ through introducing a time dimension. Over time, within a given IOR, 
different sources or ‘types’ of ‘power holdings’ might be held by different IOR agents.84 A potential 
consequence of such differences would be changes over time in power imbalances and changes to 
levels of mutual dependence in an IOR. Such changes could be associated with changes in the 
strategies available to IOR actors and in their effectiveness when deployed in contests over the 
distribution of resources in an IOR. Tracking such changes in an IOR could provide an opportunity for 
increasing the scope of RDT from explanations of why IORs were established to explanations of the 
outcomes of IORs, once established. The latter would require mapping changes over time in 
resource dependence and in the interrelationships between resource dependence and historical 
dependence. 
 
Increasing the Scope of RDT – Using Multiple Perspectives on the Exercise of Power: on the 
premise that ‘power over’, ‘power to’ and ‘power for’ are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
perspectives,85 it is suggested here that RDT arguments about IOR outcomes could also be taken 
further through using a combination of these three perspectives e.g. (i) how power is used in an IOR 
and to what ends might change over time (ii) how power is used at a given time might also be 
different between different dimensions and different contexts of an IOR.  
 
Contextualising RDT – The Institutional Environment: In the Casciaro and Piskorski formulation of 
RDT, two sources of power - ‘resource needs imbalance’ and ‘mutual dependence’ were considered 
in combination. The third source of power identified by Huxham and Beech – structural – was 
subsumed in RDT under ‘power imbalance’ (e.g. the potential availability of other providers of 
critical resources was assumed to be a key factor determining the balance of power in a dyad). 
Where RDT is contextualised to include a time dimension there is also an argument for distinguishing 
structural sources of power as a separate source of power. This would enable consideration of the 
interaction of members of a dyad with their institutional environment and the impact of that 
interaction on power imbalances/balances in the dyad and on the institutional environment. 
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2.4.2.4 IOR Institutional Environment – Monopsony and Monopsony Power  
 
Monopsony: The IOR investigated in this research inquiry was constituted as a formal contract of 
exchange and located in an institutional environment which could be described as a monopsony. 
Monopsony has been defined as the economic condition where there is one buyer (the 
‘monopsonist’) and many sellers ‘of a well-specified good or service’.86 Under this overall definition, 
the main underlying conditions of monopsony have been defined as: 
 
1. From the monopsonist’s standpoint, individual sellers are perfectly substitutable for each 
other. The substitutability of sellers for each other is facilitated partly by the ‘well specified’ 
nature of the good or service and partly by the behaviours of the sellers, which are assumed 
usually not to act in concert, whether by informal collusion and/or by formal coalition. Since 
suppliers do not act in concert, the exchange relations in a monopsony usually consist 
mainly in the set of individual dyadic relations between each seller and the monopsonist. 
Where sellers facing a single buyer join together in a coalition and act in concert, the 
resulting market arrangement is a bilateral monopoly. However, where the arrangements of 
the coalition are not enforceable between its members then the market might in effect still 
function as a monopsony. 
 
2. From the sellers’ standpoint, no alternative buyers are available to them nor will alternative 
buyers become available nor is it open to sellers economically to withdraw from selling their 
well specified product by exiting from the monopsony. As a consequence sellers’ individual 
supply curves, as well as the aggregate supply curve for the monopsony, are upward sloping 
and usually relatively inelastic. All this can be for a variety of reasons:  
- Alternative buyers for the ‘well specified product or service’ will not become available 
because the monopsony enjoys statutory or government protection, or because of high 
barriers to entry (such as relatively high start up costs) for new buyers. Or it might be 
because sellers are unable, within a given time horizon, economically to develop 
substitutes for their outputs to the monopsony for which prospective alternative buyers 
would be available. This might be because the specialised nature of the sellers’ 
resources means these can economically be used only in the production of the ‘well 
specified’ goods or services purchased by the monopsonist.  Under this condition, 
sellers, particularly organizations, can operate simultaneously in markets which are 
monopsonistic and others which are not. What matters here is whether the specialist 
nature of the resources of the seller precludes their economic redeployment to the 
other non-monopsonistic output markets in which the seller operates. Consequently, in 
testing for the existence of a monopsony, the length of the time horizon assumed or 
selected might be crucial. For example, over a relatively longer time horizon, sellers 
might have the opportunity economically to transform their specialised resources so 
that these become usable in the production of other kinds of goods or services for which 
alternative buyers would be available.  
- Sellers’ individual exit costs from the monopsony are relatively high both in the short run 
and in the long run. 
   
Given the above underlying conditions a key characteristic of monopsony is an imbalance in the 
relations of resource dependence between the monopsonist and its individual suppliers. Since no 
alternative buyers are available to an individual seller, but alternative sellers are available to the 
monopsonist, the resource dependence of each individual seller on the monopsonist is greater than 
the resource dependence that the monopsonist has on any individual seller. This imbalance in 
                                                             







resource dependence between the monopsonist and an individual seller is further reinforced by the 
relatively high exit costs to an individual seller from exiting the monopsony. 
 
In terms of Emerson’s theory of power dependence relations, the underlying conditions of 
monopsony indicate a substantial power imbalance in favour of the monopsonist, in the dyadic 
relationships between the monopsonist and its individual suppliers.87 Thus in figure 1 an IOR 
between GM (as the monopsonist) and MU (as an individual supplier) would map on to either of the 
configurations, 2 or 3; in a ‘pure monopsony’, i.e. where all of the underlying conditions of 
monopsony as specified above were met and where the power imbalance was greatest, the IOR 
would map on to the red shaded configuration 3; where the monopsony took the form of a 
‘dominant buyer’ or oligopsony then the IOR would map on to configuration 2. In practice there 
might be little difference in the consequences for a given IOR between configurations 2 and 3.88 
 
Monopsony Power: Definitions of monopsony power given in the literature have centred on 
consequences for prices, outputs, and the distribution of economic rents predicted from the exercise 
of monopsony power. For a ‘pure monopsony’ the economic power of the monopsonist has been 
defined as equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of supply.89 As Blair and Harrison (2010) noted, 
there are few examples of ‘pure monopsony’ in the real world.90 However, there are many examples 
of where, in pursuit of its perceived interests a ‘dominant buyer’ or a buyer cartel (‘collusive 
monopsony’) may exercise monopsony power.91 For these forms of monopsony Blair and Harrison 
(2010) proposed a model of monopsony power which in addition to the elasticity of supply also 
includes variables for the market share of the dominant buyer and the elasticity of demand for the 
fringe buyers. 
 
Irrespective of the precise form of the monopsony (whether ‘pure’ or ‘dominant buyer’), OECD 
(2008) has defined monopsony power more generally as a kind of buyer power ‘to mean those 
instances where a price decrease is such that it falls below competitive levels’. Associated with the 
latter were ‘a corresponding decrease in the input supplied or in any other dimension of 
competition’; the other dimensions of competition included ‘quality adjusted decreases in output 
and changes in terms of trade that amount to a price decrease’.92 
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Under all of these definitions, the monopsonist can exercise power unilaterally to determine the 
total output of its suppliers (and consequently affect price) and/or price (and consequently affect 
total output). Depending on the elasticity of the supply curves the exercise of monopsony power 
could have profound effects on suppliers in the monopsony, either collectively or/and individually. 
For example:  
 
 Given upward sloping supply curves and also an aggregate supply curve that was upward 
sloping and relatively inelastic, a decrease in price would usually lead to a decrease in the 
output levels of suppliers. However a decrease in price might instead lead to an increase in 
output for example if suppliers faced with the fixed costs of their current production 
capacity tried to make up for a reduced income due to a reduction in unit prices by seeking 
to supply more output.93 
 
 Alternatively, the outcome of a price reduction under monopsony might be to leave output 
levels the same under either or both of the following conditions: 
- Where the monopsonist was able to discriminate on price so as to pay each seller only 
the minimum amount for that seller to continue to supply. Here, the monopsonist may 
be able to ‘target more efficient suppliers and extract from them their incremental 
profits’.94 
- Where the aggregate supply curve under the monopsony was perfectly inelastic.95 Here 
the monopsonist would be able to target ‘suppliers with lower short-run costs and 
extract from them their quasi-rents’.96 Blair and Harrison (2010) have argued that a 
monopsonist that was able to offer contracts to its suppliers on an all-or-none basis 
would be able to do this.97 
 
Thus a monopsonist could exercise its power to extract all of the economic rents in a monopsony 
while also extracting from individual suppliers all or some of their quasi-rents.  
 
2.5 Issues in Monopsony and Government Monopsony: IOR Stability over Time 
 
Given the potential consequences of the exercise of monopsony power noted above, the stability 
over time of IORs within the monopsony becomes an issue.  This is particularly the case from the 
standpoint of an individual supplier: (i) the existence of many suppliers and potential suppliers as 
well as their substitutability mean that the mutual dependence of the monopsonist on a particular 
IOR is relatively low. Under such conditions, the survival of individual IORs in the MG may be under 
constant threat (Inkpen and Beamish 1997); (ii) the relative distribution of benefits, costs and risks in 
an IOR between the monopsonist and an individual seller is likely ultimately to reflect the power 
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imbalance in favour of the monopsonist. This issue, of stability over time, is considered below in the 
context of a dyad, from the respective standpoints of the individual supplier and the monopsonist in 
an IOR. Whether the issue of IOR stability might be different when the IOR is located within a 
government monopsony is also considered. First however, to enable consideration of the issue a 
concept of IOR stability is defined more precisely. The particular type of IOR assumed in the 
following is one which was relevant to this research inquiry, i.e. one where the relations of exchange 
were governed by a formal contract between a government monopsonist buyer and the supplier.   
 
2.5.1 A Concept of IOR Stability over Time  
 
Concepts of IOR stability have been developed in previous research for contract forms of IOR – 
particularly mergers – and also developed for non-contract forms of IOR, including alliances, 
networks and joint ventures. Some of these concepts have been defined in terms of a single 
dimension (such as ‘survival’) which has been taken as an indicator of the overall stability of the IOR. 
However, an IOR might ‘survive’ and even have a ‘good current performance’ from the standpoints 
of the organizations in the IOR, while at the same time be exposed to relatively significant threats to 
its future performance and survival. Thus an IOR which was considered only from a standpoint of its 
current performance and survival might be concluded to be apparently stable but when in addition 
to its current performance the same IOR was considered from a risk management perspective and 
the future prospects for that IOR, a different conclusion might be reached e.g. that the IOR was 
unstable or had entered a range of instability. Consequently, it was assumed in this inquiry that a 
multi-dimensional concept of IOR stability which was future orientated and explicitly incorporated 
risk as a factor could potentially be a more useful concept. A multi-dimensional concept of IOR 
stability also had the potential advantage of allowing the possibility that an IOR could, over time, 
exhibit different stability states across a range of dimensions.  
 
After a review of literature on IOR98 the following definition of IOR stability over time is proposed: 
 
1. IOR stability over time is a condition in which an IOR maintains a sustainable performance from 
the standpoints of the organizations in the IOR. 
 
As part of the above definition the following underlying conditions are assumed: 
 
(A) IOR performance risks, and burdens associated with those risks, are allocated sustainably 
between the organizations in the IOR and managed by them. 
 
(B) Demand and supply in the IOR continually adapts to changes in the environment of the IOR, e.g. 
through changes in demand or by processes of cost reduction or by innovation in production 
technology. 
 
(C) Adverse shocks to the IOR whether these arise exogenously to, or endogenously in the IOR are 
absorbed in the IOR so that conditions conducive to a sustainable performance of the IOR from the 
standpoints of the organizations in the IOR are maintained. 
 
The above definition of IOR stability over time has the following characteristics: 
 
(i) Dynamic. The concept takes account of change over time. No assumptions are made in the 
concept about the environment of the IOR: the latter may be turbulent, and frequent systematic 
                                                             
98 Xia (2011), Huxham and Beech (2008), Daz and Teng (2001), Inkpen and Beamish (1997), Yan and Gray 






shocks to the IOR may occur. Thus, whether the IOR was stable or unstable over time would also be 
a function of the response and/or the capacity of the organizations in the IOR to respond, to actual 
or potential turbulence and shocks. 
 
(ii) Multi-dimensional. IOR stability over time is conceptualised as a continuum on several 
dimensions, rather than as a specific value for a single variable.  
 
(iii) Normative. What counts as a ‘sustainable performance of the IOR’ will depend largely on the 
criteria used by the organizations in the IOR. Thus, there may be criteria relating to the distribution 
of costs, benefits and risk burdens between the organizations in the IOR, as well as criteria relating 
to output quality, quality assurance processes and production costs.  
 
Definitions of IOR instability, as corollaries to the definition of IOR stability given above, are also 
proposed: 
 
2. An IOR is in a range of instability when its sustainable performance and/or the sustainable 
performance of the organizations in the IOR are impaired and there is a significant likelihood that 
impairment will continue. 
 
Examples under this definition would include the impacts of exogenous shocks to the IOR which, 
from the standpoints of the organizations in the IOR, were increasingly taking the IOR away from an 
appropriate management of risks or a sustainable distribution to the organizations in the IOR of the 
benefits from the IOR.  
 
3. An IOR is entering a range of instability when there is a significant threat to the impairment of 
its sustainable performance and/or to the sustainable performance of the organizations in the IOR 
over time. 
 
This definition allows for the possibility that an IOR might currently exhibit stability (such as in the 
current performance of the IOR) but nonetheless in one or more of the conditions for stability of the 
IOR there are significant risks to the future performance and consequently to the future stability of 
the IOR.  
 
2.5.2 IOR stability over time in monopsony - supplier’s standpoint 
 
Emerson (1962) argued that in general an unbalanced power-dependence relation was ‘unstable’ 
because ‘it encouraged the use of power (by the more powerful actor) which in turn set in motion 
processes (of) ... cost reduction and ... balancing operations’.99 Processes of ‘cost reduction’ in a 
dyad were those in which the weaker actor found means to comply with the demands of the 
stronger actor. These processes could take many forms, such as increases in productivity 
(productivity improvement) through the deployment of new technology, the taking on of additional 
contractual responsibilities, and the lowering of the costs paid by the weaker party for factor inputs. 
The power imbalance position in the dyad was left unaffected; the weaker party was still vulnerable 
to the exercise of power of the stronger party in respect of new demands. In a context of 
monopsony such further demands might eventually involve a supplier giving up some or all of its 
quasi-rents to the monopsonist. 
 
In a dyad which comprised organizations, i.e. an IOR, rather than individuals, the weaker actor in 
addition to cost reduction processes may have other means available to it to comply with the 
stronger actor’s demands. For example, where the weaker actor (the supplier) was engaged in other 
output markets apart from the monopsony, then in such a case the weaker actor might be able to 
                                                             






cross-subsidise its activities in the monopsony even beyond the point where it was forgoing all of its 
quasi rents in the latter. Thus from the standpoint of the weaker actor, an IOR it had under 
conditions of monopsony could ‘enter a range of instability’ and even be ‘unstable’ in some aspects, 
but it might still be possible for the weaker actor to mitigate the risks of negative impacts associated 
with that instability. More generally the weaker actor may also simply accept an increase in IOR 
performance risks such as might arise from changes in the rules of the IOR which the stronger party 
(the monopsonist) has brought about.  
 
In contrast to compliance processes such as cost reduction and cross-subsidy, ‘balancing operations’ 
were processes which aimed at changing the structure of power-dependence relations in the dyad. 
Emerson identified four generic types of balancing operation that could be conducted by the weaker 
actor in a dyad: (i) withdrawal from the dyad; in a monopsony context this would mean the weaker 
actor (a supplier) exiting from the monopsony (ii) giving other rewards particularly status, that would 
increase the ‘motivational investment’ of the stronger actor in the dyad (iii) extension of the power 
network, i.e. adding other parties to the power-dependence relationship; in a monopsony context 
this would mean that the exchange relations between the monopsonist and its suppliers would no 
longer just be a set of individual separate exchanges with each seller but would also be open to the 
influence of other parties. Specific examples of this would be where negotiations at a local dyad 
level were superseded by negotiations at a higher (e.g. national) level where actors outside of the 
dyad were involved, or where the supplier lobbied political actors associated with the monopsony 
but not directly a part of the dyad, to use their power over the monopsonist (iv) coalition formation; 
in a monopsony context this would mean the suppliers no longer acted independently of each other 
but acted in concert.100 
 
However, from the standpoint of the weaker actor in a dyad under conditions of monopsony, the 
latter might function mostly to inhibit the restructuring of the power-dependence relations. Firstly, 
with regard to ‘withdrawal’ and ‘giving other rewards’, monopsony as defined by its underlying 
conditions (outlined earlier) largely assumes the practical unavailability, on economic grounds, to a 
supplier of these types of balancing operations Secondly, with regard to the third and fourth types of 
balancing operations, ‘extension of the power network’ and ‘coalition formation’: these operations 
imply a kind of coordination between suppliers which is unusual where such suppliers might be in 
competition with each other not only in the monopsony but in other output markets as well. 
Furthermore, to the extent that problems associated with the initiation and undertaking of collective 
action and the sustaining of that action (referred to earlier in relation to utilitarian explanations of 
institutional change) were relevant then these balancing operations might not take place or at least 
tend to be relatively limited in their scope and/or duration. 
 
2.5.3 IOR stability over time in – monopsonist’s standpoint 
 
The options open to the monopsonist as the stronger actor in regard to cost reduction processes and 
to compliance processes more generally include changes in its demand for outputs (quantity, 
quality and compliance requirements), increasing surveillance of compliance (‘monitoring creep’), 
the transfer of specific IOR performance risks to the weaker actor, and/or the extraction of rents 
including quasi-rents, for example through offering ‘all or nothing contracts’ to the weaker actor.101 
The key issue for the monopsonist is whether to exercise its monopsony power and if so to what 
extent. Once that power is exercised and compliance of the weaker actor has been secured then the 
structure of power-dependence relations remains unaltered and the issue for the monopsonist, 
                                                             
100 Emerson, R. (1962), pp 35 – 40. 






whether or not to exercise its monopsony power in regard to new demands comes to the fore again. 
In effect, so long as compliance with its demands by the weaker actor continues to be secured, the 
issue for the monopsonist remains the same.  
 
The position of the monopsonist in regard to balancing operations is different.102 Here the objective 
of the monopsonist might be to maintain or even to increase the imbalance of power-dependence 
relations in the IOR; in such a scenario, ‘unbalancing processes’ might be initiated by the 
monopsonist either in response to the ‘balancing processes’ initiated by the supplier or as part of a 
continuing endeavour further to improve its relative power position in the dyad. The ‘unbalancing 
processes’ potentially available to the monopsonist include some of the same type of politicking 
processes which were noted above as potentially available to the supplier, in particular the 
extension of the power network for example in politicking and lobbying at a higher national level. 
They also potentially include the exploitation of ambiguity and the use of discretion or veto 
available to the dominant actor in the interpretation and application of existing rules of the IOR; 
the GM could also introduce new rules into the IOR or change the existing rules. As argued by 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) the latter processes might be more readily available to the ‘dominant 
actor’ (in this instance the monopsonist) rather than to the weaker actor in a dyad.  
 
2.5.4 Characteristics of government monopsony (MG) 
 
In most respects a government monopsony (MG) is similar to other monopsonies: the underlying 
conditions of monopsony apply just as much to a MG as to any other kind of monopsony. Thus a 
government monopsonist (GM) like other monopsonists has monopsony power and the implications 
for IOR stability over time in MG should be expected to be similar to other monopsonies. However 
MG is different from other monopsonies in one respect: the standing of a MG as a monopsony is 
protected by statute or government regulation. This protection provides a GM with a further degree 
of freedom in its actions: a GM does not have to be as concerned about its behaviour being deemed 
anti-competitive in terms of its impact either on its suppliers or on prospective competitive buyers 
(since market entry of the latter is barred). 
 
Potentially, some MGs can also be different from other monopsonies in the extent to which other 
characteristics listed below might apply to them: 103 
 
I. Some MG operate as ‘quasi–markets'. Quasi-markets ‘are similar to pure markets in that the 
provision of a service is undertaken by competitive providers’104 (e.g. by ‘non-profit 
organizations competing for public contracts sometimes in competition with for-profit 
providers’105). Quasi-markets have been defined as different from ‘conventional’ markets in 
two conditions: (i) ‘consumer purchasing power (is) centralised in a single purchasing agency 
or allocated to users in the form of vouchers rather than cash’106  (ii) ‘the purchasers of the 
service are financed from resources provided by the state instead of from their own 
                                                             
102 Emerson did not consider the standpoint of the stronger actor in the context of ‘balancing operations’. 
103 All of the characteristics listed here were relevant to the MG within which the IOR was embedded. It is not 
being argued here that all of these characteristics were unique to MG and not relevant to other monopsonies. 
Monopsonists generally operate in environments which are political, may have objectives which prioritise 
short-run returns, and have resource allocation processes which are multi-layered and relatively attenuated. 
Rather, what is being suggested here is that the extent to which these characteristics routinely apply may 
usually be greater for MG than for other monopsonies. 
104 Le Grand, J. (2011), p. 80 (emphasis omitted) 
105 Brown, R. with Carasso, H. (2013), p.24 






resources’.107 In comparison to MG as well as to monopsonies generally, it is only in respect 
of the second condition that quasi-markets are distinctive. In MG operating as ‘quasi-
markets’, the entire resources of the GM are allocated to it from the resources of the State, 
often via central government plan and bid processes. The latter means that the environment 
in which resource allocation to an MG operating as a quasi-market takes place is 
predominantly political. Decisions on the allocations of state resources between different 
areas, such as between NHS, Higher Education, Education, Social Welfare, and Defence 
might be the outcome of politicking between different government departments. At an 
overall level such decisions might be sensitive to the perceived political priorities of the time 
and as such open to a range of politicking, including lobbying activity. Political priorities 
might also change substantially over the course of a Parliament and be influenced by 
exogenous factors such as the stage of the electoral cycle. 
 
II. For MG where the GM’s resources and the resources it allocates are funded from the State 
on a revenue basis rather than on a capital basis, resource allocations might be made at 
several levels prior to the resource allocation made to a specific MG. For example, in respect 
of the funding for NHS commissioned workforce education there could be five or more prior 
levels of resource allocation for NHS requirements generally before the resource allocation 
for NHS education is made. For example, a resource allocation might be made first for the 
overall NHS planned expenditures for a particular time period. A second level of allocation 
might then be made to a geographic area (often based on a formula system which itself 
might be subject to contention). A third level of allocation between NHS service 
commissioning and NHS workforce education might then be made. Once the allocation to 
healthcare workforce education had been made further allocations as between medical and 
non-medical education, and between the existing and the prospective healthcare workforce 
could take place. 
 
An important implication of such a resource allocation system is that by the time resource 
allocations are made at the level of a particular MG, the actual resources allocated to a GM 
might or might not bear a close relation to the size of those the GM bid for in the first place. 
This is because the outcomes of the inherently political nature of the resource decision-
making process, and the attenuated hierarchy of resource allocation, might have little to do 
with the technical/rational needs expressed at the relevant MG level when the GM’s 
resource bids for NHS workforce education were being made. Even after ‘final’ resource 
allocations have been made these might not be ring-fenced: virements between different 
allocation areas might still be made within the relevant time period. This could occur 
especially at the lower levels of resource allocation. 
 
III. Revenue resources allocated to the GM for an NHS education MG are usually for one year 
only. There is no automatic carry forward to future years of allocated revenue resources 
which remain unspent (although in this inquiry it became the usual practice for unspent 
resources by the GM to be carried forward). The GM is required by statute to keep within 
the ‘revenue resource limit’ (RRL) set for the MG. In the event that the RRL is exceeded, the 
GM does not go bust; however sanctions might then be applied to its management and 
tighter external controls imposed on its operations for future years. 
 
  
                                                             






2.5.5 Implications for IOR stability over time in of MG 
 
Like other monopsonists, a GM may exercise its monopsony power in relation to price, output 
(quantity and specification/quality), contract types and terms, and its choice of suppliers to extract 
quasi-rents and bring about other transfers of wealth to itself from the exchange relations with its 
suppliers. In these respects therefore the potential impacts on IOR stability over time under 
conditions of MG should be expected to be the same as for IOR in monopsonies generally. 
 
However, to the extent that the protected standing of MG adds to the monopsony power of a GM, 
then there may also be a greater potential for the GM to prevail in contests (such as ‘balancing 
operations’ or ‘unbalancing operations’) aimed at altering the structure of power-dependence 
relations in an IOR or dyad. To the extent that the MG is also different from other monopsonies in 
regard to other characteristics then there may be further implications for IOR stability over time 
under conditions of MG; in the following examples a revenue resourced MG is assumed - the NHS 
education monopsony.  
 
(i) Impact of MG characteristics I and II: changes to the structure of power-dependence relations 
and/or to the stability over time of an IOR under conditions of MG might only be partly controllable 
or open to influence by the organizations in the IOR. The inherently political environment of 
resource allocation to the GM and the attenuated system of revenue resource allocation, might 
together function to limit severely the extent to which either the GM and/or the supplier in an IOR 
were able to manage their environments, at least in the short run.  Consequently, depending on the 
size and rapidity of any adverse exogenous shocks, conditions (A), (B), and (D) for the stability over 
time of IORs under conditions of MG might no longer hold. 
 
(ii) Impact of MG characteristics II and III: operations aimed at ensuring the overall stability of an MG 
might be time inconsistent with each other. In prioritising a one year time horizon, a GM might bring 
about short term stability of the MG but at the cost of longer term instability in its suppliers. For 
example the GM might establish contracts with its suppliers which enabled the GM within a 
relatively short period to flex its demand for output. With changes in priorities from one year to the 
next (perhaps with the extent of change exacerbated by turbulence in the GM’s political 
environment) a boom-bust cycle of output demand might ensue. As a consequence conditions (A), 
(B), and (D) for the stability of IORs under conditions of MG might no longer hold. 
 
Power imbalances in a dyad situated in a MG may also change over time, whether due to exogenous 
events or due to changes in the individual actors/organizations. Associated with those events or 
changes, the impact of historical dependence processes or/and the initial conditions of the MG in 
which the IOR was situated might also change.  As a consequence the stability impacts of an IOR 
could be affected, whether on particular dimensions or/and on particular components of the IOR 
or/and at the overall level of the IOR itself. 
 
2.6 Evidence and Gaps in Research into Monopsony and MG 
 
 Evidence: Research into monopsony generally has been focussed mainly either on establishing the 
existence of monopsony or/and on the consequences at a point in time of the use of monopsony 
power. Evidence about the use of monopsony power and its consequences mainly comprises the 
findings of research studies on labour market monopsony. In April 2010 the Journal of Labor 






(2010) reviewed the published research studies.108 They concluded that the research provided 
substantial evidence of the existence of monopsony and the ‘exploitative’109 use of monopsony 
power.  Estimates were made of the elasticity of supply of labour in a wide variety of jobs and 
employers,110 in a specific market111 and for a specific employer112. The estimates made were in the 
range of 1.5 to 4. Ashenfelter et al (2010) concluded that ‘these estimates were all quite small, 
suggesting significant levels of market power for employers’.113 
 
Two further research studies into labour market monopsony where the monopsonist was a 
government employer (or ‘GM’ for ‘government monopsonist’) both showed high levels of 
monopsony power so that if the GMs had exploited their monopsony power, the mark downs on 
wage rates would have been c. 65%, and more, of the employees ‘marginal value’.114 
 
While the evidence about monopsony power is scarce, it is consistent in confirming (i) under 
conditions of monopsony there was a significant imbalance of power, in favour of the buyer, 
between buyer and sellers (ii) where monopsony power was exercised there were significant 
consequences to the advantage of the monopsonist and to the disadvantage of the suppliers. 
 
However, at present there are no explanatory theories about, nor is there any evidence concerning, 
the stability over time either of monopsony generally, or of MG, or of IOR under conditions of MG. In 
regard to research into MG, beyond statements that MG enjoy government protection, in general 
there has been little consideration of the differences between MG and other monopsonies and what 
impacts such differences might have on the dynamics of exchange relations in MG and consequently 
on MG outcomes and stability over time. Although the distinctive nature of MG compared with other 
types of market monopsony has been noted in the literature, there have been no published 
substantive research studies about the stability over time of MG. The research that has been 
conducted has been a-theoretical, consisting mostly in practitioner surveys of the perceptions of 
those in the MG at a particular point of time.
115 No research whatever has been published which 
examined the outcomes of IOR under conditions of MG on a longitudinal basis. 
 
Consequently, current policy aimed at the stability over time of IOR under conditions of MG has 
tended to be empirical and reactive. 
 
                                                             
108 Ashenfelter, O., Farber, H., and Ransom, M. (2010) ‘Labor Market Monopsony’, in Journal of Labor 
Economics, Volume 28, pp 203-210  
109 ‘Exploitative’ and ‘exploitation’ are words commonly used in the monopsony literature to denote 
price/wage and/or output levels that were below those that would have been be expected under competitive 
conditions. 
110 Hirsch, B., Schank, T., and Schnabel, C. (2010), ‘Differences in labor supply to monopsonistic firms and the 
gender pay gap: An empirical analysis using linked employer-employee data from Germany’. Journal of Labor 
Economics, Volume 28, pp 291-330 
111 Ransom, M. and Sims, D. (2010), ‘Estimating the firm’s labor supply curve in a “new monopsony” 
framework: Schoolteachers in Missouri’. Journal of Labor Economics, Volume 28, pp 331-355 
112 Ransom, R. and Oaxaca, R. (2010), ‘New market power models and sex differences in pay’ Journal of Labor 
Economics, Volume 28, pp 267-289 
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114 Ashenfelter et al (2010) ibid p. 208; the two research studies were: Falch, T. (2010) ‘The elasticity of labor 
supply at the establishment level’ in Journal of Labor Economics, Volume 28, pp 237-266; Staiger, D., Spetz, J., 
and Phibbs, C. (2010), ‘Is there monopsony in the labor market?’ Journal of Labor Economics, Volume 28, pp 
211-236 
115 An example of such a survey was Snowden, A. (2008) ‘UK NHS-University Relations’, unpublished 






2.7 A Theoretical Framework 
 
It has been argued in this Chapter that within an overall HI approach a range of compatible concepts 
and theories can be used in conjunction with each other to develop valid understandings and 
explanations about IOR stability over time under conditions of MG. These concepts and theories 
were in three interacting clusters: (i) Concepts and types of historical dependence. Building on an 
historical account of the origins of the particular institutional context of the IOR being investigated, 
these concepts included the initial conditions of the IOR. (ii) Power perspectives on inter-agent 
dynamics in IOR. Resource dependence theory was the specific power perspective adopted in this 
inquiry. (iii) Institutional perspectives on IOR dynamics and outcomes. The focal institution in this 
inquiry was an IOR under conditions of MG. The MG itself was an institution (or ‘institutional 
arrangement’) and constituted a key part of the environment of the IOR. The environment of the IOR 
also consisted of the organizations in the IOR and the sector environments of those organizations. 
 
Although all of these concepts and perspectives have been argued to be compatible, the issue arises 
as to how exactly they can be used effectively and coherently together. A high level theoretical 
framework was developed to address this issue. The framework shown below (Figure 2) brought 
together the empirical phenomena to be explained in the inquiry (IOR outcomes and consequences 
for IOR in/stability) and the theories and concepts used to explain those phenomena (resource 









In figure 2 above: 
 
 MG and IOR Origins, Formation: and Initial Conditions this included the historical events and 
processes leading to the establishing of the MG and subsequently of the IOR. 
 IOR: this included the components of Agency as defined earlier, viz. the IOR, the Resource 
Dependence relations between the IOR Agents, IOR Agency and IOR Events. 
 External Environment and Events: this included all of the constituents of, and relevant 
events in the institutional environment as defined earlier, viz. the macro institutional 
environment, the NHS and HE inter-sector institutional arrangements (including the MG once 
that was formed), and organizations, including the organizations in the IOR. 
 IOR Outcomes and In/stability: this included the IOR key outcomes and consequences for 
in/stability of the IOR. 
 Historical Dependence: this included the various forms and types of historical dependence 
which over time shaped IOR agency and also agency in the macro-institutional environment 







The dynamics between the component parts of the framework are shown by line arrows, these 
indicating directions of ‘influence’, ‘shaping’, or ‘determination’: 
 
The MG originated out of, and was formed as a result of, a confluence of events and macro policy 
developments in the external environment (the NHS sector, the HE sector, and the macro 
institutional environment). Subsequently, the IOR (between the GM and MU) also originated from 
events in the external environment – mainly in the respective NHS education buyer and university 
organizations. The formation of the IOR was the outcome of negotiations between the GM and MU 
and in which the resource dependence relations between those organizations were an influential 
factor. The relations of resource dependence between organizations in an IOR can be substantially 
different before an IOR is established between them compared with after that event, for example 
where the commitments made by one organization as a consequence of entering into the IOR were 
relatively more substantial than the commitments made by the other organization. 
 
Once the MG and IOR were established, IOR Resource Dependence became one of the key factors in 
influencing, shaping, or determining IOR Agency, Events, Outcomes and In/stability; other key 
factors shown in figure 2 were (i) forms and processes of Historical Dependence which initially might 
arise from the IOR and also be rooted in its Initial Conditions particularly as shaped by the MG, and 
which functioned to influence and shape the choices available to IOR Agency at all levels of the IOR 
(dimensions, components, and overall) and (ii) the External Environment, particularly the MG, which 
functioned to shape and partly determine power imbalances in IOR Resource Dependence. Events in 
the external environment, particularly where these occasioned ‘critical junctures’ in NHS – HE inter-
sector policy formulation, could also be a key factor over time in changing the effect on IOR stability 
impacts of the Initial Conditions shaped by the MG and/or changes to the types, forms and stability 
impacts of Historical Dependence processes on the IOR dimensions, components and overall. 
Historical Dependence processes were also potentially relevant to the MG and to Events in the 
External Environment including Events in the MG; hence the line arrows between Historical 
Dependence and the External Environment and Events are shown as two-way. 
 
The ‘Power Over’ dotted line arrows indicate where either or both of the IOR agents had the ability 
to accommodate to the demands of each other and/or to influence or change the structure of power 
dependence relations between them. For example, the dotted line arrow from the IOR to the 
External Environment indicates where either of the organizations in the IOR might undertake 
‘balancing operations’ or even ‘unbalancing operations’.116 
 
While mainly a dependent factor, IOR Outcomes and in/stability over time might also impact 
recursively as an influencing factor: this is shown in figure 2 as line arrows of feedback to the IOR, to 
the External Environment and to Historical Dependence.            
                                                             










Methodology was defined to include: (i) the questions of the research inquiry (ii) strategy of the 
research inquiry:  design; method of inquiry; boundaries (reference time period and institutional 
environments) of the inquiry (iii) the procedures and frameworks used in developing answers to the 
overall questions, and included the development of descriptions, findings, analysis, interpretations 
and explanations (iv) validity: the mitigation of potentially important threats to the validity of the 
outputs of the research. 
 
3.1 Overall Questions of the Research Inquiry 
  
Five questions for the research inquiry were defined. The first three of these questions were 
designed to obtain information which would assist the development of answers to the fourth 
question which was also the overall question relating to the first aim of the research inquiry:117 The 
objective of the fifth research question was to develop a critique of policy in ‘new public 
management’ and to make recommendations relating to the second aim of the inquiry.   
 
1(i) What were the origins and initial conditions of the NHS-HE inter-sector institutional 
arrangements and of the IOR? (ii) What were the conditions of these arrangements over the 
reference period? 
 
2. What were the IOR key outcomes and consequences for IOR in/stability over time in each of the 
main components of the IOR, viz. contracts, outputs, price and performance? 
 
3. How did in/stability over time in the IOR come about? 
 
Specifically, how were IOR relevant events, both exogenous and endogenous to the IOR responded 
to by the organizations in the IOR and what were the impacts of the responses to these events on 
in/stability over time in the IOR? 
 
4. Why did in/stability over time in the IOR come about? 
 
5. How should conflict in principal-agent relationships, such as might occur in long term contract-
based IORs, be managed so that sustainable stable outcomes from the standpoints of all relevant 
stakeholders are brought about? 
 




A qualitative design was used for the research inquiry because: 
 
 The inquiry was exploratory: the development of explanatory theory about the outcomes of 
an area not previously researched – IOR under conditions of MG -  was one of the main aims 
of the research 
                                                             
117 Taken together as a set, these questions picked up on all of the conditions for IOR stability which were 







 New concepts were being used (e.g. ‘IOR stability over time’) 
 
 The nature of the reality being investigated was complex, and consequently it was expected 
that ‘thick’ descriptions of that reality would an essential prerequisite to the development of 
valid explanations of that reality. 
 
3.2.2 Focus and Method 
 
The empirical part of the inquiry was focussed on the history of the IOR between a GM - the NHS 
Education Commissioner - and one of its suppliers, Middlesex University (MU).  The reasons for this 
focus were: 
 
i. A focus on a single IOR enabled an in-depth inquiry to be made which would help in the 
development of valid explanations of the behaviour and outcomes of IOR under conditions 
of MG. 
ii. The writer was a senior manager in the supplier, with responsibility for its IOR with the GM 
for 9 years of the 18 years span of the inquiry. During this time the writer acquired a deep 
insight into the phenomena to be investigated. The writer’s position also provided a unique 
opportunity for access to a rich fund of data about the IOR and its environment. 
iii. There was a potential relevance to policy formulation aimed at the stability over time of 
IORs in NHS-HS inter-sector arrangements. The selected IOR had several characteristics 
which were the same as other IORs in the MG, particularly over the period 2008-2013. These 
characteristics included: (i) the extent of suppliers’ relative involvement in the MG (none had 
a market share of the MG which was greater than 20%) (ii) the contracts each supplier had 
with the GM - these were similar in most respects over the period 1996-2004 and from 2008 
were precisely the same (iii) the overall financial significance to each supplier of their 
contracts with the GM (in terms of the relative share of their overall recurrent income from 
teaching accounted for by their NHS contracts none had a relative share of less than 5%) (iv) 
education pre-registration curricula and their delivery were prescribed in great detail by the 
professional body regulator (the UKCC and its successor body the NMC) such that both the 
nature of the education outputs as well as the production technologies used by suppliers in 
the MG were similar (v) the academic labour resource markets below professorial level 
available to the suppliers were the same; grading structures used for academic posts were 
largely similar and the unit costs of such resources were mostly governed by national 
agreements to which the suppliers were party. Given these shared characteristics it was 
expected, even if the in/stability outcomes were different between different IORs in the MG, 
that the dynamics between the GM and MU would be similar to the dynamics between the 
GM and other suppliers in the MG,  
 
A diachronic case history118 was used as the overall method for the inquiry because: 
 
i. The inquiry was into the history of an IOR covering a relatively long time span (18 years). 
                                                             
118 Adapting the definition given by Yin (2009) of a case study, a case history is defined here as ‘an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a historical phenomenon in depth and within its context especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not always evident’. Yin, R. (2009) ‘Case Study Research’ 4th 
edition, p. 18, Sage publications, Thousand Oaks, California. In contrast, a case study is an investigation into a 






ii. In line with the HI approach adopted for the research it was expected that the sequence in 
which events and outcomes took place could be important; it was assumed in the 
interaction of institutions and agency that history mattered.         
 
3.2.3 Boundaries of the Case History 
 
Reference Period: The reference period of the case history was over 18 years, from around the end 
of 1994 when the IOR was initiated, to March 2013, at which time substantial changes to the health 
sector environment of the IOR were being implemented, including changes to the identity and scope 
of the GM IOR agent. (ii) In line with the adopted HI approach, the origins of the MG and of the IOR 
were traced and this meant taking into consideration events prior to the reference period and how 
these events might have shaped the initial conditions of the MG and their subsequent development.     
 
The IOR and its Institutional Environment: The organizational agents of the IOR investigated, the 
GM and MU, were respectively part of organizations in the health and higher education sectors. The 
‘product’ outputs of the IOR concerned education related to healthcare occupational groups. These 
sector, organization, and occupational environments were potentially relevant to the dynamics of 
the IOR. They were also relevant to the origins and development of the MG and of the IOR. 
Consequently, each of these environments (health sector, higher education sector, occupational) as 




The procedure used to answer the overall questions of the research inquiry was inductive and 
iterative. The procedure was in five parts split according to the nature of the overall questions to 
which answers were sought in the inquiry: 
 
 Part One related to the ‘what’ questions, specifically inquiry overall questions 1, and 2 and 
consisted in the development of descriptions, findings and analysis of IOR stability. 
 
 Parts Two and Three related to the ‘how’ questions, specifically inquiry overall question 3. 
Part Two consisted in using a conceptual framework of NHS-HE IOR for the development of 
interpretations of the outputs of Part One. The conceptual framework was directly based on 
the theoretical framework defined in Chapter 2 and consisted in an unpacking of that 
framework. 
 
 Part Four related to the ‘why’ questions, specifically inquiry overall question 4. Part Four 
consisted in using the theoretical framework of IOR defined in Chapter 2 for the 
development of explanations of the outputs of Parts One, Two and Three. 
 
 Part Five related to the inquiry overall question 5. Part Five consisted in the development of 
a critique of MG based on the findings about in/stability in the IOR over the reference period. 
Taking account of that critique and the issues identified recommendations for policy and 
management were developed. 
 
3.3.1 Part One: Development of Descriptions, Findings and Analysis 
 
 3.3.1.1 Descriptions 
 
Data Types and Coverage: the database constructed in the research inquiry consisted of secondary 






the GM and MU;119 IOR contracts, commissioning/purchasing, and contracts performance review 
documents; IOR student numbers data; communications between the GM and suppliers generally in 
the MG – the latter included GM consultation, planning and policy documents; internal MU email 
communications, strategic and financial reviews concerning the IOR. Archival data also included GM 
parent organization commissioned reports into pricing in the MG; GM and MU organization level 
data, including board reports and financial reports; and communications, reports, and minutes of 
meetings of higher education lobby groups dealing with health workforce education. 
 
Some of the historical archive data relating to the GM and MU were publicly available data, these 
data including annual reports and accounts, and strategic plans. Other publicly available historical 
archive data related mainly to sector level data for the health and higher education sectors. These 
data included sector level financial data, workforce and student number statistics, ad hoc sector 
level reports including reports to Parliamentary Select Committees and records of relevant debates 
in the Houses of Parliament. Secondary data also included data relating to the relevant professional 
and regulatory bodies for the health and higher education sectors. 
 
IOR Typology: In their review of the IOR literature Hibbert, Huxham and Smith Ring (2008) noted 
that typologies of IOE (IOR) were particularly common. However, they concluded ‘there is ... no 
consensus in the literature about the nature of the items included in these typologies, nor about the 
labels used to describe them’.120 One reason for this may be because IORs can be of many different 
types, ranging from equity joint ventures where the engagement between the organizations in the 
IOR may be high, to ‘unilateral contract-based’ IORs where the engagement between the 
organizations in the IOR is relatively light.121 Daz and Teng (2000) suggest as an example of the latter 
an IOR which is based on an ‘exchange of property rights’ between the organizations in the IOR, such 
as the exchange of ‘money for a patent’.122 Contract-based IORs can also take on many forms such as 
‘...long-term supply contracts, licensing contracts, franchising contracts, distribution contracts’.123  
 
For this inquiry, a typology of the IOR was constructed based on transaction cost theory (TCT) and 
the type of the IOR which was the subject of the inquiry. In TCT an IOR has been defined by Hennart 
(2008) as an institution which functions as the mechanism governing economic exchanges within the 
IOR: ‘The TCT literature has looked at IORs as governance mechanisms, i.e. as institutions charged 
with generating rents from interdependencies ... between organizations.’ Hennart defined an 
‘institution’: ‘By institution I mean the specific set of rules, formal and informal, that define the way 
these three tasks are achieved.’124 In TCT the principal components of ‘economic exchanges’ were 
output and price.125 Hennart went on to state that IORs could be of many different types including a 
variety of contract-based IORs. 
 
The IOR between MU and the GM was a ‘unilateral contract-based’ IOR in which successive contracts 
were mostly of a 3-5 year duration; the primary resources of MU and GM in the IOR were ‘property-
                                                             
119 Source: MU NHS Email Communications 2004/05 to 2012/13 – Archive 150 
120 Hibbert, Huxham, and Smith Ring (2008), p. 398. IORs of different types could also lead to differences in 
relationship typologies: for example, Hardy, Phillips and Lawrence (2003) in constructing their typology of IOR 
collaboration excluded IORs where ‘cooperation is ... purchased, as in a firm’s supplier relationships’.  
121 Daz and Teng (2000, p.47) note that the distinctive characteristic of ‘unilateral contract-based alliances’ is ‘a 
comparatively light engagement of the partners’. 
122 Daz and Teng (2000, p. 47) 
123 Hennart, J. (2008), pp 339-340 
124 Hennart, J. (2008), p. 339. The three tasks referred to included ‘informing parties of their capabilities and 
needs, reducing bargaining, and enforcing the bargains reached.’ The purpose of these tasks referred to was 
the generation of rents from the IOR. 






based’ and the economic exchange between them consisted in a ‘contract price’ or ‘price’ paid by 
the GM to MU in exchange for education outputs of a specified quantity and quality.126 Given this, 
the typology of the IOR in this inquiry was defined to comprise three components: contract, output 
and price. The contract was the mechanism governing the relations of economic exchange between 
the GM and MU. The contract specified the obligations of each of the organizations under the 
contract, including contract compliance and management (e.g. information provision and contract 
management and review). The two principal components of the economic exchange between the 
GM and MU were output (comprising mainly product type/quality and quantity) and price. 
 
Data Categorisation, Data Selection and Data Reduction: Data items127 were categorised in a 
framework based on the IOR typology, viz. ‘contracts’, ‘outputs’ and ‘price’ each of which formed a 
principal category of data. A further category, ‘context’, was created within which data relating to 
the environment of the IOR were placed. In the course of the categorisation process, sub-categories 
were created of each of these four overall categories. Sub-categories related to specific topics or 
projects e.g. ‘London Education Contract 2008’, ‘Output Based Commissioning’, ‘Benchmark Price 
Implementation 2007’, 2006/07 Commissions’, ‘QCMP (Quality and Contract Performance 
Management) 2012/13’. Data were selected on the basis of their potential relevance to the 14 
dimensions of the ‘IOR key outcomes and performance’ that were defined (see next sub-section – 
‘Findings’). A process of data reduction also took place. If a data item was considered to be of little 
potential relevance then it was categorised into a miscellaneous category; at a later stage of the 
research inquiry these data items were reviewed to see whether any of them should be ‘promoted’ 
to one of the categories based on the IOR typology. 
 
Construction of Historical Account: A descriptive history of the IOR and its institutional 
environments was developed. This was in two parts. The first part concerned the origins of the MG 
and of the IOR (research question 1). This was considered in terms of historic events leading to the 
establishing of the MG and the IOR covering: (i) NHS (ii) Regulation of a healthcare occupation 
(nursing) (iii) UK HE and (iv) Middlesex Polytechnic/University and the NHS education 
purchaser/commissioner. 
 
The second part consisted in a history of the IOR and its institutional environment. For each 
component of the IOR typology, a summary of events and key outcomes (e.g. changes in output 
quantities and price) was developed. These summaries were used as the framework for the 
development of a detailed historical account of the IOR. The historical account was subsequently 
validated through MU member checks and became a resource for the research inquiry in the 




Key outcomes, and the consequences these had during the reference period for the stability of the 
IOR within each of the four component parts of the typology, were identified (research questions 2 
and 3).  There were four steps in this part of the inquiry procedure: 
 
 Defining dimensions of the IOR key outcomes and performance 
  
 Operationalisation of the concept of IOR stability 
                                                             
126 Supporting evidence for this finding can be found in the actual contracts of the IOR over the reference 
period. In all of these contracts the claimed relationship between outputs and price was made explicit; so too 
were the respective responsibilities of the GM and MU for outputs and prices - Archives 32-39.  
127 A report or an email with an attachment often consisted of more than one data item. 






 Ascertaining the IOR actual key outcomes and performance 
 Assessments of the impacts on IOR stability over time 
 Analysis of the impacts on IOR stability over time 
 
Defining dimensions of the IOR key outcomes and performance: altogether 14 dimensions were 
defined. For the components of the IOR typology there were 4 dimensions for contracts, 4 
dimensions for outputs, and 4 dimensions for price. A further 2 dimensions were defined for IOR 
performance, the first of which was from the standpoint of the GM and the professional body 
regulator, the second from MU’s standpoint. Details of the dimensions, the sources of those 
dimensions and their relationships to IOR stability concepts are given below in Table 1. 
 
Caption to Table 1 
 
 IOR key outcomes and performance defined on 14 dimensions (see columns IOR Key Outcomes 
Dimensions and Definitions of Dimensions) 
 All definitions of dimensions were grounded in the empirical reality of the IOR (see column 
Sources of Dimensions) 
 Dimensions 1-4 related to IOR Contracts 
 Dimensions 5-8 related to IOR Outputs 
 Dimensions 9-12 related to IOR Price 
 Dimensions 13-14 related to IOR performance assessments made by the GM and MU 









The sources of the IOR dimensions set out in Table 1 above were ‘grounded in’ the empirical reality 
of the IOR. Three primary sources were the ‘heads of terms’ of the IOR contracts, in particular the 
IOR contracts for pre-registration education provision in 2000, 2008 and 2012; the actual heads of 


















Exhibit 2: Heads of Terms for IOR Contract 2008/09 – 2012/13 
 
 
Source: MU IOR Contract Documentation – Archive 37 
 TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT  
1. Definition and Interpretation 7 
2. Agreement Duration 10 
3. Agreement Review 11 
4. Entire Agreement 12 
5. The Services  12 
6. Recruitment and Selection 12 
7. Unlawful Discrimination 13 
8. Student Screening and Clearance 14 
9. Premises 14 
10. Practice Placements 14 
11. Quality Assurance and Contract Management 15 
12. Review 15 
13. Supply of Information 16 
14. Price 17 
15. Tuition Fees 17 
16. VAT 17 
17. Liability and Insurance 17 
18. Variation 19 
19. Assignment and Sub-Contracting 19 
20. Termination 19 
21. Consequences of Termination 21 
22. Dispute and Arbitration 23 
23. Confidential Information 24 
24. Data Protection 24 
25. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 24 
26. Human Rights Act 1998 24 
27. Intellectual Property 24 
28. Law and Jurisdiction 25 
39. Partnering 25 

















Source: MU IOR Contract Documentation – Archive 38 
 
On comparing Table 1 with Exhibits 1-3 above it can be seen that the IOR dimensions defined in 
Table 1 are related to heads of terms in Exhibits 1-3 as follows: 
 
IOR dimension 1: ‘Term’, ‘Duration’ 
IOR dimension 2: ‘Termination’, ‘Termination Provisions’ 
IOR dimension 3: ‘Information to be supplied’, ‘Quality Assurance, Contract Management’, ‘Review’ 
IOR dimension 4: ‘Practice Placements’ 
IOR dimension 5: ‘Services to be provided’, ‘The Services’. Some of these services were elucidated 
further in the 2008 and 2012 contracts: ‘Recruitment and Selection’, ‘Student Screening and 
clearance’ 
IOR dimension 6: This was included as a sub-clause clause in the 2000 contract under ‘Renewal 
Reviews and Student Members’ – see Exhibit 4 below. Given its potential significance this was 
defined as a separate dimension of the IOR. 
 
Exhibit 4: Floors and Ceilings to GM Annual Demand for Output Quantities 
 
 






IOR dimension 7: This dimension was related to IOR dimension 6 as the actual variation in output 
quantities from year to year. In regard to output quantities demand, all of the IOR contracts were 
established as ‘call-off’ contracts. This meant that new output quantities (‘commissions’) were 
notified by the GM on an annual basis. In regard to the contracts heads of terms, the call-off 
arrangements were included either as part of the ‘Renewal Reviews and Student Members’ or as 
part of ‘The Services’ to be provided. 
 
IOR dimension 8: ‘Renewal Reviews and Student Members’, ‘Services’. This dimension was a 
quantification of the long-term trends in the GM outputs demands under the contracts’ call-off 
arrangements. 
 
IOR dimension 9: ‘Price’. From 2009, this dimension became part of arrangements agreed nationally 
and understood to be included as part of the price concept in the IOR. These arrangements were 
made explicit in the 2009 BMP agreement (see also Chapters 5 and 6 below). 
 
IOR dimension 10: ‘Price’. The precise definition of ‘full economic cost’ (FEC) was made explicit in the 
finance specification part of an invitation to tender issued by the GM in 2011 and which 
subsequently became part of the 2012 IOR contract (see spreadsheet Exhibit 5 below). In Exhibit 5, 
FEC was shown as the ‘Total Costs for 2012/2013’ and comprised all of the categories and sub-
categories of cost shown in the spreadsheet. For the implementation of this definition of FEC and its 
constituent cost categories shown in exhibit 5, MU under the close direction of the writer, had 
developed an extensive and systematic management information system. Commencing in 2006 that 
information system included a staff workload/time based method of allocation of actual (rather than 
merely ‘standard’) direct costs to MU teaching and research activities down to individual staff 
member and programme activity levels by year. Calculations of academic staff direct costs were 
based on a detailed and formalised system of ‘work programmes’ and was part of an established 
management information and control system for academic resources.129 This system also included a 
validated methodology for the allocation of indirect costs at contract, programme and Departmental 
levels.  In 2011 as part of MU’s work in preparing its NHS tender for pre-registration provision for 
adult nursing the system was further developed, again under the writer’s close direction, to include 
the attribution of University level overheads. The latter development was partly based on the HE 
sector-wide TRAC (Transparent Approach to Costing) methodology which itself had been introduced 
and developed over the preceding 5 years; the TRAC methodology for allocation of overhead costs 
was specifically adapted so that any anomalous attributions to the NHS contracts activity of MU 
were avoided. For example, MU overhead costs relating to overseas activities were excluded from 
attribution to the NHS contracts; also excluded were attributions of bad debt costs since all tuition 
fees were duly paid by the GM to MU.   
 
  
                                                             
129 Workload allocation norms related to teaching, teaching support and administration were formalised by 
MU School management and were used as a formal system of planning, and control by MU School 

















IOR dimension 11: ‘Price’. OBC was explicitly included as a sub-clause in the 2012 IOR contract under 
‘Price’. 
 
IOR dimension 12: ‘Price’. This dimension was a quantification of the actual FEC of the IOR from 
MU’s standpoint. 
 
IOR dimension 13: This dimension represented the range of the GM’s requirements of MU set out in 
the IOR contracts and included ‘Services to be provided’, ‘The Services’, ‘Quality assurance’, 
‘Information Requirements’ and others. 
 
IOR dimension 14: This dimension represented the range of MU’s requirements of the GM set out in 
the IOR contracts. These requirements principally included ‘price’ and within that due payment. 
Until 2004/05 MU’s requirements of the GM under the IOR contracts also included placements 
supply (IOR dimension 4) and security of outputs quantities demand (IOR dimension 6).          
 
Given all of the above, it can be claimed that this part of the research procedure was informed by 
‘grounded theory’ (GT) approaches (e.g. Glaser, B. G. and Strauss, A. (1967), Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. 
(1998), Charmaz, K (2006)) and to have satisfied criteria used in GT approaches [e.g. as in Glaser B. 
G. (1978)] for assessing the rigour and quality of a research inquiry: (i) the fit and relevance of the 
components of the typology, and the dimensions of those components, to the data of the inquiry 
was good; no data were discovered for which a modification of the IOR typology and/or to the 
dimensions which were defined was necessary (ii) the historical account produced which had used 
the IOR typology as a framework and was used as a key resource for the inquiry, was concluded by 









Operationalisation of the concept of IOR stability: this part of the research procedure concerned 
measurement: a concept of IOR stability had been defined, and data obtained and information 
generated which were relevant to the actual stability impacts over time of the IOR; the problem now 
was how to operationalise the concept ‘IOR stability’ which would enable coherent and systematic 
empirically based assessments of ‘IOR stability’. This problem was tackled by taking the underlying 
conditions of the concept of IOR stability that had been defined (see Chapter 2) and considering 
those in relation to the dimensions of the IOR and the key outcomes and performance on those 
dimensions that had been identified.  
 
For each of the 14 dimensions of the IOR key outcomes and performance, a stability impact indicator 
(‘the indicator/s’) was defined. Each indicator took the form of a specific question which could be 
answered directly and unambiguously on the basis of relevant empirical evidence. Then, depending 
on the answer to the question, the IOR on that dimension was assessed to be either stable (‘S’), or 
unstable (‘U’), or threatening to enter a range of instability (‘TRI’). This three level assessment of 
stability mapped directly on to the three potential states of in/stability defined in the concept of IOR 
stability set out in Chapter 2.130 Definitions of the stability impact indicators (‘the indicators’), 
classification of indicators by type - whether ‘stability risk’ or ‘stability outcome’, the related 
potential impacts on stability, the underlying assumptions, sources of indicators and indicators 
measurements, the rationale for each of the indicator measurements, and the relations between 
indicators and dimensions are summarised in Table 2 below. 
 
Caption to Table 2 
 
 Concept of IOR stability over time operationalised on 14 dimensions. One indicator was used for 
each dimension (see column ‘Stability Impact Indicators’). 
 Each of the 14 indicators included a risk parameter; four dimensions included an actual 
performance outcome (see column ‘Stability Indicator Type’). 
 Three categories of stability assessments were used:: stable (S), unstable (U), and threatening to 
enter a range of instability (TRI) – (see columns headed ‘Stability Impact’) 
 Assumptions underlying the stability indicators were either grounded in, or inferred from, the 
reality of the IOR (see column ‘Underlying Assumptions, Sources of indicators ...) 
 Two stability states were possible on each of the dimensions numbered 1-12; three stability 
states were possible on IOR performance dimensions 13 and 14. 
 Each one of the dimensions 1-12 were related to performance dimensions 13 and 14.   
                                                             
130.See Chapter 2 for the definition and corollary definitions of IOR stability; thus, here ’stable’ corresponded 
with the definition of IOR stability - definition 1, ‘unstable’ corresponded with the first corollary definition of 
IOR stability - definition 2, and ‘threatening to enter a range of instability’ corresponded with the second 











The indicators in Table 2 above are now reviewed in regard to (i) criteria and rationale used in the 
development of the indicators and their associated measurements (ii) an argument for a multi-
dimensional concept of IOR stability incorporating risk dimensions (iii) the structure and nature of 
the dimensions, and the relations between dimensions and indicators. 
 
(i) Indicators and Associated Measurements Criteria and Rationale 
 
Each indicator had to satisfy GT criteria of fit and relevance to the empirical reality of the IOR. 
Specifically, this meant that each indicator had to be grounded in the reality of the IOR dimension to 
which it related and should be a useful tool for the interrogation of that reality, e.g. the IOR stability 
states which each indicator denoted should convey something potentially important about IOR 
stability on the relevant dimension. 
 
The criteria of fit were particularly important in regard to the measures of IOR stability which were 
used. As stated in Chapter 2 the concept of IOR stability defined in this paper is a normative concept. 
This potentially becomes an issue when, as in this inquiry, IOR stability was defined as a multi-
dimensional concept of the ‘sustainable performance’ of the IOR from the standpoint of each of the 
organizations in the IOR – what counted as a ‘sustainable performance’ and when was an 
‘unsustainable performance’ indicated? To avoid the imposition of a stability concept which was 
alien to the IOR investigated in this inquiry, the measures of IOR stability used in each dimension 
were set relative to the first baseline or standard which had been established by the organizations in 
the IOR in the history of the IOR itself. For example, on IOR dimension 4 (placement responsibilities) 
the respective responsibilities of the organizations in the IOR under the 1995-2004 contracts were 
defined. Excepting for dimension 9 the baselines were set relative to the IOR contracts for 1995/96–
2004/05; on dimension 9, innovation incentives were not introduced into the IOR until 2009/10. 
 
(ii) Multi-Dimensional Concept of IOR Stability incorporating Risk 
 
A key feature of the approach used in the inquiry was the use of a multi-dimensional concept of IOR 
stability which incorporated risk. It was assumed in this inquiry that an understanding of in/stability 
in IOR would benefit from an approach which took account of the potential for different stability 
states between the individual components of an IOR and their constituent dimensions, to co-exist 
and to vary over time. This is particularly the case with IOR performance risk: risk can be associated 
with any of the components of an IOR (price, output, contracts) and the level of risk in each of those 
components can vary over time. Yet an increase in risk to the future performance of an IOR would 
not necessarily become apparent if only the historic or current survival of an IOR was considered. 
Thus the stability of an IOR when only considered on a single dimension such as ‘survival’ (e.g. Xia 
2011) might exhibit ‘stability’ when at the same time from a future orientated, risk, perspective that 









(iii) Overview of Dimensions and Indicators and Relations between them 
 
The use of a multi-dimensional concept of IOR stability raises questions regarding the overall 
structure of the dimensions, the nature of the individual dimensions and their inter-relationships. In 
Table 2: 
 
Overall Structure of Dimensions 
 
 Dimensions 13 and 14 were dimensions of the IOR historic/current actual performance as 
well as the perceived likely future performance of the IOR from the standpoints of the 
organizations in the IOR – dimension 13 from the standpoint of the GM, dimension 14 from 
the standpoint of MU. 
 
 All of the dimensions in the contracts, outputs and price components of the IOR (dimensions 
1-12) and their associated stability indicators were sub-dimensions of the IOR performance 
dimensions (dimensions 13 and 14) and their associated indicators. 
 
Nature of the Dimensions and their Inter-relationships 
 
 Each of the indicators associated with dimensions 1-11 measured specific  risks - 
endogenous to the IOR - to the future performance of the IOR either from the standpoint of 
the supplier or/and from the standpoint of the buyer. In terms of IOR stability, the worst 
possible outcome on the indicator for each of those dimensions was ‘TRI’ - a ‘threatening to 
enter a range of instability’ - rather than an outcome where the performance of the IOR had 
already become impaired and was thus ‘unstable’. 
 
 IOR dimensions 8 and 12 were also sub-dimensions of the actual/ historic IOR performance 
dimension 14: the indicators on dimensions 8 and 12 measured outcomes which featured as 
criteria used by the supplier (MU) in dimension 14 to assess IOR current performance. 
However, IOR dimensions 8 and 12 were also dimensions of risk in relation to the future 
performance of the IOR from the supplier’s standpoint. For example, an unstable stability 
impact on dimension 12 meant that there were inadequate resources from the IOR flowing 
to the supplier to cover the full economic costs of the supplier in producing outputs of the 
requisite quality. 
 
 There were also relationships between dimensions (3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11) and dimension 
12. In each of these cases the relationship was also one of risk: the higher costs to the 
supplier implied by a ‘TRI’ outcome on dimensions 3, 6, and 7 or the reduced income to the 
supplier implied by a TRI outcome on any of the dimensions 8-11 meant there was a 







Ascertaining the IOR actual key stability impacts and performance: using the same sources used for 
the development of definitions of the IOR dimensions, the actual key stability impacts and 
performance of the IOR were identified. This information was examined for changes or consistencies 
in those outcomes and performance from year to year during the reference period. Types of 
changes/consistencies identified included: 
 
 For dimensions under Contracts: the balance of obligations and risks in the IOR between the 
GM and MU 
 For dimensions under Outputs: trends and the size of the changes in the GM demand for 
quantities; changes/consistencies to/in the basis on which the GM allocated its demand 
between suppliers 
 For dimensions under Price: changes/consistencies to/in the basis on which price was 
supposed to be set; changes in the level of actual price relative to the estimated full 
economic costs (FEC) to MU of its NHS education provision and/or relative to estimated FEC 
standards at national level. 
For IOR Performance: (i) changes/consistencies to/in assessments made by the GM of MU’s overall 
contract performance (ii) changes/consistencies to/in assessments of product quality and quality 
assurance performance - the conclusions drawn by the regulatory body, the NMC were used as 
proxy measures for the performance on these dimensions of the IOR (iii) changes in the financial and 
strategic performance of the IOR from the standpoint of MU. For financial performance, data were 
available for 1995/96 and from 2005/06 for the level of contribution to MU overheads from the IOR. 
Also available were data for 1995/96 and for 2012 for NHS contract income to MU relative to the full 
economic costs of its activities in the MG. These data were used as proxy measures of the financial 
performance of the IOR from the standpoint of MU. Other proxy measures of the IOR performance 
which were used included assessments made by MU in strategic reviews of the IOR in 2006, 2009, 
and 2012. 
 
Assessments of the impact on IOR stability over time: using the indicators set out above in Table 2, 
and given the IOR actual key outcomes and performance identified, assessments were then made of 
the impact on IOR stability over time on each of the dimensions of IOR key outcomes and 
performance. The impact assessments were summarised below in Table 3(i). 
 
Caption to Table 3(i) 
 
 In the table are shown the stability impact assessments (‘S’, ‘TRI’ or ‘U’) for each of the 14 IOR 
dimensions for each year of the reference period, 1995-2013. 
 Most stability impacts were ‘S’ for the period 1995-2004 – the first half of the overall reference 
period. 
 Most stability impacts were ‘TRI’/’U’ for the period 2005-2013 – the second half of the overall 
reference period (see also summary analysis in Tables 9 and 10). 
 For summaries of relevant events, HD process and power dependence responses which brought 
about these outcomes see Tables 4(i), 4(ii), 11-13, 14(i) – 14(iii) and 15. For detailed analysis of 











The objectives of analysis in this part of the procedure were firstly, to ascertain the incidence over 
time of in/stability on the IOR dimensions and its principal components and secondly, to identify any 
patterns to the incidence of in/stability over time. Two tables, Tables 9 and 10 were produced to aid 
this analysis and these are presented below in Chapter 5. 
 
 3.3.2 Procedure Part Two: Development of Interpretations (1) 
 
To aid the development of interpretations of how the IOR key outcomes and in/stability 
consequences came about (inquiry overall question 3) a conceptual framework (EEAPOC), was 
developed and is shown below as Figure 3.131  The EEAPOC framework brought together the main 
concepts used in the inquiry132 and was designed to map some of the key underlying process 
relationships being assumed in the research, particularly within the environment and agency 
components as well as between those components.133 The EEAPOC framework was based on the 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2) and consisted in an unpacking of the 
environment (yellow), IOR agents (blue), IOR and IOR events (green), and IOR outcomes and 
in/stability consequences (white) boxes in that framework. 
 
                                                             
131 EEAPOC is an acronym of the main constituents of the framework: Events, Environment, Agency, Power, 
Outcomes, and Consequences. 
132 The main concepts included those defined above as well as those defined in the previous chapter, the latter 
including: Monopsony; Government monopsony, MG - in this inquiry the MG was the NHS healthcare 
workforce education monopsony; Government monopsonist, GM - in this inquiry the GM was the NHS 
healthcare workforce education commissioner/purchaser; Monopsony power; IOR stability; IOR instability; 
IOR stability in monopsony and in MG; ‘Power over’; ‘Power to’; Exercise of power. 
133 The framework was developed as a synthesis of two frameworks: (i) a framework for institutional analysis 






Thus, in Figure 3 below, the EEAPOC framework comprises three parts: (i) the Institutional 
Environment of the IOR, represented by the yellow boxes which, following Hollingsworth (2002), 
separate three different levels of institutional analysis (in this case the macro institutional 
environment, the sector level institutional environment, and finally the specific institutional 
arrangements between the sectors – viz. the government monopsony)  (ii) IOR Agency, represented 
by the green and blue boxes which separate the components of IOR agency viz. IOR relations of 
Power and Mutual Dependence, IOR Agents, and IOR Events (iii) Key Outcomes and In/stability over 
Time of the IOR represented by the white boxes which separate the IOR key outcomes, the 
consequences for IOR in/stability over time and the feedback of IOR outcomes and in/stability 
consequences to the IOR and its institutional environment. Line arrows between the component 





In Figure 3: 
 
 Macro Institutional Environment and Events: this included institutions and events at the 
macro level of the political, economic, social and technological environment of the health 
and higher education sectors. ‘Institutions’ at the macro-societal level were defined as ‘the 
basic norms, rules, conventions, habits and values of a society’ (Hollingsworth 2002, North 
1990).134 
 
                                                             
134 Hollingsworth, J. (2002), p. 5. In this definition a distinction is made between ‘institutions’ and 
‘organizations’: ‘organizations’ are not defined as ‘institutions’ and are analysed as constituents of the 






 Health and Higher Education Institutional Sectors and Events: this included relevant 
organizations and events in the health and HE sectors e.g. the organizations in the MG, the 
relevant funding, professional and regulatory bodies (such as the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council, the Higher Education Funding Council of England, the Quality Assurance Agency), 
and lobbying groups such as the Council of Deans of Health and the London Deans of 
Health Group). Also included were the relevant healthcare occupations for which 
education was provided in the MG. 
 
 Health and Higher Education Inter-sector Institutional Arrangements: these were the 
governance and funding arrangements between the NHS and HE sectors. In this research 
inquiry these included principally the NHS healthcare workforce education monopsony 
(the MG) and also the relevant inter-sector co-ordinating groups (such as the Health 
Education National Strategic Exchange). They also included the funding models and 
regulatory frameworks and processes which were relevant to healthcare occupations and 
healthcare workforce education. 
 
 IOR Agency: this comprised (i) the IOR Agents (including their ideas, aims and objectives, 
their perceptions of the other IOR agents, their perceptions of the force of external norms 
and constraints, and their expectations of IOR outcomes); in this inquiry the IOR agents, as 
organization level agents (see Chapter 2) were the GM and MU (ii) the IOR (which included 
the formal (contractual) arrangements governing exchange between the IOR agents, and 
their power-dependence relations with each other) (iii) IOR Events (which included the 
exercise of power by IOR agents). 
 
 IOR Key Outcomes: these included the product/service outputs of the IOR, the prices paid 
for IOR product/service output, and the specific contract mechanisms and contracts in the 
IOR governing the relations of exchange between the GM and its suppliers 
 
 IOR Performance: this was the performance of the IOR from the perspectives of the IOR 
agents (e.g. in relation to their objectives and expectations) and included measures used 
by the IOR agents in their evaluations of the IOR and of its performance. 
 
 Consequences for IOR in/stability over time: this concerned the impact on the in/stability 
of the IOR, the IOR components, and the IOR dimensions arising from the IOR key 
outcomes and performance. 
 
Foucault (1983) argued that ‘it is perfectly legitimate to analyze power relationships by focussing on 
carefully defined institutions’ However Foucault (1983) also argued against approaches which 
analyzed those power relationships from the standpoint of the institutions, because (i) there was 
‘the risk of deciphering functions which are essentially reproductive, especially in power relations 
between institutions’ (emphasis omitted) and (ii) whatever explanations were developed might only 
be tautological - ‘one lays oneself open to seeking the explanation of the former (power relations) in 
the latter’ (the institutions) which, Foucault maintained, would be tautological – ‘explaining power 
to power’ (Foucault 1983) (iii) although ‘power relationships were embodied and crystallised in an 
institution ... the fundamental points of anchorage of those relationships were to be found outside 
of the institution. Instead of analyzing power relationships from the standpoint of the institution, 
Foucault (1983) suggested the opposite approach be taken viz. that institutions should be analysed 
from the standpoint of power relationships and that such analysis should include the historical 
formation of those relationships, the sources of their strength and their fragility. Following Foucault, 
in this inquiry the approach taken to answering research question 3 – the how question – was to 
analyse the IOR as an institution from the standpoint of the power relations in the IOR while taking 






history on the IOR and its power relationships. Foucault (1983) suggested that the analysis of power 
relations required ‘a certain number of points to be established concretely’; these points included: 
 
 ‘The system of differentiations which permits one to act upon the actions of others’ In this 
inquiry the ‘differentiations’ between the organizations in the IOR were grounded in the 
successive IOR contracts. In figure 3 these IOR contracts are part of what constitutes the 
green box ‘IOR’. 
 The types of objectives pursued by those who act upon the actions of others’ In this inquiry 
these agents were the GM and MU and in figure 3 these agents are represented in the blue 
and green boxes. In addition to the objectives of these agents, their expectations of IOR 
outcomes, perceptions of risks, norms, and of each other are also included in figure 3 mainly 
with the aim of providing a rich fine grained analysis of the power relationships in the IOR 
and their linkages to the IOR environment and history. 
 ‘The means of bringing power relations into being: according to whether power is exercised 
by ... economic disparities ... or by means of control’. In this inquiry these ‘means’ were at 
IOR level specified in the IOR contracts and put into effect in the conduct of the IOR. In 
figure 3 these processes are reflected in the line arrows of determination particularly all of 
those feeding in directly or indirectly to the green box ‘IOR Events - Exercise of Power’. 
 ‘Forms of institutionalization’: a wide variety of forms was possible. In this inquiry at IOR 
level the form taken was the IOR contract (‘with its own regulations’). Also relevant in this 
inquiry was the next level up of institutional analysis (of which the IOR contract was just one 
of many such IOR contracts), the MG. In figure 3 the MG in included within the yellow box 
‘NHS and Higher Education Inter-sector Institutional Arrangements’.       
 
In Figure 3, IOR Agency was assumed to be driven by the ideas, aims and objectives of the IOR 
agents. These ideas, aims and objectives may have varied according to issues and contexts – they 
were not necessarily either wholly or partly economic. The capacity of IOR agents to achieve their 
aims was dependent on their Powers (‘Power to’ and ‘Power over’). Whether, when and how IOR 
agents used their powers was mediated by their expectations of potential outcomes and the 
perceived risks of the choices open to them. These expectations and perceptions of risk of IOR 
agents were affected by IOR agents’ perceptions of other IOR agents (e.g. by the perception the IOR 
supplier had of the GM) in particular of the intentions of other IOR agents, the extent to which their 
interests were mutual and their expected behaviour. The expectations of IOR agents of potential IOR 
outcomes might also have fed back to modify their perceived interests and goals and also their 
perceptions of the congruence of their interests and goals with those of other IOR agents (e.g. as 
between a supplier and a GM). IOR agents might have exercised their powers either strategically or 
habitually; for example, an IOR agent’s expectations of outcomes might have been so well formed 
on particular issues and in particular contexts that the social reality was ‘taken for granted’ and the 
IOR agent’s conduct was habitual. An important influencing factor on the exercise of power by IOR 
agents was assumed to be their perceptions of the force of norms and constraints whether these 
were within their own organizations or in the institutional environment. 
 
The Institutional Environment of the IOR, particularly the macro institutional environment was 
assumed to be important in ‘determining’, ‘shaping’, or influencing IOR agency and its components. 
For example, an important source of the powers of the GM in the IOR was the Health-Higher 
education inter-sector institutional arrangements, i.e. the MG which became the institutional 
arrangement within which context the IOR was originated, developed, and conducted.   IOR agents 
might however also have influenced or shaped their institutional environment to some extent. The 
latter was represented by the dotted line arrows ‘Power over’ between IOR Agents and their 






including their institutional environment; for example, the GM might have influenced the MG 
institutional arrangements. 
 
IOR Key Outcomes and Performance: these were the outcomes of IOR agency as shaped by the 
power-dependence relations between IOR agents and by the institutional environment and events.    
 
Consequences for IOR in/stability: these followed on from IOR key outcomes and performance. 
 
Processes of feedback: these processes arose from IOR key outcomes and performance and the 
consequences for IOR in/stability; they included resultant feedback from the IOR to all constituents 
of the environment (i.e. including the macro institutional environment, the health and higher 
education sectors, and the health and higher education inter-sector institutional arrangements); 
there was also feedback to components of agency, partly via processes of reflexivity of the IOR 
agents themselves. 
 
3.3.3 Procedure Part Three – Development of Interpretations (2) 
 
This stage in the development of interpretations commenced with the bringing together of the 
constituents of the empirical reality to be interpreted. These constituents comprised (i) the events, 
endogenous as well as exogenous to the IOR, which occurred within the reference period and which 
were thought likely to have been associated with changes in the stability of the IOR in its dimensions 
and components, and with the patterns of that stability, were identified (ii) movements in the 
stability over time on each dimension of the IOR. 
 
The relevant key events affecting stability of the IOR in each of its principal components (contracts, 
outputs, prices and performance are shown below as Tables 4(i) and 4(ii). The events were selected 
from the history of the IOR which had been developed and consisted in events which were 
exogenous and endogenous to the IOR.135  Events included developments in the MG institutional 
arrangements during the reference period, particularly any which might have affected the 
underlying conditions of ‘monopsony’, and relevant changes in the organization structures of the 
IOR organizations. 
 
The final step in the development of interpretations was an inductive one: events and movements in 
stability which took place in a given time period were examined and using the EEAPOC framework, 
inferences made about plausible connections between events, IOR agency, and stability impacts. 
Narratives of interpretation of the interplay of events, IOR agency, and stability impacts on the IOR 
were then constructed; these narratives are presented in chapter 6 below. The narratives were 
structured into four parts. The first of these concerned the origins of the IOR. The remaining three 
narratives were structured into consecutive time periods (1996-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2013) each 
of which reflected material changes in the contracts component of the IOR as well as distinctive 
impacts on the stability of the IOR, its dimensions and components. 
 
Foucault (1983) argued that relationships of power had a continuing potential to become 
confrontations (or ‘struggles’) between two adversaries; equally those relationships ‘may give place 
to the putting into operation the mechanisms of power.’ The search for interpretations of power 
relationships could consequently be done either ‘from inside the history of the struggle or from the  
standpoint of the power relationships’. In regard to ‘struggles’, Foucault (1983) argued that ‘the 
mechanisms brought into play in power relations could be interpreted in terms of strategies’. Those 
strategies could be manifest in the means employed by those in the power relationship to achieve 
their objective(s). ‘Strategy can be defined by the choice of ... solutions ... power strategy (is) the 
                                                             
135 The history of the IOR referred to here is Walsh (2013). Validity checks of that history included ‘member 






totality of the means put into operation to implement power effectively or to maintain it’ (Foucault 
1983).  For the last of the periods of the inquiry, 2008-2013, the interpretations of IOR in/stability 
were developed from ‘inside by history of the struggle’ through an analysis of 4 ‘power games’.  In 
each of these games the GM and MU had conflicting objectives. Both the GM and MU deployed 
strategies to promote their objectives and/or to frustrate the achievement of the objectives of the 
other.  The outcomes of each of those games had specific consequences for the stability of the IOR 
on twelve of its dimensions. The structure of each power game, the principal 
players/agents/’adversaries’ involved and their objectives are summarised in Table 16; details of the 
moves/’means employed’ in each game are presented chronologically in Tables 17 – 20. All of these 
Tables (16 -20) are presented and discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
Events, ‘Key Events’ and their Relation to Stability Impacts: as part of the inquiry procedure for 
development of interpretations, movements in IOR stability were plotted in relation to all of the 
identified events. Although some of these events could be clearly associated with impacts on 
stability on particular dimensions in or around the same time periods, there were many events 
(particularly higher level events occurring in the environment of the IOR rather than in the IOR itself) 
where the connections with stability impacts were either indirect or attenuated over time. This was 
partly because of the impact of other, intervening, variables between those higher level events and 
stability impacts. As shown in the EEAPOC framework, Figure 2, these other intervening variables 
potentially included variables in the IOR environment (e.g. sector level events and variables 
intervening and ameliorating the effects of macro institutional level events and variables) and IOR 
agency which itself was potentially affected by changes over time in power relationships – implicit in 
Figure 2 is the potential for the balance of power in power relationships to change (as well as to be 
reinforced) through processes of feedback and structuration. 
 
When it came to constructing explanations of IOR in/stability these higher level events and 
intervening variables were explicitly taken into account. At that stage of the procedure it became 
possible to associate particular, ‘key’, events along with the relevant intervening variables (the latter 
brought together as ‘explanations A, B, and C’) with stability impacts on dimensions in particular 
years. These ‘key’ events are set out in Table 21 and the stability impacts associated with these key 
events and the relevant explanations are set out in Table 22; ‘key events’ most directly associated 
with IOR stability impacts ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ in particular years have been highlighted in yellow in Tables 
4(i), 4(ii), 11, 12 and 13. 
 
Caption to Tables 4(i) and 4(ii) 
 
 Summaries of events and when these occurred which were relevant to IOR stability impacts for 
the reference period 1995-2013. 
 All events are grouped into the components of the IOR (contracts, outputs, price and 
performance) where these were most relevant. However it should be noted that some events 
had relevance on more than one dimension and which went across different components of the 
IOR e.g. ‘GM devises and implements a new strategic framework – 2007-2013. 
 Some events were part of a continuous process (e.g. the consolidation of nursing as a 
profession); other events were discrete, one-off events (e.g. the Project 2000 review) but which 
may indirectly have had an eventual stability impact on dimensions of the IOR (e.g. the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008). 
 Some events, also described as ‘key events’ (and highlighted in yellow in these tables and also in 
Tables 11-13), had a direct impact on the stability of the IOR e.g. ‘BMP Implementation and 













3.3.4 Procedure Part Four: Development of Explanations 
 
To aid the development of explanations of why the IOR key outcomes and in/stability consequences 
came about (inquiry overall question 4) the high level theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 
(Figure 2) was used. The rest of the procedure used for the development of explanations was similar 
to that used in Part Two above for the ‘Development of Interpretations (2)’: (i) the same 
constituents of the empirical reality and the findings about IOR in/stability which were brought 
together in Part Two above (see Tables 4(i) and 4(ii)) were also used in Part Three (ii) an inductive 
approach was used: using the high level theoretical framework, inferences were made about 
plausible connections between resource dependence and the power dependence responses of the 
IOR actors, historical dependence processes and the impact of the initial conditions of the MG, IOR 
agency, events (exogenous and endogenous to the IOR), and IOR stability impacts over time (iii) five 
narratives of explanations were constructed. The first four of those narratives were structured in the 
same way as the interpretations in Part Two, i.e. the first narrative related to the origins and initial 
outcomes of the IOR, while the second, third and fourth narratives were structured into the same 
consecutive time periods. The fifth narrative consisted in (i) conclusions drawn from the previous 
four narratives and (ii) based on those conclusions, an explanation of the stability of the IOR over the 
reference period as a whole. 
 
To support the development of explanations as well as to clarify the analysis: 
 
1. Seven tables (Tables 5(i) - 5(iv), 11, 12, 13) were constructed which consisted in summaries of the 
main events (exogenous and endogenous to the IOR) relevant to the origins and to each of the three 
periods of the IOR. 
 
2. The history of the IOR over the reference period was analysed to identify types of historical 
dependencies which were relevant. This analysis was completed at two levels: 
 
(i) At IOR level in respect of IOR stability impacts. This analysis was completed at IOR dimension level 
for each of the 18 years of the reference period. Based on the classification of types of historical 
dependence developed by Page (2006), four types of historical dependencies were identified as 
potentially the most relevant:136 
 
 Initial Conditions (IC) 
 Founder (F) 
 Forgetting (FG) 
 Burden of History (BU) 
 
(ii) At the level of the context of the IOR. The analysis at this level concerned the conditions under 
which the IOR existed, specifically focussing on the conditions of MG and the types of historical 
dependencies relevant to the persistence of those conditions.   
 
3. The history of the IOR over the reference period was also analysed to identify the types of power 
dependence responses used by the IOR actors which were relevant to the IOR stability impacts. 
                                                             
136 See Chapter 2 for definitions of these which were given by Page (2006). It should be emphasised however, 
following Sewell (1996) and Pierson (2004) and as stated earlier, that all of these types of historical 
dependence despite their origins in ball and urn model simulations, were assumed in this inquiry to be non-
deterministic and to be potentially associated with phat dependence as well as with path dependence. A 







Based mainly on the typology of power dependence responses developed by Emerson (1962), 12 
types of power dependence responses (five by MU and seven by the GM) were identified:137 
 
 MU - Cost Reduction/Productivity Improvement 
 MU - Internal Cross-subsidy 
 MU – Acceptance of Increase in IOR Performance Risk  
 MU - Lobbying 
 MU - Coalition Formation 
 GM - Outputs Demand Changes 
 GM - Rent Extraction 
 GM – Transfer of IOR Performance Risk 
 GM – Increasing Compliance Surveillance (‘Monitoring Creep’)  
 GM - Lobbying 
 GM - Exercise of Discretion or Veto 
 GM – IOR Rules Change 
 
The outputs of the analyses of types of historical dependence processes at the IOR level and of 
power dependence responses by the IOR actors were brought together with the findings on IOR 
stability impacts in Table 15 below; historical dependence processes were analysed for each of the 
dimensions of the IOR and for each of the years of the reference period. 
 
Caption to Table 15 
 
 Shown are the types of historical dependence (HD) processes associated with stability impacts 
by IOR dimension for each year of the reference period. 
 
Example: Dimension 1 
 
Years   Stability Impact  HD Process 
 
1995/96-1999/2000  S  Initial Conditions (IC) 
2000/01-2004/05   S → TRI  Founder (F1) 
2005/06-2007/08   TRI  Forgetting (FG) 
2008/09-2011/12   S → TRI  Founder (F2) 
2012/13    TRI  Founder (F3) 
 
 Shown for each dimension is the incidence of the types of HD processes for each year of the 
reference period. Examples of these were: 
 
Example 1995/96: Initial conditions – 12 dimensions; Founder – 4 dimensions 
Example 2009/10: Initial Conditions – 1 dimension; Founder – 10 dimensions; Forgetting – 4 
dimensions; Burden of History – 1 dimension 
 
 Shown is the occurrence of particular types of power dependence responses by the GM and MU 
respectively for each year of the reference period. Examples of these were: 
 
Example 1995/96: MU – Cost Reduction/Productivity Improvement; GM – Rent Extraction 
                                                             






Example 2012/13: MU – Cost Reduction/Productivity Improvement, Acceptance of Increased 
Risk; GM – Output demand Changes (red crosses in Table denote reductions in demand from 
previous year), rent Extraction, Increasing Compliance Surveillance, Exercise of Discretion/Veto, 
IOR Rules Change, Transfer of Risk. 
 
 Types of power dependence responses by MU and the GM increased during the reference 
period, particularly in 2005/06 (from 3 to 6 different types) and again from 2008/09 (from 6 to 8 
different types). By 2012/13 the GM alone was using 6 different types of power dependence 
responses mainly reflecting a range of strategies it was using to consolidate or to increase its 










 3.3.5 Procedure Part 5: Development of Critique and Recommendations 
 
The fifth and final part of the research procedure concerned the second aim of the inquiry and was 
focussed on the development of answers to research question 5. The origins, initial conditions and 
the persistence of the IOR under conditions of MG operating within a macro context of a ‘new public 
management’ (NPM) approach to public sector management (one of the main findings in the inquiry, 
set out in Chapter 4) were taken as the starting point in this part of the research procedure. An 
important theoretical underpinning of NPM generally and also specifically in the IOR was principal-
agent theory (PAT). PAT is outlined briefly and strengths and limitations claimed in the literature to 
be associated with PAT are considered.  The limitations of PAT centred on its empirical validity, 
specifically in terms of the ubiquity of power (Foucault 1983, 1988), the characteristics of institutions 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010) and of market institutions in particular (Chang 2010), and of how 
markets actually function under conditions of asymmetric power. Within this framework of strengths 
and limitations of PAT, the actual outcomes and stability impacts of the IOR were considered as an 
empirical example of what happened in an NPM approach. Based on the latter and drawing on the 
theoretical framework of PAT strengths and limitations, a normative critique of Mg as a technique for 
NPM was developed. 
 
This part of the research procedure was concluded with a set of recommendations for policy and 
management of NHS-HE relationships at both IOR and inter-sector levels. These recommendations 
were made after taking into account (i) an update of the position on NHS-HE inter-sector 
institutional arrangements in January 2016 since the end of the reference period of the inquiry 
(March 2013) (ii) the existence of a wider set of relevant stakeholders (beyond the GM and MU) at 
MG, inter-sector and macro societal levels.          
 
3.4 Methodology (iv): Validity 
 
Validity has been defined as the plausibility or correctness of the outputs of the research inquiry.  138 
These outputs include the historical account which was developed, the interpretations and 
explanations which were inferred, and the conclusions drawn. Validity as a component of the 
methodology for the research inquiry consisted of the strategies used to mitigate the main threats 
to the validity of the research outputs. Four significant potential threats to validity were identified: 
 
 Construct validity 
 Incomplete data and data limitations 
 Researcher bias 
 Reactivity 
 
3.4.1 Construct validity 
 
This validity threat concerned the extent to which the following were appropriate for the 
development of valid descriptions, interpretations and explanations of the phenomena studied: 
 
(a) The typology of the IOR (‘Contracts’, ‘Outputs’, ’Price’, ‘Performance’)  
(b) The concept of IOR stability and the constructs developed to operationalise that concept, 
                                                             
138 This definition of ‘validity’ and its use as a component in the methodology for the research inquiry comes 







(c) A theoretical framework for the explanation of IOR reproduction and change, and a conceptual 
framework (EEAPOC) derived from the theoretical framework. 
 
The main strategy used to mitigate this validity threat was to review the relevant literature 
(including IOR, IOR stability, HI, institutional theory, power-dependence relations, and monopsony) 
and then to develop and define the constructs used in the research in ways which either closely 
corresponded with established theory, or developed the latter specifically to address some of the 
gaps in theory which were relevant to the empirical reality of the IOR. 
 
The theoretical and conceptual frameworks, although new, were for the most part syntheses or 
adaptations of established theory: Hollingsworth (2002), Morriss (2002), Lukes (1975/2005), 
Foucault (1983, 1988), Sewell (1996), Pierson (2004), Page (2006), Streeck and Thelen (2005), 
Emerson (1962), Casciaro and Piskorski (2005), Huxham and Beech (2008), Blair and Harrison (2010), 
Stucke (2013), and Mahoney and Thelen (2010). The overall approach taken in the inquiry, an agent-
centred HI, was based on the argument and recommendations made by Bell (2011). The concept of 
IOR ‘stability’ was informed by the IOR literature and grounded in the empirical reality (‘dimensions’) 
of the IOR. The typology used to describe the IOR was based on constructs used in the transaction 
cost economics literature to conceptualise exchange relationships in contract-based IORs (Hennart 
2008, Daz and Teng 2000). 
 
However, there were no precedents for bringing together all of these elements (frameworks, 
concepts, and typology) into an HI approach for an inquiry into IOR stability under conditions of 
government monopsony. The operationalisation of the concept of stability in IOR (IOR dimensions, 
stability impact indicators, and stability assessments) was also new.  Consequently, the research 
inquiry was exploratory in nature and its conclusions about IOR stability under conditions of 
government monopsony should be regarded as propositions for further research and development. 
 
3.4.2 Access, Data Coverage and Data Limitations 
 
Access: the writer was a senior manager of MU and had full responsibility for the IOR with the GM 
for the last half of the reference period, from 2004 to 2013. Consequently the writer had full access 
in MU to all IOR documentation for the whole of the reference period, including MU strategy and 
planning reports, management accounting data and information, curriculum and academic 
workforce information. The writer also had full access to MU’s archive on the IOR which included 
documents covering the period 1995 to 2004. The writer also had full access to all IOR 
communications between MU and the GM over the last half of the reference period (i.e. from 2004 
to 2013), including copies of all presentations and GM commissioning data. 
   
Data Coverage: at sector level, data coverage was considered to be good: both the health and higher 
education sectors in England as well as the organizations in those sectors were extensively and 
reliably documented over the whole of the reference period of the inquiry. At sector level there 
were also good records going back before the reference period. The latter also applied to the 
documentation available for the relevant occupational groups. 
 
At institutional level (i.e. for the IOR): the stability impacts data were analysed in regard to the 







Caption to Table 3(ii) 
 
 Data coverage in the inquiry on each of the 14 dimensions is shown for each year of the 
reference period. 
 Three categories were used to describe data coverage, viz. ‘data complete’, ‘data estimated’ and 
‘data gaps’. Data coverage was found to be 80% ‘complete’ and 19% ‘estimated’. Data gaps 




There were 14 data points (one for each dimension) for each of the 18 years of the reference period, 
making a potential total of 252 data points. 201 (c. 80%) of these data points were completed 
without difficulty. 
 
Estimates were made for a further 49 (c. 19%) of the data points; those estimates were believed to 
be reliable – the supporting evidence available was sufficiently strong that only relatively weak 
assumptions were needed for the relevant stability impact estimates to be made: except for the 
1995 GM/MU contract, all contract documentation was available for the whole of the reference 
period. With regard to the 1995 contract, it proved possible through referring to other documents 
around that time and from interviewing MU senior management reliably to infer and estimate the 
missing data. IOR and output performance assessments by the GM and external regulators for the 
period 1995-2006 were inferred on the basis that contracts were renewed (implying IOR 
performance was at least satisfactory for the GM perspective), and that pre-registration 
programmes continued to be validated by the regulator and their outputs continued to gain 
professional registration – all implying that the external regulator also considered the IOR output 







Altogether 2 (c. 1%) of the data points could not be completed or estimated. Overall, the results of 
the analysis supported the conclusion that coverage of the IOR stability data was good for the whole 
of the reference period, 1995-2013.  
 
(iii) At organization level: with regard to MU, data coverage was good for the whole of the reference 
period. There were extensive archival records for the period 1994-2004. For 2004-2013 the records 
were virtually complete, including an email database of virtually all MU internal communications, 
and also all external communications with the GM and other external parties. With one exception, 
there was complete information regarding output quantities, price, and performance dimensions of 
the IOR. The one exception concerned the relation of actual price levels to MU FEC levels (dimension 
14). It was not until 2011 that MU calculated explicitly its actual FEC for its NHS activities. However, 
it proved possible to make reliable estimates of the likely relationship of actual FEC levels to actual 
price levels for all but two of the preceding years of the reference period (1995-2008). 
 
With regard to the GM: the main data gap here concerned communications: there were no data on 
the communications which were internal to the GM; however many details of the GM’s formal 
strategies, plans and reported performance both at overall organization level as well as at the level 
of the MG, were available particularly in the latter half of the reference period from 2005, and from 
those it was possible to make plausible inferences about the priority objectives of the GM and its 
perceptions of its interests. 
 
Data Limitations: the main limitation of the data concerned its usefulness for substantive inferences 
to be made about agency: inferences made in respect of the GM about ‘expectations’, ‘perceived 
interests’ and ‘perceived force of norms and constraints’ were based on data drawn from formal 
statements and reports. The position on this was better in regard to inferences on these matters 
made about MU. Here the researcher in virtue of being a senior manager in MU was able to draw on 
personal knowledge gained over many years in formal and informal settings across a range of 








3.4.3 Researcher bias 
 
The researcher (and writer) in this research inquiry was the senior manager in MU with responsibility 
for the IOR for the last 9 years of the 18 years of the reference period of the research. Consequently 
the researcher gained experiential knowledge of the IOR which has been useful in the development 
of the research inquiry and in production of its outputs. A threat to validity here was researcher bias 
e.g. the selection of data which ‘stand out’ to the researcher; the development of descriptions which 
emphasise some phenomena and neglect others; the development of interpretations which 
selectively focus on phenomena the researcher knows relatively more about; and the development 
of particular types of explanations. 
 
Four strategies were used to mitigate this threat to validity: 
 
1. Thick description: the historical account of the IOR was relatively detailed, this being made 
possible by the extensiveness of the research database, particularly for the last 9 years of 
the 18 years period of the IOR. 
 
2. Accessibility for evaluation of the research outputs: the conceptual and explanatory 
frameworks, the concepts and operational constructs, and the underlying assumptions 
were fully defined. 
 
3. Member checks: drafts of the historical account of the IOR together with a copy of the 
database which was used in the construction of that history were given to senior 
management members of MU for them to check the accuracy, comprehensiveness and 
overall validity of the history. They completed those checks. A final version of the history 
was agreed and subsequently used as one of the main empirical inputs to the research. A 
similar process of member checks on the dissertation was carried out. The same members 
of MU senior management who had validated the historical account also validated the 
dissertation; apart from a few minor corrections, they fully endorsed the dissertation. 
 
4. Expert academic review: the draft research outputs (including drafts of the dissertation), 
the historical account and a copy of the research inquiry database and archive were given 
to the academic supervisors of the research and their subsequent comments taken into 




‘Reactivity’ refers to ‘the influence of the researcher on the setting or individuals studied’.139 Maxwell 
suggests that while it is impossible to eliminate the influence of the researcher it is helpful ‘to 
understand it and use it productively’.140 To mitigate this validity threat, the researcher’s actual and 
potential influence as a member of an organization in the IOR was taken into account particularly 
when it came to the part of the research procedure involving the development of interpretations 
and explanations.  
                                                             
139 Maxwell, J. (2005) ibid p. 108  










The main aim of this Chapter is to present and analyse the empirical findings in regard to research 
question set 1 of the inquiry141, viz. 
 
1(i) What were the origins and initial conditions of the NHS-HE inter-sector institutional 
arrangements and of the IOR? (ii) What were the conditions of these arrangements over the 
reference period? 
 
This question is dealt with below in two parts, firstly in regard to the NHS-HE inter-sector 
institutional arrangements (the ‘MG’) and secondly in regard to the IOR. The first part which follows 
is split into four sub-sections, dealing with the history of respectively the NHS, the development and 
regulation of nursing, the UK higher education sector, and a confluence of events which led to the 
establishing of the MG. Each of these sub-sections is concluded with a statement regarding the 
underlying conditions of MG which were satisfied and a further statement regarding the persistence 
of those conditions over the whole of the reference period of the inquiry (1995-2013). The second 
part deals with the origins of the IOR. 
 
A further aim of this Chapter is to consider the conditions under which the IOR existed after it was 
established, specifically to answer the question whether, over the reference period, those conditions 
continued to amount to MG.   
  
4.1 Origins and Initial Conditions of the MG 
 
The institutional arrangement, within which the IORs between the NHS Education 
Purchaser/Commissioner and Education Providers were established and developed, was a 
Government Monopsony (‘the MG’). The MG was established as part of the reforms of the NHS 
enacted under the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act and implemented in the early 1990s.142 The 
origins of the MG and the form it eventually took in terms of contractually based IORs between an 
NHS education buyer and HEIs, can be traced to events in three areas: (i) NHS (ii) Development of 
non-medical occupations, particularly nursing, and their regulation (iii) UK Higher Education. A 
summary of relevant key events in these areas is given below in Tables 5(i)-(iii). These events are 
described over the next three sections of this Chapter; how these events came together to bring 
about the MG is considered in a concluding summary section. 
  
                                                             
141 The other research questions of the inquiry are dealt with in later Chapters: question 2 is dealt with in 
Chapter 5 and questions 3-4 are dealt with in Chapter 6. 
142 NHS Community and Care Act 1990; available at 







Caption to Tables 5(i) – 5(iii) 
 
 Summaries of events leading up to the formation of the MG. 
 Three strands of events are shown: in Table 5(i) events in the development of the NHS; in Table 
5(ii) events in the development & regulation of Nursing occupations; in Table 5(iii) events in UK 
HE. 
 The overarching context and events which brought these strands together was the development 
of a new approach to public sector management. That context and the specific events within 











The NHS was established in 1948.143 The overall aims of the NHS were to provide a comprehensive 
healthcare service based on clinical need on an equal basis to all which was free at the point of use. 
Other aims included the reduction of health inequalities and responding to different needs of 
different populations. The main objective of the NHS was ‘to improve the physical and mental health 
of the people through the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illnesses’.144 
 
The funding of the NHS was mainly from government taxes, principally income tax and also from 
national insurance contributions. The total net expenditure for the UK NHS between 1950/51 and 
2010/11 is summarised below in Table 6. In real terms the total net expenditure for the UK NHS 
between 1950/51 and 1990/91 increased 4 fold between 1950/51 and 1990/91. As a proportion of 
GDP, NHS expenditure grew from 3.5% in 1950/51 to 4.7% in 1990/91. 
 
Table 6: Net government expenditure on the UK NHS 1950/51 to 2010/11145 
 
Year  Net expenditure (£m at 2010/11 prices)  Net expenditure as a % of GDP 
 
1950/51  11,782       3.5 
1975/76  32,964       4.9146 
1990/91  44,811       4.7 
1999/00  63,204       5.2 
2005/06  101,964      7.0 
2009/10  121,477      8.3 
2010/11  121,305      8.2 
 
The growth of the NHS over the whole period reflected several factors these including rising 
expectations of, and demand for free healthcare, and an ever-widening range of treatments made 
possible by advances in medical technology. Many of these factors were inter-related, e.g. increasing 
standards of public health and the effectiveness of medical technologies combined to increase 
longevity which in turn was associated with changing epidemiological patterns particularly in 
relation to an aging demographic of the general population. 
 
Context - Neoliberalism, Public Choice Theory and New Public Management: Neoliberalism has been 
defined as ‘as a specific economic discourse or philosophy which became dominant and effective in 
world economic relations (from around the mid-1970s in the USA and from c. 1979 in the UK) as a 
consequence of super-power sponsorship’ (Olssen & Peters 2005).’ Manifestations of this discourse 
in government have been described as ‘an art of government containing forms and systems of 
expertise and technology utilizable for political control’ (Foucault 1991, Olssen and Peters 2005). In a 
                                                             
143 This was enabled by the passing of the National Health Service Act 1946. Available at: http://old.post-
gazette.com/pg/10119/1054305-114.stm Accessed February 2014 
The origins of the NHS itself and the values reflected in its overall aims and main objective are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  
144 ‘A Guide to the NHS’, Geoffrey Rivett, February 2013. Available at: 
http://www.nhshistory.net/a_guide_to_the_nhs.htm Accessed 21st May 2013.  
145 Source: ‘NHS funding and expenditure, Standard Note SN/SG/724’, Rachael Harker, Social and General 
Statistics, House of Commons Library, London April 2012. Available at: 
http://www.nhshistory.net/parlymoney.pdf Accessed February 2014 
146 In the mid-1970s there were rapid rises in the level of costs and prices in the UK, (especially in energy, 
wages, and property and these reached relatively high levels very quickly. Consequently, caution is needed 






neoliberal perspective, markets were seen by government policy makers as potentially an important 
technology which could be used to exercise control and enhance performance in the public sector 
(Olssen and Peters 2005). 
 
Many of the key assumptions underlying neoliberalism were similar to that in classical economic 
liberalism; including (i) maximisation of self-interest was the motivator of individual behaviour and 
(ii) markets, particularly free markets, were the most efficient means for the allocation of resources 
and the generation of opportunities/innovation. However, a distinguishing characteristic of 
neoliberalism was in regard to ideas about how free, self regulating markets were brought about 
and how the state needed to act positively to ensure the establishment of such markets. In classical 
economic liberalism the assumption was made that ‘free’ markets would emerge spontaneously in 
the course of economic exchange. From the early 1960s with the development of Public Choice 
theory (PCT), this assumption was queried. PCT theorists (e.g. Buchanan 1962) ‘had little faith in the 
“spontaneous” ordering of the market or in the efficiency of the social evolutionary process’ (Olssen 
and Peters 2005). In contrast, PCT theorists maintained that spontaneous or social evolutionary 
processes in the development of markets might produce social chaos and dysfunctional patterns as 
readily as they might social harmony and equilibrium (Buchanan 1962). Rather, to promote market 
efficiency Buchanan argued, there was a role for government to exercise ‘positive power’, ‘acting 
deliberately through the vehicle of the state to engineer the conditions for efficient economic 
production’, ‘acting deliberately through the vehicle of the state to engineer the conditions for 
efficient economic production’(Olssen and Peters 2005). Within a PCT approach, ‘market techniques 
were systematically developed and first became a technology for institutional governance’. PCT 
approaches constituted ‘a supply-side process of “governing without governing”, a process by which 
compliance was extracted through systems that measured performance according to both externally 
imposed levers and internally reinforced targets’ (Olssen & Peters 2005). 
 
‘Influenced by, and building upon PCT a number of internal theories of organization through which 
efficiency and effectiveness were rendered operative in public sector institutions became prominent 
from the 1970s’ (Olssen and Peters 2005). These theories included principal-agent theory (PAT). The 
overall umbrella for these theories (PCT, PAT) and the techniques developed in their application 
became known as New Public Management (NPM). Central to NPM was an emphasis on contract: 
‘NPM in applying quasi-market or private sector micro-techniques to the management of public 
sector organizations replaced the “public service ethic” whereby organizations were governed 
according to norms and values derived from assumptions about the “common good” or “public 
interest” with a new set of contractualist norms and rules’ (Olssen & Peters 2005, p. 324). 
 
‘In neoliberalism the patterning of power is established on contract, which in turn is premised upon a 
need for compliance, monitoring, and accountability organized in a management line and established 
through a purchase contract based upon measureable outputs’ (Olssen & Peters 2005).   
 
NHS Reforms: Partly with the objective of mitigating the increasing burden on government 
expenditure associated with the growth of the NHS, governments from the 1970’s initiated and 
implemented reforms of the NHS. The reforms most relevant to the origins of the MG are 
summarised in Table 5(i) above. Initially, these reforms were about organizational restructuring of 
the NHS, consisting in the establishing of Area/Regional/Strategic Health Authorities under the 1973 
NHS Reorganization Act, and in 1977 the implementation of a new framework for the NHS which 
distinguished ‘primary care’ and ‘secondary care’). However, following the change from a Labour to 
a Conservative led UK government in 1979; subsequent reforms of the NHS reflected a neoliberalism 
approach taken by government to the management of the public sector generally. The first of these 






new senior management roles in the NHS provider organization (the Griffiths Report of 1983 and the 
subsequent implementation of the recommendations of that report). Where previously 
management was a function carried out as part of their duties by professional medical staff, now 
much of the management function and associated decision-making was to be undertaken by 
dedicated professional managers.147 
 
The second reform was the introduction of an ‘internal market’ into the NHS. In the 1989 White 
Paper, ‘Working for Patients’148, it was asserted that there were a number of problems in the quality 
and costs of the NHS. It was claimed that increasing waiting lists and relatively wide variations in the 
average costs of treating acute hospital in-patients between different health authorities were 
evidence of organizational problems in the NHS such that merely putting more money into the NHS 
was not by itself going to address the problems of quality and costs. To address these problems it 
was proposed in the White Paper that a fundamental change to the contracting structures for 
healthcare provision in the NHS be made through the creation of an ‘internal market’. A defining 
characteristic of the internal market was the creation of a split between the purchasers of 
healthcare services, and the providers of such services. The rationale for the split was to enable 
competition between would-be providers to take place while at the same time devolving as much 
responsibility as possible to local area/regional level. An important underlying assumption of the 
government’s proposals was that competition between providers, once engendered, would 
eventually allow resource allocation to be done more efficiently and with better results on quality. 
Following the White Paper, an ‘internal market’ was introduced into the NHS in 1990.149 
 
Reform of NHS Education and Training: As part of its 1989 White Paper review of the NHS, the 
government also considered the approach to be taken to the contracting of education and training 
of the NHS workforce. The government concluded that a purchaser-provider split should also be 
introduced for education services.150 Specifically it was proposed that the funding for nurse 
education be transferred from the existing fund holders, the DHAs and the national professional 
boards, to the RHAs. Funding was to cover: 
 
(i) The costs to education providers of the delivery of their provision. Education providers were 
prohibited from charging tuition fees directly to students on NHS purchased places. 
(ii) Maintenance support costs for students on full time programmes; this funding was provided in 
the form of student bursaries. 
 
Thus all the funding for NHS non-medical workforce education was to continue to come from the 
state. Using these resources which were devolved to them, RHAs were to act on behalf of the units 
                                                             
147 The impact of the Griffiths report is discussed in ‘The Griffiths NHS Management Inquiry: its origins, nature 
and impact’ (2010) Gorsky, M (ed.), Centre for History in Public Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine. Available at: 
http://history.lshtm.ac.uk/Griffiths%20Inquiry%20Witness%20Seminar%20final%20versionsecure.pdf 
Accessed February 2014 
148 ‘Working for Patients’, White Paper January 1989, Department of Health, HMSO London 
149 NHS and Community Care Act 1990 The NHS internal market had all the characteristics of a ‘quasi-market’ 
as defined above in Chapter 2. In creating the administrative structure to administer it, the government’s 
acceptance in 1984 of the Griffiths Report (1983) on NHS management, and the subsequent implementation of 
the recommendations to create a distinctive and hierarchical management structure to which 
professional/career managers would be appointed, were crucial to enabling the development subsequently of 
the internal market in the NHS (Gorsky, M. 2010). 






and Trusts managed by them, as the purchasers of nurse education151. Government policy at the 
time was ‘wherever possible training should be employer led and the supply of training places should 
be closely linked to the workforce planning needs identified by the service’.152 The fact that 
employers themselves would not be funding their own education requirements and consequently 
would not be wholly responsible for their own education decisions had been recognised by the 
government in their 1989 White Paper on Education and Training (WP 10) as a departure from their 
own policy. The reason for the government’s stance on this was to avoid the circumstance where 
healthcare workforce employers which invested in education would be at a cost disadvantage 
relative to those employers which did not. Where funding for education came only from employers, 
there was a possibility that some employers would choose either not to invest, or to invest only 
minimally, in education. Rather, some employers would try to become ‘free riders’ on the education 
outputs of those that did. In such circumstances it was believed the internal market for healthcare 
services would itself become distorted: the costs of education would fall disproportionately amongst 
healthcare providers with the consequence that some would be at a cost or price disadvantage 
when competing for contracts. The avoidance of the latter possibility was identified by the 
government as a key underlying principle of the centralised funding arrangements being proposed 
for education.153 
 
There were additional underlying principles argued for the centralisation of funding for education. 
These included ‘the need to maintain an adequate supply of key professional and technical skills’.154  
The lead time for the outputs of education at pre-registration level was mostly 3 or 4 years; this was 
substantially longer than the typically one year horizons of employers’ plans, driven by their financial 
and budgetary constraints. The government also argued the need for a greater use of education 
contracts where the outcomes of education were more precisely specified. Such contracts were also 
intended to be used to promote competition between potential education providers and to that 
extent were expected to bring about the benefits of a ‘market’ being created.155 
 
There was one important component of the funding of education on which WP 10 was ambiguous: 
that concerned the funding of placements costs. In 3 or 4 year pre-registration professional 
programmes, placements typically accounted for at least 50% of the duration of those programmes 
and consequently their costs as a proportion of the overall costs of the programmes could be 
relatively significant. At one point in WP 10 the cost of placements was identified, along with course 
costs and student support costs, as one of the three elements for funding.156 However, elsewhere in 
WP 10 the hope was expressed where employer-led consortia contract with providers to meet their 
                                                             
151 The term ‘education’ is used in this dissertation where appropriate also to refer to ‘training’ and vice versa. 
This is consistent with the usage adopted in WP 10 where ‘training’ was used to refer to ‘education and 
training’. 
152 ‘Political principles in action: a critical analysis of Education and Training: Working Paper 10 and its 
implications for nurse education’ Burke L.M., Nurse Education Today 1995 (15) pp 381-389, p. 382 
153 The fact that some healthcare (albeit a relatively small amount) was provided privately, i.e. outside of the 
NHS, was also recognised by the government as a potentially distorting factor. ‘For the foreseeable future, 
however, the overall responsibility for ensuring the continued basic supply of many professional staff will rest 
with the NHS and arrangements will need to ensure that NHS hospitals are not at a competitive disadvantage 
to the private sector because of the latter’s low(er) training costs.’ Source: ‘Education and Training: Working 
Paper 10’ (1989) ibid, p. 12  
154 ‘Education and Training: Working Paper 10’ (1989) ibid p.9 
155 Ibid p. 10 
156 ‘Funding should cover all aspects of training costs – course costs, student support and costs of clinical 






requirements for education, that such employers might be able to absorb the costs of placements 
within their overall expenditures.157 
 
The proposed centralisation of the funding for NHS workforce education was implemented over the 
period 1991 to 1993. Following the reconfiguration in 1991 of the existing local fund-holders for NHS 
education – the District Health Authorities - and the creation of the first Trusts in the same year, the 
funding for nurse education was transferred to the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). RHAs were to 
act on behalf of the Trusts managed by them, as the purchaser of nurse education.  
 
Each of the RHAs was empowered as the sole purchaser for nurse education in their regions – this 
was in line with government funding and policy that each of the regions should be self-sufficient for 
their workforce requirements. Thus most of the education providers had only one purchaser of 
healthcare workforce education and training that was potentially relevant to them: given the 
number of regions and the geographic coverage of each, and also given that the requirements of 
placement meant that students should be able to live within a reasonable travel distance from both 
their education provider as well as where their placements would be located, this was an inevitable 
result. Only those education providers situated on the borders of the geographic areas of different 
regions would in practical terms have potentially more than one NHS education purchaser, but these 
were only a small minority of the potential education providers. 
 
This was a fundamental change in the arrangements for the procurement of NHS workforce 
education: previously the DHAs as fund-holders had been the purchasers of the NHS requirements 
for nursing and midwifery education. There were over 90 DHAs in England each of which funded 
education to be provided by Schools of Nursing and later Colleges of Health. Any College of Health 
could in its turn be a supplier to several DHAs – this was because the size of the geographical areas 
covered by each DHA made it easier for such a many buyers to many sellers interface to be 
logistically feasible for the provision of education and clinical practice which covered several DHA 
areas. With the changeover to RHAs however the number of buyers reduced to 14 and the 
geographical areas associated with the RHAs was much greater. In effect most education providers 
would now only be dealing with a single buyer.   
 
From the standpoint of the education providers this meant that a new institutional arrangement, 
in effect a quasi-market in the form of a MG, had been created for their provision of non-medical 
education to the NHS: that a key condition of this quasi-market was the existence of a single buyer 
(within its designated geographical area). Thus two of the underlying conditions defining the 
existence of a government monopsony on a quasi-market basis (a single buyer whose standing 
was protected by government regulation and whose resources came entirely from the state) had 
been created.158 
  
                                                             
157 Ibid p. 35; this was to become one of the key issues in the arrangements between the NHS education 
commissioner and the education providers, particularly in relation to the respective responsibilities of the 
education providers and the placement providing employers. 
158 See Chapter 2 in which the underlying conditions of monopsony and government monopsony are defined. 
The fact that education providers were not allowed to charge tuition fees to students on NHS purchased places 
meant that all of the income they obtained for their education provision to the NHS would necessarily come 






4.1.2 Development of Professionally Qualified Non-Medical Occupations and their 
Regulation – Nursing159 
 
The education160 purchased in the MG by the GM was for the non-medical occupational roles in the 
NHS workforce. The education requirements for gaining professional registration in those 
occupations, including the content of education curricula and the methods of delivery, were a 
function of the regulations governing the practice in those occupations, the entry to them and of the 
historical development of those occupations. A summary of the key events in that development is 
given in Table 5(ii) above. There were three factors which had a bearing on the origins of the MG:  
 
1. Nursing was a relatively new profession: the first professional training school for nurses was 
established in the UK in 1860; the professional body for nursing (the RCN) was founded in 1916; a 
register for nurses was introduced in 1919 but registration did not become compulsory until 1943; 
the General Nursing Council with powers in relation to nurse education was established in 1949. 
 
2. The up-skilling of nursing roles was also a relatively new phenomenon: until the 1960’s the tasks 
of the ‘traditional nurse’ were mainly to do with the hygiene, nutrition and care of the patient’s 
environment. Events leading to the development of modern nursing roles were mainly as a result of 
changes in the organization of healthcare, in the delivery of healthcare, and in medical treatments 
and opportunities. Nursing structure was reviewed in the Salmon Report (1966) and nursing practice 
in the Briggs report (1972). However it was not until 1979 that the government acted on the 
recommendations of Briggs, and it was not until 1983 that the UK Central Council for Nursing, 
Midwifery and Health Visiting (the UKCC) was established.161 
 
3. The beliefs that nursing roles required (i) systematic knowledge which was founded on evidence 
based practice and research, and (ii) clinical decision making skills, became accepted as part of 
government policy thinking following the 1983-85 review of nursing education by the Judge 
Committee. An outcome of the latter was ‘Project 2000’, an initiative of the UKCC. In the 1986 report 
of Project 2000 detailed and wide-ranging proposals were made concerning the content, structure 
and delivery of nurse education; proposed were (i) programmes of 3 years duration leading to a 
Diploma in Higher Education (ii) programmes to have an initial common foundation programme 
followed by a choice of specialisms in adult nursing, child nursing, mental health nursing and 
learning disabilities nursing; the theoretical (‘academic’) proportion of these 3 year pre-registration 
programmes was increased to 50%, still making it possible for the practical (placement) component 
which made up the other 50% to meet the EU minimum duration requirement of 4600 hours (iii) 
                                                             
159 There were many different occupations which came under the term ‘professionally qualified non-medical 
occupations’. Nursing was selected as an example mainly because (i) this was by far the largest of these 
occupations (accounting for c. 60% of the NHS professionally qualified non-medical staff over the reference 
period – source: ‘NHS HCHS and General Practice Workforce Statistics’ The Information Centre: General and 
Personal Medical Services; Medical and Dental Workforce Census; Non-medical Workforce Census; Available 
at: 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/searchcatalogue?productid=13332&q=monthly+nhs+hospital+and+community+servi
ce+workforce+statistics&sort=Relevance&size=10&page=1#top Accessed February 2014); (ii) c. 90% of the 
contracted quantities of commissions in the IOR between the NHS Education Commissioner and Middlesex 
University were for programmes in nursing; and (iii) c.70% of the GM’s non-medical commissions were for 
programmes in nursing.  
160 The term education is used throughout this dissertation to refer to education and training. 
161 The UKCC became the single statutory and regulatory body (SRB) for the allied health occupations and 






students to have supernumerary status162 (iv) development of links between the existing Colleges of 
Nursing (mostly based on hospital sites and attached to particular hospitals) where nursing 
education was carried out with the higher education sector.163 These proposals were accepted by 
the government in 1988. Thus the purchaser provider split envisaged in the 1989 White Paper would 
take place at the same time as the implementation of Project 2000. 
 
The new statutory and regulatory body, the UKCC, and its successor body, the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council (the NMC)) maintained oversight and control of entry to the professional registers 
for the allied health occupations (including nursing). This control included maintaining close control 
of the relevant education ‘products’; the discretion which education providers had on their ‘product’ 
was relatively limited and consequently so too was the ability of education providers to differentiate 
themselves from each other on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of their product offering. For 
example, the amount of control exercised by the UKCC and its successor body the NMC was 
reflected in the initiative by the UKCC in 1999 to review the implementation of Project 2000 in terms 
of the ‘fitness for practice’ of newly qualified entrants to the nursing register and in the outcomes of 
that review.164 These outcomes included a subsequent NMC review of standards of nursing 
education and the issuing in 2004 of new ‘standards’.165 Later, in 2007, at the initiative of the DH166 a 
further major review was conducted by the NMC167 and new standards issued in 2010.168 Under the 
NMC standards issued in 2010 the minimum requirements for each of the 10 standards set out for 
the education ‘product’ was specified in considerable detail and the discretion allowed to education 
providers on the nature and production of the product was relatively limited. The areas covered by 
the standards included education outcomes; the structure, design, content, and delivery of 
                                                             
162
 Underlying this proposal was the belief that the training of nurses had become too dominated by the 
exigencies of service (i.e. by the requirements of healthcare delivery) and consequently that the development 
of a core professional capability for the modern nurse, which was informed by best practice and based on a 
rational foundation of systematic knowledge and its application, remained an ideal which was rarely attained. 
With increasing as well as new demands being made on the nurse, it was concluded in the interests of the 
future quality of healthcare provision, that the education and development of the nurse had to be prioritised. 
As a means of achieving this, it was recommended that a separation be made between service and the 
education and training of nurses. The independence of the ‘trainee’ from the specific service settings in which 
they would continue to have the practical components of their training programmes was achieved by changing 
their status to that of students: as students the ‘trainees’ were to be regarded, formally at least, as 
supernumery to the healthcare workforce. 
163 UKCC (1986) ‘Project 2000: A New Preparation for Practice’, UKCC London, available at: http://www.nmc-
uk.org/Documents/Archived%20Publications/UKCC%20Archived%20Publications/Project%202000%20A%20Ne
w%20Preparation%20for%20Practice%20May%201986.PDF Accessed March 2013 




20Report%20September%201999.PDF Accessed February 2014 
165 NMC (2004) ‘Standards of proficiency for pre-registration nursing education’; available at http://www.nmc-
uk.org/documents/standards/nmcstandardsofproficiencyforpre_registrationnursingeducation.pdf Accessed 
March 2013 
166 Department of Health (2006) ‘Modernising nursing careers – setting the direction’; available at: 
http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/modernising_nursing_careers-2.pdf Accessed February 2014 
167 NMC (2007) ‘Nursing: Towards 2015’; available at: http://www.nmc-
uk.org/Documents/ResearchPapers/Nursing%20towards%202015%20full%20report%20.pdf Accessed March 
2013 
168 NMC (2010) ‘Standards for pre-registration nursing education’; available at: http://standards.nmc-
uk.org/PublishedDocuments/Standards%20for%20pre-registration%20nursing%20education%2016082010.pdf 






programmes; the selection, admission, progression, assessment and completion of students; quality 
assurance processes; and resource requirements. All this remained the case for the whole of the 
reference period, 1994 – 2013.169 
 
Thus the detailed specification of the requirements for nurse education which resulted from 
Project 2000 and which were enforced through the regulatory authority given to the UKCC and its 
successor body the NMC, also meant further underlying conditions for the existence of a 
monopsony or MG were fulfilled: the condition regarding the substitutability of suppliers was 
fulfilled since the product of the suppliers in the MG had become relatively ‘well specified’. From 
the perspective of the GM, the sellers (education providers) thereby became more readily 
substitutable for each other.170 
 
There was also a potential substitutability of sellers’ outputs generally: instead of newly educated 
UK trained healthcare professionals, healthcare providers could source some equivalent new 
labour resources from outside of the UK or EU, especially if it could be shown these were for 
occupations where suitably qualified and skilled labour was in short supply in the UK.  
 
A further condition for monopsony and MG - regarding no alternative buyers becoming available - 
was also fulfilled because the nature of the well specified product entailed in its production the 
use of specialised resources, mainly academic staff, for which there were no alternative economic 
deployments and which over a given time horizon were not economically amenable to 
transformation (e.g. from retraining) for alternative employment within the suppliers’ 
organizations. Consequently the specialised nature of these resources of the suppliers also meant 
that over a given time horizon the exit costs of those suppliers from the MG could be relatively 
high and exceed the opportunity costs to them of staying in the MG. The implications this had for 
the suppliers’ power dependence relations in their IOR with the GM would depend to some extent 
on the proportion of their activities that those suppliers had bound up with the MG. 
 
As a consequence of the above, both the individual supply curves and the aggregate supply curve 
in the MG would be upward sloping and relatively inelastic. This fulfilled a further underlying 
condition for the existence of monopsony or MG.
171 
                                                             
169 Although the education product was well specified and closely controlled by the relevant regulatory body, 
this did not mean that the specification itself remained the same over time. Rather, the onus was on education 
providers to ensure their provision was developed appropriately when any changes to the specification of the 
education product were made. 
170 It is assumed here that the more standard and detailed the specification of the education ‘product’ the less 
opportunity there was for suppliers (education providers) to differentiate their offerings. However, a perfect 
substitutability of all suppliers for each other is not assumed here. Suppliers in virtue of their geographical 
location relative to placement opportunities might still have enjoyed barriers to entry to at least some of the 
other potential suppliers, at least in the short run and also even to some of those potential suppliers located in 
the same geographical region covered by the MG. The existence and strength of such barriers to entry would 
have probably depended on the overall size of the region, the transportation links within the region, the 
overall number of suppliers in a given region and their location relative to each other. 
Suppliers could also have differentiated themselves in the recruitment market for potential students on the 
basis of the perceived reputation of their university overall. Potentially this could have translated into 
recruitment of students who were more likely to complete their programmes of study. This in turn would have 
led to higher outputs from a given level of funding and consequently better VFM from the standpoint of the 
NHS education commissioner. 
171 A supplier, especially if it is an organization with resources to sustain it over the short run, can operate 
simultaneously in monopsonistic and non-monopsonistic markets. This does not mean necessarily that the 







4.1.3 UK Higher Education (UK HE) 
 
Developments in UK HE also had a bearing on the emergence of the MG, in particular on the supply 
side.172 Two of the recommendations of Project 2000 were (i) nurse education be moved from the 
existing Schools of Nursing (mostly based on hospital sites and attached to particular hospitals) to 
separate autonomous Colleges of Health (so that the needs of the health service did not continue to 
dominate the content of education and its delivery) and (ii) the Colleges of Health should develop 
links with the HE sector (so that the curriculum had a stronger academic component). The 
appropriateness and feasibility of these recommendations depended upon there being a sufficient 
number of suitable organizations in the UK HE sector which would have the willingness to engage 
with the education requirements of the NHS non-medical occupations workforce. This indeed was 
the case as a result of events over the preceding 30 years which had taken place in UK HE. 
 
Following the report of the Anderson Committee in 1960 which led to the introduction of student 
maintenance grants,173 and the Robbins Report174 in 1963 which led to the creation of new HE 
organizations, the HE sector in Great Britain expanded five fold in student numbers over the period 
1963 to 1995.175  The complexion and nature of organizations which made up the HE sector also 
changed. With the main aim of providing an effective response to the manpower needs of industry, 
in 1966 the government formulated a plan for, and later decided to implement, a binary system of 
higher education, comprising universities in one part of the system (including, as recommended by 
Robbins, the CATs which were relabelled as ‘universities’, and the creation of an additional 17 new 
‘plate glass universities’), and mainly ‘Polytechnics’ in the other. Following the 1966 White Paper, ‘A 
Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges’,176 30 ‘Polytechnics’ were created over the period 1969-
1973 out of mergers of 60 existing technical, commercial and art colleges in the further education 
sector. These organizations formed one side of a binary division of the HE sector with ‘universities’ 
on the other side of the binary divide. It was envisaged that universities would continue as largely 
autonomous organizations ‘whose primary purpose was the pursuit and transmission of knowledge 
and culture through research, scholarship, and teaching’.177 Polytechnics primarily would be teaching 
institutions and that ‘the purpose of any research (carried out within the polytechnics) was to 
support the teaching function’.178 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
would not be ‘pure monopsonies’. The specialist nature of the supplier’s resources and the relative costs of 
transforming those resources so these could be economically deployed elsewhere (within a given time 
horizon) might be such that the conditions for monopsony (in the monopsony market) continue to prevail. 
172 A summary of relevant key events in HE is given above in Table 5(iii). 
173 Anderson C. 1960 ‘Grants to Students: report of the Committee appointed by the Minister of Education and 
the Secretary of State for Scotland’ Cmnd 1051, HMSO London 
174 ‘The Robbins Report’ Cmnd 2154, HMSO London 1963; see also ‘The Robbins Report’ Memorandum by the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General to the Cabinet of HM Government C. (63) 173 London 
30th September 1963 Available at: http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-114-c-173.pdf  
Accessed 31st March 2013  
175 Archive 5 GB HE Statistics 1963-2012. Sources: HESA; The Robbins Report (1963), ibid. Statistics for Great 
Britain only (rather than for the UK) were available for 1963. Consequently Great Britain was used as the 
baseline in this comparison and the later data from HESA were selected accordingly.   
176 Department of Education and Science (1966) ‘A Plan for Polytechnics and other Colleges’; available at 
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-125-c-70.pdf Accessed February 2014 
177 Booth C. (1999) ‘The Rise of the New Universities in Britain’ pp 106-123 in ‘The Idea of a University’ eds. 
Smith D. and Langslow A. K., Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London,  p. 108 






The binary system operated from 1969 to 1988/1992 and was the UK HE sector context within which 
the MG was initiated and established. According to Pratt (1997)
179 the polytechnics transformed the 
academic quality of technical and vocational education that had previously been available. To some 
extent this was probably due to the impact of the CNAA on the polytechnics particularly through the 
processes of validation and revalidation of the polytechnic degrees: university level standards were 
set and enforced by the CNAA and this also enabled the dissemination of good practice on academic 
standards in the polytechnics.180 
 
Pratt (1997) also claimed that the thriving of the polytechnics under the binary system brought 
about some other lasting and important changes in the UK HE sector and to UK HEIs generally (i.e. to 
universities as well as to polytechnics), changes which endured beyond the eventual abolition of the 
binary system itself. These changes included greater expansion of the HE sector,181 and greater 
access to higher education.182 According to Pratt (1997) the polytechnics were also influential on the 
whole HE sector (i.e. including the universities) in the development of curricula and pedagogy that 
was more responsive to needs arising from changes in industry and technology, and the consequent 
impact of these changes on occupations, occupational structures and social mobility; polytechnics 
pioneered and established many new subject areas as appropriate for higher education and for 
study at degree level.183 
 
Context in 1989 of UK Higher Education: by 1989 when the government was considering the options 
for NHS workforce education the UK HE sector had developed in two important respects. Firstly, 
there were now a sufficient number of potentially suitable organizations in the HE sector for 
realising the ambitions set out in the Project 2000 report for a more academic curriculum founded 
on evidence based practice and research. It was recognised at the time that the Colleges of Health 
might themselves eventually be merged into Higher Education organizations - the 1988 Education 
Reform Act had taken the Polytechnics out of Local Authority control and made these into Higher 
Education Corporations (HECs) and it would not be long before the HECs became designated as ‘new 
universities’ under the Further and Higher Education Act 1992.184 
                                                             
179 Pratt, John (1997) ibid 
180 ‘With more than a thousand academics involved in its subject boards, the CNAA was particularly important 
as a mechanism for spreading good practice. Above all it encouraged polytechnics to adopt a self-critical 
culture which became embedded in their own processes for regularly evaluating their courses against students’ 
needs’. Booth C. (1999) ibid p. 109 
A further factor was the gradual influx of a new generation of more highly academically qualified academic 
staff in the Polytechnics: over the 1970s and 1980s these gradually came to replace most of the academic staff 
inherited from the regional and area technical colleges and probably helped in the picking up by the 
polytechnics of the good practice being transferred from the universities through the CNAA validation 
processes. 
181 Between 1965 and 1992 the number of students in the polytechnics had grown five-fold, twice the rate of 
growth in the universities. Pratt (1997)  
182 According to Pratt (1997) the polytechnics functioned to increase access to higher education courses from 
non-traditional students, including minority ethnic and mature students, and ‘non-standard entrants’.  In 1991 
the polytechnics had twice as many part-time students as the universities and nearly four times as many 
sandwich students. In effect, the polytechnics functioned in such a way as to enable the UK HE system to 
become a mass system. Pratt (1997) 
183 Innovation in curricula relevant to changes in allied health occupations, occupational structures and medical 
technologies took place in universities long before the advent of polytechnics; for example the first degree in 
nursing was established in 1960 by the University of Edinburgh. Thus Pratt’s argument about the influence of 
the polytechnics on curricula is probably more relevant here to the diffusion of innovation throughout the HE 
sector rather than about the genesis of that innovation. 
184 Meerabau (2001) noted in the initial implementation of Project 2000 (c. 1988/89) that neither the Secretary 







Consequently the role of the District Health Authorities (‘DHAs’), which in 1989 straddled both the 
purchasing of healthcare and the management of hospitals which in turn were the providers of 
education, was to be changed: the DHAs would continue as purchasers of education but they would 
no longer also be involved in its provision. Subsequently, in 1991 when the RHAs began to take over 
from the DHAs the purchasing of NHS education, the purchaser provider split in NHS workforce 
education was implemented: the Colleges of Health had become autonomous, some had already 
been merged with HECs (shortly to become ’new universities’), and the remainder were in the 
course of being merged.185 
 
Secondly, beginning in the 1960s, the role of HE in the UK economy was seen by successive 
governments as having an increasing importance for the economy. By the late 1980s, the five-fold 
increase in UK HE which had taken place over the course of the previous 25 years had transformed 
the UK HE sector into a mass higher education system which, from the standpoint of government, 
had become more strategic to the UK economy, politically more visible and much more substantial 
in its requirement for funding; ‘within the knowledge-based economy the connection between the HE 
institutional sub-system and policy goals of economic growth became sharper’ (Enders et al 2013). 
Consequently, as with the NHS sector, the UK HE sector became a candidate for NPM approaches to 
its management. This required two things: 
(i) The universities were to be transformed so that they became organizations that were amenable 
to internal management and external control. Under the contractualism of PAT, the HE sector was 
represented as an input-output system which was reducible to an economic production system. 
However, to make the HE sector amenable to NPM approaches, changes were needed to the key 
constituent organizations of HE, viz. the universities. Under an NPM programme, universities were to 
be changed from being bottom heavy with ‘low potency for collective action’ to ‘strategic 
organizational actors with capacities for managerial self-regulation and internal control’ (Enders et 
al 2013, p. 9). Under NPM ‘universities were supposed to act as social entities that possessed a ... 
degree of autonomy ... with self-interested goals as well as with rational means, commanding 
independent resources and visible boundaries’. The underlying assumption was that, within an NPM 
framework the application of the new tools of governmental control would increase organizational 
performance. 
(ii) Competition between the transformed universities was to be engendered. ‘The installation of 
relations of competition in HE has been seen as a way of increasing productivity, accountability and 
control, and of improving quality’ (Olssen & Peters 2005). ‘Increased competition (in HE) is meant to 
increase responsiveness, flexibility and rates of innovation ... increase diversity of what is produced 
and what can be chosen ... enhance productive and allocative efficiency ... improve the quality and 
volume of production ... strengthen accountability [of HEIs and of the HE sector] to students, 
employers and government’ (Marginson 1997, p. 5). Implementation of an NPM approach by 
government to management of the UK HE sector commenced in 1988: following the 1988 Education 
Reform Act, the UK government introduced the principle of ‘contractual funding’ into the HE sector, 
i.e. ‘that the public funds allocated to universities/polytechnics/colleges are in exchange for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Health and HEIs. It was a couple of years later, when the those links had developed and were seen to be 
working that mergers between the Colleges and HEIs became the actual direction of policy. Source: Meerabau, 
E. (2001) ‘Back to the bedpans: the debates over preregistration nursing education in England’ in Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 34(4) pp 427-435 
185 Burke, L.M. (1995) ‘Political principles in action: a critical analysis of Education and Training: Working Paper 
10 and its implications for nurse education’ in Nurse Education Today 1995 (15) pp 381-389; Walsh, D. (2013) 






provision of teaching and research and are conditional on their delivery ...’.186 Thus the possibility of 
contract based IOR in the HE sector was created just as it was for the NHS internal market. 
 
A further condition for the establishing of a monopsony or MG – the existence of many sellers in 
formal contract-based relations of exchange - had thus also been satisfied: with c. 100 HE 
organizations across the UK willing to participate in NHS education, there were many potential 
sellers in each of the 14 RHA regions.187 
 
4.1.4 A Confluence of Events, a Critical Juncture and an MG Outcome 
 
The events described in the preceding three sections came together in the late 1980s and functioned 
to bring about the establishment of the MG. In summary, these events were associated with 
perceived functional, educational, organizational, and inter-organizational requirements: 
 
 In regard to functional requirements:  advances in healthcare and in the expectations of 
healthcare in the decades following the establishment of the NHS engendered a 
development in the perceived requirements for, and in the expectations of non-medical 
roles, especially nursing. 
 In regard to education requirements: the preparation for practice provided by the Schools of 
Nursing attached to hospitals came to be seen as inadequate and it was concluded in 
government committees in the 1970s and 1980s that ‘modern’ healthcare roles such as 
nursing required systematic knowledge and evidence based practice. 
 In regard to organizational requirements: to ensure the delivery of the education provision 
of the requisite scope and balance it was decided by government that the Schools of Nursing 
which hitherto were part of the employer healthcare organizations, be transformed into 
independent Colleges of Health. At the same time the independence of the Colleges of 
Health from the day to day operational pressures of the service was also extended to their 
students with a change in the status of the latter from being part of the staff establishment 
to being supernumery. To develop education provision of the requisite quality and 
particularly to ensure that curricula were evidence-based, it was envisaged that the Colleges 
of Health would develop close relationships with HEIs. In the event the latter quickly were 
seen to be so successful that government decided it would be helpful that all Colleges 
eventually were merged into existing HEIs. 
 In regard to IOR requirements: reflecting the emergent NPM approach of government to the 
public sector it was simply assumed in WP10 (1989) that the principle of ‘contractual 
funding’ should apply to the education provision and that there should be a purchaser-
provider split. Both the principle and the way it was to be applied were compatible with the 
arrangements and objectives of the internal market about to be introduced into the NHS 
and, as noted above, the principle had already been introduced into the HE sector in the 
previous year (1988). Thus the NHS-HE inter-sector IOR that would eventually develop were 
also envisaged as based on market based arrangements to promote competition and (it was 
assumed) bring about greater efficiency in education outputs. 
 
                                                             
186 DES (1988a and b) letters from the Secretary of State to the Chairmen of newly created funding agencies 
(the Universities funding Council and the Polytechnic and Colleges Funding Council, cited by Williams, G. 
(2004), p. 246  
187 Sources: National Audit Office (2001); BMP JM Consulting Report (2003) – Archive 28; BMP JM Consulting 
Review – Archive 29; BMP Agreement 2009 – Archive 30; CoDH (2006) Briefing on the current crisis in nursing 
education – Archive 5; Walsh, D. and Jelfs, E. (2015) ‘Beyond BMP: Where next for the funding of nursing, 






In effect, WP10 functioned as the critical juncture which brought together the relevant preceding 
events in the NHS and HE sectors as well as the outcomes of policy proposals relating to the 
development of non-medical workforce education. The establishment of what became the MG in 
non-medical education was the direct result of the decisions, based closely on WP10, which were 
taken shortly thereafter and given legislative effect under the NHS and Community Care Act 1990. 
 
It is not being claimed here that government policy makers intended that the institutional 
arrangements to ensure a purchaser-provider split be ‘government monopsonies' as such; the term 
‘monopsony’ did not appear in any of the policy papers at that time and the first reference to the 
term ‘monopsony’ in relation to the UK government’s role in higher education that the writer was 
able to find was made some years after these events, in Williams, G. (1997) cited by Brown, R. with 
Carasso, H. (2013). It seems more likely it was a consequence unintended by government policy 
makers that the NHS-HE inter-sector institutional arrangements actually established met all of the 
underlying conditions defining ‘government monopsonies’. However, according to Williams (1997) 
the exercise of power by government which happened to be ‘near-monopsonistic’ was intended: 
commenting on the letters from the Secretary of State to the Funding Councils (DES 1988a, DES 
1988b) Williams stated: ‘(The letters were) quite explicit that higher education institutions were 
henceforward to be seen as selling teaching ... services to the government which was the near 
monopsonistic purchaser of these services. This transfer of financial power from the suppliers of 
academic services to a proxy consumer was extremely far reaching’.188 
  
                                                             






4.2 Origins of the Inter-organizational Relationship (IOR) 
 
The NHS Education Buyer/Commissioner (the ‘GM’): the RHAs had been established in 1973 as part 
of an extensive reorganization of the NHS. The main functions of the RHAs were to oversee the NHS 
Trusts (which began to be established from 1991), the DHAs, and the Area Health Authorities, in the 
provision of healthcare in the NHS. In discharging this responsibility the RHAs were to provide 
direction and leadership to the DHAs and Trusts and to ensure that local systems of healthcare 
operated effectively. In 1991 the RHAs took over from the DHAs the funding and responsibilities for 
NHS workforce education. Until 1996 the GM for the NHS area within which MU was located was the 
RHA (North Thames). 
 
Middlesex Polytechnic (MP)/Middlesex University (MU): a summary of relevant key events is given 
below in Table 5(iv). 
 
Caption to Table 5(iv) 
 
 Summary of events from the standpoint of MU which led up to the formation of the IOR 
 MU sought growth and diversification into new academic subject areas, objectives which it had 




Middlesex Polytechnic (MP) was established in 1973 as one of the 30 polytechnics created over the 
period 1969-73. MP itself was typical of the ‘new’ polytechnics both in its creation out of the 
amalgamation of existing colleges and technical institutes, and in the scope and nature of its 
portfolio of subjects and disciplines. MP grew through the 1970s with the merger of 3 further 
colleges. During the late 1980s MP senior management first became aware of the potential for 
involvement in nurse education arising from the implementation of Project 2000. In 1990/91 MP 
initiated and launched its own degree in nursing (in conjunction with Barnet College). Subsequently, 
MP tendered, in competition with other universities, to the relevant RHA for its region, for non-
medical education to the NHS. The tendering process was initiated, designed and managed by the 
RHA and was a process which was replicated in all RHA regions. The objective of the RHAs was to 
secure the merger of each of the existing the Colleges of Health with universities whose tenders 
were successful. However, MU (which had tendered to merge with Barnet College) was not 
successful in its tender. However, a tender from another HEI which had initially been successful 
subsequently failed in the ensuing negotiations about merger with the relevant College, the North 
London College of Health Studies (NLCHS). Subsequently, in c. 1994, MU was approached by the 
NLCHS about the possibility of a merger. 
 
MU proceeded to negotiate with the RHA about a merger with the NCLHS; those negotiations 
concluded in a signed agreement of merger; the NLCHS became part of MU as a ‘Faculty of Health 
Studies’ and MU took over the NHS contracts. Thus the IOR between the NHS Education Buyer (the 







4.3 IOR Context 1995 – 2013: Persistence of the Conditions of MG 
 
The provision of non-medical education by HEIs to the NHS continued to be made mostly under 
conditions of MG on a quasi-market basis for the whole of the reference period 1995-2013: 
 
1. There was a single education buyer (the GM) whose standing was protected by government 
regulation and whose resources came entirely from the state.189 
 
2. The education product for pre-registration education (which accounted for c. 90% of the activity 
by volume and value in the MG) continued to be ‘well specified’ both in terms of content and 
delivery, by the relevant regulatory body; consequently from the buyer’s standpoint different 
suppliers continued to be substitutable for each other.190 The potential substitutability of sellers’ 
outputs generally also remained, particularly in terms of the potential for healthcare workforce 
employers to source registered non-medical professionals from outside of the UK.191 
 
3. No alternative buyers for outputs from the specialised resources (mainly academic staff) of the 
suppliers became available. The potential cost of the transformation (via retraining) of those 
resources so that they could be redeployed by the suppliers to alternative uses continued to be 
uneconomic. Under their IOR contracts with the GM, sellers continued to be barred from charging 
tuition fees to their students; 192 thus, the entire income to sellers, such as MU, from their NHS 
contracts activities continued to come from the GM. 
 
4. As a consequence of the persistence of the conditions under 2 and 3 above, the individual supply 
curves and the aggregate supply curve in the MG continued to be upward sloping and relatively 
inelastic over the reference period. 
 
5. There were many sellers as well as many potential sellers in the geographic area defined for the 
GM over the course of the reference period.193 This remained the case even when GM restructurings 
took place and the geographic area covered by the GM was redefined; for example, in 2012 for the 
region applicable to the IOR there were c. 12 potential higher education providers of adult nursing 
pre-registration programmes and 9 actual providers. 
 
6. Processes determining contracts, outputs and prices were in their final stages usually conducted 
between the GM and individual sellers. The exceptions to this occurred in the later part of the 
reference period when from 2009 the sellers acted in concert in processes of price determination.194 
The effect of this was that on dimensions of the price component of the IOR, the conditions under 
which the IOR existed became those of bilateral monopoly. However, as will be discussed below in 
Chapter 6, from 2011 these conditions of bilateral monopoly began to be contested by the GM.   
 
Finding (1): The IOR investigated in the inquiry originated under conditions of MG and continued to 
exist mostly under those conditions during the reference period.   
                                                             
189 Sources: National Audit Office (2001); Department of Health (2006a); NHS London (2007); GM Presentation 
to LDHG (March 2011) – Archive 130 
190 Sources: NMC (2004); NMC (2010). As stated earlier, perfect substitutability between suppliers within a 
given geographic area is not being claimed here. What is being claimed is that the substitutability of suppliers 
remained relatively high throughout the reference period.  
191 Sources: Buchan, J. (2012); Buchan, J. and Seccombe, I. (2011); Buchan, J., Seccombe, I. and O’May, F. 
(2013). 
192 Sources: MU NHS Contracts 1997-2013 – Archives 32 – 38. 
193 Sources: National Audit Office (2001); BMP JM Consulting Report (2003) – Archive 28; BMP JM Consulting 
Review – Archive 29; BMP Agreement 2009 – Archive 30; CoDH (2006) Briefing on the current crisis in nursing 
education – Archive 5; Walsh, D. and Jelfs, E. (2015) ‘Beyond BMP: Where next for the funding of nursing, 
midwifery and AHP pre-registration education in England?’ – Archive 145 










The purpose of this Chapter is to present and analyse the empirical findings in regard to research 
question 2 of the inquiry195, viz. 
 
2. What were the key outcomes and consequences for IOR in/stability over the reference period in 
each of the main components of the IOR, viz. contracts, outputs, price and performance? 
 
The IOR stability concept was operationalised on 14 dimensions of IOR key outcomes and 
performance, defined above in Table 1.196 IOR stability was assessed on each of the 14 dimensions 
on the basis of the criteria defined above in Table 2.197 The main findings of this inquiry on the 
stability over time of the IOR between the GM and MU are summarised above in Table 3(i).198 In this 
chapter these findings on the stability of the IOR are presented and analysed at three levels of the 
IOR, dimensions, components, and overall. To facilitate the presentation of the analysis the 
dimensions were grouped under their relevant IOR component, (i) contracts; (ii) outputs; (iii) price; 
(iv) performance.  
 




Over the whole of the reference period, 1995 – 2013, MU had a contract with the NHS Education 
buyer/commissioner (the GM) for its pre-registration education provision. Several successive 
contracts were involved; this was mainly because of re-organizations of the NHS during the period 
and consequent changes in its structures of provision and commissioning, including education 
commissioning. The terms within existing contracts also gave rise to new successor contracts, 
whether because the existing contracts had a limited duration which was about to expire, or 
because there was a contract review requirement. 
 
Throughout the reference period, the overall structures and detailed contents of the contracts were 
initiated and designed by the GM. The contracts were locally drawn and did not originate in national 
contracts or framework agreements.199 In terms of contract structures/’heads of terms’, the main 
changes to the framework of the IOR contracts were as a result of GM initiatives. Details of the GMs 
for MU and their dates are in Archive 6. Also in Archive 6 are details of each of the nine NHS 
contracts for pre-registration education held by MU over the reference period; these details include 
the identity of the GM and the periods in which each contract had effect. Copies of the contracts are 
in Archives 32-39. Copies of national framework agreements are in Archives 40-41.  
                                                             
195 The empirical findings in regard to research questions 3 and 4 of the inquiry are presented in the following 
Chapter, Chapter 6.  
196 See supra chapter 3, Table 1. 
197 See supra chapter 3, Table 2. 
198 See supra chapter 3, Table 3. 
199 A National Standard Contract (NSC) was established in 2006. In 2010 the NSC was developed as a National 
Standard Education Framework Agreement (NSEFA). The intention of the NSC and NSEFA was to provide a 
framework that would be adopted by local GM areas/regions throughout the UK. However neither the NFC nor 
the NSEFA were accepted by the GM and consequently some important provisions in them were never 
implemented for the IOR. Details of what was stipulated on each of the dimensions under the NSC and the 






5.1.2 Definitions of Contracts Key Outcomes Dimensions 
  
Under the contracts component of the IOR, the key outcomes were defined on 4 dimensions, 
comprising:200  
 
1. Duration was the period for which the current contract was in force. 
 
2. Termination referred to the ways in which the contract could be brought to an end. 
 
3. Contract Compliance – Information Requirements were the information reporting requirements 
under the contract, including their content and frequency. 
 
   – Management and Review included the content and processes of contract 
monitoring, management and review, e.g. contract performance indicators, quarterly and annual 
reporting requirements, action plans and review frequency. There was some overlap between the 
requirements for management and review and for information. 
 
4. Placement Responsibilities were about the responsibilities for the obtaining of placements, their 
planning, organization and management, and how these responsibilities were distributed between 
the organizations in the IOR. 
 
Shown below under each dimension are the relevant stability impact indicator, a summary of the key 
outcomes identified, and an assessment of the impact of the key outcomes on IOR stability. 201 To 
enable analysis of changes over time, the key outcomes for each dimension were ordered 
chronologically. The same format of presentation is also maintained in the sub-sections below for 
the other IOR components. Fuller details of the key outcomes for most of the dimensions as they 
appeared in the various contracts for the IOR are in Archive 6.  
 





                                                             
200 As stated in Chapter 3, a total of 14 dimensions were defined, these relating to the IOR key outcomes on the 
4 components - contracts, outputs, price, and IOR performance. All 14 dimensions were defined in accordance 
with the definitions of these in the contracts, so that the dimensions were grounded in the empirical reality of 
the IOR. From a review of the ‘heads of terms’ in all of the contracts, it is believed that those which were most 
relevant to the IOR key outcomes have been included here. The main omissions were terms about insurances, 
disputes and jurisdiction. However, none of these terms or changes that were made to them gave rise to 
issues which remained unresolved or which had a material impact on the IOR and its stability. 
Since the contracts between the GM and MU were the mechanisms governing the relations of exchange in the 
IOR then all of the 14 dimensions could have been classified under a ‘contracts’ component. However, the 
processes in the IOR relating to outputs, price and performance were sufficiently distinctive to merit a 
typology of the IOR which facilitated the analysis of these individually as well as in relation to each other. 
201 These analyses were informed by interpretations of the contracts made by the writer. The contracts had 
generally been well drawn so it is thought that the interpretations were reliable. In making these 
interpretations the writer was able to draw on written legal opinions obtained on the 2008 and 2012 contracts 
as well as on the 2010 NSEFA. For reasons of ‘legally privileged’ confidentiality, none of these legal opinions 
are quoted from directly. Sources of data for dimensions 1-4: IOR contracts and contract documentation and 







Contracts throughout the reference period had a definite duration. Duration lengthened in the first 
10 years of the reference period, from an annually rolling 3 years in 1995/96 to 5 years for the 
period 2000/01 – 2005/06. In a period of restructuring of the NHS which directly affected the GM, 
there followed 3 successive ‘interim contracts’ each of 1 year’s duration for the years 2005/06-
2007/08. The subsequent 2008/09 contract was for 5 years, extendable by 1 year on up to three 
occasions; the 2012/13 contract had duration of 3 years, extendable by one year on up to two 
occasions. In all instances it was the GM which determined the duration clauses stipulated in the 








Until 2004/05, contracts could be terminated only in the event of a material breach of the contract 
which was not remedied within a specified time. In the 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08 contracts 
either party could terminate on written notice – no period of notice was specified. In the 2008/09 
and 2012/13 contracts either partial or full termination could be effected on one academic year’s 
notice being given by either party in the event that some or all of the programmes ceased to be 
offered or required.202 In all instances it was the GM which determined the termination clauses 
stipulated in the contract. Given the conditions of termination in the contracts as stated above, in 
particular the various notice periods (if stipulated) that were required for termination, the following 









                                                             
202 In the event of termination students already in the system that would be completing their programmes 
after the termination dates would continue to be funded. These stipulations regarding the ‘consequences of 






Contract Compliance – Information: From 1995/96 to 2007/08 the information which MU had to 
provide under the contract consisted mainly of quarterly returns of data about student numbers and 
movements in the system. The dataset was broadly equivalent to the minimum data set the 
University had to provide in its reporting to HESA with some additional data items reflecting some 
distinctive characteristics of NHS education provision.203 
 
Under the contract for 2008/09 the information which MU had to provide increased substantially. In 
addition to the earlier information requirements, MU had to provide further information as part of a 
new contract performance and management (CPM) system which was introduced by the GM. This 
additional information included analysis of the quarterly data returns as part of plans to ‘maintain 
and improve (contract) performance’. Analysis at individual student datum level was required where 
appropriate, and where there were small cohorts this was almost inevitable.204 
 
The information requirements continued to grow as the new CPM system itself was developed. In 
particular there was under the 2012/13 contract a substantially increased requirement on MU to 
provide qualitative data, analysis and information.205 
 
Contract Compliance – Management and Review: From 1995/96 to 2007/08, contract management 
consisted of review meetings once or twice a year and an annual report to the GM prepared MU. 
Reporting was to course level. A new CPM system was foreshadowed in the 2007/08 interim 
contract, in which a brief outline of it was given. It was not until the 2008/09 LEC that significant 
detail of the new CPM was provided and implementation of it got under way. Subsequently the CPM 
system continued to develop, mainly in terms of further information and management review 
requirements. For example, under the new CPM system, from 2008/09 review meetings were held 
quarterly. Eventually the CPM included a new ‘Quality Assurance Framework’ (QAF). The QAF was in 
addition to the University’s own quality assurance systems and the review under the QAF was also 
additional to the annual monitoring reviews of the same education provision conducted by the 
regulator, the NMC. Under the QAF, in addition to the requirements set out in the 2008/09 contract 
(at programme and cohort levels draft action plans, identification of strengths and weaknesses) MU 
was required as part of an annual review process to: ‘assess the quality of the provision for each 
Programme against the agreed key performance indicators in partnership with their Placement 
Providers and to monitor the performance of their Placement Providers’. The ‘key performance 
indicators’ (KPIs) to be used were specified by the GM and comprised: 20 KPIs, 5 business 
intelligence measures and 8 sets of supporting information requirements. Progress on the action 
plans was to be reviewed every 3 months by MU reports and meetings between the GM and MU. 
 
Under the 2012/13 contract a new ‘Quality and Contract Performance Management’ (QCPM) 
framework was initiated by the GM and formally implemented. The QCPM was based on the CPM 
system which it replaced and was the culmination of developments to the latter which had taken 
place since 2008/09. The QCPM also incorporated further measures which the GM had developed 
from ideas obtained from bidders submissions made as part of the 2012/13 contract tender process. 
The QCPM had 32 Contract Performance Indicators (CPIs) measured in 8 dimensions on 68 
‘compliance and innovation’ measures; there were also ‘business intelligence’ measures on a further 
                                                             
203 In comparison with the HESA requirements the main additional information which MU had to provide was 
an annual report which consisted in an interpretation of the quantitative statistics. Examples of the 
requirements from different times during the reference period include: (i) Letter and enclosures from North 
London Consortium to MU of 3rd June 1996 – Archive 27, NHS History 6A, pp 1-4 (ii) NHS contract 
documentation 2004-05 – Archive 33 p. 14. 
204 Source: NHS contract documentation 2008-09 – Archive 37 p. 15, pp 29-34. 






9 dimensions. As per the 2008 contract, reporting was to include plans by programme, with progress 
on action plans reported quarterly and reviewed in meetings between the GM and MU. The new 
QCPM system also included the placement part of the education provision for which MU as under 
the 2008 LEC continued to have full responsibility. Full details of the QCPM are in Archive 8. 
 
The burden of the QCPM introduced under the 2012/13 contract was estimated by MU management 
to be about five times that of the burden placed on them by the annual monitoring reviews and five 
yearly validation reviews conducted by the professional body regulator, the NMC. 
 
Given the increased and increasing compliance burdens placed on MU commencing in 2008/09 and 








From 1995/96 until 2004/05, the planning management and organization of placements was the 
joint responsibility of the organizations in the IOR. It was the responsibility of the GM and the 
placement providers to find sufficient placement capacity. From 2005 it became the responsibility of 
MU (in consultation with placement providers) ‘to determine the location of any Clinical 
Placements.’206 
 
From 2008/09, the planning management and organization of placements became the sole 
responsibility of MU. The quality of placements in terms of the standards required by the 
professional body regulator (the NMC) also became the sole responsibility of MU which, under the 
2008/09 and the 2012/13 contracts, had to ‘use its reasonable endeavours’ to ensure those 




The above stability impact assessments reflected the fact that from 2005/06 MU had taken on sole 
responsibility for some aspects of the quality of the product over which they had no control. 
Whether or not a placement was provided was in the control of a potential placement provider, not 
of MU. As to the placements when provided: the placement environment as well as the conduct of 
the placement was mostly in the control of the placement provider; MU could influence the 
placement (e.g. through the training and guidance they provided to placement provider mentors) 
but not control it. 
 
                                                             
206 NHS contract 2005-06, Archive 34, p. 5 






A copy of the 1995 contract was not available. However it was possible based on other contract 
documents from that period and from interviews with MU management to make an estimated 
assessment for 1995/96-1997/98 on the stability impact indicator for this dimension; this also the 
case with similar estimated assessments made for 1995/96-1997/98 on dimensions 6, 12 and 13.208 
 
5.2 Outputs Key Outcomes and Stability Impacts 
 
5.2.1 Definitions of Outputs Key Outcomes Dimensions 
 
Under the outputs component of the IOR, the key outcomes were defined on 4 dimensions, 
comprising: 
 
5. Output Specification was the specification of the education product/service. 
 
6. Output Floors and Ceilings referred to restrictions on the changes to quantities of new 
commissions’ outputs from one year to the next which could be made by the NHS education 
commissioner. ‘Floors’ referred to permitted maximum reductions in quantities of new commissions 
for a given year; ‘ceilings’ referred to permitted maximum increases of new commissions for a given 
year. 
 
7. Short Run Variability of Output Quantities referred to the extent to which the GM varied its 
demand from year to year for quantities of outputs. Quantities were defined in terms of 
‘commissions’ for the education and training provision for students on programmes of specified 
duration. Commissions were measured in terms of ‘full-time equivalent students’ (FTEs). Targets for 
new commissions were set annually by the GM in consultation with its suppliers.209 
 
8. Trends in GM Demand for Output Quantities were defined in terms of the direction (increase or 
decrease) of the annually moving 3 year total of the output quantities demand of the GM.  
  
5.2.2 Outputs Key Outcomes Stability Impacts 
 




The stipulations in the contracts throughout the reference period about output specification 
reflected the standard nature of the product demanded by the GM. Under the 2008/09 and 2012/13 
contracts programmes were to be reviewed annually to ensure they continued to meet the GM’s 
‘workforce requirements’. However, the requirements of the professional body remained paramount 
throughout the reference period – the technical specification for outputs was stipulated as 
conformance to the requirements of the professional body regulator. Consequently both the GM 
                                                             
208 Archive 32, pp 1-3 and 9-27. 
209 Under the contracts, any over-recruitment of FTEs against targets was not funded. Because of its 
implications for the payment of student bursaries the education provider might also be subject to income 






and MU were ‘specification takers’; although from 2007/08 the GM introduced a new CPM (later 
“QCPM”) system the performance measures used in that system reflected a focus on the quality 








Until 2004/05 new commissions could be varied by the GM on the previous years’ commissions’ 
level only by a specific amount (c. +/- 15%) that is unless both organizations in the IOR agreed 
otherwise. From 2005/06 the contracts contained no stipulations about floors and ceilings; 
effectively, the levels of new commissions could be set from year to year at any level and be 








The biggest year on year change in overall quantities was a reduction in these of c. (22%) in 2009/10. 
Otherwise changes in overall quantities did not exceed +/- 10% in consecutive years. These changes 
were mainly associated with changes in the levels of new commissions, although annual change in 
attrition rates for the three and four year pre-registration programmes was also a factor. The main 
changes in new commissions’ levels for pre-registration programmes between 1995 and 2004 were 
all increases; from 2005 they were all reductions. The reductions occurred mainly in 2006/07, c. 
(8.5%) and during the last years of the reference period for pre-registration adult nursing 
programmes - the GM reduced its London-wide demand for these programmes for 2010/11 by c. 
(10%), for 2011/12 by c. (19%), and for 2012/13 by c. (25%). There was also a reduction of c. (59%) in 
the GM’s demand for post-registration programmes over the period 2002/03 to 2007/08, with the 
largest year on year reductions occurring in 2002/03, c. (23%) and in 2006/06, c. (19%).210 
                                                             







From 1995/96 to 2008/09 new commissions for pre-registration programmes were allocated by the 
GM to all of its suppliers on the basis of their respective historic shares of those commissions. In 
2009/10 MU volunteered a temporary reduction (for one year) in their new commissions for adult 
nursing programmes. The reduction was necessary because there was insufficient placement 
capacity for MU to fulfil the output demand requirements of the GM. This was agreed on the basis 
that in the following year, 2010/11 MU’s share of the GM’s new commissions London-wide for adult 
nursing pre-registration programmes was restored to its earlier level.211 In 2010/11 the GM initiated 
and implemented a change to the basis of allocation: historic shares would continue to be used but 
the resultant quantities for each supplier were now subject to adjustment (up or down) by the GM 
to reflect that supplier’s performance on the GM’s new CPM system. The GM never revealed details 
of how the levels of adjustments made to allocations were arrived at, nor were details available of 
adjustments made which affected other suppliers. It was possible to conclude however that MU 
gaining a top position in the CPM league table for 2010/11 for one occupational group (mental 
health nursing) resulted in a 15% better allocation to MU than the average allocation to all suppliers 
for that occupation for the following year. 
 
In 2011 the GM initiated and held a tendering process for its commissions on two occupational 
groups which between them accounted for c. 50% of its overall commissions in the MG. As part of 
the tender process the GM introduced a new basis of allocation. Tenders were scored on 12 
dimensions.212 The quantities of commissions which successful bidders received was a function of 
their relative score overall. The outcome of the tender exercise was a reduction in the number of 
existing suppliers (for adult nursing the number of suppliers was reduced from 9 to 8). No new 
suppliers were appointed. The outcome for MU was a reduction in their share of new commissions 
for 2012/13 for adult nursing: MU’s share of new commissions for that market segment declined 
from c. 13.8% (2011/12) to 10.5% (2012/13), effectively a reduction of c. (24%) in one year.213 
 
A feature of the allocation system used by the GM in the tender process was that relatively large 
changes in each supplier’s new commissions’ levels resulted from relatively small differences in their 
relative ranking in the tender and in their relative scores.214 
 
In general over the reference period, MU was able economically to adjust its supply to these changes 
in GM demand, whether brought about by changes in the GM’s overall demand in the MG or by 
changes in the allocation of that demand between suppliers.  Nearly all of these changes were 
signalled well in advance by the GM. With regard to the relatively larger 2009 reduction, MU itself 
had initiated this as a part of a larger exercise it undertook to adjust its supply to available 
placement capacity. The following stability assessments therefore reflected (i) whether the year on 
                                                             
211 Source: Letter from NHSL to MU dated 19th February 2010 – Archive 46. 
212 Full details of the Invitation to Tender were sourced in Archive 47. Although bidders had to submit full 
details of expected costs of their provision, price was not one of the criteria on which the tender was 
evaluated. 
213 Source: Archive 9 and Archive 45. 
214 For adult nursing there were 8 successful bidders and all were scored within the range 61% to 74%; the 
middle 6 of the 8 successful bidders were scored in the range 65.45% to 69%. MU was ranked sixth (bidder 6) 
and scored 65.50%. Bidder 5 was scored 65.54% and bidder 7 was scored 65.45%. Bidder 5 had no reduction 
made to their previous years’ commissions’ level, bidder 6 (MU) had a reduction of c. 36% and bidder 7 had a 
reduction of c. 50%. Sources: (i) Walsh, D. (2013) ‘Middlesex University and the NHS Education Commissioner: 
A History 1994-2013’, p. 120 – Archive 85 (ii) ‘ITT feedback from NHS London to Middlesex University’ April 
2012 – Archive 63 (iii) ‘Update on the tender for Adult Nursing ... January 2012’, attachment presentation 






year changes exceeded the parameters stated in the 2000 contract; (ii) the ability of MU effectively 








Full details of the quantities of commissions received by MU from the GM are given in Archive 9. 
Overall trends in commissions quantities during the period are illustrated in Table 7 below: over the 
course of the reference period the total quantities of MU commissions initially grew by c. 32% 
(1995/96 - 2001/02), then after a one year fall of c. 10% in 2001/02 remained approximately the 
same (2002/03 - 2005/06) before finally going into decline by c. 28% (2006/07 - 2012/13). 
 








Source: Middlesex University NHS Contracts Records, Archive 9 
 
MU’s overall market share, defined as MU’s share of the GM’s total non-medical commissions, was 
c. 10% over the period 2009/10 to 2012/13. MU’s share of pre-registration and post-registration 
total commissions was also approximately the same (c. 10% and c. 9% respectively).  MU offered its 
provision for only some of the non-medical occupations so that its shares within the relevant pre-
registration market segments were higher (at c. 12% for nursing and at c. 15% for midwifery 
programmes). Overall these shares were fairly consistent from year to year. 216 
 
MU’s share of new commissions for pre-registration nursing programmes ranged between c. 13% 
(2007/08 and 2008/09) to c. 8% (2009/10) to c. 11.5% (2010/11 and 2011/12) to 9.8% (2012/13). In 
                                                             
215 Details of agreed commissions for all years 1995 to 2013 were sourced in Archive 9. The details were 
compiled by the writer from MU contracts records and independently checked and confirmed by MU 
management. 
216 Sources: (i) MU quantities from MU and NHS Commissioner contracts records, Archive 9 (ii) Overall market 
commissions’ data for 2007-2012/13 from NHS London: response to Freedom of Information request 
December 2012 – Archive 45. Data for earlier years were not available. But it is estimated that MU’s overall 






contrast MU’s share of new commissions for midwifery programmes was relatively consistent over 




The above stability impact assessments reflected that from being a source of long term growth for 
MU its NHS activity had became a source of long term decline. This is illustrated in Table 8 below: 
the proportion of MU’s total FTE students that were NHS students generally followed the same 
pattern - growth, steady state and decline – as changes in its quantities of NHS agreed 
commissions.218 
 
 Table 8 Middlesex University Quantities (FTEs) of all Students and of all NHS Students 
 
   MU All Students        MU All NHS Students219  MU NHS Students/ 
            MU All Students 
   FTE 000’s  FTE 000’s     %  
 1995/96 18.21   1.62      8.9 
 2001/02 20.39   2.16    10.6 
 2002/03 19.56   1.93      9.8 
 2005/06 21.12   1.94      9.2 
 2011/12 20.66   1.39      6.7 
 
Sources: HESA; MU NHS Contracts Documents – Archives 9 and 10 
 
5.3 Price Key Outcomes and Stability Impacts 
 
5.3.1 Definitions of Price Key Outcomes Dimensions 
 
Under the price component of the IOR, the key outcomes were defined on 4 dimensions, 
comprising: 
 
9. Basis of Price – Innovation was whether price included incentives to the supplier to innovate 
and/or included allowances to the supplier for costs associated with product or process innovation. 
 
10. Basis of Price – Full Economic Costs (FEC) was the nature of the price for outputs (unit price, 
contract price) and the principles on which it was based. FEC was defined as the full economic actual 
cost or the full economic planned standard cost, including the treatment of inflation. FEC was 
defined in this inquiry to exclude costs associated with either product or process innovation – these 
were dealt with separately under IOR dimension 9 (basis of price – innovation).   
 
11. Basis of Price – OBC Risk was the relative shares of the financial risks borne by the GM and MU 
for student attrition. 220 
                                                             
217 Sources: Ibid. 
218 Details of the University’s total student FTE and of its total NHS student FTE over the reference period were 
sourced in Archive 10. 
219 Actual numbers of students are shown here, in Table 8. In Table 7 the NHS numbers shown were ‘planned 
commissions’, not numbers of actual students – hence the differences in figures between the two tables.   






12. Actual Price v Supplier’s Actual/Planned FEC was the actual price paid for outputs relative to the 
supplier’s actual/planned FEC. ‘Actual Price’ was defined as the levels of price, ex post, expressed in 
real terms. 
 
5.3.2 Price Key Outcomes Stability Impacts 
 




Under the IOR contracts from 1995/96 to 2006/07 no allowances were included in the price for MU 
costs associated with product or process innovation; neither were any price related incentives for 
innovation provided. Price in the 1995/96 contract was negotiated and agreed locally by the 
organizations in the IOR. From 2007/08 the price under the contracts for new pre-registration 
commissions became the National Benchmark Price (BMP).221 However the BMP concept was based 
on an historic average actual cost of outputs which did not recognise costs associated with either 
product or process innovation (e.g. the costs of research were specifically excluded from the BMP 
concept).  
 
This continued to be the case under the 2008/09 contract. However, in 2009 following a review of 
the BMP and as the outcome of a national negotiation, ‘price’ was redefined to consist of two 
elements. The first element continued to be the BMP. The second element of price was a ‘quality 
premium’. The quality premium (equal to c. 5% of the BMP) was payable in line with arrangements 
which were to be locally devised by, and agreed between the organizations in the IORs (such as the 
GM and MU). Although never subsequently formalised, the quality premium became from 2009/10 a 
de facto part of the contractual arrangements between NHSL and MU. The quality premium was an 
incentive system designed to reward suppliers which through product and process innovation were 
able to achieve contract compliance outcomes at a relatively high level; such outcomes for example 
might come about through a decrease in the incidence of student attrition, the results of which 
would be reflected in systematic assessments made by the GM under the CPM arrangements of 
supplier contract performance.222  
                                                             
221 The BMP was a national tariff applicable to all professions within non-medical education. The BMP concept 
arose out of recommendations made by the National Audit Office in 2001 in its review on non-medical 
education and training. The NAO found there were wide variations in pricing across the country only part of 
which could be explained by variations in unit costs; it concluded there was evidence of historic under-pricing 
by some HEIs, the latter partly reflecting a legacy of initial ‘market-entry’ level pricing. Source: ‘Educating and 
training the future health professional workforce for England’, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General; 
HC2771 Session 2000-01; 1 March 2001, p.4. 
The BMP concept was subsequently developed in a DH commissioned study in 2002/03; source: ‘Provision of 
Standard Pricing System for NHS Non-Medical Education and Training Contracts’, JM Consulting January 2003. 
A copy of the 2003 JM Consulting report is included as Archive 28. 
The final details of the BMP were agreed subsequently in national level negotiations in 2003 between the 
Department of Health and Universities UK. However the implementation of the BMP did not begin until 2005 
and it was not until 2007 that it was implemented by the GM in London. 
222 Source: ‘BMP Review Process and Outcomes’, p. 12 in ‘CoDH Update on 2008/09 BMP Negotiations’ (March 







Under the 2012/13 contract both elements of price, the BMP element and the ‘quality premium’ 




These stability impact assessments reflected the absence of an innovation element in the price until 
the introduction of the ‘quality premium’ in 2009/10. Once introduced the quality premium 
continued to be part of the price concept in the IOR for the rest of the reference period. 
 




Price agreed under the 1995/96 contract was an overall contract price and was supposed to be 
based on the expected costs to MU of the education provision. However, due to a c. £1m under-
pricing/costing of MU’s proposal, the actual contract price was set at a level well below MU’s FEC.224 
 
Using the contract price and quantities of student (FTE) commissions under the 1995/96 contract as 
the basis, unit prices were calculated and agreed for the 1996/97 contract.225 These unit prices (with 
a negotiated adjustment for annual inflation related to movements in the GDP deflator for the NHS) 
became the basis for price agreed by the GM and MU from 1996/97 until 2006/7.226 
 
In 2007/08 the unit price for pre-registration programmes became the BMP. An underlying principle 
of the BMP was that it should reflect the estimated standard FEC cost to education providers of 
delivering the education provision.227 Although the GM (NHSL) implemented the BMP and paid the 
BMP rates, it never accepted the underlying principle (price ≈ FEC) on which the BMP was supposed 
to be based.228 From 2005/06 the overriding principle adopted by the GM had been that the overall 
contract price should be affordable within its annual budgets. From the GM’s perspective the 
application of this ‘affordability’ principle (from the GM’s standpoint) meant the freedom for it 
either to make adjustments to its demand for output quantities, or to make adjustments to price, or 
to make a combination of output quantity and price adjustments. In relation to unit price, this 
became material in 2005/06 when the GM delayed implementation of the BMP (which would have 
                                                             
223 Changes in NHS structures in 2013 meant that all MG nationwide came under the control of a single GM, 
HEE, from April 2013. However both MU’s 2012 contract and 2008 contracts were novated to HEE so that the 
price arrangements based on BMP and the quality premium continued to apply. 
224 Archive 27, ‘NHS History 4’, pp 1-2, where details were sourced of the items which had been under-costed. 
225 Ibid 
226 Archive 9, ‘Commissions Quantities Prices MU History 1995/96 – 2012/13’ 
227 This principle was stated both in the NSC (2006) and in the NSEFA (2010) – Archive 7.  
228 This was the position also applied to all suppliers throughout the MG at least from 2009 when the below 






raised unit prices) initially to 2006/07 and subsequently to 2007/08.229 Even then, the 
implementation of the BMP was phased in over a three year period: from 2007/08 the BMP was paid 
only for new pre-registration commissions - the old unit rates continued to be paid for students 
already in the system. Thus the BMP was not fully implemented until 2009/10. However, in 2009 the 
BMP unit price itself was affected by application of the principle of ‘affordability’ from the GM’s 
standpoint: due to an intervention by the Chief Executive of the GM, the outcome of the 2008-2009 
national level negotiations on the BMP resulted in its underlying principle, (price ≈ FEC), being 
superseded: the new rates negotiated for the BMP were c. 8.9% less than if the (price ≈ FEC) 
principle had been applied.230   
 
The new 2009/10 BMP rates, with annual increments for inflation, continued as the main basis of 
price for the rest of the reference period (to 2013). Under the 2012/13 contract the BMP rates were 
to continue as the main basis of price until at least 2013/14. For 2014/15 onwards the GM and MU 
were to use ‘all reasonable endeavours’ to agree a new basis for unit price, one which was based on 
‘output measures’. The latter was intended as part of a plan to ‘move away from Benchmark pricing 




These stability assessments reflected the fact that at no time during the reference period was price 
based on the principle that price should approximate to MU’s FEC. 
 
11. Basis of Price – OBC Risk: 
 
After a brief introduction about the background and rationale of OBC, this sub-section is structured 
into four parts (i) Background and Rationale of OBC (ii) Definition and Basis of OBC (iii) Allocation of 
Responsibilities and Risks and (iv) Outcome and Consequences of an OBC Proposal. 
 
(i) Background and Rationale of OBC: from the early 1990s there was a trend in public procurement 
to the use of ‘performance based contracts’ (PBC) otherwise known as ‘output based contracts’ 
(OBC).232 ‘Performance’ was conceptualised as a hierarchy of four levels. In NHS workforce education 
these levels consisted in:233 
 
1. Inputs – such as funding and money expenditures 
2. Activities (effort) – such as the number of education programmes provided and the number 
of students trained on those programmes 
3. Outputs – such as the number of qualifiers/successful completers from those programmes 
                                                             
229 Sources: NCLSHA notes of meeting on 28th September 2005 between NCLSHA and MU – Archive 70; NCLSHA 
letter to MU, dated 27th July 2006 – Archive 71.  
230 Sources: JM Consulting (2008) ‘Review of benchmark prices in nursing, midwifery and AHPs for the 
Department of Health’, p.20 paragraph 5.2 – Archive 29; ‘Agreement between UUK/CoDH and DH/SHAs (May 
2009), paragraph 1 – Archive 30; Walsh, D. (2013) ibid, pp 137-138 and footnotes 457-458; CoDH (2014) ‘BMP 
Cost/Funding Gap 2007-2013’ – Archive 11 
231 Source ‘MU NHS Pre-registration Adult Nursing Contract 2012_15’ p. 17, paragraph 14.6 - Archive 38. 
232 For the purposes of this dissertation, OBC and PBC are assumed to be synonymous. However where 
‘performance’ is equated with outcomes rather than merely with outputs, the differences between these 
levels of performance need to be appreciated. 
233 The following conceptual framework is taken from Smith, D. And Grinker, W. (2003) ‘The Promise and 
Pitfalls of Performance-Based Contracting’ 25th Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public 







4. Outcomes (achievement) – such as the number of qualifiers who become employed in NHS 
provider organizations 
 
Contracts at levels 3 and 4 above were described as either PBC or OBC. The main justification given 
for OBC was that these contracts functioned to shift the focus of the contracting parties from the 
lower levels of performance (‘inputs’ and ‘activities’) to the higher levels (‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’). 
 
A further justification given for OBC concerned the kind of control of the contracting relationship 
which needed to be exercised. A distinction was made between control which was focussed on 
‘behaviours’ (such as on how activities were carried out) and control which was focussed on 
‘outcomes’. There were circumstances when supplier behaviours were either too complex or too 
many, for these to be managed effectively (via the contract mechanism) by the buyer. But if in those 
circumstances the desired outcomes could be well defined and provided that the performance 
against those outcomes could cost-effectively be measured, monitored and incentivised then, it was 
argued, a control system focussed on outcomes was more appropriate. 
 
(ii) Definition and Basis of OBC: in the context of pre-registration education provision an ‘Output 
Based Contract’ (OBC) has been defined as ‘a contract based on the number of qualified graduates at 
the end of a commissioned education programme’. This meant that tuition fees for students were 
payable by the commissioner provided those students successfully completed a programme for 
which they had held a commissioned place.  
 
Thus the main differences between OBC and the actual contracts for pre-registration education 
between the GM and MU during the reference period concerned the level and type of performance 
sought, the allocation between the GM and MU of responsibilities and risks concerning student 
attrition, and in practical terms the respective payment obligations and entitlements of the GM and 
MU. With regard to level and type of performance, the actual contracts were geared to the 
completion of student months on a programme. Although technically this was an output based 
arrangement it was in its essence closer to an ‘activities’ level rather than an output level of contract 
performance. 
 
(iii) Allocation of Responsibilities for and Risks of Student Attrition: under the contracts during the 
reference period MU was mainly responsible for student attrition. However with regard to payment 
obligations, under all of the contracts in the reference period tuition fees were payable by the GM to 
MU in proportion to the attendance by students on their programmes.234 Consequently the resource 
and funding risks relating to attrition were shared between the GM and MU. For example, for a 
student who completed the first year of their programme but dropped out half way through their 
second year, the tuition fees payable by the GM under the contracts was for 1.5 fte.235 In contrast, 
under OBC defined on the basis of programme completion (rather than student months completed), 
no tuition fees would have been payable for that student and any fees already paid by the GM to 
                                                             
234 This was subject to the attendance being for a period which went beyond the initial 10 weeks of the first 
year, and also subject to attendance in respect of repeat years). Thereafter MU was paid for completed 
student months (these were calculated as a proportion of annual fte). 
235 Thus MU got paid for the direct costs for their fte student attendance. What MU lost was the income they 
could have obtained for post-attrition student fte. This was material since most of that income would have 
been to cover part of MU’s costs of ensuring sufficient capacity to deal with pre-attrition fte student activity 
levels – such costs would generally continue at about the same level post-attrition, at least in the short-run. 
What the GM ‘lost’ was equal to what they paid MU for those students who left the programme before 
completion (this assuming that a part completion was of no value to the GM). Thus, depending on when on 
average attrition occurred during a programme then the risks of student attrition were shared more or less 






MU for that student for both their first and second years would have been subject to full clawback 
from MU. Thus under OBC as defined above, MU would have been wholly responsible for attrition 
and would also have borne all of the consequential risks relating to income and costs. 
 




In May 2010 the GM made a proposal to all of its suppliers that the existing pre-registration 
contracts be changed and put onto an OBC (completion of programme) basis.236 The rationale given 
by the GM was that its proposal was part of set of proposals the objective of which was to cut the 
costs of funding non-medical education by c. (20%) by 2014/15. After ensuing 
discussions/negotiations with its suppliers, the GM announced in November 2010 that it was 
shelving its OBC proposal as it had identified other means by which it could attain its cost cutting 
objective. 
 
In September 2011, as part of the tender exercise it had initiated for adult nursing pre-registration 
education, the GM stipulated as a condition of the tender that the GM and successful bidders would, 
by 2014/15, make ‘all reasonable endeavours’ to move their pre-registration contracts on to an 
output basis. This stipulation subsequently became incorporated as a term of the contracts finally 




The above stability impact assessments were based on: 
 
(1) In September 2010 MU calculated that the financial impact of the OBC arrangement proposed by 
the GM would be the equivalent of a c. (22%) reduction on the unit price per fte they received on 
their pre-registration NHS activity.238 Thus the shelving of that proposal meant that a potentially 
financially unsustainable position for MU on its pre-registration NHS contract had been averted, at 
least for the time being. 
                                                             
236 ‘Financial Strategy for Workforce Transformation’, presentation by NHSL to LDHG, May 2010, slide 5; 
‘London Deans’, presentation by NHSL to LDHG, 1st July 2010, slide 10; ‘London Deans of Health’, presentation 
by NHSL to LDHG, 29th July 2010, slides 5-10 – Archive 48. 
237 Source ‘MU NHS Pre-registration Adult Nursing Contract 2012_15’ p. 17, paragraph 14.6 - Archive 38.  
238 Archive 12 ‘Potential Financial Impact of OBC’, email from MU to the HEFCE of 13th September 2010, 
attachment: ‘NBP v OBC’, slide 3. Key to the financial assessment were assumptions made about future 
attrition rates and the extent to which these could be managed downwards by MU. MU’s view was that 
although it could exercise an influence on attrition rates, the factors which were associated with attrition or 






(2) The reinstatement of OBC as a matter for negotiation between the GM and MU (along with other 
suppliers in the MG) by 2014/15 meant that there was a continued prospect that MU’s position on its 
pre-registration NHS contract would become financially unsustainable. However, OBC was in effect 
off the agenda until 2014/14, hence the assessment above of ‘stability’ for the remaining years of 
the reference period. 
 




Details of unit prices for the reference period are given in Archive 9. In arriving at the 1995/96 
agreed contract price, MU had underestimated the expected costs of staffing. That underestimate, 
in addition to other omissions and underestimates meant that the MU contract proposal for 
1995/96 had been under-priced by c. (£1m). The under-estimate was picked up by MU only after the 
contract had been signed although before the commencement of the contract term. However the 
agreed contract price continued to be applied.239 
 
Unit Prices 1996/97 – 2006/07: these were based on an assumed linear relationship between the 
1995/96 contract price and output quantities. Annual unit price uplifts for inflation were made. 
Later, in 2003, a negotiated adjustment to the unit price for post-registration programmes was made 
when a real terms increase of c. 25% was made. The GM agreed this increase as a compensation for 
the reductions in the GM’s demand for output quantities for post-registration programmes which 
had been made in 2002/03, c. (23%) and also in 2003/04, c. (11%). 
 
Unit Prices 2007/08 – 2012/13: BMP rates were implemented for new pre-registration commissions 
from September 2007. The effect of this was to increase the unit prices paid to MU for these 
commissions by c. 12%. The BMP was initially planned by the DH to take effect nationally from 
September 2005. However the GM delayed the implementation of the BMP in its region by two 
years to September 2007, citing funding constraints as the reason. 
 
                                                             
239 Source: MU senior management; Walsh, D. (2013) ‘Middlesex University and the NHS Education 
Commissioner: A History 1994 – 2013’, p. 126. That some substantial under-pricing had occurred was inferred 
from examination of the costs estimates prepared by MU senior management in 1995/96/97 – Source: Archive 
27). For example, for 1996/97 the total charges estimated for MU overheads plus costs of service agreements 
(estates and other related external overheads) were c. (£1.2m). This was c. 13% of the estimated contract 
value and represented a contribution to overheads of c. 15%. In addition MU put forward for negotiation with 
the GM some of those costs which had been omitted from their 1995 contract proposal. These costs - for 
research, capital, and salary under-provision - amounted to c. (£640k). If the contract price had been adjusted 
to reflect these costs then the contribution to MU overheads would have risen to c. 19%. This probably would 
still have been well below FEC levels (a contribution to overheads of c. 35% would probably have represented 
an FEC break-even position). As it turned out, the GM refused to make any adjustments to the contract price. 
Furthermore, no adjustments to the unit prices in subsequent contracts were ever made for the under-pricing 
in the 1995/96 contract. Consequently, the potential loss to MU became a c. (£1m) p.a. (at 1995 prices) loss in 
perpetuity, not just a loss for 1995/96. It was not until 2007-09 when a new basis for unit price (the BMP) was 






National level negotiations on the BMP were also conducted in 2009. There were three outcomes to 
those negotiations: (i) following an intervention by the Chief Executive of the GM the DH 
representing the GMs throughout England decided to renege on an agreement which they had 
reached with the HEIs’ representatives in 2008;240 (ii) the second outcome was to reset BMP rates 
from September 2009 to a level which was c. (8.9%) below the estimated national standard cost at 
that time.241; (iii) the third outcome was to introduce a ‘quality premium’ the basis of which 
depended on GM assessments of the contract performance of their suppliers. The quality premium, 
which was additional to the BMP, was payable on criteria to be developed locally by each GM for 
their respective areas, up to a level equal to 5% of the BMP. In practice the criteria set by the GM for 
payment of the quality premium were such that the actual quality premium paid overall in the MG 
did not exceed c. 0.5% of BMP.242 Thus in relation to the principle, price ≈ cost, an outcome of the 
2009 national negotiations was an average net loss to MG suppliers of c. (8.4%) on the overall unit 
prices.243 
 
By 2014, a comparison by the Council of Deans of Health (CoDH) of BMP rates for 2013/14 with the 
estimated national standard costs for pre-registration nursing education concluded that there was a 
c. (11.5%) shortfall of the BMP. Even when an estimated 0.5% for the quality premium was added, 





The above stability impact assessments were based on: 
 
(1) The actual contract price for 1995/96 was c. £1m below MU’s planned full economic costs 
 
(2) For the period 1996/97 to 2006/07 the actual unit prices for the IOR pre-registration programmes 
were directly based on the 1995/96 contract price. Consequently, for that period MU sustained a 
loss compared to the unit prices it could have had for its pre-registration programmes, which was 
                                                             
240 Sources: (i) Walsh, D (2013), ibid (ii) ‘CoDH Update on 2008/09 BMP Negotiations’ – Archive 65 
241 In 2007 the DH commissioned JM Consulting Limited to complete the first five year review of the 
benchmark price. The estimate of 8.9% is based on (i) JMC’s 2008 report which concluded that the BMP had 
over the previous 5 years fallen behind the standard cost by c. (12.8%), and (ii) the actual BMP settlement in 
the 2009 BMP negotiations (which was an increase of 3.9% p.a.). Sources: JM Consulting Limited (January 
2008) ‘Review of Benchmark Prices in nursing, midwifery and AHPs for the Department of Health’, copy report 
as Archive 29; ‘Agreement between Universities UK/Council of Deans of Health and the Department of 
Health/Strategic Health Authorities on the implementation of the review of benchmark prices for nursing, 
midwifery and allied health profession pre-registration education’ (22 May 2009), copy agreement sourced in 
Archive 30. 
242 As a proportion of the BMP, the quality premium earned by MU over the period 2010-2012 was c. 0.3% p.a. 
243 (8.9% - 0.5%) = (8.4%). 
244 Source: Council of Deans of Health (2014), Archive 11 ‘BMP Funding Gap 2007_2014’, tab 2. In arriving at 
this estimate the choice of cost index was important. An exercise completed in 2014 by the writer with the 
Council of Deans of Health (CoDH) showed that if the index used was based on annual GDP movements then 
the shortfall between the 2013/14 BMP and estimated actual costs to the average HEI of their NHS pre-
registration provision was c. (7.9%). But if an index based on changes in costs in Higher Education was used 






equal to c. 12.5% of the value of its teaching provision for its NHS pre-registration contracts.245 
Whether actual prices would cover MU’s actual FEC depended partly on the level of MU’s indirect 
costs. MU made substantial operating losses, for all years from 2000/01 to 2005/06. For the years 
2011/12 and 2012/13 MU made operating surpluses which were at or well above, HE sector 
averages.246 
 
(3) Implementation of the BMP in 2007 was a phased implementation – the BMP rates were for new 
commissions only. Consequently, existing commissions (i.e. second and third year students on pre-
registration programmes) would continue to be paid at the old rates for a further 2 years to 2008/09  
 
(4) The contribution levels from its NHS activities estimated by MU in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2012.247 
 
(5) The actual FEC position on its NHS activities estimated by MU in 2011 and 2012.248 
From the above it was concluded that MU’s NHS activities were FEC negative for the period 1995/96 
– 2008/09 and FEC positive for the period 2011/12 – 2012/13.249 It was also noted however that 
throughout the period MU’s SSR levels were well below those strongly recommended by the 
professional body, the NMC. Had MU implemented the NMC SSRs then its NHS FEC position for 
2011/12 would have been negative and for 2012/13 at approximately break- even level.250   
 
5.4 Performance Key Outcomes and Stability Impacts 
 
5.4.1 Definitions of Performance Key Outcomes Dimensions 
 
13. Performance (i) was the assessment of the historic and current performance of the IOR made on 
criteria used by the GM and by external regulators. 
 
14. Performance (ii) was the assessment of the historic and current performance of the IOR made 
on criteria used by MU. 
 
5.4.2 Performance Key Outcomes Stability Impacts 
 
13. Performance (i) 
 
 
                                                             
245 Coincidentally, the increase in unit price on new pre-registration commissions which MU received in 
2007/08 following the implementation of the BMP was c. 12.5% i.e. the increase was almost exactly the same 
adjustment to unit prices which MU would have argued for on the basis of what uplift to unit prices should 
have been applied had the 1995/96 contract price been formulated correctly (so that price ≈ cost). 
246 Source: MU Financial Statements 2000/01 to 2012/13 – Archive 18 MU Financial Statistics 1993-2013; HEI 
Financial Statistics 1995-2013 - HESA. 
247 Sources: MU NHS Contracts financial Sustainability Assessments 2006, 2009, 2012 – Archives 19, 20, 21 and 
22. 
248 Sources: (i) MU NHS Adult Nursing Tender 2011 Financial Schedule – Archive 21, tab 1 (ii) MU NHS 
Contracts financial Sustainability Assessment 2012 – Archive 22.    
249 There were insufficient data to make reliable assessments for the years 2009/10 and 2010/11. 







5.4.2.1 IOR Performance Assessments made by the GM 
 
The stability impacts on the dimensions of the performance component of the IOR prior to 2006 
reflect imputed assessments of IOR performance by the GM. These were inferred from the various 
renewals of the IOR contract made by the GM without any expressed reservations. 
 
In 2007/08 the GM developed and piloted a framework for assessing the performance of its 
education suppliers. Assessments were made of each supplier based on their performance against 
the ‘key performance indicators’ (KPIs) included in the GM’s contract management and performance 
framework.251 KPI dimensions included marketing, student recruitment and selection; curriculum 
content, delivery and learning outcomes; practice placements; student attrition, progression and 
achievement. The performance on each dimension was measured on several measures. Both 
quantitative and qualitative measures were used. Each supplier’s performance on all dimensions was 
brought together by the GM for an overall assessment of the supplier. The overall assessment was 
given as a score which was categorised either as ‘green’ (no issues), high and low amber (some 
issues), and red (major issues requiring immediate improvement). Suppliers were ranked according 
to their overall score and the ranking published as press releases (e.g. as in Archive 13 in April 2009 
for assessments of 2007/08 performance). The results were also posted on the GM’s website. 
 
Summaries of the overall assessment ratings by the GM of MU and also of its other suppliers for 
nursing and midwifery education for the three years 2008/09 to 2010/11 were sourced in Archive 14 
and for the three years 2010/11 to 2012/13 in Archive 15. Over the whole period 2007/08 to 
2012/13 MU’s ratings across all occupational groups for which it provided education, averaged ‘high 
amber’ and by occupational group ranged from ‘low amber’ to ‘green’. Overall therefore, from the 
GM’s perspective the performance outcome of the IOR it had with MU was at least ‘satisfactory’ and 
usually ‘very satisfactory’.252 
 
In 2011 MU submitted a tender to the GM for adult nursing pre-registration education. The tender 
was assessed by a group comprising the GM and NHS placement providers. MU were successful 
along with 7 of the 8 other existing education providers. MU’s tender was given a 65.5% score by the 
assessors.253 In relation to CPM scoring this result was equivalent to a ‘low amber’ or satisfactory 
rating. Except for one of the successful bidders which received a score equivalent to ‘high amber’, all 
of the other successful bidders also received scores which were equivalent to a ‘low amber’ rating. 
 
5.4.2.2 IOR Performance Assessments made by Regulatory Bodies 
 
As part of the requirements of the professional body, MU was rated annually by the NMC on the 
quality and quality assurance of its pre-registration education. The ratings obtained by MU in these 
NMC annual monitoring reviews were consistently either ‘Satisfactory/Good’ or ‘Good’ (the highest 
NMC rating). In both the 2009 and 2012 annual monitoring reviews the University’s pre-registration 
                                                             
251 Also see supra the section ‘Contracts Key Outcomes’ under ‘Contract Compliance - Management and 
Review’.  
252 It was much the same performance assessment for other suppliers of nursing and midwifery education in 
the MG; excepting one university whose performance was on average rated as ‘low amber’, all other 
universities averaged a ‘high amber’ performance. There was no ‘red’ rating of contract performance given to 
any university on any occupational group over the whole period such ratings were made – 2007-2013. 
The same position overall was the case for assessments made by the GM of the performance of its university 
suppliers of allied health professions education – a summary of the GM’s assessments for those professions for 
the period 2010/11 to 2012/13 was sourced in Archive 15. Thus from the GM’s standpoint the performance of 
the MG overall was also satisfactory. 






provision had been rated by the NMC as ‘Good’ on all 5 dimensions of the review.254 It was unusual 
for the NMC to give its highest rating across the board in a single annual review; MU was one of only 
two London universities to achieve this overall rating in 2009 and the only one in 2012. 
 
MU was also successful in the 5 yearly NMC revalidation reviews of its pre-registration programmes. 
In 2011 MU was amongst the first of the universities to have pre-registration programmes validated 
to the NMC 2010 standards for nursing education. The stability impact assessments below were 
based on the separate assessments of MU performance by the GM and the NMC: for the GM in 
regard to the GM’s renewal of contracts with MU and by the GM assessments of MU contract 
compliance over time (including the CPM assessments from 2007/08); for the NMC by it ratings of 








MU made assessments of the performance of its NHS contracts at various times during the reference 
period. These assessments concerned financial and non-financial performance and future prospects. 
  
5.4.2.3 MU Assessments of the IOR Financial Performance 
 
The main conclusions of these analyses255 were: 
 
 1995/95: Income to MU from its NHS contracts was estimated to be c. (£1m) below planned 
FEC.256  In 1995/96 MU recorded an operating surplus of c. £2.7m. 257 
 2006: The overall contribution to MU overheads from income on its NHS contracts and 
associated activity for 2006/07 was forecast at c. £6.37m, c. 44% of forecast income.258 For 
the same year comparable contribution rates from other large operating areas of MU such 
as Business, Computing Science and Arts were c. 50% to 55%. To put this in perspective: in 
                                                             
254 Source: Walsh, D. (2013) ‘Middlesex University and the NHS Education Commissioner: A History 1994 – 
2013’, pp 152-153 – Archive 85. The 5 dimensions rated were: (i) Admissions (ii) Practice Learning (iii) Fitness 
to Practice (iv) Resources (v) Quality Assurance.  
255 The earliest of these, from 1994 to 1997/98 used a standard costing approach to estimating the full costs to 
MU of its provision. From 2006 an actual costing methodology was used for directly attributable costs. 
However it was only from 2011 that the actual costing methodology was combined with a robust methodology 
for attributing central university overheads to produce reliable and valid estimates of the FEC position. 
256 Sources: MU senior management; Walsh, D. (2013). Planned FEC assumed staff costs were for staff 
establishment. 
257 Source: Archive 18, ‘MU Financials 1993-2012’, Middlesex University Accounts. Operating surplus was taken 
for all years to mean ‘surplus after depreciation of tangible fixed assets at valuation and before tax’.  






2005/06 MU sustained an operating deficit of c. (£17.7m), the biggest deficit in its history259; 
the deficit was c. (13.5%) of MU’s overall income. 
 2009:  The overall contribution to MU overheads from income on its NHS contracts and 
associated activity for 2008/09 was forecast at c. £6.01m, c. 41% of forecast NHS contracts 
income; the contribution rate from MU’s NHS pre-registration contract for 2008/09 was 
estimated at c. 50%.260 In 2008/09 MU recorded an operating surplus of c. £1.9m, equal to c. 
1.2% of MU’s overall income. 
 2011/12: MU recorded an operating surplus of c. £7.7m.261 Also in 2011/12, in its tender 
submission to the GM for pre-registration adult nursing education MU forecast the 
contribution rate for 2012/13 would be c. 41%.262 This was also forecast to equate to 
forecast FEC, i.e. an overall break even position for MU was forecast for that activity. 263 
However, in the forecast an SSR of 1:15.7 was assumed; if instead an SSR of 1:14, as 
recommended by the NMC and as requested by the GM had been assumed then the 
contribution rate would have been c. (4.7%) less and a negative FEC position (equivalent to 
c. (4.7%) of forecast income for pre-registration adult nursing programmes) would have 
been forecast.  
 2012/13: MU recorded an operating surplus of c. £12.83m, the largest in its history, both 
absolutely and relative to its overall income, c. 7.1%.264 For its NHS contracts and associated 
activity for 2012/13 MU forecast a contribution of c. £6.6m, a contribution rate of c. 46%, 
and a surplus on its FEC position of c. £1.26m.265 However, in the forecast an SSR of 1:17.8 
was assumed. If instead, for its pre-registration activity, the NMC recommended SSR had 
been assumed then the forecast would have been a contribution rate which was c. (3%) less 
and a breakeven FEC position. 
 In the same 2012/13 exercise, MU forecast the contribution and FEC position on its NHS 
contracts to 2015/16 under different scenarios. Assuming that price remained constant in 
real terms and that quantities of new commissions would continue at 2012/13 levels then a 
positive FEC position was forecast for 2015/16.266 In the event that there were reductions to 
the BMP of between 5% - 10% then the FEC position would be at about breakeven. 
However, if instead the assumed SSR levels for pre-registration activity had been increased 
to NMC recommended levels, then a negative FEC position would result. In the event of OBC 
as proposed in 2010 by the GM being introduced then the FEC position was likely to become 
strongly negative, even without any further reduction in BMP as was being proposed by HEE.  
 
5.4.2.4 MU Assessments of the IOR Non-financial Performance and Future Prospects 
 
Although the 2006 review initiated by MU top management was motivated by concerns about the 
financial sustainability of the NHS contracts and more generally about the survival of the University, 
the non-financial performance of the NHS contracts activity was also assessed. This assessment was 
based on four dimensions: (i) quality ratings of its provision by QAA and the NMC (ii) contract 
compliance performance levels (percentage level of commissions fulfilled) (iii) employment rates for 
                                                             
259 Source: Archive 18, ‘MU Financials 1993-2012’, Middlesex University Accounts. 
260 Source: Archive 20, ‘NHS Income and Costs 2009’, Middlesex University working papers. 
261 Source: Archive 18. 
262 Source: Archive 21 ‘Adult Nursing Income and Costs 2012’, copy of part of Middlesex University tender 
submission in November 2011 to NHS London (the GM). This assumed a unit price which was approximately 
the same as the BMP forecast for the same year.  
263 Source: Archive 21, ibid. 
264 Source: Archive 18, ibid. 
265 Source: Archive 22, ‘NHS Income and Costs 2012-2015’.  






its graduating students (iv) the value added to graduating students taking account of the academic 
entry levels to the programmes. It was concluded that the performance on each of these dimensions 
was satisfactory or good.267 Future prospects were considered in terms of (i) output quantities – 
likely demand in the NHS and competition from other universities for capacity at placement 
providers and (ii) unit price (the prospective implementation of the BMP). While the overall forecast 
on these dimensions was positive there were risks and uncertainties identified which were beyond 
MU’s ability to avoid. The potential impact of these risks was substantial and the mitigation 
strategies available to MU were of potentially limited effect. 
 
In 2009 the non-financial performance was assessed on the same criteria used in 2006 review and a 
similar conclusion was drawn regarding the level of that performance. Future prospects were also 
similarly assessed. The rationale given by the GM for the 2008 LEC which was to introduce ‘market 
dynamics’ into NHS workforce education provision, was also considered. Future risks were identified 
and evaluated concerning NHS budgets (both overall and for education), placement capacity 
availability, and the potential impact on output quantities from developments in nursing as a 
graduate profession.268 
 
The 2012 review also included assessments of non-financial performance on the criteria which had 
figured in the 2006 and 2009 reviews. However, the University context in which the 2012 review 
took place was different from before: MU top management had developed a ‘new direction’ for the 
University and as part of that had recast its strategic priorities, objectives, and the measures of 
success that it used. As a result the 2012 NHS contracts review was framed specifically in terms 
which aligned with the ‘new direction’ and strategic priorities of the University. The overall strategy 
for the NHS activities set out in the 2012 was to ‘compete on quality’.269 A key part of that strategy 
was the performance of students in their placements, particularly of final year students.270 The 
measures of success were similar to those in previous reviews, including NSS scores, progression and 
completion rates of students, and employment rates (first destination statistics). Generally the 
performance in 2012 of the NHS contracts activity on many of these measures was found already to 
meet the University’s targets for 2017. 
 
Future prospects were assessed in the 2012 review taking account of the future need and demand 
for the NHS, future funding in a context of pressures nationally on NHS budgets and the 
consequential pressures on the overall NHS education budget (MPET) as well as more directly on 
placement capacity for the training of medical and non-medical occupations, and the further 
development of nursing as a profession and the likely developments in roles with nursing functions 
(such as health care assistants). 
 
                                                             
267 Source: Archive 23, ‘Review of the NHS Contract December 2006’. 
268 Source: Archive 24, ‘2009 Sustainability Review of NHS Contracts and Associated Activities’. 
Recommendations for management were made in the review that the risks should be included within the 
register of risks for the University (at School level) and action plans developed to mitigate those risks. Those 
recommendations were subsequently accepted and implemented by MU School management. 
269 Source: Archive 25, ‘NHS Contracts Strategy and Issues to 2017’. 
270 Although supposed to be supernumery, students in placement particularly final year students were 
regarded by placement providers as a resource for the delivery of care to patients. Excellent performance in 
placement therefore was regarded as one of the best means to ensure good employability prospects for the 
students on completion of their programmes. Excellent performance in placement would also help MU to 
maintain placement capacity with its placement providers and possibly also to be favoured by placement 








The above stability impact assessments were based on: 
 
(i) MU’s assessments of the non-financial performance of the IOR throughout the reference period 
were that it was good 
(ii) The financial assessments however were mixed: for the period 1995-2008, MU’s NHS activities 
were making positive contributions to the University’s overheads. By 2006 the contribution was 
estimated to be significant in absolute terms and this continued to be the case for the remainder of 
the reference period. However, the actual FEC position was known to be negative from the outset of 
the NHS contracts in 1995/96 (due partly to the ‘mistake’ but due also to MU’s under-pricing). While 
FEC estimates of its NHS activity were not subsequently made until 2011/12 it was reasonable to 
suppose that MU’s FEC position continued to be negative until c. 2009/109. This was because the 
unit prices were based on 1995/96 contract price and because the overall financial performance of 
MU for the years to 2008/09 was such that it could reasonably be assumed that the overhead 
burden arising from its NHS activities was not covered by MU’s NHS income. 
 
Consequently, for the period 1995/96-2008/09, the overall performance assessments of the IOR by 
the University were mixed: strategically the IOR was a good thing; however financially it was FEC 
negative but at the same time it was necessary to maintain the IOR because of the size of its 
contributions to University overheads. For the period 2011/12-2012/13 the NHS activities were 
estimated to be FEC positive. However, from 2008/09 to 2012/13 there had been a 25% decline in 
the output quantities supplied to and demanded by the GM in the IOR; thus, the overall stability of 
the IOR from the standpoint of MU continued to be mixed.271 
 
Also reflected in the assessments above for 2012/13 were the uncertainties and risks relating to 
years beyond the reference period, particularly relating to IOR dimension 11 - OBC Risk - which, 
depending on the outcomes of future negotiations with the GM, could have material negative 
implications for the future financial sustainability of the University’s NHS contracts. 
 
5.5 Analysis of IOR Stability over Time: Dimensions, Components and Overall 
 
In this section an analysis is made of the stability over time of the IOR in its dimensions and principal 
components, as well as overall.  
 
5.5.1 Stability over time on the IOR dimensions 
 
The research inquiry findings about the stability over time on the IOR dimensions were summarised 
in Table 3(i).272 From inspection: 
 
                                                             
271 Sources: Archive 9 and 22. In 2012 the absolute size of the estimated contribution to the University’s 
overheads from its NHS activities, was c. £6.6m p.a. and projected for 2015/16 to be £4.3m (Archive 22) and 
continued to be regarded by University top management as relatively substantial and important. In the 
University’s August 2012 review of the NHS contracts (Archive 25), on being told the size of the current and 
projected  contribution to MU’s overheads from its NHS and associated activities, the response of the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor to the writer was ‘there was no question’ that these activities would and should continue to 
be part of the University’s portfolio. 
272 See supra, Chapter 3. The terms ‘stable’ and ‘stability’ here and in the remainder of this Chapter are used 






 Stability on the IOR dimensions at the beginning of the IOR (1995) was different from 
stability at the end of the reference period (2013): 10 of the 14 dimensions of the IOR were 
‘stable’ in 1995; in 2013, 6 of the 14 dimensions were ‘stable’ and 8 dimensions were 
‘threatening entry to a range of instability’. 
 The greatest number of changes to stability from year to year occurred in 2005/06: 3 of the 
14 dimensions became less stable (these dimensions changed from ‘S’ to ‘TRI’) and 1 
dimension became stable. Prior to 2005/06, stability had changed on only one dimension (in 
2003/04 on ‘Duration’). From 2007/08 to 2012/13 stability changed on 5 dimensions. 
 
Stability states over time on all dimensions were compared in 3 time periods corresponding to when 
a number of material changes occurred in the stability of the IOR dimensions, particularly in the 
duration dimension of the contracts component of the IOR. The results are presented in Table 9 
below. The beginning and end years are shown for each of the 3 periods. 
 
Caption to Table 9 
 
 In the Table is shown the incidence of IOR in/stability for all IOR dimensions for selected years of 
the reference period. 
 Also shown in the Table was a reduction in overall IOR stability took place from the beginning to 
the end of the reference period (1995 to 2013). 
 Most of the reduction in IOR stability occurred over the period 2005/06 to 2007/08. These 
reductions were almost entirely consolidated in the remaining years of the reference period – 
2008/09 to 2012/13.    
 
Table 9 Stability Impact Assessments of the IOR Dimensions 1995/96 – 2012/13 
 
    S TRI U 
1995/1996  10   3  1 
2004/2005    8   5  1 
 
2005/2006    6   7  1 
2007/2008    5   8  1 
 
2008/2009    5   8  1 
2012/2013    6   8  0 
 
Key: S = Stable; TRI = Threatening entry to Range of Instability; U = Unstable 
 
Source: Analysis of findings presented in Table 3(i) 
 
The reference period (1995/96-2012/13) comprised three distinctive periods: (i) 1995/96-2004/05 
(ii) 2005/06-2007/08 and (iii) 2008/09-2012/13. 
 
(i) 1995/96-2004/05: apart from price related dimensions, the IOR overall was stable on nearly all of 
its other dimensions during this period. 
(ii) 2005/06-2007/08: The biggest shift in the stability of the IOR over the entire reference period 
1995-2013 occurred between 2004/05 and 2007/08. As shown in Table 9 above, in 2004/05 the IOR 
had been stable on 8 of its 14 dimensions in 2004/05; in 2007/08 the IOR was stable on only 5 
dimensions. The new overall pattern of in/stability on the IOR dimensions which emerged in 
2005/06 continued broadly unchanged for the rest of this period, to 2007/08. 
(iii) 2008/09-2012/13: there were several movements in stability at IOR dimension level during this 
period. Compared with 2005/06, IOR instability in 2008/09 had reduced on one dimension 
(dimension 1) and increased on two dimensions (dimensions 3, 8). Compared with 2008/09, IOR 
instability had by 2012/13 increased on one dimension (dimension 1) and reduced on two 







5.5.2 Stability over time on the IOR components 
 
The stability of the IOR was also analysed in terms of its principal components (contracts, outputs, 
and price). This was done by grouping together similar assessments on the relevant dimensions 
defined for each of the IOR components. A comparison was also made with the performance 
dimensions of the IOR. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 10 below. 
 
Caption to Table 10 
 
 In the Table is shown the incidence of IOR in/stability by IOR components over time. 
Example: In 1995/96 the contracts and outputs components were stable on their eight 
dimensions; the price component was stable on one dimension, threatening instability on 
two dimensions and unstable on one dimension; the performance component was stable on 
one dimension and threatening instability on its other dimension. 
 In the Table are shown on which components of the IOR the main shifts in overall IOR 
stability occurred viz. between 2004/05 and 2007/08 on the contracts and outputs 




From inspection of Tables 3(i) and 10: 
 
 The pattern of an overall reduction in the stability of the IOR over the whole of the reference 
period, which was identified at the level of dimensions, was repeated at the level of the IOR 
components ‘contracts’ and ‘outputs’; all of the stability changes which took place in 
2005/06 occurred in dimensions of the contract and outputs components of the IOR. This 
was not the case for the IOR component ‘price’, where until 2008/09 three of the four 
dimensions were not stable. However, stability on the price component subsequently 
increased so that for the last two years of the reference period, 2011-2013, three out of the 
four dimensions of ‘price’ were stable. 
 IOR performance was stable on one dimension and ‘TRI’ on the other throughout the whole 
of the reference period, 1995/96 to 2012/13. Given the reducing stability from 2005/06 of 
the IOR on most of its other dimensions this was an interesting finding which suggested an 
unchanged stability on the performance of an IOR from both the buyer’s and supplier’s 
standpoint might coexist, for a time, with reducing stability in other components and 
dimensions of the IOR, particularly on dimensions of risk. 
 
From MU’s standpoint the assessments made by the GM of the performance of the IOR (which 






were amongst its own criteria for assessment of the IOR performance. In contrast, from the GM’s 
standpoint MU’s assessments of the performance of the IOR were not amongst the criteria used by 
the GM for assessment of the IOR performance. This difference in criteria used by the GM and MU 
meant that from the standpoint of each of the organisations in the IOR different assessments might 
be made of the performance stability of the IOR with the possibility that from the GM’s standpoint 
the IOR performance might be ‘stable’ while from MU’s standpoint the IOR performance might be 
‘unstable’.   
 
5.5.3 Change and stability over time of the IOR overall 
 
On only 4 of the 14 IOR dimensions, was the relevant stability state impact assessment the same 
throughout the whole of the reference period: output specification, basis of price – OBC risk and IOR 
performance (i) each were ‘stable’ while IOR performance (ii) was ‘threatening to enter a range of 
instability’ (Table 3). The changes to the stability states of IOR dimensions occurred mainly during 
the latter half of the reference period, 2005/06 - 2012/13. 
 
An unchanged state of stability on a particular dimension of the IOR did not necessarily mean there 
had been no events and/or changes in circumstances potentially affecting the stability state on that 
dimension. For example: (i) In relation to IOR dimension 5, an outcome of the consolidation of the 
professionalisation of nursing during the reference period was substantial change to the output 
specification, affecting the curricula of nursing programmes and their delivery. MU responded 
effectively to those (exogenous) changes so that the stability state on this dimension of the IOR 
remained ‘stable’ even during the period of greatest change (2001/02-2012/13); (ii) In relation to 
IOR dimension 14, the stability state was a ‘threatened instability’ (‘TRI’) on this dimension 
throughout the reference period. There was an underlying change in the source of that stability 
state: until 2008/09 the main source was the inadequacy of the basis of price relative to the FEC of 
MU; from 2009/10 the main source changed to become the relatively substantial decline in the GM’s 
demand for output quantities that had begun in that year.273 
 
The nature of the changes that occurred to the stability states on 10 dimensions of the IOR, meant 
that by the end of the reference period the IOR had become relatively less stable overall, both in 
regard to its dimensions and in regard to two of its three principal components (contracts, outputs). 
On the third component, price, stability increased during the last few years of the reference period – 
from 2009/10. By 2013 actual prices were ≥ FEC; however, with the basis of price continuing to be 
predicated on ‘affordability’ from the GM’s standpoint the issue was whether, from MU’s 
standpoint, the threat of instability inherent in such a basis would eventually result in actual prices 
that were below its FEC and consequently change the stability state of actual prices from ‘stable’ to 
‘unstable’ - with the further potential consequence that the IOR performance from MU’s standpoint 
(dimension 14) would change from a ‘threatened instability’ to become ‘unstable’. 
 
The reduced stability of the IOR over the reference period occurred mainly on the 11 dimensions 
indicating IOR stability risk (dimensions 1-11): at the start of the reference period, 9 of these 
dimensions were stable and 2 were threatening instability. By the end of the reference period the 
position was almost reversed, with 7 of these dimensions ‘threatening instability’ and 4 were stable. 
This suggested that while the stability or threatened instability of the IOR on its performance 
component, both from the GM’s standpoint and from MU’s standpoint, had remained unchanged 
over the reference period, this was against a background where the overall risks of IOR instability, 
particularly from MU’s standpoint, had substantially increased. 
                                                             







Finding (2): The IOR tended to become less stable over time from the standpoint of the supplier 
(MU); reductions in IOR stability occurred in dimensions of risk relating to the future performance 
of the IOR. 
 
Finding (3): From the standpoint of the GM, IOR performance stability was maintained throughout 
the reference period. This suggests that from the GM’s standpoint, IOR performance stability can 










The purpose of this Chapter is to present and analyse the empirical findings in regard to research 
question sets 3 and 4 of the inquiry, viz. 
 
3. How did in/stability over time in the IOR come about? Specifically: 
 
 How were IOR relevant events, both exogenous and endogenous to the IOR responded to 
by the organizations in the IOR and what were the impacts of the responses to these 
events on in/stability in the IOR?  
  
4. Why did in/stability over time in the IOR come about? 
 
These questions are dealt with below in six sections. In the first four sections interpretations and 
explanations of in/stability in the IOR are presented in four consecutive time periods: (i) 1995/96 - 
the start of the IOR (ii) 1996-2004 (iii) 2005-2007 (iv) 2008-2013. Each of these periods had different 
characteristics which were thought potentially to have had a bearing on the stability of the IOR. Over 
the periods 1995-2004 and from 2008-2013 the IOR contracts had a minimum duration of 3-5 years. 
The contracts for the period 2005-2007 were of one year’s duration. 1995-96 marked the start of the 
IOR where the stability impacts were in part brought about by negotiations between the GM and 
MU which took place before the IOR was established. 
 
In each of the first four sections, interpretations of how the in/stability in the IOR came about 
(research question 3) are followed by explanations of why the in/stability in the IOR came about 
(research question 4). 
 
In the fourth section, dealing with 2008-2013, the interpretations are developed in greater detail in 
the form of 4 ‘power games’ involving the organizations in the IOR which took place during this 
period. These power games are presented in 5 tables: the structure of each game, including the 
principal players/agents and their respective objectives, is presented in Table 16; the moves in each 
game and which players/agents played those moves, are set out in Tables 17-20.  
 
In sections five and six the in/stability in the IOR is analysed taking the reference period as a whole. 
In section five, the relationships between historical dependencies and resource dependencies as 
determinants of in/stability in the dimensions of the IOR are outlined. In section six, instabilities and 
threatened instabilities in the IOR over the reference period are analysed and an argument 
developed to explain them. The argument draws together the explanations put forward in the 
previous five sections of the Chapter and develops these into an overall explanation of the instability 







6.1 1995/96: Initial Conditions and Historical Legacies; Mutual Dependence 
 
IOR stability impact assessments for the first year of the IOR are summarised in Table 5(v) below. 




6.1.1 Interpretation of IOR Stability Impacts 1995/96 
 
To some extent the IOR stability impacts shown in Table 5(v) above reflected the outcomes of the 
negotiations in late 1994 between the GM and MU which established the IOR. However, although 
these negotiations were part of a ‘negotiated tender’ process they were rooted in and largely 
affected by the policy decisions based on WP10 and their implementation.274 At the outset of the 
negotiations between the GM and MU, there were already many initial conditions or historical 
legacies which had a bearing on the stability of the potential IOR between the GM and MU. At an 
NHS-HE inter-sector level the initial conditions included: 
 
 An agreed aim of government policy makers, healthcare employers, educators and 
professional body regulators that the education and training for non-medical roles be 
developed so that these roles functioned effectively to meet the demands and increased 
expectations of modern healthcare, in particular that healthcare practice should be 
‘evidence based’.275 
 The funding model for non-medical education, specifically that all of the funding for tuition 
and training and a substantial amount for student support would come from the state.276 
 NHS-HE inter-sector institutional arrangements based on a purchaser-provider split in non-
medical education. As it turned out, these arrangements took the form of MGs.
277 Arising 
from the latter an important initial condition concerned the process of price determination 
including the level at which this took place – this was to be a negotiation process between 
the GM and individual suppliers, such as MU. 
                                                             
274 See supra Chapter 4. 
275 See supra Chapter 4. 
276 See supra Chapter 4. 







IOR dimensions 1-9, 11: At the potential IOR (GM and MU) level there were historical legacies 
consisting in the heads of terms of the negotiated tender and the substantive clauses under those 
heads: it is likely that these were similar to those which has been drafted by the GM as part of an 
‘invitation to tender’ which had been used for a competitive tender process about a year earlier.278 
These historical legacies at the potential IOR level included: 
 
 The IOR contract terms relating to duration, termination, monitoring/compliance 
requirements and allocation of placement responsibilities (IOR dimensions 1-4).279 
 The IOR requirements relating to outputs, specifically the NLCHS education provision 
covering outputs specifications, output quantities history and current demand/students 
(IOR dimensions 5, 7, and 8).280 Regarding IOR dimension 6 (): there is evidence to suggest 
that stipulations regarding output floors and ceilings were included in the 1995 contract;281 
these were likely to have been based on similar stipulations in the competitive tender. 
 The basis of price in terms of what was to be paid for – this included the treatment of the 
costs of innovation (IOR dimension 9) and the allocation between the GM and MU of the 
risks relating to student attrition (IOR dimension 11).282   
 
IOR dimensions 10, 12: These were the IOR dimensions where the IOR stability impacts were the 
outcome of the pre-IOR negotiations in late 1994 between the GM and MU. MU’s bid for NLCHS was 
substantially underpriced. Consequently when this bid was accepted by the GM, MU’s FEC did not 
become the basis of price (IOR dimension 10); subsequently, with no improvement in MU’s cost 
position to compensate for the under-pricing, MU’s actual FEC exceeded the actual contract price 
the actual price was less than MU’s FEC (IOR dimension 12). 
 
6.1.2 Explanation of IOR Stability Impacts 1995/96 
 
GM Objectives: Throughout the reference period, 1995-2013, there were three main objectives of 
the GMs in respect of NHS non-medical workforce education. These concerned (i) the requisite 
quality of the education provision. Also throughout the reference period, the output specification 
requirements of the GMs were based mainly on the requirements of the relevant professional body 
(particularly at the pre-registration level of education outputs). Fulfilment of these requirements 
was taken as the main proxy indicator of output quality; (ii) the requisite quantities of education 
                                                             
278 Source: MU management. The competitive tender process itself had been initiated as part of the 
implementation of the 1990 NHS Community and Care Act, which included provisions for non-medical 
education that were based on WP10. 
279 There is evidence that many of the terms and substantive clauses in both the competitive tender and the 
negotiated tender originated in, and were similar to those in the various agreements which the NLCHS had 
with NHS Trusts prior to its merger with MU. For example: (i) IOR dimension 1 (duration) the 3 year rolling 
contract was the basis of the NLCHS 1993/94 contract with the Royal Free Hampstead Trust – Archive 31, 
clause 2.2; (ii) IOR dimension 3 (compliance) the quarterly monitoring procedures and annual contract review – 
Archive 31, clause 8.1 and clause 10.1; Archive 1, clause 2.3. 
280 Again, many of these dimensions of the IOR had been specified in a similar way in prior NLCHS contracts. 
For example: (i) IOR dimension 5 (output specification) the Project 2000 curriculum – Archive 1, clause 1.2; (ii) 
IOR dimension 7 (output quantities) the determination of output quantities for a given year was determined 
over the course of a contracting cycle which began 12 months earlier. In this cycle the quantities for pre-
registration provision would have been finalised c. 6 months prior to the start of the relevant year. Thus the 
output quantities which MU had for the year 1995/96 were those which it inherited from the contracting cycle 
finalised with the NLCHS the previous year – Archive 2 ‘The Process of Contracting’. 
281 Evidence that this was so is in a letter to MU dated 18th January 1995 in which the GM refers to ‘terms of 
the (1995) contract relating to floors’ – Archive 5. 
282 The allocation of risks between the GM and MU on student attrition was deduced from the definition of 






outputs; (iii) efficiency in the procurement of that provision. All of these objectives were prefigured 
in WP10 and in the ensuing policy framework and instruments that were developed.283 However, 
during the period 1993-1998, the GMs had two overriding objectives which were firstly to 
implement the integration of all of the Colleges of Health into the HE sector, and secondly to set up 
consortia of employers which would take over the GM function of education purchasing for their 
designated regions/areas. The direct involvement in NHS education purchasing of the actual GM in 
place in 1995 for MU’s region (the RHA North Thames) was planned to be temporary; from the GM’s 
standpoint its priority objectives at the time that negotiations with MU were taking place were to 
bring about the targeted mergers and to do so on an efficient, VFM, basis.284 
 
MU Objectives: A key objective of MU during the 1990s was to grow the organization particularly in 
terms of student numbers. The potential merger with NLCHS was also perceived by MU as a 
significant opportunity in that respect – the potential extra student numbers would add c. 9% - 10% 
to MU’s student numbers and also to its operating income.285 A merger with NLCHS was also seen as 
potentially securing the right kind of growth for MU: the historic outputs quality performance of the 
NLCHS had been evidently adequate – NLCHS had already established good relationships with a wide 
range of NHS employers, including some relatively large healthcare providers. Thus in terms of the 
potential impact of the NLCHS acquisition on MU’s overall reputation for output quality the 
prognosis from MU’s standpoint was good. In addition, MU top management assessed that the 
NLCHS subject area was complementary and potentially synergistic to MU’s existing provision and 
the geographic fit with the University’s presence in North London was good.286 The NHS was also 
seen by MU management potentially to open up opportunities for expansion of the University into 
medical education, particularly dentistry. In relation to the University’s planned expansion in 
overseas student markets, the NHS opportunity was also perceived to ensure a useful balance and 
spreading of risk in the University’s overall diversification strategy.287 
 
Thus, at the time of the negotiations of the potential merger of NLCHS with MU there was 
compatibility between the growth objective of MU and one of two overriding objectives of the GM. 
 
IOR dimensions 1-9, 11: As noted earlier, there were initial conditions or historical legacies on 10 of 
the dimensions of the potential IOR (dimensions 1-9 and dimension 11) and on 9 of these 
dimensions the equivalent of a positive stability for the IOR was indicated. Unfortunately, there was 
insufficient information available to the inquiry as to precisely why these stability impacts came 
about. All that is suggested here is that it was a combination of two factors (i) the initial conditions 
of the IOR negotiations in late 1994 and the historical dependence on prior outcomes of a 
                                                             
283 Burke, L. (1995), p. 385; Meerabau (2001) 
284 Burke, L. (1995), p. 387; Meerabau, E. (2001); Following the replacing of the RHAs by the NHS Executive in 
1996 (itself organised into ‘regions’), employers led consortia were established. For the region/area relevant to 
MU, the North London Consortium (NLC) was established in 1997/98. The NLC took over the responsibilities 
for NHS education and training purchasing for its area, which included all those employers which provided 
placements for students with MU. The handover of education commissioning to the NLC from the NHS 
Executive was completed during 1997/98. Source: Walsh (2013). 
285 Sources: Middlesex University Financial Accounts for the years 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96; Middlesex 
University Student and Staff Statistics 1995-1996 HESA end July 1996 census and MU NHS Contracts Records – 
Archive 10 for summaries of these statistics. 
286 Sources: MU senior management; Report of the Chair (1995) in ‘Middlesex University Financial Accounts for 
the Year ended 31st July 1995’, pp 3-4 – Archive 50. 
At the time MU had also been pursuing its growth objective in North London as well as internationally: in 1994 
the North London College of Dance became part of MU; see Table 5(iv) for a summary of the mergers of other 
Colleges with MP/MU over the period 1973-1995. From the mid-1990s MU also began to establish a 
substantial network of overseas offices. 






competitive tendering process which had preceded those IOR negotiations (ii) compatibility in 
overall objectives of the GM and MU, which largely explained the stability impacts in 1995/96 on IOR 
dimensions 1-9 and 11. 
 
IOR dimensions 10 and 12: In contrast, on these two dimensions of the price component, IOR 
dimensions 10 and 12, the stability impacts were not a given either in virtue of initial conditions or of 
historical outcomes. On these two dimensions of the potential IOR that there was a potential conflict 
of objectives between the GM and MU and consequently the potential for a negative IOR stability 
impact existed – in effect this was a fourth variable explaining IOR stability impacts on the two 
relevant dimensions. It transpired that the under-pricing of their bid for NLCHS by MU was due to a 
combination of mistakes in the calculation of direct costs, omissions relating to merger transition 
costs, and a charge for University overheads which was probably too low. The outcomes of the 
competitive tender process which preceded the IOR negotiations on price were also likely to have 
been influential on the stability impacts on the dimensions of the price component of the IOR: from 
the standpoint of the GM the competitive tender process had established a benchmark on the price 
dimensions specifically in relation to the potential merger of NLCHS with a HEI; from MU’s 
standpoint the failure of their previous bid to take over the healthcare education provision of Barnet 
College might have prompted MU to make a ‘keener bid’ for a merger with NLCHS.288 In addition, 
from MU’s standpoint, it was not known whether the GM had ‘outside options’ such that it could 
still reject MU’s bid and explore NLCHS merger options with other HEIs.289 
 
Without further information it is possible only to conjecture an explanation for the stability impacts 
in 1995 on IOR dimensions 10 and 12. In terms of resource dependence theory: (i) there was a 
mutual dependence between the GM and MU; from the GM’s standpoint the key objective was to 
find and establish a suitable HE education provider for the GM’s output demand requirements and 
from MU’s standpoint the key objective was a suitable growth in its education activity (ii) on the face 
of it there was no power imbalance between the GM and MU. From MU’s standpoint, it had not as 
yet made the resource commitments which would arise from a merger with NLCHS and there was 
also no resource criticality which was pressuring it to make such a commitment. MU’s overall 
financial position was also sound: (i) its operating surplus to income was 3.9% for 1993/94 and 4.1% 
for 1994/95 (ii) its long term debt to capital employed stood at c. 45% over the period 1993-1995. 
For its part the GM still had time to develop and explore other university options to fulfil its merger 
of NLCHS objective. However, it is possible that MU perceived a power imbalance, in favour of the 
GM, between MU and GM and acted on that perception: the opportunity for the NLCHS merger was 
at that time the only available route for MU substantially to develop its activity in the NHS education 
market - a similar sized opportunity with similar potential synergies with its existing provision was 
not available to MU at that time.290 The strength of MU’s overall operating and debt position may 
also have encouraged it to believe it had latitude to submit a ‘keen price’ in its bid for NLCHS.  
                                                             
288 MU’s financial calculations in 1994-95 were based partly on relatively broad estimates, particularly of 
overheads costs and their attribution; it was not until over 10 years later, in 2005 that the University had 
developed the database which enabled it to calculate potential financial contributions to its overhead costs on 
a reliable basis – a basis which involved the precise attribution of relevant staff time and which also used the 
expected actual costs (rather than standard costs) of those staff. It was also even later, in 2011, before MU had 
developed a database along with a reliable methodology, which it could use for the attribution of its overhead 
costs to its NHS contracts activity. Thus, MU did not have a validated methodology to calculate the full 
economic cost of its NHS contracts until 2011. 
289 The term ‘outside options’ comes from Muthoo (2000) and refers to one of the potential key factors which 
might influence the outcome of a bargaining process. 
290 MP/MU had since 1991 run a full time undergraduate honours degree programme in nursing. The intake 
numbers on the programme were relatively small (c. 30 new entrants per year). Such a small programme did 






6.2 1995/96 – 2004/05: Collaboration and Growth; Historical Dependence and Resource 
Dependence 
 
Key events, exogenous and endogenous to the IOR, along with the IOR stability impact assessments 
for the period 1995/96 – 2004/05, are summarised below in Table 11. 
 
Caption to Table 11 
 
 Summaries of events and when these occurred which were relevant to IOR stability impacts for 
the period 1995-2004. 
 All events are grouped into the components of the IOR (contracts, outputs, price and 
performance) where these were most relevant. 
 Some events were part of a continuous process (e.g. the consolidation of nursing as a 
profession); other events were discrete, one-off events (e.g. the Project 2000 review) but which 
may indirectly have had an eventual stability impact on dimensions of the IOR. 
 Some events, also described as ‘key events’ (and highlighted in yellow in the Table) had a direct 
impact on the stability of the IOR e.g. ‘IOR Tender/Price Negotiations’ which impacted on some 









6.2.1 Interpretation of IOR Stability Impacts 1996/97 – 2004/05 
 
The stability impacts on each of the IOR dimensions in 1995/96 continued to be almost exactly the 
same year on year over the whole of the succeeding period 1996/97-2004/05. How these stability 
impacts came about and how they persisted over the period was due to a number of different 
factors and events, the relevance of which varied depending on the particular IOR dimension 
affected. 
 
The first of these factors was the specified duration of the IOR contracts and the terms and 
conditions of the contracts. 
 
IOR dimensions 1-4, 6, 9 and 11: The 1995/96 IOR contract was an annually rolling contract of three 
years duration. Unless changes were made to terms and conditions of the contract, this meant that 
from year to year the same consequences for IOR stability due to contract variables were likely to 
ensue. As it turned out, no changes were initiated or proposed by either the GM or MU to the 1995 






impacts on IOR dimensions 1-4, 6, 9 and 11 remained the same for the period 1996-2000 as they had 
for 1995/96.  
 
When in 1998 the NLC was established as the new GM, the 1997 IOR contract was allowed to run for 
the whole of its specified duration (3 years) and replaced in 2000 by a new contract with a fixed 
duration of five years (i.e. up to 2005). Since in other respects the 2000 contract was closely 
modelled on the 1995 contract the stability impacts on IOR dimensions 1-4 and IOR dimension 6 
continued to remain generally the same. The one difference was in IOR dimension 1: the duration of 
the 2000 pre-registration contract was specified as a fixed term and because this contract was not 
renewed before it had 2 years left to expire it meant that for the last two years of the contract there 
was a ‘threatened instability’ on this dimension of the IOR. 
 
The second factor related to two sets of events exogenous to the IOR. 
 
IOR dimension 5: The first set of these exogenous events was relevant to IOR dimension 5 and 
consisted in a review of Project 2000. Concerns had been raised in the 1990s by healthcare providers 
and others concerning Project 2000, particularly about whether the curriculum was too theoretically 
biased and whether newly qualified and registered nurses were ‘fit for practice’. In response, the 
UKCC established a Commission for Education. After ‘extensive consultation’ this Commission 
reported in 1999 and recommended that the main focus of pre-registration education should be on 
the students’ development of relevant competencies defined and assessed in terms of ‘outcomes’.291 
Responsiveness to current and expected future healthcare needs was defined as the criterion for 
relevance; the standard of actual outcomes, particularly in practice, was recommended as a key 
criterion for determining ‘fitness for practice’; in this connection the theory taught on the education 
programmes should support the practice. Subsequently, from c. 2001 these recommendations 
became incorporated into pre-registration curricula (including MU’s curricula) as the ‘Making a 
Difference Curriculum’; in 2001, the competence outcomes-based approach became the basis for 
the requirements of the UKCC, and also subsequently of the NMC,292 for pre-registration education 
programmes.293 These requirements became the basis of the output specification – IOR dimension 
5.294 It was MU’s effective responsiveness to the new requirements which brought about a 
continued ‘stable’ impact on this IOR dimension. 
 
IOR dimensions 7, 8: The second set of exogenous events was relevant to IOR dimensions 7 and 8, 
and consisted in the NHS Plan 2000 and the enactment of that Plan in the Health and Social Care Act 
2001. Concerns had been raised in the 1990s by healthcare providers and others concerning the 
adequacy of NHS provision for both the quality and quantity of patient care. One of the problems 
identified was a shortage (relative to demand and need) of registered nurses and midwives.295 Under 
                                                             
291 UKCC ‘Fitness for Practice’ UKCC 1999 
292 In April 2002 the UKCC was superseded by the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). At the same time the 
English National Board ceased to exist and its education quality assurance function was taken over by the 
NMC. 
293 UKCC ‘Requirements for pre-registration nursing programmes’ UKCC London 2001. NMC ‘Standards of 
proficiency for pre-registration nursing education’ NMC London 2004. The ‘standards of proficiency’ had been 
initially defined as ‘competencies’ – for practical purposes the two terms were interchangeable. To gain entry 
to the register, applicants had to achieve the standards of proficiency which were stipulated by the NMC.   
294 More generally all of these developments also marked the beginnings in the 21st century of the 
consolidation of the professionalisation of nursing. 
295 ‘Widespread shortages of NHS staff, particularly nurses were reported from 1994/95 to 2000.’ – Walsh, D 
(2013), p. 16. Of particular importance to the overall supply of nurses was the number of newly qualified 






the NHS Plan 2000, priority was to be given to increasing capacity in the NHS, particularly of 
consultants, general practitioners and nurses. To bring this about there was to be ‘a substantial 
expansion in medical and nursing education’ extra resources were to be provided for training so that 
a further 20,000 nurses, 6500 therapists, 7500 consultants and 2000 GPs would be added to the 
professional registers by 2005.296 With the implementation of the NHS Plan 2000, the NHS grew 
rapidly – between 2000 and 2005 the growth was c. 60%; the latter compared with a growth of 50% 
over the previous 10 years.297   
 
The planned extra investment in training of new nurses had been anticipated to some extent by the 
newly formed employers training consortia which increased the output quantities they demanded 
from the time of their formation in the mid 1990s.298 Over the period 1997/98 to 2000/01 the NMET 
budget was increased in real terms by c. 25%; from 2001/02 to 2004/05 the MPET levy was 
increased by c. 40% in real terms.299 The increases in these national budgets were distributed to the 
MGs directly in relation to their historic allocations. At the MG level allocations were made by the GM 
on a similar basis, i.e. over the period 1995/96 to 2004/05 the GM allocated its demand for output 
quantities between its various HEI suppliers directly in relation to their historic allocations. Thus, in 
terms of the output quantities demanded of MU, the period 1995/96 to 2004/05 was mainly one of 
substantial overall growth: between 1995/96 to 2001/02 output quantities demanded for MU’s pre-
registration provision increased by c. 47% - this increase was consolidated in subsequent years, up to 
2005.300 Although in some years (1997/98, 1998/99, 2000/01) the sizes of the increases in the GM 
demand for output quantities exceeded the output ceilings stipulated in the IOR contracts for the 
period, MU was able to agree the increased demand and respond effectively, a key part of which 
was enabled by a commensurate increase in the quantities of clinical placements made available by 
healthcare providers. Consequently, the stability impacts on IOR dimensions 7 and 8 were mostly 
‘stable’ over the period 1995-2004. In regard to the size of changes in GM output quantities demand 
(IOR dimension 7) the main exceptions to ‘stability’ were firstly in 1997/98, 1998/99, 2000/01: in all 
of these cases the GM increased its annual demand by more than the output ‘ceiling’ which had 
been agreed in the IOR contract. In 2002/03 the GM reduced its overall demand for output 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
entrants to nursing programmes in the UK. A consequence of this was during the period 1990/91 to 1997/98 
there had been a c. 37% decrease in the number of new UK registrants on the professional register. Sources: 
CoDH (2006) ‘Briefing on the current crisis in nursing and allied health profession education in England’ 14th 
August 1986, paragraph 12 – Archive 5; Buchan J. et al (2013), p.17, Figure 8 
296 Source: NHS Plan 2000, p. 11 and p. 51. 
297 Source: Harker, R. (2012), ‘NHS funding and expenditure, Standard Note SN/SG/724’, Social and General 
Statistics, House of Commons Library, London. Available at: http://www.nhshistory.net/parlymoney.pdf 
Accessed February 2014. See also Table 6 above (p.61) 
298 From 1990/91 to 1997/98 the number of new UK registrants on the professional register decreased by c. 
37%. However, between 1997/98 and 2005/06 there was an increase of c. 42% in the number of new UK 
entrants on the professional register of nurses. Sources: Buchan (2012), p. 12; Buchan et al (2013), p.17. 
Until 2000/2001 output quantities demanded by GMs collectively were based on a bottom up workforce 
planning process – employers forecast their workforce requirements including the requirements for new 
professional staff entering the healthcare workforce by occupational group; the GM for each region collated 
those forecasts and used them as the basis for calculating the future education demand requirements. With 
the establishing of the Workforce Development Confederations (WDCs) in 2001 the process became a top 
down process with regional and local area requirements derived from national projections made by the WDCs. 
This remained the position until 2009/10. Thus until 2000/01 and in a context of increasing budgets for 
workforce education the GM had effective control of the output quantities it demanded.  
299 Source: Department of Health, August 2014, response to FOI request – Archive 51; estimates of the budget 
allocations in real terms over the relevant period were made using the movement in national pay settlements 
for academic staff – source HESA. 






quantities for post-registration programmes by c. 25%. This was a response to the lack of take up of 
places on post-registration programmes by the healthcare employers. In regard to trends in GM 
output demand (IOR dimension 8) the exceptions to stability occurred in 2003/04 and 2004/05: in 
those years the trend in the GM output quantities demand began to decline. While the overall 
demand for new non-medical staff was still buoyant and the funding for expansion which was 
provided under the NHS Plan 2000 was still available, healthcare employers had increasingly met 
their requirements for new staffing by recruiting suitably qualified staff from outside of the UK. 
International recruitment which had accounted for only 10% of new recruits rose rapidly in the early 
2000s mainly because the output of newly qualified staff from the home education providers could 
not keep pace with the sudden substantial increases in employer demand for those staff.301   
 
IOR dimension 10: The third factor affecting IOR stability impacts during the period 1996-2004, 
particularly on the price component of the IOR, was a change in the basis on which price was 
determined. The context of the 1996 negotiations between the GM and MU was different to what it 
had been in 1995: an IOR had already been established (a 3 year rolling contract was in force) and a 
baseline contract price had been established (as the outcome of the 1995 negotiations) where 
previously none had existed. In the 1996 negotiations MU proposed that increases be made to the 
contract price via uplifts to the unit prices for output quantities and the inclusion of additional costs 
items to correct the previous under-pricing. These proposed increases and additions were not 
agreed however and the outcome of the 1996 negotiations was that the unit prices actually 
determined were based almost entirely on the 1995/96 prices, with some adjustments made for 
inflation ‘and efficiency gains’. 
 
Thus although in 1996 the overall price agreed between the GM and MU was still a ‘contract price’ 
the basis of that price (IOR dimension 10) consisted mostly in a combination of unit prices and unit 
costs which were derived from the prices and output quantities agreed for the previous year, 
1995/96, and adjusted for agreed inflation and efficiency savings factors.302 With one exception, unit 
prices and the basis of those prices once firmed up as an outcome of the 1996 negotiations 
continued on those lines (with annual adjustments as noted above) for the rest of the period, 
1996/97-2004/05. The exception occurred in 2003/04 when following for an unusual c. 25% 
reduction in its annual demand for post-registration outputs which had been made in 2002/03 (see 
discussion on dimension 7 above), MU used its discretion under the contract to enter negotiations 
with the GM for a new unit price. MU’s case to the GM was based on the principle that the unit price 
should cover the MU’s costs and submitted detailed evidence to show that the unit price on post-
registration had not kept pace with the increases in MU costs; the GM accepted MU’s case and 
agreed to an uplift of 25% in the unit price for post-registration outputs.303 Nonetheless, the stability 
impacts on IOR dimension 10 (‘threatened instability’) continued.304  
 
IOR dimensions 12 and 14: The outcome of the 1996 negotiations was that the actual price 
continued to be less than MU’s FEC. This outcome was affected by a fourth factor – MU’s operating 
performance. The latter partly reflected MU’s performance in ‘cost reduction’ and potentially 
affected MU’s FEC levels and thus the amount of financial contribution MU sought from output 
quantities.305 Over the period 1996-2004/05, MU’s overall operating position declined substantially: 
                                                             
301 Buchan et al (2011, 2012, 2013) 
302 See also Chapter 5 above under findings on IOR stability impacts for IOR dimensions 10 and 12. Details were 
sourced from Walsh (2013) -Archive 145, and from Archive 27. The format and level of detail of MU’s price 
proposals were in line with requirements which had been specified by the GM. 
303 Source: MU letter to the GM 26th February 2003 – Archive 146. 
304 Post-registration quantities comprised only c. 10% of the overall IOR contract value. Source: Archive 9 
305 The financial contribution that any given operating area, such as MU’s NHS contract activity, would require 






MU sustained operating deficits in six of the nine years, five of those occurring in the final years of 
the period, culminating in 2004/05 in the largest deficit in MU’s history – (£17.7m) which was c. 
(8.7%) of MU’s overall income for that year.306 This performance added to the negative price effect 
on IOR dimension 12 and together these outcomes brought about the threatened instability impact 
on IOR dimension 14. 
 
6.2.2 Explanation of IOR Stability Impacts 1996/97 – 2004/05 
 
Variables which were relevant to explanations of the 1995/96 IOR stability impacts - (i) compatibility 
in the objectives of the GM and MU (ii) historical dependencies of the IOR (including the initial 
conditions of the IOR) and events (both exogenous as well as endogenous to the IOR) (iii) conflict in 
the objectives of the GM and MU and their consequent power dependence responses to that 
conflict - continued to be relevant to explanations of stability impacts over the period 1996-2004. 
 
Compatibility and Conflict in GM and MU IOR Objectives: Following completion of the NLCHS-MU 
merger in 1995, the IOR objectives of the GM over the period 1996/97-2004/05 were (i) the 
performance of the IOR should comply with the education outputs quality/specification and 
quantities requirements of the GM (ii) efficiency in procurement of the education provision.307 MU’s 
IOR objectives concerned the performance of its NLCHS acquisition, in particular to maintain outputs 
quality (so that MU’s reputation for education quality was maintained to that extent) and 
consolidate the gains MU had made in student numbers via the acquisition while also being 
responsive to any new outputs demands.308 
 
Thus the compatibility of objectives between the GM and MU in regard to IOR performance on 
compliance with requirements on output quality/specification and on outputs quantities which had 
existed in 1995, continued over the rest of the period, 1996/97-2004/05. A factor which 
strengthened the compatibility of objectives of the GM and MU was the substantial growth in the 
GM’s demand for output quantities over the period 1997 to 2001 and which was subsequently 
mostly maintained at the increased levels to 2003.309 
 
The potential conflict between the objectives of the GM and MU continued with regard to price: for 
the GM, efficient procurement meant a continued application of the unit prices which had been 
established in 1995/96. However, unless MU was able to effect a substantial productivity 
improvement, the GM’s pursuit of its efficiency objective meant it was most unlikely that MU would 
ever cover its FEC on its NHS contract. 
  
                                                             
306 Source: MU annual financial accounts 1995-2013 - Archive 18. 
307 Sources: (i) GM objectives for the period 1995-2004 were inferred from IOR contract documentation, 
including the terms, conditions and the compliance requirements specified in the IOR contracts, e.g. the 2000-
2005 pre-registration contract (Archive 32), and in contract correspondence e.g. GM letter to MU of 18th 
January 1995 (Archive 4) (ii) MU senior management. 
308 Source: MU senior management. 







Historical and Power Dependence:  Historical dependence processes and power dependence 
responses relevant to explanations of IOR stability impacts for the period 1995/96–2004/05 are 
summarised in Table 14(i).310 
 
Caption to Table 14(i) 
 
 Shown are the types of historical dependence (HD) processes associated with stability impacts 
by IOR dimension for period 1995/96-2004/05. 
 
Example: Dimension 1 
 
Years   Stability Impact  HD Process 
 
1995/96-1999/2000  S  Initial Conditions (IC) 
2000/01-2004/05   S → TRI  Founder (F1) 
 
 Shown for each dimension is the incidence of the types of HD processes for each year of the 
period. Example 1995/96: Initial conditions – 12 dimensions; Founder – 4 dimensions 
 
Shown are the occurrences of particular types of power dependence responses by the GM and MU 
respectively for each year of the reference period. Example 1995/96: MU – Cost 
Reduction/Productivity Improvement; GM – Rent Extraction 
                                                             
310 Numbers in Table 14(i) under IC and HD Processes for each year indicate the number of IOR dimensions in 
which these processes occurred. ‘X’ indicates where a particular power dependence response occurred in a 








IOR dimensions 1-9 and 11: As shown in Table 14(i) above and as previously discussed, the stability 
impacts in 1995/96 on IOR dimensions 1-9 and 11 were largely the outcome of historical 
dependencies on the initial conditions (IC) of the IOR. This continued broadly to be the case over the 
period 1996/97 to 1999/2000; the annual rolling nature of the IOR contract provided both the GM 
and MU the formal opportunity to seek change to the rules of the IOR on any of its dimensions 
during this period. However neither the GM nor MU sought any change during that period on IOR 
dimensions 1-9 and 11. The GM’s second medium term special objective noted earlier - to establish 
an employers’ consortium and then to hand over its GM function to that consortium – continued to 
be relevant. The rolling nature of the contracts, their duration (IOR dimension 1) and conditions of 






on a trial basis (subject to annual review), was also consistent with the GM’s second special objective 
and continued to be so.  
 
IOR dimensions 1, 2: The successful completion of that trial period was effectively recognised in the 
2000/01 pre-registration contract; in that contract the duration (IOR dimension 1) was set at 5 years 
and termination (IOR dimension 2) continued to be applicable only to where material un-remedied 
breaches of the contract had occurred. Taken together, the conditions on both of these dimensions 
functioned to establish the IOR on a more permanent longer term basis. Thus a new historical 
dependence (‘Founder’) which came about in virtue of the 2000 pre-registration contract was 
established on these two dimensions of the IOR.311 In effect, this contract functioned for the period 
of its specified duration, as a lock-in mechanism for the impacts on these dimensions of the IOR.   
 
IOR dimension 3: The information and reporting requirements which had been specified by the GM 
in 1995 continued unchanged over the period 1996/97 to 2004/05; the GM had made clear in 1995 
at the outset of the IOR that it did not want ‘an industry’ to be created by the development of 
burdensome/complex information requirements.312 Subsequently, the associated standardisation of 
the GM’s contract monitoring procedures functioned as a self-reinforcing mechanism for the 
stability impacts on this dimension of the IOR. 
 
IOR dimensions 4, 5, 6, 9 and 11: Arrangements established on these IOR dimensions also continued 
unchanged over the period 1996/97 to 2004/05.313 The stability impacts on all of these dimensions 
were brought about by the lock-in mechanisms of successive contracts. However, during the period 
there were also underpinning self-reinforcing processes which affected IOR dimensions 4 and 5: in 
regard to IOR dimension 4, the shared responsibilities of the GM and MU for placement established 
in the 1995 contract had reflected a historical legacy (initial conditions) which itself had been 
grounded in a characteristic of the production technology used for education outputs, viz. that the 
latter were the outcome of joint inputs by HEIs (for the academic input) and NHS employers (for the 
practical inputs during placement). 
 
In regard to IOR dimension 5 the requirements of the professional regulatory body meant that at 
pre-registration level the education provision for many of the non-medical occupations, including 
nursing and midwifery, was equally split by duration, learning and assessment requirements 
between the academic periods in the HEI and the placement periods in the healthcare providers. In 
addition to providing placements employers also provided the day to day supervision of the students 
in placement as well as their mentoring. Furthermore, while the formal position was that all pre-
registration students were supernumerary, the reality was that many of those students, especially 
final year students, contributed directly to patient care. Employer representatives also participated 
in the interview part of the selection processes in the recruitment of students. 
 
Given all of these factors, the nature of the education provision and its delivery came to be 
considered by healthcare employers and HEIs to have an intrinsically collaborative nature in which 
                                                             
311 The stability impact on the duration of the contract (IOR dimension 1) changed to ‘TRI’ in 2003/04. This was 
an unintended consequence of the nature of the fixed term contract which was agreed. Unless a new contract 
was made by the beginning of the penultimate year of the fixed 5 year term, then automatically the IOR 
stability would become TRI on that dimension. As it turned out, this is what happened. 
312 Source: Letter from GM to MU dated 18th January 1995 – Archive 5. 
313 As noted earlier, the IOR outputs specification changed following the evaluation of Project 2000 in 1999. 
The relevant conditions in the IOR contracts were drawn so that such changes were automatically applied to 
the IOR outputs specification. However, given the materiality of the change represented by the introduction of 
the ‘Making a Difference’ curriculum, this has been reflected in Table 14(i) as a new historical dependence 






both of those parties had an equal role. This perception was reinforced further following the 
establishment of the NLC in 1998 and its takeover of the role of GM. With employers via the NLC 
now directing engaging with the HEIs at all levels of the IOR, the delivery of the education provision 
came to be regarded as a ‘partnership’ between the employers and the HEIs (such as MU). 
‘Partnership Boards’ which included both HEI and employer members and which had the remit to 
monitor and review the effectiveness of the HEI-employer collaborations as well as the curricula and 
plans for their development took on added significance, functioning not only as an important part of 
the IOR communications structure but also in legitimising the IOR overall as a ‘partnership’ 
enterprise.314  
 
IOR dimensions 7 and 8: New outputs quantities demands were made annually by the GM. During 
the period 1996-2004 those quantities were either the result of the amalgamation of the bottom up 
generated employers’ demands (to 2000/01) or the result of top-down national/regional planning 
(to 2004/05 and up to 2009/10). GM allocations to its suppliers (including MU) of its outputs 
demand were based on the previous year’s allocations made to those suppliers, adjusted for the 
latest year’s planning inputs. Given the annual carry forward of the prior outputs demand which was 
still in the education supply ‘pipeline’, at an IOR level the stability impacts on IOR dimensions 7 and 8 
were a function of the most recent history of outputs demands; thus the type of historical 
dependence on these dimensions as shown in Table 14(i) was ‘FG’ (‘Forgetting’). 
 
However at the overall MG level, GM outputs demand was always subject to affordability constraints 
(from the GM’s standpoint); thus the size of the overall NMET budget/MPET levy and how that 
varied from year to year were further factors which ultimately determined the stability impacts on 
IOR dimensions 7 and 8. As previously discussed the size of the overall NMET budget/MPET levy was 
not only a function of the historic size of those budgets but was also determined by the size of the 
overall NHS budget which in turn was the outcome of macro-environmental events and political 
decisions about resources and their allocation. 
 
IOR dimensions 10, 12, and 14: The conflict of objectives between the GM and MU on the price 
component of the IOR which had existed in 1995/96 continued over the period 1996-2004. The 
disadvantageous outcome in 1995 to MU on contract price provoked an attempt by MU in 1996 to 
renegotiate price.  However, the outcome of these negotiations between MU and the GM was to 
leave the basis of price (IOR dimension 10) unchanged from what had been established in the first 
IOR negotiations in 1995 – MU failed to attain any of its objectives on price in the 1996 negotiations. 
 
This outcome can be explained as due to a combination of self reinforcing processes of historical 
dependence and change in the relations of power between the GM and MU, in favour of the GM, 
which had occurred: (i) self-reinforcing processes were relevant to the price component dimensions 
of the IOR because the annual recurrent budgets set for the GM usually took its previous year’s 
expenditures as a baseline. Since these expenditures reflected prices paid by the GM on its IOR 
contracts generally, and since these prices were predicated on a unit price basis, then beyond 
changes to sanctioned budgets to allow for volume changes, there was stickiness in the GM budgets 
                                                             
314 Source: MU senior management; Walsh (2013) – Archive 85. The ‘Partnership Boards’ consisting of senior 
and middle management representatives met three or four times each year. The quality of the 
communications and of the interaction between HEIs such as MU and the employers was also probably 
assisted by affinities in the backgrounds of their respective staff: all of the HEI academic staffs were 
professionally qualified in one of the healthcare professions; many had spent time in the NHS with the very 
employers which were now the ‘partners’ of their respective HEIs and many had been colleagues of those 
employers’ representatives. 
In his history of the NHS, Rivett (2014) notes the ‘partnership’ ethos underpinning the HEI-NHS employer 






sanctioned for subsequent years. In effect, once unit prices based on the 1995/96 outcomes had 
become established then these, together with the price outcomes on its other IOR contracts, 
functioned as self reinforcing mechanisms in determining the budget allocations to the GM and 
subsequently set a limit to the allocations that the GM was willing and able to make to its suppliers. 
 
(ii) By the time of the 1996 negotiations MU had made relatively substantial commitments to the 
IOR: NLCHS had become a part of MU so that all of the associated resources and costs associated 
with the merger were now wholly MU’s; MU had expanded its estate with the purchase of an 
additional campus at Archway, the intended main purpose of which was as a resource to support the 
delivery of MU’s NHS contract education provision.315 Compared with the context of the first IOR 
negotiations which took place in 1994/95, both of these commitments by MU were new. In effect, 
through its merger with NLCHS, MU had taken on resources which were substantial relative to MU’s 
overall recurrent operating performance and to its asset base.316 These resources were also 
specialised and could only be useful to MU in its NHS contract activities. Hence a critical resource 
dependency of MU on the continuation of the IOR and MU’s continued participation in the MG had 
been created. In contrast to MU’s dependency which had increased in the dyad with the GM, the 
GM’s dependency remained unchanged; in the event that MU terminated the IOR the GM continued 
to have outside options – other university suppliers could be found to replace MU.  
 
As an organization with other activities (in 1996 the NHS proportion accounted for c. 9%-10% of 
MU’s total activity by volume and value),317 MU was not wholly dependent for its survival on its 
activities in the MG. In the event that the GM began to extract quasi-rents there were options open 
to MU in how it could sustain its NHS activity. These options included (i) cost reduction through 
bearing down on its costs university-wide (albeit in a context where staffing costs were determined 
mainly under nationally negotiated agreement arrangements and where in many subject areas SSRs 
were ‘strongly recommended’ and monitored through annual monitoring reviews by the relevant 
regulatory professional body so that these costs were less amenable to MU’s direct control) and (ii) 
cross-subsidisation from its HEFCE contract and international activities. 
 
The actual power dependence responses to the outcome of the 1996 price negotiations by the GM 
and MU were: (i) the GM continued extraction of rents from MU (ii) MU cross-subsidised its NHS 
activity. The outcome of the 1996 negotiations however was also consequential for the stability 
impacts on IOR dimensions 10, 12 and in subsequent years up to 2004/05. The effect of the 1996 
outcome on price was to establish and legitimise the basis of price at unit price levels which were in 
line with 1995 levels and which were below MU’s FEC. Given that only incremental adjustments 
based on inflation and year on year efficiency improvements were made to unit prices in subsequent 
years, a consequence of the outcome on price negotiations in 1996 was to reinforce the historical 
dependence (F1) founded in 1995/96 in respect of IOR dimensions 10, 12 and 14. The underpinning 
                                                             
315 The Archway campus was a joint purchase of MU and UCL and was completed in 1996.  
316 The resource criticality of the NHS contract to MU was inferred from the income to MU from its NHS 
contract and MU’s overall financial operating profit at that time. The annual income to MU from its NHS 
contract activity in 1995/96 was c. £8m; this was c. 300% of MU’s operating surplus (Archive 18 was the source 
of the base data). If MU’s NHS contract was not rolled forward in 1996 (with the consequence that the 
contract would expire within a further two years by the end of 1997/98) and given MU’s inability to deploy its 
relevant specialised NHS resources to non-NHS income opportunities (even if such opportunities had existed) 
then the loss of income to MU in 1996/97 alone would have meant MU’s overall operating position would 
have changed in 1996/97 from operating surplus to an operating loss for that year. Added to that would have 
been the costs to MU of initial downsizing and eventual withdrawal from the IOR which would have been 
sustained over the period 1996-1998, and consequently the prospect of MU sustaining relatively significant 
operating deficits during that period. 
317 The share of MU total student FTE and MU total income accounted for by its NHS activity was sourced from 






self-reinforcing mechanism for the historical dependencies on these IOR dimensions was the 
continuing level of resource dependency of MU in the IOR and the consequent power imbalance 
between the GM and MU. 
 
As evidenced in the outcome of the 2003 negotiations between the GM and MU, post-registration 
was the one part of the education provision where price determination proved to be more flexible. 
There is little information about why the GM decided to agree MU’s request for a 25% increase in 
the unit price (see Chapter 5 above). What is known is: 
 
(i) In 2003 post-registration was c. 15% of MU’s overall NHS contract activity and consisted of short 
courses.318 This latter characteristic distinguished it from the rest of the NHS contract activity which 
consisted of 3 and 4 year programmes. Apart from some programmes for the training and 
development of mentors the post-registration part of its NHS activity could be treated by MU on a 
stand-alone basis commercially.   
 
(ii) MU had concluded that its direct costs in this area were not being covered in this area.319 In the 
context of the 2003 negotiations an exit by MU from the MG in that part of its activity in the MG was 
a viable option both logistically and economically. Given the latter there was in relation to post-
registration provision a different balance of power between the GM and MU:  in a context where 
MU’s direct costs were not being covered post-registration activity was not resource critical to MU – 
quite the opposite. Consequently in this area there was not a power imbalance between the GM and 
MU as there was on the other 85% of the IOR. 
 
(iii) Compared with the previous year 2002/03, the overall MPET budget for 2003/04 had increased 
by over 11%.320 Consequently the GM had more resources at its disposal to accommodate increases 
in costs in 2003/04. 
 
(iv) The relatively minor proportion of the post-registration activity to the overall IOR also meant 
that from the GM’s perspective the stakes were commensurately smaller. This became even more 
the case when in 2003/04 the GM reduced its demand for post-registration output quantities from 
MU by a further c. 10%.321 Thus in combination with the increases in its overall education budgets 
the GM was in a position to agree MU’s request for a price increase, notwithstanding the size of it, 
and perhaps was consequently also more readily persuadable by the merits of MU’s case for an 
increase.    
                                                             
318 Source: IOR Commissions Quantities and Prices 1995/96–2012/13 – Archive 9.  
319 Source: MU letter to GM re post-registration unit price 26th February 2003 – Archive 146. 
320 Source: MPET and NMET Budgets 1997/98-2012/13: FOI Response from the DH, August 2013 – Archive 51. 






6.3 2005/06 – 2007/08: Exogenous Change; Drift and Adaptation 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, the biggest shift in the stability of the IOR over the entire reference period 
1995-2013 occurred between 2004/05 and 2007/08. All of the stability changes between those years 
occurred in dimensions in the contract and outputs components of the IOR, and arose from events 
exogenous and endogenous to the IOR.  These key events, along with the IOR stability impact 
assessments for the period 2005/06 – 2007/08 are summarised below in Table 12. 
 
Caption to Table 12 
 
 Summaries of events and when these occurred which were relevant to IOR stability impacts for 
the reference period 2005-2007. 
 All events are grouped into the components of the IOR (contracts, outputs, price and 
performance) where these were most relevant. However it should be noted that some events 
had relevance on more than one dimension and which went across different components of the 
IOR e.g. ‘IOR Tender/Price Negotiations’. 
 Some events were part of a continuous process (e.g. the consolidation of nursing as a 
profession); other events were discrete, one-off events but which may indirectly have had an 
eventual stability impact on dimensions of the IOR (e.g. the ‘NHS Financial Crisis’ of 2005). 
 Some events, also described as ‘key events’ (and highlighted in yellow in the Table) had a direct 
impact on the stability of the IOR e.g. ‘BMP delay and Implementation’ which impacted on some 















6.3.1 Interpretation of IOR Stability Impacts 2005/06 – 2007/08 
 
6.3.1.1 Exogenous Events and IOR Interim Contracts 
 
In 2005 and coincident with the time that MU’s 5 year NHS contract for its pre-registration provision 
was coming to an end (March 2005) and the commencement of the final year of its 3 year post-
registration contract (April 2005), a new national level framework education contract, the ‘National 
Standard Contract’ (NSC), was in the process of being negotiated at NHS-HS inter-sector level. It was 
expected by all GMs and HEIs once these negotiations were finalised that individual GM-HEI 
contracts would be redrawn so as to align with the NSC. Consequently, pending the outcome of the 
NSC negotiations, the GM proposed to MU a new interim one year contract (for the period 
2005/06), the terms and conditions of which were partly based on those in the IOR’s previous 
contracts. This proposed new contract was agreed by MU. The intentions of the GM and MU were 
that once an NSC had been agreed then a new longer term contract for the IOR which was based on 
the NSC would be negotiated. 
 
In the following year, 2006, there were two sets of exogenous events which further influenced the 
contract arrangements between the GM and MU and had consequences for IOR stability. The first of 
these was the negotiations on the National Contract: these were still continuing. The second 
consisted in a chain of events which commenced in 2001 and related to the functions and 
organizational structures of the GM: in 2001 the functions of the NLC were transferred to newly 
formed Workforce Development Confederations (WDCs). The membership of the WDCs was similar 
to that of the preceding employer consortia such as the NLC and the strong ethos of partnership 
which had been created between NHS healthcare workforce employers and the HEIs continued. 
However, in the context of the implementation of the NHS Plan 2000 and the consequent relatively 
large impacts on the NHS workforce which were planned, the WDCs were to take a top down 
approach to workforce planning and development. 
 
In 2002, alongside the WDCs taking over the NLCs and coterminous with the boundaries of the 
WDCs, 28 Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) were created; the SHAs replaced the NHS Executive 
and were responsible to the Department of Health (DH).322 The scope of the SHAs was 
comprehensive, covering both the acute and primary sectors of NHS: all of the NHS Trusts and all of 
the Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) became responsible to the SHAs. In 2004 the WDCs were disbanded 
and their education commissioning functions taken over by the SHAs.323 The SHAs now had three 
roles: (i) ‘strategic leadership’ of healthcare provision and delivery in their areas. In this role the 
SHAs were required to maintain a ‘strategic oversight’ of both the NHS Trusts and the PCTs and to 
support healthcare provider development, ‘particularly in shaping the structure of local supply; 
assessing capacity requirements; ensuring sufficient competition and contestability; supporting 
major service reconfiguration; and achieving financial recovery’; (ii) operational oversight of the NHS 
Trusts and PCTs, particularly to ensure that local healthcare systems operated effectively and in line 
with Government policies;324 (iii) NHS workforce development. This role was about SHAs ‘ensuring all 
                                                             
322 The 28 SHAs were created under the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002. 
Details available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/17/contents Accessed February 2015. See also 
the Department of Health web archive at: 
http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20130329111203/http://www.london.nhs.uk/webfiles/Corp
orate/Workforce%20Strategy/Development%20of%20an%20Education%20Commissioning%20System%20for
%20NHS%20London.pdf Accessed February 2015  
323 Source: Audit Commission (2004) p. 4 
324 Although the PCTs directly received the funding for the commissioning of primary healthcare services for 
their area (which across all PCTs accounted for the bulk of the overall budget for the NHS) and were 
responsible for the management of that funding, they did so under the ‘strategic oversight’ of the relevant 






aspects of workforce supply – including education, training, and workforce planning – best support 
service demand’.325 
 
Thus, in 2004 the SHAs became the new GMs. For MU the new GM SHA was the North London 
Central Strategic Health Authority (NCLSHA). In July 2006 the 28 SHAs were restructured into 10 
SHAs.326 The restructured SHAs included for the first time a pan-London SHA, NHS London (NHSL), 
which then became the relevant GM for the IOR with MU. Meanwhile, earlier in 2006, given the 
impending reorganization of the GMs and to allow the new London SHA some time to become fully 
operational, the outgoing GM (NCLSHA) for the IOR with MU proposed a further one year interim 
contract (for the period 2006/07), the terms and conditions of which were identical to the previous 
year’s interim contract. This new interim contract for the IOR was also agreed by MU. 
 
IOR dimensions 1 – 4: A consequence of the interim contracts was the ‘threatened instability’ on IOR 
dimension 1 (Duration) continued from 2004/05 into 2005/06 and 2006/07.327 ‘Threatened 
instability’ was also the impact on IOR dimension 2 (Termination) – the GM and MU had equal rights 
of termination but under the interim contracts this could be done on written notice with no 
minimum period of notice required. Compared with previous contracts, there were no differences in 
the interim contracts for 2005/06 and 2006/07 regarding compliance information and management 
requirements, so on dimension 3 the IOR continued to be ‘stable’. However in regard to IOR 
dimension 4 (Placement Responsibilities), under the terms of these interim contracts MU was now 
solely responsible for the sourcing of placements. Given the lack of control MU had over the 
employers’ placements provision (particularly in regard to the quantities and types of placements 
provided – ‘placements capacity’ – but also to some extent over the quality of placements) this 
meant that the stability impact on IOR dimension 4 became a ‘threatened instability’. 
 
IOR dimensions 5, 6 and 13: The outputs specification (IOR dimension 5) continued under the 
interim contracts to be on the basis of the requirements of the regulatory professional body; as in 
previous periods, it was MU’s effective adaptation to these requirements which brought about a 
continued stability impact on this IOR dimension and consequently also on IOR dimension 13 in 
regard to requirements for outputs quality.328 In regard to output floors and ceilings, IOR dimension 
6: no provisions were made for these were made in the draft interim contracts prepared by the GM 
– since the interim contracts were agreed at the same time as the output quantities allocations were 
specified these omissions did not seem to MU management to be material at the time. However, the 
effect of the omission of such provisions did technically mean that the impact on IOR dimension 6 
was a ‘threatened instability’. 
  
                                                             
325 Sources: Department of Health (2006a); ‘Who we are’ NHS London 2013, available at 
http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20130304122318/http://www.london.nhs.uk/who-we-are  
Accessed May 2013. 
326 The NHS Act 2006 empowered the Secretary of State for Health to vary the area for which a SHA was 
established and to abolish a SHA. Source: NHS Act 2006, Chapter 1, Clause 13. Available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/41/pdfs/ukpga_20060041_en.pdf The Secretary of State duly 
exercised this power in March 2006, ordering the reorganization of the SHAs to take place in July 2006. 
327 For IOR stability on the dimension of ‘duration’, the duration of the contract had to be at least 2 years. 
However, by day 2 in each of the years 2003 and 2011 the remaining duration of the contract had become less 
than two years. 
328 The effectiveness of MU’s responses in relation to outputs specification requirements were reflected in the 
stability impacts on IOR dimension 13 (Performance i) consisting in the continued satisfactory performance 
ratings in the regular monitoring reviews of the professional regulator (the NMC) and in the satisfactory ratings 






6.3.1.2 Exogenous Events and GM Demand for Outputs 
 
IOR dimensions 7, 8: By 2005/06, events exogenous to the IOR had occurred or were in the process 
of occurring, which were to have an impact on the stability of IOR dimensions 7 and 8. One of these 
events was the Health and Social Care Act 2003. According to Pollock et al (2003) one of the main 
objectives of the Act was to abolish government control of NHS Trusts by turning them into 
competing independent corporations.329 All NHS Acute Hospital Trusts were to become Foundation 
Trusts by 2010.330  Both NHS bodies and non NHS bodies, including private companies could apply to 
become Foundation Trusts. Foundation Trusts were intended to have greater operational 
independence and thereby it was hoped to be relatively more responsive to the healthcare needs 
and demands of their local areas. To be given Foundation Trust status, an NHS Acute Trust had to 
demonstrate its financial sustainability. 
 
Implementation of the 2003 Act brought about the establishment of the first NHS Foundation Trusts 
established in 2004.331 However, even though implementation of the NHS Plan 2000 had already 
resulted in substantially increased budgets for NHS Trusts as well as for the NHS overall,332 many 
NHS Acute Trusts returned financial deficits for the financial year 2004/05 – for the NHS overall, a 
net financial deficit for the year was recorded.333 The overall net deficit for the NHS in England 
increased in the following year, 2005/06: a gross deficit of £1,277m and a net deficit of £512m were 
recorded; the number of provider organizations in deficit increased year on year from 159 to 174 
organizations (the latter comprised 31% of all NHS provider organizations, excluding Foundation 
Trusts).334 
 
Financial balance in the NHS was considered by the DH as essential to the success of the new 
‘market style reforms’; consequently, successive years of deficits in a context where NHS budgets 
overall had been increasing were seen by the DH and the Treasury not merely as a fiscal problem but 
also as a strategic problem: potentially at stake was the success of government policy overall for the 
marketisation of the NHS – with a ‘real market’ in place it was believed by government policy makers 
that greater efficiency including better VFM and cost efficiency of NHS providers, would result.335 
                                                             
329 Pollock, A., Price, D., Talbot-Smith, A., Mohan, J. (2003) ‘NHS and the Health and Social Care Bill: end of 
Bevan’s vision?’, British Medical Journal 2003, 327:982 
330 Later, this target date was extended to 2014. By 2014 there were 175 NHS foundation trusts; in addition to 
these, there were 99 acute hospital trusts still seeking foundation trust status; however it was estimated that 
under their current organizational arrangements perhaps c. 47 of those trusts might never be in a position to 
satisfy the requirements for financial sustainability to be given foundation trust status. 
331 Source: Rivett, G. (2013) ‘NHS foundation trusts first established in 2004 ... are accountable to an 
independent regulator, Monitor, which is accountable directly to Parliament.  ... NHS foundation trusts are freer 
from central government control, manage their own budgets and shape the health care services they provide to 
reflect local needs and priorities.’ 
332 There had been a 5 year moving average annual growth of 7.6% p.a. in overall NHS expenditures in England 
between 1999 and 2004. Source: Harker, R (2012), pp 5-6. 
333 Source: King’s Fund (2006), p. 1. 
334 Source: King’s Fund (2006), pp 1-2. The financial figures also exclude Foundation Trusts. 
335 Source: The King’s Fund (2006), p. 7. The internal market of the NHS that had been introduced in the 1990s 
had mainly consisted in implementation of a purchaser provider split; the latter had included the creation of 
PCTs and hospital trusts, and the process of ‘commissioning’ by PCTs from hospital trusts. All of this had 
become well established. However what had not yet been established was a market with competition and a 
diversity of suppliers both at organization (e.g. hospital) and role (e.g. hospital consultant) levels. According to 
Player (2013), Leys and Player (2011), and Pollock (2004) the new ‘market style reforms’ (PbR; the new 
contracts for hospital consultants and other NHS staff; the establishing of Foundation Trusts; and the 
introduction of ‘patient choice’ of healthcare provider) the implementation of which had begun in 2003 






Responses by government to the 2005/06 NHS deficits were to insist that NHS Trusts current 
budgets were not exceeded and included a range of substantive measures to tackle the perceived 
underlying problems as well as ‘financial adjustment’ measures to balance the books.336 Substantive 
measures included ‘turnaround programmes’: on the perception that ‘poor management’ was an 
important cause of the deficits, ‘turnaround programmes’ were initiated in December 2005 by the 
DH in 101 of the deficit making NHS organizations.337 In addition, Trusts generally sought to cut their 
costs, mainly by not recruiting to outstanding vacancies and by closing wards. 
 
An example of ‘financial adjustments’ was a response by the London region SHAs to top slice 1% of 
the budgets of surplus making PCTs to offset deficits elsewhere.338 However ‘financial adjustments’ 
were not limited to healthcare service budgets but were also made to the NHS MPET budget/levy 
and the allocations of the latter which individual SHAs made in their regions. Although the NHS 
overall was in deficit in 2005/06, the position was different not only between individual NHS 
organizations but also between different types of NHS organizations: while Trusts and PCTs were 
overall in deficit, SHAs were in surplus.339 SHAs’ surpluses totalled c. £500m and related mainly to 
their MPET allocations. From the time it was first created in 2001, the MPET budget had been ring-
fenced; however, in 2005 as one of their responses to the NHS financial crisis, SHAs throughout 
England decided to lift the MPET ring fencing and to use some of the MPET funding to plug or 
mitigate the deficits of NHS service providers. About £150m of the MPET funds transferred to the 
service budgets in 2005/06 came from the part of the MPET budget used to fund education for the 
allied health professions, the Nursing, Midwifery Education and Training (NMET) budget – the IOR 
GM (NCLSHA) itself transferred c. £6.3m out of its MPET budget allocation to its service budget.340  
 
As part of the latter move, in 2006/07 the GM reduced its demand for output quantities across all 
IOR contracts it had in the MG, including its IOR with MU: new commissions for 2006/07 were 
reduced by c. 10% on 2005/06 levels. The way in which the reduction in commissions was made by 
the GM avoided any short run problems of stability on IOR dimension 7 (Size of Variability of Output 
Quantities): firstly, the GM gave MU several months’ warning of the potential for a reduction; when 
finally made, the reduction was kept to within the maximum reduction permitted under the previous 
                                                             
336 Based on Public Interest Reports (PIR) issued by the Audit Commission and on reports from Trusts, The 
King’s Fund (2006) summarised the causes of the 2004/06 deficits under three main groupings: 
(i) Local management: in this group were ‘poor management’ and higher than planned costs of private finance 
contracts (PFIs). 
(ii) National policies and decisions: in this group were the higher costs of new contracts for NHS staff (e.g. 
hospital consultants) introduced in 2003/04, the adverse funding impacts on those Trusts with higher than 
national average costs of the introduction in 2003 of payment by results (PbR) for hospital procedures and 
treatments, and the cost of implementing NICE guidance – the last reflecting increasing costs of medical 
treatments and expectations about the quality of healthcare). 
(iii) Local health economies: in this group were duplications of services in particular areas (implying a need for 
the reconfiguration of services) and contagion effects. The latter could occur for example, where some 
hospitals were dependent for a large proportion of their income on another NHS organization (such as a 
Primary Care Trust) which was in financial trouble. On the other hand, PCTs generally were thought to be 
unable effectively to control the demand for hospital services: referrals were made by GPs who were not 
under the control of PCTs and hospitals would never send away sick patients. Source: The King’s Fund (2006), 
pp 4-6. 
337 Source: The King’s Fund (2006), p. 4. The ‘turnaround’ initiative included ‘turnaround teams’ commissioned 
from external auditors (KPMG) which were sent into the relevant NHS organizations. 
338 The King’s Fund (2006), p. 7 
339 The King’s Fund (2006), p. 3 
340 Source: CoDH (2006), ‘Draft Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry into NHS Deficits’ - 






pre-registration contract of the IOR in which output floors and ceilings had been specified; secondly 
the GM consulted, and eventually also agreed, with MU about precisely in which education 
programmes the reductions would be made so there was the least adverse impact on MU. 
 
The reduction in the GM’s demand for outputs in 2006 continued a decline in the rolling 3 yearly 
output demand of the GM which had first begun in 2003/04. The impact on IOR dimension 8 was a 
‘threatened instability’. The GM’s demand for outputs was never subsequently restored to its pre-
2006 levels – the GMs new commissions demand in 2007/08 was nearly the same as it was in 
2006/07 – so that the trend of decline continued into 2007/08 
 
Over the period 2004-2006 and coincident with when they were in financial deficit MU’s main NHS 
Trust placement providers made reductions in their placement capacity for pre-registration 
students. The placement capacity associated with the hospital wards that were closed was lost and 
not replaced. These reductions substantially exceeded the actual cuts to commissions for students 
which had been made by the GM so that there was a threat MU’s performance in the IOR would, 
from the GM’s perspective, become deficient (thus threatening the stability on IOR dimension 13). 
Given that under the interim contracts the GM no longer had a responsibility that sufficient 
placement capacity was found, the problem became MU’s problem.341 In response, MU devised and 
implemented arrangements with those Trusts which were its main providers of placements, which 
functioned to increase the productivity of the Trusts’ remaining placement capacity.342 As a result, 
sufficient placement capacity was found by MU during the period. 
 
6.3.1.3 Exogenous Events and Price 
 
IOR dimensions 10-12: Events exogenous to the IOR both prior to 2005 as well as during the period 
2005-2007 also had an impact on the stability of the IOR in its price component. As part of the 
implementation of the NHS Plan 2000, substantial extra investment in education for the future NHS 
workforce had been allocated.343 However, government policy makers realised it was another matter 
whether HEIs would actually deliver on the volume increases in education that would be demanded 
of them. Against this background and the government priority rapidly to increase NHS workforce 
capacity, the Comptroller and Auditor General (AG) of the National Audit Office (NAO) in 2001 
reviewed ‘the effectiveness of the arrangements for educating and training the future NHS health 
professional workforce’ in order to identify issues that needed to be addressed if the policy 
objectives for the NHS as set out in the NHS Plan were to be achieved.344 
 
On price and costs the AG found there were ‘wide variations in price per student for the same 
qualification’ and ‘the contribution to overheads in NHS funded contracts is much less than for non-
                                                             
341 In effect, at the same time that placement capacity had become a problem the GM had, via the new interim 
contracts, transferred to MU the responsibility for addressing the problem. 
342 The ‘productivity’ of placement capacity was increased mainly through either allocating more students per 
ward and per mentor, and/or by increasing the flexibility of placement capacity by dividing the total time of 
placements required into placement units of shorter duration – while the latter increased the number of 
placement ‘units’ the increased scheduling flexibility which this brought about functioned to increase usage 
(and thereby productivity) of the available placement capacity.  
343 See supra this Chapter for discussion of increases to the NMET budget and MPET levy over the period 
1997/98-2004/05.   
344 Audit Commission (2001), ‘Educating and training the future health professional workforce for England’, 
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General; HC2771 Session 2000-01; 1 March 2001, p. 2. The NHS Plan 






NHS funded contracts’.345 The AG concluded that the then existing (2001) position on price and costs 
for pre-registration education provision could hinder the sought for expansion of the healthcare 
workforce.346 The AG also concluded that the wide variation on pricing also meant there was a lack 
of transparency throughout the system such that value for money of money spent on NHS workforce 
education and training could not be assured. The AG recommended that the Department of Health 
(DH)  ‘agree a standard benchmark pricing formula for NHS funded programmes similar to that 
operating for HEFCE funded programmes’.347 This recommendation was accepted and in 2002 JM 
Consulting Limited (JMC) was appointed by the DH to investigate, and make recommendations 
about the establishing of a national tariff or benchmark price arrangement for the pre-registration 
level education provision for NHS non-medical staff. 
 
JMC (2003) concluded that the establishing of a national tariff based on a standard pricing system 
was desirable (for the reasons stated earlier by the AG) and would also be an appropriate.348 The 
appropriateness of a standard cost approach was because (i) there was little variation in direct costs 
on a unit cost basis: a large proportion of those costs were staff costs the level of which were 
negotiated nationally and were broadly well aligned between education providers (ii) the design of 
the curricula and its delivery was closely prescribed and controlled by the regulatory body (the NMC) 
– there was relatively little latitude for individual education providers to vary in their production 
technology. ‘Strongly recommended SSRs’ norms were monitored through annual monitoring 
reviews by the regulatory body and while HEIs deviated from those norms they did so within 
informally accepted limits but at their own risk (iii) in regard to overheads: although individual 
providers varied in what each classified as ‘central’ and ‘local costs’, when these costs were assessed 
on a standard basis JM Consulting found that ‘the derived standard costs were not very sensitive to 
changes in this area’.349 JMC recommended: 
 
 Benchmark prices should be determined on an average standard costing basis. 
 The levels at which benchmark prices were set should be based on the principle that price 
reflected the agreed average standard costs to HEIs of delivering the education provision to 
the required specification/quality standards – the latter being determined mainly by the 
professional bodies. HEIs’ full economic costs (FEC) were to be covered, including costs of 
capital. 
 It was assumed in the JMC recommendations that HEIs would be paid for the fte students 
that were on their programmes where fte was calculated on the basis of student 
attendance.350 
                                                             
345 Audit Commission (2001), ibid (i) pp 30-32 (ii) p. 32, paragraph 3.8 
346 Underlying this conclusion was the belief that HEIs might not respond co-operatively or as readily to the 
national priority to increase the numbers on their health programmes if the extra resources needed by those 
HEIs to invest in an expanded infrastructure (which they had told the AG they needed for the increased 
numbers) were not made available. The lower contribution rates of NHS contracts were also probably seen as 
a potential issue, either for the quality of the education provision and/or if ultimately NHS workforce 
education was being cross-subsidised from Universities’ HEFCE contracts and overseas activities. 
347 Audit Commission (2001), ibid p. 7 
348 Source: BMP JM Consulting Report 2003 – Archive 28.  
349 Source: BMP JM Consulting Report 2003, p. 3. 
350 Under this arrangement the risk to the GMs was lower VFM from relatively higher student attrition; from 
the HEIs’ standpoint the risk was that part of the prior resource commitment they made on the assumption of 
a lower attrition rate would not be compensated (e.g. in the event of higher attrition and the consequent 
partial non-deployment of their committed resources). As an alternative arrangement JMC suggested that 
prices, instead of being paid on the basis of student fte attendance, could be paid for student fte completing 
their programmes. In the latter scenario, JMC suggested some uplift to the BMP could be made so that HEIs 






 Having regard to the ‘affordability’ (from the GM’s standpoint) of the introduction of the 
benchmark pricing system (that is the costs of their proposals relative to the current NMET 
levy allocations within the overall MPET levy) JMC recommended that SSRs were assumed 
for each relevant occupational group at levels equal to the then average of HEI planned SSRs 
(i.e. equivalent to budgeted establishment) rather than at the levels then being 
recommended by the professional bodies.351 
 Benchmark prices should be reviewed every 5 years. In the interim, benchmark prices were 
to be adjusted annually for inflation using the GDP deflator for the NHS. 
 
IOR dimensions 9 – 12: Following consultations between the DH, UUK and the Council of Deans of 
Health (CoDH),352 a BMP arrangement was agreed and ‘guidance’ issued by the DH to GMs that a 
new standard pricing structure based on this approach be implemented with effect for cohorts 
commencing from April 2006, or from September 2005 if agreed locally between a SHA and the 
education providers.353 By July 2006 the new BMP had either already been implemented by most of 
the SHAs in England (including 2 of the 5 outgoing London SHAs) or was about to be implemented 
for 2006/07. However, mainly on grounds of affordability from its standpoint, the GM, NCLSHA, 
refused to implement the BMP in September 2005 and refused again in April 2006, leaving it to the 
new incoming SHA/GM, NHSL, eventually to review the position for potential implementation in 
2007/08.354 Consequently, from MU’s standpoint the unit prices for its pre-registration education 
provision which on an inflation adjusted basis were based mainly on the original 1995/96 contract 
price continued to apply in 2005/06 and in 2006/07; as a result the stability impacts on IOR 
dimensions 9 – 12 in those years were unchanged from 2004/05.   
 
6.3.1.4 2007/08: Key Endogenous Events: Important GM Decisions about Contract and Price 
 
IOR dimensions 1, 2, 4 – 6, 9 and 11: By the end of 2006 a National Standard Contract Framework 
(NSC) had been agreed between the DH and UUK and subsequently had been adopted as the 
framework contract by the other SHAs in the country. However, the new GM for London, NHSL, 
indicated it was not satisfied with parts of the NSC. For that reason and to allow further time for an 
alternative to the NSC to be developed, the GM proposed and MU agreed a further interim contract 
of one years’ duration for 2007/08. Except in two respects the 2007/08 interim contract was 
identical to the previous interim contracts and the consequent stability impacts on the relevant 
dimensions of the IOR – dimensions 1, 2, 4-6, 9 and 11 were also the same.  The differences in the 
2007/08 contract related mainly to dimensions in the contract and price components of the IOR: 
 
(i) IOR dimension 3: The 2007/08 interim contract had new clauses which concerned a ‘contract 
performance management (CPM) system’ which mainly consisted in a more specific formulation of 
the information and reporting requirements set out in previous IOR contracts. These clauses also 
                                                             
351 The difference between the two SSRs was material, e.g. for nursing the relevant professional body (the 
NMC) recommended in 2002 an SSR of 1:12, whereas JMC found that HEIs on average planned an SSR of 1:15. 
352 The CoDH was founded in 1997 and represented UK universities which had NHS contracts for non-medical 
education. 
353 In January 2005, the CoDH recommended the outcome (then proposed) to its members, stating their belief 
that ‘this is the best deal that DH officials are able to recommend to Ministers’. Source: BMP Agreement Part 1 
and additional note January 2006 – Archive 66. With regard to attrition it was agreed informally between the 
DH and UUK/CoDH that universities would seek to improve on attrition so that the national average, then at c. 
18%, would eventually reduce to no more than 13%. However, no penalties were involved in the event this 
informally targeted reduction in student attrition was not achieved. 
354 ‘Affordability’ meant a lack of GM budgeted resources. Thus the NHS ‘financial crisis’ of 2005/06 and the 
GM’s response to that ‘crisis’ in lifting the ring fence of its MPET budget was also consequential for the (two 






indicated the introduction of new planning and management review requirements. However, precise 
details of these new requirements were not set out in the 2007/08 interim contract – full details 
would only become known as the CPM system itself was developed subsequently. For the time being 
(i.e. for 2007/08) the stability impact on IOR dimension 3 remained ‘stable’, albeit the potential had 
been opened up for relatively substantial ‘monitoring creep’ in the overall compliance burden to 
develop and eventually for a ‘threatened instability’ impact on this IOR dimension.355 
 
(ii) IOR dimensions 10, 12, and 14: The GM decided that the BMP was to be implemented 
throughout its London area and where it had not already been implemented the BMP was to be 
phased in over three years commencing from September 2007.356 This meant the determination of 
price for new pre-registration commissions now changed from being determined locally by 
negotiation between the GM and its suppliers (including MU), to become a national level negotiation 
between the respective representative bodies of the GMs and of the universities. There were two 
consequences of this. The first effect was to change the conditions under which the IOR existed in 
respect of the dimensions of its price component from MG to bilateral monopoly. The second effect 
was on the stability impacts on dimensions 10, 12 and 14. The establishing of unit price on an 
assumed FEC basis changed the stability impact on IOR dimension 10, from a ‘threatened instability’ 
to being ‘stable’ However, the latter would not come about until the phasing in of the BMP was 
completed in 2009/10 and relied on the assumption that meanwhile the FEC basis of unit price 
would continue. 
 
In respect of IOR dimension 12 (actual price vs MU’s FEC), MU stood to gain substantially from BMP 
implementation – c. 12% uplift on the unit prices it was paid for pre-registration provision in the IOR. 
MU’s overall financial performance had also improved: as a result of the implementation of internal 
cost-cutting measures but also partly due to the introduction of the £3k fees in the HE sector in 
2006, MU made a (small) operating surplus in 2006/07, its first since 1999/2000; MU consolidated 
this performance with a further operating surplus in 2007/08. However, until the BMP was fully 
implemented then on stability impact, IOR dimension 12 would continue to be ‘unstable’ and as a 
consequence IOR dimension 14 would continue in a state of ‘threatened instability’. 
 
6.3.2 Explanation of IOR Stability Impacts 2005/06 – 2007/08 
 
Variables which were relevant to explanations of stability impacts in earlier periods of the IOR 
continued to be relevant over the period 2005-2007. These variables included exogenous change, 
the objectives and priorities of the GM and MU in the IOR, power dependence responses of the GM 
and MU, and historical dependencies in the IOR. 
 
6.3.2.1 Exogenous Change and IOR Objectives     
 
Until 2004, when the WDCs were merged with the SHAs, the main focus of the GM (in the context of 
the IOR) had been on its role on matters associated with NHS workforce development. From 2004 
the GM at overall SHA level had three roles (health service ‘strategic leadership’, health service 
operating performance, and workforce development) and objectives associated with each of those 
roles. On workforce development, the overall objective of the GM was to ensure an appropriately 
skilled healthcare workforce was in the right place at the right time. At IOR level the GM had three 
                                                             
355 See also supra Chapter 5. The potential under the CPM system for substantial additional MU management 
resources to be required was not appreciated by MU management until more details of the CPM requirements 
were provided in the LEC contract of 2008 and the implementation of the CPM got under way in 2009. After 
2009 the CPM itself underwent a continuous development from 2007 to 2012 when it became the ‘QCPM’. 






objectives: (i) to ensure that the investments made in healthcare staff and services ‘delivered the 
best possible care and support for the public and patients’357 while also (ii) ensuring ‘value for 
money’ (VFM) was obtained from expenditures on education and training, and (iii) ensuring that 
these expenditures did not exceed the agreed annual budgets.358 
 
Over the period 2005-2007, MU’s IOR objectives continued to include IOR performance objectives 
particularly in terms of the level student numbers, compliance with the contract requirements, and 
the assessed quality of ‘outputs’ i.e. graduates and the performance of students in placement.359 
These objectives had the same potential compatibility with the GM’s objectives on contracts and 
outputs components related dimensions of the IOR, and the same potential conflict on price 
component related dimensions of the IOR that had existed over the previous period, 1996-2004. 
However, events exogenous to the IOR – specifically the negotiations on the NSC, the restructuring 
of the GMs, the NHS financial ‘crisis’ of 2006 and the overall financial performance of MU – and the 
responses of the GM and MU to those events, changed the potential for compatibility and conflict in 
the IOR. They also shaped the power dependence responses of the GM and MU in the IOR and 
affected the historical dependencies on many of the IOR dimensions. 
 
6.3.2.2 Power Dependence Responses and Historical Dependencies 
 
Power dependence responses of the GM and MU and historical dependencies relevant to 
explanations of IOR stability impacts for the period 2005/06-2007/08 are summarised in Table 
14(ii).360 
 
Caption to Table 14(ii) 
 
 Shown in Table 14(ii) are the types of historical dependence (HD) processes associated with 
stability impacts by IOR dimension for the period 2005/06-2007/08. 
 
Example: Dimension 1 
 
Years   Stability Impact  HD Process 
 
2005/06-2007/08   TRI  Forgetting (FG) 
 
 Shown for each dimension is the incidence of the types of HD processes for each year of the 
period. 
 
 Shown is the occurrence of particular types of power dependence responses by the GM and MU 
respectively for each year of the reference period. 
 
 Types of power dependence responses by MU and the GM increased compared with the 
previous period, e.g. from 3 different types in 2004/05 to 6 different types in 2005/06. 
                                                             
357 Source: PCT and SHA Functions and Roles (2006) 
358 Source: The VFM objective was inferred from IOR contract documentation, including the terms, conditions 
and the compliance requirements specified in the IOR contracts during the period, e.g. the pre-registration 
contracts for 2005/06, 2006/07, and 2007/08 (Archives 34, 35, and 36). The budgetary objective was taken 
from SHA Board papers and published accounts for the periods. 
359 Source: ‘MU NHS Contracts Financial Sustainability Assessment 2006’ – Archive 19 
360 Over the course of the reference period ‘Founder’ historical dependencies changed on IOR dimensions 1-3, 
5, and 10 – old ‘Founder’ dependencies gave way to new ones. To distinguish the different ‘Founder’ 
dependencies and when they changed these dependencies have been numbered. For example, in Table 14(ii) 
IOR dimension 10, the first ‘Founder’ dependency (which applied from 1995/96 to 2006/07) is denoted by ‘F1’; 









IOR dimensions 1, 2: As noted earlier, the one year interim contracts for 2005/06 and 2006/07 were 
initiated by the GM in response to exogenous events – in 2005/06 to the prospect of an NSC which 
was still being negotiated at national level, and in 2006/07 to a reorganization of the GMs. 
Compared with the IOR contracts before 2005 the interim contracts were a change in the rules of 
the IOR; the increase in flexibility to the GM and MU which the new rules provided was associated 
with an increase in risk in the IOR from  MU’s standpoint on these dimensions – contract duration 
was only one year and termination could be made ‘on notice’ by either party at any time; the 
duration of previous contracts had been ≥ 3 years and no termination effected except for material 
un-remedied breach.361 Whereas the GM had other supplier options to satisfy its outputs demand, 
MU did not have other buyer options to meet its resource commitments in supply. MU’s response 
                                                             






was to accept what was in effect an increase in risk in the IOR, partly because MU perceived the 
probability of the occurrence of negative outcomes associated with the risk was low – both MU and 
the GM expected at the outset of each year in the period that a new longer term contract would be 
in place by the following year.362 The 2007/08 interim contract was different in that it arose not from 
an event exogenous to the IOR but rather from a decision taken by the GM not to accept the NSC 
but instead to develop a new contract for the London MG. However, once again it was expected by 
MU and the GM that a longer term contract would be in place by the following year. From MU’s 
standpoint the probability of negative occurrences associated with the risk continued to be low.363   
 
A consequence of the successive interim contracts was to bring about a 3 year period of drift in the 
IOR. Associated with this was change in the historical dependencies on IOR dimensions 1 and 2 these 
changed from a ‘founder’ to a ‘forgetting’ type of historical dependence, reflecting in effect the 
short duration of the IOR contracts brought about by the changes in the (contract) rules of the IOR 
and consequently the end of the lock-in dependencies which had driven the impacts on these 
dimensions of the IOR in the previous period, 1995-2004.  
 
IOR dimensions 4, 6: The changes under the interim contracts on these IOR dimensions also were a 
change in the rules of the IOR and an increase of risk in the IOR that MU accepted. The impact on 
historical dependencies on these dimensions was the same as outlined above for IOR dimensions 1 
and 2, viz. a change from a ‘founder’ to a ‘forgetting’ type of historical dependence.   
 
IOR dimensions 7, 8: prompted by the NHS financial crisis of 2005 and the financial deficits of the 
service (the PCTs and NHS Trusts) GMs throughout England prioritised their service objectives over 
their workforce development objective and redirected some of the resources at their disposal which 
had been allocated for NHS workforce education, to their service roles. This had the effect that the 
output demand of GMs in all MGs was reduced and consequently also reduced in all IORs nationally. 
 
Responses to these reductions were made by HEIs and by representative organizations of HEIs both 
at overall HE sector level and IOR level. At HE sector level these responses were made through the 
CoDH. The CoDH both directly and through its member universities and also via the media, lobbied 
the DH, members of both Houses of Parliament and parliamentary committees (e.g. HoC Health 
Select Committee). The CoDH also lobbied the RCN and other healthcare professional bodies for 
support. The CoDH argued that a ‘boom-bust’ approach to healthcare workforce education had been 
developed by the DH and that this was destabilising the relationship between the NHS and HE 
sectors. According to the CoDH, the increase in demand for pre-registration education which had 
taken place from the late 1990s and continued in the early 2000s with the implementation of the 
NHS Plan (2000) had been a response to shortages of NHS staff in the 1990s. This had been the 
period of ‘boom’ in the demand for education. The cutbacks to education demand in 2005/06 were 
not because the need for newly registered professional staff had reduced but rather were due to 
short term financial pressures on the NHS. This was now a period of ‘bust’.364  
 
                                                             
362 The fact that the overall period of interim contracts eventually lasted for 3 years had neither been foreseen 
nor expected by either the GM or MU. 
363 The GM did not at the time indicate specifically why it found the NSC to be unsatisfactory so there were no 
apparent reasons in that connection for MU to be concerned. In relation to contract compliance, MU’s 
performance had always been rated as at least satisfactory by the GM so there no reasons either on those 
grounds for MU to believe that the GM would seek to exit from the IOR. 
364 Sources: CoDH note on HoC Health Select Committee Report on Workforce Planning (2007) – Archive 59; 
CoDH (2006) Evidence to HoC Health Committee – Archive 67; CoDH Briefing to Members on ‘Boom-Bust’ – 






The CoDH ‘boom-bust’ campaign lasted from 2005 to 2007. The main outcomes included a review of 
the NHS-HE sector relationship365 and the establishing of NHS-HE inter-sector committees (UKHEAC 
in 2007 and HENSE in 2008)366 which were designed to foster inter-sector dialogue and stability). In 
key respects however, the CoDH boom-bust campaign did not succeed: the output quantities 
reductions made by GMs in 2005/06 and 2006/07 were not subsequently wholly reinstated; MPET 
funding continued not to be ring-fenced and the SHAs continued to have the discretion to use MPET 
funding to support the service budgets when they considered that was necessary.   
 
MU’s response in the IOR was to adapt to the reduced demand through processes of productivity 
improvement and cost reduction. The stability impact on IOR dimension 7 was partly due to 
productivity improvements in placement resources which MU was able to achieve; MU was helped 
in this by collaborative planning with the GM and by the cooperation of the Trusts whose overall 
placement capacity had been reduced.  However, MU’s adaptation was made mainly through a 
process of internal cost reduction. In response to its own financial crisis in 2006, MU had conducted 
the first comprehensive review of the sustainability of its NHS contract.367 There were two main 
outcomes of that review: (i) MU initiated and completed a substantial cost cutting exercise in its IOR 
resources368 (ii) MU recognised the importance its NHS contract had in the financial sustainability of 
MU overall – for the year 2005/06, MU’s NHS contracts activity was estimated to have contributed 
over £6m to MU’s overheads.369 This compared with an estimated real terms equivalent contribution 
from MU’s NHS contract of c. £1m p.a. over the period 1995/96 – 1997/98.370 Over the period 1995 -
2005 as a result of the growth of its NHS activities there had been relatively substantial increasing 
returns at contribution level to MU from its NHS contract. This growth had functioned to increase 
the resource dependence of MU in the IOR and, in a context of MU’s overall financial position, also 
to increase the criticality of the IOR for MU’s survival.371   
 
A consequence of this was to increase the perceived as well as the actual underlying power 
imbalance between the GM and MU: from MU’s standpoint its top management concluded that 
even if its FEC position on its NHS activity was negative that the absolute size of the contribution to 
University overheads from its NHS contract meant there was no viable option for MU but to 
continue with the NHS activity as part of its portfolio and in the short run seek to mitigate its overall 
financial deficit position through cutting costs.372 From the GM’s standpoint and in the context of an 
MG, the GM continued to have the option of choosing amongst different suppliers while MU did not 
have a similar type of option in respect of alternative buyers. The increasing power imbalance 
between the GM and MU was further reinforced by the impact of the interim contracts on IOR 
dimensions 1 and 2, by the transfer of burdens from the GM to MU on IOR dimension 4, and by the 
transfer of risks on IOR from the GM to MU on IOR dimension 6. For example, a one year interim 
                                                             
365 Snowden, A. (2008) – Archive 62. 
366 Source: UKHEAC Annual Report 2012 – Archive 68, paragraphs 5, 10, and Archive A.  
367 Sources: MU NHS Contracts Financial Sustainability Assessment 2006 – Archive 19; MU NHS Contracts 
Overall Review 2006 – Archive 23. The NHS Contract sustainability review was one of several other 
sustainability reviews of its activities which MU conducted at that time, these including a review of the 
sustainability of its contract with the Teacher Development Agency (TDA). 
368 Source: MU NHS Contract Staffing Strategy 2007 – Archive 78. 
369 Source: MU NHS Contracts Financial Sustainability Assessment 2006 – Archive 19. 
370 Sources: (i) MU NHS Contracts and Estimated Costs 1995/96-1996/97 – Archive 42 (ii) MU NHS Contract and 
Estimated Costs 1997/98 – Archive 43. 
371 In 2005/06 MU had returned the biggest operating deficit in its history (13.5% of turnover). Source: MU 
Financial Accounts 1993-2013 – Archive 18 
372 For the NHS activity, MU worked out a plan to cut staffing costs by c. £1m p.a. Most of this saving was 
subsequently achieved by the deletion of current vacancies and freezing recruitment to all but essential posts. 






contract functioned to curtail the security of supply MU had under its previous contracts and made it 
potentially easier for the GM to exercise options over its potential suppliers. Given the level of 
mutual dependence MU had in the IOR and the underlying power imbalance between it and the GM, 
there was on economic criteria no better option available to MU but on each occasion to accept the 
interim contracts when these were proposed by the GM. 
 
IOR dimension 10: As noted earlier, on grounds of ‘affordability’ from its standpoint, the GM refused 
in 2005, and again in 2006, to implement the BMP in the MG. The conditions of non-affordability in 
the MG (from the GM’s standpoint) had been created by the GM itself when, in 2005, it transferred 
resources out of its MPET budget to the service budgets of the Trusts in its area. In refusing to 
implement the BMP in 2006 the GM was exercising a discretion that it had been given by the DH.373 
MU’s senior management recognised the ‘unit of resource’ (i.e. the BMP or equivalent) in the IOR as 
a key issue – one of the outcomes of MU’s 2006 sustainability review of its NHS contract activity was 
further to raise the awareness of MU of its continued dependence on its NHS contracts and more 
particularly of the importance for financial sustainability of outcomes on the price dimensions of the 
IOR. MU tried to persuade the GM in 2005 and again in 2006 to implement the BMP, but without 
success. MU concluded that on its own it had no leverage in the matter and decided to lobby other 
HEIs in the MG for a concerted response to the GM. However, the response from other HEIs (which 
also were in a similar position with expiring contracts) was that they felt they had to protect the 
security of their supply and accept the contracts they were offered i.e. without BMP 
implementation.374 Again, given the resource criticality of the IOR to MU and with no other viable 
options available, MU accepted the non-implementation of the BMP both in 2005 and in 2006. 
 
Thus the power dependence response of the GM was to continue the extraction of rents from MU 
that had begun at the outset of the IOR in 1995; MU’s power dependence responses, after the 
lobbying at inter-sector level, were to continue the cross-subsidising of its NHS activity while also, 
from 2006, embarking on a programme of cost reduction.375 Consequently for 2005/06 and 2006/07 
the historical dependence in regard to IOR dimension 10 continued to be the same as it had been in 
the previous period. In 2007 the GM exercised its discretion and implemented the BMP throughout 
the MG.
376 The effect of this was to establish a new historical dependence (F2) in relation to IOR 
dimension 10. 
 
IOR dimensions 11, 12, 14: On IOR dimension 11 over the period 2005/06-2007/08 the distribution 
of OBC risk between the GM and MU remained the same, there was no change to the arrangements 
which had been established from the initial conditions of the IOR; the introduction of the BMP in 
2007 did not change this situation – payment to MU of its IOR outputs continued under BMP 
arrangements to be on the basis of completed student months. On IOR dimension 12, actual price 
continued to be below MU’s FEC. MU continued to cross-subsidise its IOR over the period 2005-
2007. It would take some years for the effects of MU’s cost reduction programme started in 2006/07 
                                                             
373 As noted earlier the DH had issued ‘guidance’ to the GMs about the timing of BMP implementation. In 
doing this the timing of BMP implementation became from the DH standpoint ‘a local matter’, i.e. a matter for 
GMs individually to determine. 
374 Source: BMP and Contracts Feedback from London HEIs August 2006 – Archive 147.  
375 MU’s programme of cost reduction in the IOR was part of a University-wide cost reduction programme; the 
latter had been prompted by the overall financial performance and position at that time – it had not been 
initiated due to MU’s financial performance in the IOR. 
376 It is probable the GM took this decision because it had concluded that to continue with the BMP for some 
HEIs in the MG and not for others (which had been the case one the 5 London MGs had been merged into one 
pan-London MG in 2006) would not be something which it would have been able to defend in the event of a 






and the phasing in of the BMP which commenced in 2007/08 to turn around MU’s negative FEC 
position in the IOR. Consequently the threatened instability on IOR dimension 14 in regard to the 
financial performance of the IOR from MU’s standpoint, continued.  
 
IOR dimensions 3, 5, 13: Stability impacts on these IOR dimensions continued over the period 2005-
2007 to be the same as they had been since the start of the IOR in 1995 and were explainable by the 
same factors which applied in the previous period 1995-2004, viz. the continued effectiveness of 
MU’s adaptation and ‘power to’ responses in the IOR. In respect of IOR dimension 5, over the period 
2005-2007 MU continued in close collaboration with its NHS placement providers to consolidate and 
adapt its education provision to the NMC standards (particularly those issued in 2004). On IOR 
dimension 3, there were no immediate changes to IOR compliance information and review 
requirements during the period – albeit in 2007 the potential for substantial changes to these 
requirements had been introduced by the GM. For the time being however, the requirements 
determined by the initial conditions of the IOR continued to apply and MU’s ‘power to’ responses to 
those requirements continued to ensure a stable impact on this IOR dimension. In regard to IOR 
dimension 13, the stability impacts during the period 2005-2007 were partly due to MU’s 
performance on outputs quality and quantities (IOR dimension 5), and to MU’s continued fulfilment 
of IOR compliance information and review requirements (IOR dimension 3). In addition (compared 
with the previous period 1995-2004), MU’s success in collaboration with its main providers of 
placements in increasing the productivity of placement capacity was a further factor which also 
explained the stability impact on IOR dimension 13.377 
 
6.3.2.3 Relationship between historical dependence, resource dependence and events 2005-
2007 
 
IOR dimensions 1, 2, 4, and 6: Several changes in historical dependence processes occurred in the 
period 2005-2007. Some of these changes (IOR dimensions 1, 2, 4, 6) were associated with the 
change to one year interim contracts. The lock-ins on these dimensions which had been in place in 
contracts during the period 1995-2004 either applied now only for a maximum duration of up to 1 
year or, in IOR dimension 6, ceased to exist. All of these changes were initiated by the GM as 
responses to exogenous events and were accepted by MU because of its position of resource 
dependence in the IOR and their expectations of developments in the IOR once the period of each 
interim contract had come to an end. 
 
IOR dimension 10: the change in 2007 in historical dependence on IOR dimension 10 was an 
outcome of a response by the GM to exogenous events; it was the resistance of the GM to change 
on this dimension at an earlier time (in 2005) which was important – the GM exercised a discretion it 
had to maintain the status quo regarding the basis of price, a status quo which since 1995/96 had 
resulted from the combined effect of a historical dependence process and a power imbalance 
between the GM and MU. 
 
IOR dimensions 7, 8: stability impacts on these dimensions continued to be due mostly to the GM’s 
responses to recent exogenous events. As in the previous period, 1995-2004, these events consisted 
of the annual NHS workforce planning processes and the future NHS workforce needs determined in 
                                                             
377 A further factor was MU’s success in recruiting the numbers of acceptable students required to satisfy the 
GM’s outputs quantities demand/commissions numbers targets. Throughout the whole reference period, 
1995-2013, MU compliance with these demands generally averaged c. 95% or above, which from the 
standpoint of the GM was satisfactory or good. There were some years in which the compliance on particular 
occupation specialisms (e.g. mental health nursing) or on particular intakes (particularly the mid academic year 






those processes. However in 2006 an additional exogenous event, the NHS financial crisis through 
the GM’s response to it, became a further relevant recent exogenous event to the IOR stability 
impacts on these dimensions. 
 
IOR dimensions 3, 5 and 9: historical dependence processes continued to be important for stability 
impacts on these dimensions. The lock-ins from previous contracts continued; neither the GM nor 
MU sought changes to the IOR on these dimensions. 
 
6.4 2008/09-2012/13: A Critical Juncture, Exogenous Shock, Decline; Power Games 
 
During this period, events exogenous to the IOR but which were also endogenous to the MG, made 
perhaps their greatest impact over the whole of the reference period on the stability of the IOR. 
Some of these events were initiated by the GM which, for the first time since the creation of and 
handover of the MG to the NLC in 1998, took a pro-active role in strategically managing the MG. 
Other exogenous events were also important, in particular a macro exogenous shock to government 
finances which ultimately had a significant and lasting impact on NHS funding from 2009/10.  All of 
these events, along with the IOR stability impact assessments for the period 2008/09 - 2012/13 are 
summarised below in Table 13. 
 
Caption to Table 13 
 
 Summaries of events and when these occurred which were relevant to IOR stability impacts for 
the period 2008-2013. 
 All events are grouped into the components of the IOR (contracts, outputs, price and 
performance) where these were most relevant. However it should be noted that some events 
had relevance on more than one dimension and which went across different components of the 
IOR e.g. ‘GM devises and implements a new strategic framework – 2007-2013. 
 Some events were part of a continuous process (e.g. the consolidation of nursing as a 
profession); other events were discrete, one-off events but which may indirectly have had an 
eventual stability impact on dimensions of the IOR (e.g. the Global Financial Crisis of 2008). 
 Some events, also described as ‘key events’ (and highlighted in yellow in the Table, had a direct 
impact on the stability of the IOR e.g. ‘BMP Review and Negotiations’ which impacted on some 















6.4.1 IOR Stability Impacts 2008/09 – 2012/13 
 
6.4.1.1 Overview of Exogenous Events 
 
One of the most important of the exogenous events occurred just before the start of the period: the 
restructuring in 2006 of the 5 London SHAs had brought together 5 different organizations with 
different practices in education commissioning. Following a restructuring of the GMs in England, a 
review of the MG was commissioned by the new GM and carried out by the consultants, McKinsey 
and Company; the review was strategic in scope and took a future time horizon of 10 years, to 
2016/17. The key conclusions of the review, which were endorsed by the GM, were that the overall 
system for education commissioning in the MG was ‘not fit for purpose’, that the quality of the 
suppliers was too ‘variable’ (and in some cases fell below the minimum acceptable standards), and 
that contract arrangements between the GM and its suppliers were ‘too complex’.378 The ‘quality’ 
assessment was based on feedback received from some of the NHS employer placement providers; 
the ‘complexity’ of the contracts arrangements referred to the tripartite arrangements between the 
NHS placement providers, the education suppliers (including MU) and the GM in the shared 
responsibilities they had for pre-registration placements. The ‘fitness for purpose’ referred to both 
of these factors but also to the VFM implications of what were perceived to be relatively high levels 
of student attrition from the education programmes. 
 
Following this review, the GM set itself two overall priorities: (i) to determine and develop a single 
optimal standardised education commissioning system ‘that was fit for the needs of London’ (ii) to 
ensure the effective management of its education budget; at c. £1bn p.a. the education 
commissioning budget for London was nearly three times larger than the average education budget 
for other individual SHAs in England and accounted for c. 23% of the overall MPET budget for 
England.379 
 
In line with these priorities, in November 2007 the GM defined its overall aim in education 
commissioning in VFM terms as the maximisation of education outcomes per £ spent: 
 
‘Commissioning = Max (Education outcomes for service need and desired service volume/£ spent)’. 380  
 
The GM pursued this aim through an ‘education commissioning regime’ (ECR). 381 As later became 
apparent, the initiating and establishing of the ECR functioned as a ‘critical juncture’ in the relations 
between the GM and its HEI suppliers in the MG, including MU. The ECR was initiated by the GM in 
                                                             
378 Sources: NHS London (2007, 2008b); GM presentation to London HEIs ‘London Education Contract 
Feedback’, June 2008 – Archive 99. 
379 Sources: (i) NHS London (2007), p. 1 (ii) MPET and NMET Budgets 1997/98-2012/13 – Archive 51.  
380 Source: NHS London (2007), p. 5. Initially the ECR was referred to as an education commissioning system. 
However, by April 2008 the term ECR became more commonly used instead. For further details of the ECR see 
also NHS London (2008b), pp 39-47. 
381 Sources: NHS London (2007); GM presentation to London education suppliers (including MU) June 2008 – 
Archive 99.  In their 2008 presentation the GM put the ECR in the context of its overall vision of education 
commissioning: ‘To develop an Education Commissioning Regime to support a World-Class Healthcare 
Workforce for London ... Consequently we are developing a new commissioning process which will take a 
sustainable ‘value for money’ approach to meeting the workforce needs of the service, aligned with best 
practice from the system reform agenda and world class commissioning.’ Source: NHS London (2008) 
presentation, slide 6 – Archive 99. The use of the term ‘world-class’ was a reference to the ‘World Class 
Commissioning’ (WCC) initiative which had been launched by the DH in December 2007. Source: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/managingyourorganization/commissioning/






2008 and structured into four projects. The first two of these projects were: (i) a contracting project; 
this project consisted in the development and implementation in 2008 of a new contract between 
the GM and the HEIs which would apply to all IORs in the MG – the ‘London Education Contract’ 
(LEC)382 (ii) a quality assurance project; this project was a sub-project of the contracting project and 
consisted in the development and implementation over the period 2008-2012 of a new quality 
assurance framework and which was founded on the CPM that had been introduced in 2007.383 The 
new quality assurance framework eventually became known as the ‘Quality and Contract 
Performance Framework’ (QCMP) and had become fully developed and formally implemented under 
the IOR contract as the QCMP by 2012/13.384 
 
In November 2009, the GM initiated the third ECR project: this project was aimed at an integration 
of NHS workforce planning processes with NHS workforce education commissioning processes – 
according to the GM these processes had never previously been systematically related to each other 
– in effect, the short-term plans for education commissioning were not necessarily that closely 
related to the NHS workforce needs that had been identified in the NHS workforce plans.385 The 
project consisted in obtaining information about the capacity of each of the HEI suppliers in the MG 
and the potential flexibility and responsiveness of each HEI from a capacity standpoint to potential 
changes in the GM’s demand for output quantities.386   
 
In March 2011, the fourth and final project of the ECR was initiated by the GM.387 This project was 
about the management by the GM of the ‘supplier landscape’. The overall aim of the project was to 
sharpen the dynamic of competition between HEI suppliers in the MG ‘by incentivising innovation, 
rewarding excellence ... and having a clear procedure for intervention where improvement was 
required’.388 This project mainly consisted in a formal tendering process (ITT) designed and 
implemented by the GM over the period 2011/12 which determined which HEI education providers 
of pre-registration level education would continue in the MG and also determined with effect from 
2012/13 the relative allocation of the GM’s demand for output quantities between those HEIs.389 
 
Events exogenous to the MG as well as to the IOR were also consequential for IOR stability impacts 
during the period 2008-2013. In this connection, perhaps the most consequential of these events 
during this period was the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the eventual impact that had on 
overall resources allocated by the UK government to the NHS. Given the eventual negative impact 
on the resources allocated to the NHS  and the knock-on consequences that had for resources 
allocated via the MPET levy to NHS workforce education and to non-medical education in particular, 
the global financial crisis could fairly be described as an ‘exogenous shock’ to the MG as well as to the 
IOR. The implications of the ‘exogenous shock’ for resources allocated to the NHS overall were given 
specific form by what became known from 2009 as the ‘Nicholson Challenge’.390 In response to that 
                                                             
382 Source of details of the LEC - Archive 37 
383 Sources: (i) NHS London (2008b), ibid, pp 44-45 (ii) details of the CPM are in the relevant sections of the IOR 
contracts for 2007/08 - Archive 36 - and in the 2008 LEC - Archive 37. See the discussion in Chapter 5 above on 
IOR dimension 3, ‘Contract Compliance – Information, Management and Review’. 
384 Sources: Details of the introduction of the QCMP as part of a competitive tendering process initiated by the 
GM in 2011 were sourced in Archive 47; source of details of the QCMP as finally implemented - Archive 8. 
385 Source: ‘Pre-registration commissioning update’, NHSL presentation to London Deans on 15th November 
2010, Slide 18, first and second bullet points – Archive 79.   
386 Source: ‘How is the Capacity Data used?’ NHSL Presentation to London HEIs April 2011 – Archive 80. 
387 Source: GM presentation to LDHG ‘Education Planning and Market Update’, March 2011 – Archive 130. 
388 Source: NHS London (2008) ibid, p. 45  
389 Source: NHS London letter to London Deans 1st July 2011 ‘Shaping the Education Provider Landscape’ – 
Archive 81. 






challenge the GM initiated in 2010 a ‘financial strategy for workforce transformation’ (FSWT) 
project.391 The scope of the FSWT project included potential changes in the GM’s demand for output 
quantities and potential changes in the definition of what outputs would be paid for. Ultimately the 
FSWT project also led to the ITT process and the management of the supplier landscape referred to 
above. Thus the exogenous shock of the global financial crisis ultimately engendered a number of 
endogenous events in the MG as well as in the IOR.      
 
Other exogenous events which had an impact on the stability of the IOR during the period were (i) a 
review of the BMP conducted in 2007/08 and the outcomes of the subsequent national level 
negotiations on the recommendations made in that review, which were concluded in 2009392 (ii) the 
financial performance of MU overall, which continued an improvement in that performance which 
had commenced in 2006/07 and which from 2011/12 reflected relatively substantial operating 
surpluses being made by the University393 (iii) a review by the DH in 2006/07 of nursing roles and 
careers.394 The outcomes of the DH review for nursing pre-registration level education were taken 
up in 2007 by the NMC which launched a profession and employer wide consultation.395 The 
outcomes of that consultation ultimately led to the NMC Standards of 2010 for nursing pre-
registration level education and a graduate level entry requirement for professional registration.396 
 
6.4.1.2 Power Games and IOR Stability Impacts 2008-2013 
 
Excepting the DH review and the consequent development of the NMC Standards of 2010, all of the 
events noted above were played out in the IOR over the period 2008 - 2013 in 4 ‘power games’. 
After an introductory overview, each of these power games and their respective impacts on the 
stability of the IOR, are presented and discussed below in ‘Parts (i) – (vi)’: 
 
(i) Event(s) which functioned as a catalyst or ‘trigger’ for each power game 
(ii) The players in each power game and the level (IOR, MG or nationally) at which each game was 
played 
(iii) The specific objectives of the players, what was at stake in each game, and a summary of what 
each game was about 
(iv) The moves of each game 
(v) The outcomes of each game 
(vi) IOR stability impact assessments and explanations of those assessments in terms of historical 
dependencies and the power dependence responses of the GM and MU 
 
Parts (i) – (iii) are summarised for each game in Table 16 below. The objectives of each of the players 
and the implications of these for what was at stake in each game are then discussed. In Part (iv), the 
moves are summarised and presented in Tables 17-20: power game 1 in Table 17; power game 2 in 
Table 18; power game 3 in Table 19; power game 4 in Table 20. In Part (v) the outcomes of each 
game are summarised. This is followed by Part (v) in which firstly, a summary is presented in Table 
14(iii) of the IOR stability impacts and power dependence responses of the GM and MU for the 
period 2008-2013, and secondly, explanations of the IOR stability impacts are presented in narrative 
form for each game.  
                                                             
391 Source: ‘Financial Strategy for Workforce Transformation’ GM Presentation to London Deans, June 2010 – 
Archive 82. 
392 Source: JM Consulting Limited (2008) – Archive 29. 
393 Source: Middlesex University Financial Statements and Annual Reports 1993-2013 – Archive 18 for 
summary statistics. 
394 Source: Department of Health (2006b) 
395 Source: NMC (2007). 






6.4.1.2.1 Overview of Power Games 1-4 
 
Each power game was initiated by the GM as a response to ‘trigger’ events which were exogenous to 
the IOR. In each power game these events were either purely exogenous to the MG (as in power 
game 2) or were both exogenous as well as endogenous to the MG (as in power games 1, 3 and 4). 
Power games 1, 3 and 4 were played out at the level of the MG as well as at the IOR level; the GM 
and MU were players in these games. Power game 2 was played out at a national level; the GM was 
a player in this game; through its representatives (CoDH and UUK) in the national level negotiations, 
MU was indirectly a player in this game. 
 
The conditions under which the IOR existed in power games 2 and 3 were those of bilateral 
monopoly. This applied only to the dimensions of the price component of the IOR which were 
affected in these games; on all other dimensions the IOR continued to exist under conditions of MG. 
The conditions under which the IOR existed in power games 1 and 4 changed over time: at the 
outset of these games the sellers acted in concert and these games were played under conditions of 
bilateral monopoly.  Ultimately, however the outcomes of the games became determined under 
conditions of MG.   
 
In power game 1 the potential impact of the relevant exogenous events (GM restructuring and 
‘World Class Commissioning’ - WCC) was primarily on the priorities of the GM and on its ideas about 
how it could and should pursue the optimisation of its VFM objectives in the IORs in the MG, 
including in its IOR with MU. One of the aims of the GM in power game 1 was to increase the 
flexibility it had contractually in its IORs in the MG.
397 The main aim of the suppliers, including MU, 
was to maintain (or as in MU’s case, to obtain) the security of supply provided to them under the 
NSC.398    
 
In power game 2 the overall aim of the GM was to defend the resources it had from being depleted 
by a nationally agreed price increase for the suppliers’ outputs in the MG.
399 The overall aim of the 
suppliers was to get implementation of the price for their outputs which had already been agreed 
nationally and in doing so to preserve the underlying basis of price, viz. that price should equate to 
the full costs of the suppliers education provision in the MG.
400  
 
In power game 3 the overall aim of the GM was to get the suppliers in the MG to bear the full costs 
of the GM meeting its FWST objectives through a transfer of risk relating to student attrition.401 The 
overall aim of the suppliers was for the status quo to be maintained, in which the risks of attrition in 
were equally shared between the GM and its suppliers (including MU).402 
 
Power game 4 was partly a continuation of power game 3 in that the overall aim of the GM was to 
meet the same FWST (now EDA) objectives. However the stakes of game 4 were higher than those of 
power game 3 in that the GM also sought to optimise its ‘supplier landscape’ while at the same time 
ensuring an overall continuity of supply in the MG was maintained so that the GM’s workforce 
planning objectives were met.403 
 
In effect, power games 1-3 were zero sum games; power game 4 was a zero sum game in most 
respects. In all of these games there was conflict between the aims and objectives of the GM and 
                                                             
397 Source: NHS London (2007). 
398 Source: LDHG letters to the GM June 2008, July 2008 – Archives 87, 88.  
399 Source: DH letter to the CoDH March 2009 – Archive 91. 
400 Source: CoDH/UUK reports and correspondence – Archives 89 - 90, 92 – 94. 
401 Source: GM presentation to the LDHG July 2010 – Archive 12. 
402 Source: MU email and attachment to the HEFCE September 2010 – Archive 12. 






those of its suppliers (including MU). In power game one the conflict was about the distribution of 
risks, specifically in the flexibility in the IOR sought by the GM and the security of supply sought by 
the suppliers. The conflicts in power games 2, 3, and 4 were about the distribution of benefits as well 
as of risks in the IORs between the GM and its suppliers, and in power game 4 conflict was also 
about the allocation of the GM’s demand for output quantities between its suppliers. The stakes in 
all of these games were relatively high to each of the players.    
 
6.4.1.2.2 Parts (i) – (iii): Trigger Events, Game Players, Level of Game and Specific 
Objectives of the Players 
 
These are summarised for each game in Table 16 below. 
 
Caption to Table 16 
 
The framework used to analyse Power Games 1-4 is presented in this Table: 
 The ‘Principal Players’, key events which triggered each game (‘Trigger events’), the 
institutional levels (sector/IOR/ inter-sector) at which each game was played and the overall 
type of game are set out in the yellow highlighted rows in the table 
 The IOR dimensions that were relevant for each game are set out in columns 1 and 2 e.g. 
the relevant dimensions for Power Game 1 were dimensions 1-4, 6 and 10. 
 The objectives which the Principal Players had in each power game are set out in columns 












6.4.1.2.3 Power Game 1 – IOR Rules Change: Players’ Objectives and Stakes, IOR 
Dimensions 1-4, 6 and 10 
 
The first of the four ECR projects – the LEC – was from the standpoint of the GM crucial to the 
pursuit of its overall aim to maximise the VFM outcomes from education commissioning. The LEC 
was designed to replace all of the existing contracts the GM had with its suppliers (including MU) in 
the MG: the individual IORs between the GM and its suppliers in the MG would continue to be 
contract based but the outcome sought from the LEC project was that all of these contracts would 
become identical to each other. The objectives of the GM on IOR dimensions 1 and 2 were 
formulated to provide the GM with flexibility in the management of its supplier base; this was 
particularly the case in relation to dimension 2 where the GM could on one years’ notice terminate 
any individual IOR contract.404 This contrasted with the objective of the LDHG and MU which was for 
security of supply and for which they sought an ‘evergreen’ contract such as the NSC.405 Flexibility 
was also the underlying objective of the GM on dimension 6, here in regard to giving it the flexibility 
to vary the quantity of outputs it demanded from year to year.406 This also contrasted with the NSC 
(and the objective of the LDHG and MU) which had floors and ceilings in the variability of output 
quantities from year to year.407 
 
The LEC was also crucial from the GM’s standpoint in regard to its second ECR project, quality 
assurance. To become established in the IOR the GM’s envisaged system of quality assurance (the 
CPM system) required to be an integral part of the conditions of the LEC. The underlying objective of 
the GM in IOR dimension 3 was through the CPM system to increase its control in the IOR over 
output quality through increasing its surveillance in the IOR.408 The objective of the LDHG and MU 
was to minimise the administrative and management burdens which would be introduced by the 
CPM system into what was already a highly regulated and monitored part of the education 
provision.409 At the minimum, the LDHG and MU sought compensation for the additional burdens 
which they would have to bear, so that on IOR dimension 10 the basis of price would continue to be 
predicated on the principle that it should cover HEIs FEC (as stated in the NSC).410 In contrast the 
GM’s objective on IOR dimension 10 was simply that price should conform to what was agreed 
nationally – no mention was made by the GM about the FEC principle as the basis of price.411 
 
In relation to IOR dimension 4: here the objective of the GM was twofold: (i) to simplify the 
contractual arrangements by moving away from the tripartite arrangements between the GM, the 
education suppliers these including MU) and the NHS placement providers in which all three of these 
organizations had responsibilities for placement provision and quality (ii) to transfer to HEIs in the 
MG (including MU) all of the responsibilities for, and associated burdens with, securing the necessary 
supply of placements for the practice component of the pre-registration programmes.412 From the 
standpoint of the LDHG and MU this latter objective of the GM seemed to be perverse: the supply of 
placements was up to the placement providers. The placement providers were accountable to the 
GM, not to the HEIs such as MU. In regard to the quality of placements, a good deal hinged on the 
organizational context within which the placements took place and also the time which the qualified 
                                                             
404 Source: Draft LEC May 2008 – Archive 86. 
405 Source: LDHG letters to the GM June 2008, July 2008 – Archives 87, 88. 
406 Source: NHS London (2007); Draft LEC May 2008 – Archive 86. 
407 Source: LDHG letters to the GM June 2008, July 2008 – Archives 87, 88. 
408 Source: NHS London (2007); Draft LEC May 2008 – Archive 86. 
409 Source: LDHG letters to the GM June 2008, July 2008 – Archives 87, 88. 
410 Source: LDHG letter to the GM July 2008 – Archive 88. 
411 Source: Draft LEC May 2008 – Archive 86. 






mentors (who were employees of the placement providers) were able to devote to supervising and 
supporting the students. As analysed by the CoDH who advised the LDHG and MU on this matter, 
this requirement of the GM would bring to an end the formal basis of collaboration which had 
underpinned the HEI – placement provider relationship from the time that the NHS-HE inter sector 
relationship had first been established c. 15 years earlier.413 
 
6.4.1.2.4 Power Game 2 – Veto: Players’ Objectives and Stakes, IOR Dimensions 12, 
10 and 9 
 
In implementing the BMP in the MG in 2007 the GM had on the face of it relinquished its role in price 
determination in the MG, which henceforth was to be negotiated nationally. Thus the subsequent 
intervention by the GM in what was supposed to be a national negotiation and with no formal 
standing to make such an intervention was a remarkable event. At stake was not simply the actual 
level of the BMP and its future basis (IOR dimensions 12 and 10) but also the legitimacy of the GM to 
intervene in national level negotiations. The objective of the CoDH/UUK was an implementation of 
the BMP as JM Consulting had recommended and by that means also to maintain the FEC basis of 
price.414 The objectives of the GM - to prevent the previously negotiated increase to the BMP and to 
introduce a quality premium in lieu of that increase to the BMP415 - were contrary to the FEC basis of 
price. Overall, the stakes in this game were relatively high, not only in terms of the percentage 
difference between the two sides on unit price (8.9%) but also in terms of the process of price 
determination and the future basis of price both in the MG and nationally. It is possible that the 
CoDH and UUK did not at the time fully appreciate the stakes involved in this game.416 
 
6.4.1.2.5 Power Game 3 – Coalition and Lobbying: Players’ Objectives and Stakes, 
IOR Dimension 11 
 
From MU’s standpoint, the stakes in this game could scarcely have been higher: if the GM secured 
its objective of meeting its FSWT objectives through the introduction of OBC on a programme 
completion basis then the IOR would no longer have been viable from MU’s standpoint. On a historic 
simulation of the impact of OBC, MU calculated that it would have sustained the equivalent of a 22% 
cut in the unit price; given the lack of control which MU had over the majority of the relevant factors 
determining student attrition, and on the basis of the detailed assessments MU had made in the 
previous 12 months about the financial sustainability of its NHS contracts, MU believed that the 
introduction of OBC would have left it with no reasonable alternative other than to terminate its IOR 
and exit from the MG.
417 From the GM’s standpoint, once it had assumed that OBC in the MG was a 
feasible and sustainable option, OBC was also attractive because it offered the promise that the GM 
                                                             
413 Source: CoDH analysis of draft LEC 2008 – Archive 97. 
414 Source: CoDH/UUK reports and correspondence – Archives 89 – 90, 92 – 94. 
415 Source: DH letter to CoDH March 2009 – Archive 91. 
416 In an email to its members recommending what became the final agreement on the BMP in 2009, the CoDH 
stated: ‘We believe that this is the best deal we can get in the circumstances. After all the kerfuffle of the last 
three months, this is really little different from the original agreement made last autumn, with the exception of 
the GDP minus 0.5% factor, which will be reviewed in two year's time.’ Source: CoDH email to members, 21st 
May 2009 - Archive 144. As can be inferred from the summary of the outcomes of the power game given in 
Table 18 below, this assessment by the CoDH, that the final agreement on the BMP was little different from 
the original agreement, was unsound. 
417 Source: MU presentation to LDHG about OBC July 2010 – Archive 121; MU briefings of the HEFCE on OBC 
September 2010 – Archive 124. At the time, MU’s most recent assessment of the financial sustainability of its 






would achieve its FWST objective of securing a 20% cut to the MPET budget and because of the 
apparent ease with which OBC, once agreed, could be implemented in IORs throughout the MG.
418 
 
6.4.1.2.6 Power Game 4 – Exercise of Discretion: Players’ Objectives and Stakes, IOR 
Dimensions 8, 7, 11, 10, 3 
 
In 2010 the GM received the first results from its third ECR project, the creation of a systematic link 
between NHS workforce planning and NHS education commissioning; these results indicated in 
order to avoid a situation of over-supply that relatively substantial reductions in the NHS non-
medical workforce should be made by 2014/15.419 Consequently in respect of education 
commissioning, reductions also needed to be made in the GM’s demand for output quantities. Given 
the 3 year duration of education programmes at pre-registration level those reductions needed to 
be front loaded. The size of the reductions was such that the GM saw its way to achieving its ECR 
(formerly FWST) objectives entirely through reductions in its demand for output quantities i.e. 
without the need for OBC.420 From the GM’s standpoint therefore, the stakes in this power game 
(achievement of its ECR objectives) were the same as in power game 3. 
 
However, there were further potential issues in this power game: the size of the cuts entailed in 
some non-medical roles, especially adult nursing and physiotherapy, were relatively substantial. 
Given that these cuts were to be made in the short run (thus potentially affecting IOR dimension 7 as 
well as dimension 8) this gave rise to a potential instability in the GM’s supplier base. For this reason 
the GM believed that the way in which the reduction in its demand was made was important and 
decided to initiate its fourth ECR project – ‘management of the supplier landscape’.421 
 
From the standpoint of MU as well as the other suppliers in the MG, the way in which the GM made 
its reductions in demand was also important; a reallocation by the GM of its demand on the basis of 
the outcomes of a tendering process was perceived by the LDHG members including MU as a higher 
risk option at least in the short run than one based on a reduction proportionate to each supplier’s 
historic shares of the GM demand.422 
 
The stakes in this power game were to increase during the game: when eventually the GM exercised 
the discretion it had under the LEC 2008 IOR contract for partial termination of the IOR contracts 
and proceeded with the tendering process to effect its reallocation of demand, the contract it 
formulated as part of the tender included new IOR rules affecting the basis of price (IOR dimensions 
10 and 11) and the requirements for compliance information and review (IOR dimension 3).423 On 
price, the GM sought to move away from the BMP and on to an OBC basis.424 Associated with these 
changes, once implemented, the GM would once again become the sole party with which individual 
suppliers in the MG, such as MU, would negotiate on price. In regard to compliance, the changes in 
the new contract would mean a further substantial increase in the burden on HEIs, in effect 
consolidating a monitoring creep of surveillance and control on QA processes in the IOR which had 
been initiated by the GM in 2007. 
 
                                                             
418 Source: GM presentation to the LDHG July 2010 – Archive 12. 
419 Source: GM presentation to the LDHG November 2010 – Archive 79. 
420 Source: GM presentation to the LDHG November 2010 – Archive 79. 
421 Source: GM presentation to the LDHG ‘Education Planning and Market Update’ March 2011 – Archive 130. 
422 Source: MU and LDHG emails to the GM June/July 2011 – Archive 96. 
423 Source: GM ‘Invitation to Tender’ issued September 2011 – Archive 47. 






Thus, overall the final stakes in power game 4 went well beyond the original stakes in the game 
which were about the reduction in the GM’s quantities demand and the allocation of that demand, 
and included further stakes relating to changes in the price and contract components of the IOR, 
some of which would also increase the discretion and relative power the GM had in the IOR, as well 
as in the IORs generally throughout the MG. 
 
6.4.1.2.7 Part (iv): Moves in Power Games 1 - 4 
 
The moves in each game are described in Tables 17 – 20 below. 
 
Caption to Tables 17 – 20 
 
 The moves in each of the power games are set out in Tables 17-20: 
- Table 17 for Power Game 1 
- Table 18 for Power Game 2 
- Table 19 for Power Game 3 
- Table 20 for Power Game 4 
 Details of moves (column 4) are presented chronologically by number and date (columns 1 and 
2). The players making each move are noted in column 3 and the sources of evidence regarding 
the moves in each game are noted in column 5. 
 The outcomes of each move along with any comments are shown in column 6. 
 The overall outcome of the each game is noted in the bottom right hand corner of each Table. 
For example in Power game 4 (Table 20) the GM achieved its initial objectives in the game and 



































6.4.1.2.8 Part (v): Outcomes of Power Games 1 - 4 
 
Power Game 1: the outcomes of this power game were (i) the GM achieved all of its objectives (ii) 
beyond obtaining contracts for continuing supply to the GM of its requirements for outputs, the 
LDHG members, including MU, did not achieve any of their objectives (see Tables 16 and 17). 
 
Power Game 2: the outcomes of this power game were (i) the GM achieved all of its objectives (ii) 
the HEIs (including MU), which were represented in this national level game by CoDH and UUK, did 
not achieve any of their objectives (see Tables 16 and 18). Although the introduction of a ‘quality 
premium’ was a potential gain from the HEIs standpoint this was not sought by them and it had 
come at a high cost which the HEIs may not at the time have fully appreciated. The ‘final’ BMP 
agreement accepted by the HEIs amounted to a significant departure from the principle that the 
BMP should equal the FEC of HEIs in their education provision, the establishing of the principle of 
affordability from the standpoint of the GMs, but not the ‘affordability’ from the standpoint of the 
HEIs, as a criterion in the determination of the BMP, and the acceptance that individual GMs which 
were not directly part of the national level negotiations could veto any ‘agreement’ reached on their 
behalf by the national negotiating team.425 
 
Power Game 3: The immediate outcome of this power game was that MU and its coalition partners 
in the LDHG achieved their objective of blocking the introduction of OBC into their IORs with the GM 
(see Tables 16 and 19). However, while the GM failed to achieve its objective, it was, subsequent to 
the conclusion of this power game, able to get OBC put back on to the agenda for future negotiation 
individually with all HEIs (including MU) in the MG (see power game 4, Tables 16 and 20). 
 
Power Game 4: The outcomes of this power game were (i) the GM achieved all of its objectives (ii) 
the HEIs (including MU) did not achieve their objective (see Tables 16 and 20).  
                                                             
425 Sources: DH paper to the HENSE group regarding the BMP March 2009 – Archive 113; BMP 2009 






6.4.1.2.9 Part (vi): IOR Stability Impacts: Power Dependence Responses and 
Historical Dependencies 
 
Power dependence responses of the GM and MU and historical dependencies relevant to the IOR 
stability impact assessments for the period 2008-2013 are summarised below in Table 14(iii). 
 
Caption to Table 14(iii) 
 
 Shown are the types of historical dependence (HD) processes associated with stability impacts 
by IOR dimension for each year of the period. 
 
Example: Dimension 1 
 
Years   Stability Impact  HD Process 
 
2008/09-2011/12   S → TRI  Founder (F2) 
2012/13    TRI  Founder (F3) 
 
 Shown for each dimension is the incidence of the types of HD processes for each year of the 
period. Example 2009/10: Initial Conditions – 1 dimension; Founder – 10 dimensions; Forgetting 
– 4 dimensions; Burden of History – 1 dimension 
 
 Shown are the occurrences of particular types of power dependence responses by the GM and 
MU respectively for each year of the period. Example 2012/13: MU – Cost 
Reduction/Productivity Improvement, Acceptance of Increased Risk; GM – Output demand 
Changes (red crosses in the Table denote reductions in demand from previous year), rent 
Extraction, Increasing Compliance Surveillance, Exercise of Discretion/Veto, IOR Rules Change, 
Transfer of Risk. 
 
 Types of power dependence responses by MU and the GM increased during the period, from 6 
to 8 different types. By 2012/13 the GM alone was using 6 different types of power dependence 
responses mainly reflecting a range of strategies it was using to consolidate or increase its 














6.4.1.2.10 Power Game 1 - IOR Rules Change: IOR Dimensions 1-4, and 6 
 
As shown in Table 13, the stability impact of the outcomes of power game 1 on dimensions 2, 4 and 
6 was a continued ‘threatened instability’; on dimension 3 the stability impact changed from being 
stable to a ‘threatened instability’; on dimension 1, the 5 year term of the new contract (the LEC) 
which superseded the previous 1 year interim contract, meant that on this dimension the IOR 
became ‘stable’. 
 
The strategy of the GM in power game 1 was a process strategy which in its later stage of execution 
allowed the GM to use its monopsony power to ‘divide and rule’ its suppliers. In the first half of the 
game the GM conducted a process of collective consultation and communications with all of its 
suppliers; in response the suppliers acted in concert and thus the game was played under conditions 
of bilateral monopoly.426 However in the second half of the game the GM proceeded to conclude the 
game with a series of individual negotiations with each of the suppliers, including MU; thus the 
outcomes of the game became determined under conditions of MG.
427 During the individual 
negotiations MU checked with its legal advisers about the feasibility of MU compliance with the 
terms of the proposed contract (Table 17, move 9). MU also continued to have informal discussions 
with other members of the LDHG (Table 17, move 8); however the latter did not lead to any further 
concerted representation by HEIs to the GM or others about the GM’s proposals. Ultimately 
therefore, in this game MU was alone in facing the GM when the game was concluded. 
 
MU’s acceptance of the LEC put forward by the GM can be explained by its resource dependency in 
the IOR. From a financial standpoint the IOR continued to be critical to MU; although MU had since 
2005/06 improved its operating position - by 2007/08 MU was recording an operating surplus of c. 
1% to its overall income - that operating position was still relatively fragile and the contribution to 
MU’s overheads made by the IOR continued substantially to exceed that operating performance.428 
MU’s contractual position in the IOR was also exposed: by December 2008 when MU took the final 
decision to accept the LEC, the duration of its existing one year interim contract had already come to 
an end (in August 2006). No other contract options were on the table and the GM had potentially 
other supplier options it could organise in good time for substitution of MU’s supply to be made by 
the following year 2009/10. In effect there were also no historical dependencies e.g. from lock-ins 
provided by existing contractual arrangements upon which that MU could rely. Thus from MU’s 
standpoint, there was no status quo contractually which could be defended on the relevant IOR 
dimensions. 
 
As shown in Table 14(iii), the impact on historical dependencies in the IOR was to create new 
‘Founder’ dependencies in dimensions 1-4 and 6 of the IOR; the basis of these historical 
dependencies lay in the LEC which MU had accepted. 
 
6.4.1.2.11 Power Game 2 – Veto: IOR Dimensions 12, 10, 9 
 
As shown in Table 13, the stability impact of the outcome of power game 2 on dimension 10 was a 
continued ‘threatened instability’; on dimension 9 the stability impact was to make this stable for 
the first time in the history of the IOR. The stability impact on dimension 12 was also negative but it 
is not known for that year (and also for the following year, 2010/11) whether MU’s actual FEC 
exceeded the price it received for its NHS contracts; the improvement in MU’s overhead cost 
                                                             
426 See Table 17, moves 1 – 5. 
427 See Table 17, moves 6 – 7, and 10. 
428 Sources: (i) MU accounts reports for 2005/06 and 2007/08 – HESA and Archive 18; (ii) MU NHS Contracts 






position started in 2006/07 had continued but it was not known if that improvement had been 
sufficient to compensate for the shortfall in the BMP which the 2009 national agreement had now 
opened up. 
 
With its decision to implement the BMP in 2007, the GM had changed the conditions under which 
future price determination in the IOR would take place from those of Mg to those of a national level 
bilateral monopoly in which both the GM and MU were represented by others in the processes of 
negotiation. In this context the strategy of the GM in power game 2 was to exploit ambiguities in the 
rules of the NHS-HE inter-sectoral arrangements at a national level. Although the DH had negotiated 
on behalf of the GMs, and the GMs were accountable to the DH, GMs individually in virtue of their 
statutory duty to meet their RRLs could exercise a veto on matters which threatened the meeting of 
that statutory duty. By claiming the original BMP agreement negotiated in 2008 was ‘unaffordable’ 
the GM was exercising this veto – the GMs meeting of its RRL trumped the rules of the BMP national 
level negotiations. The GM was not required to prove its claim about the unaffordability of the BMP 
increase; it was sufficient for the GM simply to make the claim.429 
 
The strategy of the HEI representatives was to lobby HENSE and the DH by disputing the non-
affordability claim (8 of the 10 GMs in the country had budgeted for planned the implementation of 
the originally agreed increase to the BMP) and to argue that the HE sector could not subsidise health 
service education, to brief their members (including MU) and to encourage the HEI VCs to make 
direct representation to the GMs (see Table 18, moves M7 - M9). However, at the same time the HEI 
representatives also agreed to the DH request for an early resumption of the negotiations which in 
effect gave the HEIs only a few weeks to prepare for the new negotiations (see Table 18, moves M8 - 
M10). 
 
Perhaps the simplest explanation of the acceptance by HEIs (including MU) of what became the final 
BMP proposals lies is to be found in the combined effect of two factors: (i) the HEI negotiating team 
had been outmanoeuvred by the DH and ultimately behind the scenes, by the GM in the BMP 
negotiations; the readiness of the DH to renege on what the HEIs had been led to believe was a firm 
agreement430 was probably a significant factor in this and one from which the HEI negotiating team 
never recovered (ii) the lack of dissent from HEIs. For example, when the final proposed agreement 
was put to its members by CoDH, MU did not dissent. This non-response from MU was partly due to 
the (erroneous) assessment made by the CoDH on which MU relied, that the final proposals on the 
BMP were little different from what had been previously agreed. The tacit acceptance by MU of the 
proposed agreement was also due to the evaluation of the agreement made by the CoDH that it 
represented the best outcome that could be obtained in the circumstances. 431 Given that view from 
the HEI national negotiating team it was not obvious, at least not to MU that any useful purpose 
would be served by objecting to the proposed agreement which was being recommended by its 
national representatives.432 
 
As shown in Table 14(iii), the impact on historical dependencies in the IOR of MU’s acceptance of the 
BMP agreement was to create new ‘Founder’ dependencies in dimensions of the IOR directly related 
                                                             
429 Although the CoDH had at the time disputed the veracity of the GM’s claim about affordability it was unable 
due to lack of publicly available evidence to pursue this line of attack; the relevant accounting evidence (cited 
in Table 18 – see under ‘Comments’ for move M7 of the game) only came to light over a year later, after the 
GM’s accounts for the relevant years had been published. 
430 Source: Email and briefing of CoDH to members March 2009 – Archive 108; see Table 18 game move M5. 
431 Source: CoDH email and attachments to members May 2009 – Archive112. 
432 Source: MU senior management. The writer was the lead member of the MU team who assessed whether 






to price - dimensions 12, 10, 9, and in dimensions of the IOR indirectly related to price – dimensions 
13 and 14. The basis of these historical dependencies lay in the IOR contract on how, in future, price 
under that contract was to be interpreted and applied. 
 
6.4.1.2.12 Power Game 3 – Coalition and Lobbying: IOR Dimension 11 
 
As shown in Table 13, the stability impact of the outcome of power game 3 on dimension 11 was a 
continued stability, a stability which had been part of the initial conditions of the IOR when it was 
established in 1995 and a stability which continued to be maintained throughout the whole of the 
reference period. 
 
The strategy of the GM in this power game was to conduct a consultation process with the HEIs 
collectively in the MG. During that process the GM advocated OBC and offered the opportunity to 
HEIs to participate in a ‘working group’ to analyse the potential impacts of OBC (see Table 19, moves 
M1, M2, M4, and M7). Later, at a decisive stage in the process the GM proposed that OBC be 
‘piloted’ (see Table 19, move M10). It is fair to state that at the outset of this game none of the HEIs 
in the MG, apart from MU, appreciated the magnitude of the stakes in this game and the potential 
threat to the continued financial viability of all or most of the IORs with the GM in the MG,, not just 
to the continued viability of the IOR between the GM and MU.433 
 
Given the magnitude of the stakes in the game and after initial discussions with the LDHG and the 
GM had taken place, MU decided that a campaign of opposition based on a strategy of coalition with 
other LDHG members and intensive focussed lobbying both at MG and at HE-NHS inter-sector levels, 
was urgently required.434 MU concluded that since it was the only member of the LDHG which was 
sufficiently knowledgeable about OBC to be aware of the potential consequences of its introduction, 
it should initiate and lead the campaign. MU accordingly devised a strategy, initiated a campaign and 
subsequently, with the support of the Chair of the LDHG, took the lead role on behalf of the other 
members of the LDHG, in that campaign.435 A key part of MU’s strategy was to educate/inform LDHG 
members about OBC and its implications. MU did this through completing a detailed analysis of the 
potential consequences of OBC on its own IOR and then sharing that information in full with other 
members of the LDHG and subsequently also with key influencers at NHS-HE inter-sector level.436 
 
Two explanations of the outcome of this power game are: 
(i) The effect of MU’s strategy was that power game 3 came to be played out under conditions of 
bilateral monopoly. In the game, the countervailing power of the coalition of HEIs proved to be 
sufficient to maintain the status quo on OBC in the IORs in the MG and to block the GM in its attempt 
to change the rules of the IOR on price. From MU’s standpoint a difference in this game from the 
previous games was that MU’s resource dependency on the IOR was not as significant a factor as it 
had been previously: the stakes in power game 3 were sufficiently high that continuation in the IOR 
on the basis of the OBC proposals of the GM would probably have been less attractive to MU than 
                                                             
433 Source: This feedback was given personally to the writer during the months July 2010 to September 2010 by 
other HEI members of the LDHG. Supporting evidence for this is in the presentations made by MU to LDHG 
members during the period and other feedback from MU about OBC - Archives 117, 121, 127, 128. 
434 Just as in power game 1, the GM had set a relatively short timescale for the introduction of the new 
arrangements it was proposing. In power game 1 the GM had given c. 3 months notice. In this power game the 
GM sought to commence a ‘pilot’ within 2 months of first proposing it. 
435 See Table 19, moves M6, M9, M11 – M13, and M15.  
436 See Table 19, moves M5, M9, M13, and M15. The Chair of the LDHG continued to be very supportive of 
MU’s endeavours throughout the campaign, particularly in the sharing of MU analyses and communications at 






exit from the IOR altogether. While this position was never explicitly communicated to the GM, MU 
did state at the last meeting with the GM and the McKinsey consultant it had retained for its FWST 
project, that MU was trying its utmost to prevent the GM from perpetrating a ‘disaster’ in the MG.
437 
 
(ii) Coincidentally shortly after the game had come to a pause (Table 19, move M17), an alternative 
means arose by which the GM could achieve its FWST objectives (see power game 4); this alternative 
means also provided the GM with an option to pursue its OBC objective at some later time in a 
setting largely of its own design and where the risks of facing opposition from a strongly motivated 
and united coalition of suppliers could be avoided. 
 
As shown in Table 14(iii), the historical dependence on the initial conditions of the IOR in dimension 
11 was unchanged and continued to the end of the reference period. 
 
6.4.1.2.13 Power Game 4 – Exercise of Discretion: IOR Dimensions 8, 7, 11, 10, 3 
 
As shown in Table 13 the stability impacts of the outcomes of power game 4 on the relevant 
dimensions of the IOR were to leave these unchanged:  a ‘threatened instability’ continued on 
dimensions 8, 3, and 10 while on dimensions 7 and 11 the IOR continued to be stable. However, the 
threatened instabilities had been reinforced: on dimension 8 the outcome for MU on the 
reallocation of the GM’s output quantities demand was to continue the trajectory of decline which 
had commenced back in 2006; on dimension 3 the outcome was to increase the burdens on MU 
associated with contract compliance; on dimension 10 it was to reinforce the threatened instability 
with the prospective formal re-entry of the GM into price negotiations. The continued stability in 
2012/13 on dimension 11 was also potentially only temporary; by 2014/15 there was to be a formal 
negotiation with the GM on OBC. 
 
Under the 2008 LEC which it had with its suppliers (including MU) the GM had discretion on the 
serving of the required notice, to terminate those contracts either in whole or in part.438 The strategy 
of the GM in this power game was (i) to exercise the discretion it had under the LEC to terminate its 
IOR contracts in the MG (ii) to initiate and complete a process of tendering in the MG. The tendering 
process was particularly attractive to the GM because it had discretion under that process 
substantially to redraw the future contracts of the IORs it had in the MG. Once the process was 
formally under way then the rules of that process prohibited the ‘bidders’ (prospective suppliers) 
from ‘colluding’ with each other by whatever means such as by coalition. The tactics used by the GM 
in the game included (i) completing the formalities of ‘seeking the views’ of the HEI suppliers 
(including MU) on an individual basis (ii) obtaining the support of the NHS employers on whose 
behalf they were the education commissioners and (iii) exercising its discretion to redraw the IOR 
contracts in the MG (see Table 20, moves M2, M4, M8, M9 and M10). 
 
The HEIs’ strategy was to act in concert and seek to persuade the GM to delay the execution of its 
plan; the HEIs also lobbied the DH and eventually also a member of the HENSE group (see Table 20, 
moves M5, M6 and M10). 
 
Explanation of outcomes of Power Game 4: Power game 4 was similar to power game 1 in so far as 
at its concluding moves were between the GM and MU each acting just on their own behalf as the 
organizations in the IOR (see Table 17 moves M9 and M10, and Table 20 moves M11 and M12). Thus 
although the HEIs had tried to get the game played out under conditions of bilateral monopoly, 
                                                             
437 Source: This was a statement made by the writer to the Interim Manager for the GM FSWT project at the 
LDHG meeting with the GM on 23rd September 2010 – Table 19, move M17. 






ultimately the GM was able to exercise its discretion to ensure the outcomes of the game were 
determined under conditions of MG. 
 
As in power game 1, MU’s acceptance of the GM’s invitation to tender and subsequently of the 2012 
LEC can be explained by its resource dependency in the IOR. Just as in 2008 when MU accepted the 
2008 LEC, the IOR was critical to MU from a financial standpoint. MU’s operating surplus in 2011/12 
was c. £7.7m (c. 4.4% of its total income for that year).439 The contribution to MU’s overheads from 
the IOR in 2011/12 was c. £6.6m; MU’s FEC position on its NHS contracts was also positive.440 
Consequently, from MU’s standpoint with the IOR still under conditions of MG (i.e. no other buyers 
for MU’s NHS outputs and no other economically feasible deployments available for MU’s dedicated 
NHS resources), it had no better option than to continue in the IOR. Contractually there was no 
status quo option either for MU: the GM had exercised the discretion it had under the 2008 IOR 
contract and given the requisite notice to MU.441 Furthermore, the relatively little resource 
dependence of the GM on the IOR was expected to reduce further: the tendering process the GM 
had initiated was expected ultimately to provide more potential suppliers options in the MG from 
which the GM would be able to choose. 
 
As shown in Table 14(iii), the impact on historical dependencies in the IOR was to create new 
‘Founder’ dependencies in dimensions 1 and 3 of the IOR; the basis of these historical dependencies 
lay in the 2012 LEC which MU accepted by its submission of a tender to the GM. Under the 2012 LEC 
there was also the potential by 2014/15 for new Founder dependencies to be created in IOR 
dimensions 10-14. 
 
6.5 Historical Dependencies and Resource Dependencies 1995 - 2013 
 
The relationships between historical dependencies and resource dependence in the IOR were 
important determinants of stability impacts on dimensions of the IOR over the reference period. The 
aim of this section is to explain those relationships and thereby to develop the conclusions about 
IOR in/stability which were presented in the previous sections of the Chapter.  
 
Historical dependence (HD) processes were relevant to the IOR and the impacts on IOR in/stability at 
two levels (i) at the macro institutional level, specifically at the level of the MG in which the IOR was 
embedded (ii) at the IOR level, specifically at the level of the different dimensions of the IOR. 
 
6.5.1 MG level 
 
the establishing of the IOR within an MG context functioned to create a HD: the persistence of the 
MG in most of its essential conditions over the reference period meant that a ‘Founder’ type of HD 
between the IOR and the MG was created.
442 Once the IOR was established in 1995 and MU had 
made its resource commitments to the IOR under conditions of MG, then the MG itself also became 
one of the main sources of power imbalance, in favour of the GM, between the GM and MU in the 
IOR. Thus resource dependence in the IOR – RD(IOR) - and historical dependence at MG level – 
                                                             
439 Source: MU annual report and accounts 2011/12 – Archive 18. 
440 Source: MU NHS Contracts Financial Sustainability Assessment 2012-2015 – Archive 22. The figures 
calculated in MU’s NHS sustainability assessment for 2012/13 are used as a proxy for 2011/12 financial 
performance. 
441 Source: GM letter to MU giving notice of partial termination under the 2008 LEC, August 2011 – Archive 143 
442 The exceptions to these conditions were on dimensions in the price component of the IOR when from 2007 
these were partly under conditions of bilateral monopoly. The exceptions and the stability impact on the 






HD(MG) - acted in combination as a determinant of in/stability impacts in the IOR – I/S(IOR). A 
shorthand description of this is expression (a) below: 
 




I/S(IOR) = stability (S), instability (U), and threatened instability (TRI) in dimensions of the IOR; 
 
In the right hand side of expression (a) above: the asterisk denotes the combination of resource 
dependence (RD) with HD processes at the MG level; the dots denote other variables which could be 
relevant to the in/stability of the IOR. As indicated for events shown in Table 21 under the Contracts 
component of the IOR, during the reference period of the IOR, these variables included the demand 
from the NHS for newly registered non-medical professional staff and the placement capacity to 
train prospective non-medical professional staff. At the IOR level (below) these variables included 
the compatibility in the objectives of the GM and MU and their respective powers in regard to the 
achievement of their shared objectives in the IOR. 
 
6.5.2 IOR level 
 
HD processes affected stability impacts on all IOR dimensions over the reference period: 
 
IOR dimensions 1-6 and dimensions 9-12: HD processes (‘initial conditions’ and ‘founder’) became 
locked in; the rules or conditions and terms stipulated in the IOR contracts functioned as the 
mechanism which locked in these HD processes. The lock-ins lasted for as long as the IOR contracts 
were in force. However, just because a HD lock-in had occurred did not mean that the lock-in was 
guaranteed to continue beyond the term of a given contract or in perpetuity: either the GM or MU 
could seek a change at the time the IOR contracts came to be renewed or had reached the end of 
their specified duration. Thus there was always a potential for the rules of the IOR to be changed. 
But whether or not the rules of the IOR were actually changed depended largely on implications 
those changes had for the distribution of benefits in the IOR between the GM and MU and on the 
power imbalance between the GM and MU. Since the main sources of what became the imbalance 
of power in favour of the GM was the combination of MU’s resource commitment to the IOR and the 
conditions of MG, then ultimately the continuation of HD process in specific dimensions of the IOR 
was also dependent on MU’s resource dependency in the IOR. 
 
IOR dimensions 7 and 8: Given the definitions of these dimensions, only recent history or the history 
of the previous 3 years was relevant to their stability; in effect, ‘forgetting’ was the type of HD 
process involved. Recent events which had the potential for a large stability impact on these 
dimensions were often exogenous to the IOR and associated with NHS funding decisions taken 
annually in the macro political environment of the MG. 
 
IOR dimensions 13 and 14: Two different types of historical dependence – ‘forgetting’ and ‘founder - 
operated simultaneously on these dimensions. In respect of compliance with GM output quantities 
and quality requirements (dimension 13) and also in respect of compliance with the requirements of 
the regulatory professional body, it was the recent performance of MU which was relevant; the 
recent performance on these requirements and the consequent impact on MU’s reputation was also 







However a ‘founder’ type of HD was also relevant on these two dimensions: in relation to the GM’s 
requirement for the VFM performance of the IOR (part of dimension 13), and in relation to MU’s 
requirement for the financial performance of the IOR (part of dimension 14). In both of these cases 
this was because the actual price level set in the IOR had an impact on the IOR’s VFM performance 
from the GM’s standpoint and on the IOR’s financial performance from MU’s standpoint. Since the 
price level set in the IOR was subject to a founder type HD process this meant that a founder type 
HD process was also relevant to IOR performance dimensions 13 and 14. 
 
A shorthand description of the in/stability impact on IOR dimensions of historical dependence 
processes at IOR level – HD(IOR) – is expression (b) below: 
 
 I/S(IOR) = f[HD(IOR), ...] (b) 
 
Since ultimately the continuation of HD processes in specific dimensions of the IOR was also 
dependent on MU’s resource dependency in the IOR and since the latter was partly a function of the 
HD processes at MG level, for a statement of the relationship between impacts on in/stability in the 
IOR over time, i.e. I/S(IOR)T where T is the selected time period, and historical dependence processes 
and resource dependence, expressions (a) and (b) above need to be combined to get expression (c) 
below: 
 
I/S(IOR)T = f [{RD(IOR) * HD(MG)}, HD(IOR), ...]  (c) 
 
6.6 IOR Instability and Threatened Instability 1995 – 2013 
 
Explanations of in/stability in the IOR have been argued in the previous five sections of this Chapter. 
The focus of these explanations has been on stability, instability, and threatened instability in 
dimensions of the IOR examined in consecutive sub-periods of the reference period. Focussing on 
threatened instability and instability in the IOR, the aim of this final (sixth) section of the Chapter is 
to draw together these explanations and draw a conclusion about the instability (‘U’) and threatened 
instability (‘TRI’) in the IOR over the reference period as a whole. 
 
This section is structured in three sub-sections: 
 
1. Summary and analysis of explanations of instability and threatened instability impacts on IOR 
dimensions during the reference period. The number of these impacts and the components of the 
IOR in which these impacts occurred are analysed along with the explanations associated with them 
and conclusions drawn about how IOR instability and threatened instability came about. 
 
2. Overall explanation of IOR instability and threatened instability during the reference period. The 
different explanations of IOR instability and threatened instability are considered and an overall 
explanation of IOR instability and threatened instability which features each of these explanations is 
suggested. 
 
3. Overall Conclusion. In this sub-section an overall conclusion is stated about instability and 







6.6.1 Summary and Analysis of Explanations of Instability and Threatened Instability on IOR 
Dimensions 1995-2013 
 
These explanations are summarised in Table 21 below. 
 
Caption to Table 21 
 
 A summary of ‘key events’ and of the explanations associated with unstable (‘U) and threatened 
instability (‘TRI’) impacts on IOR dimensions are presented in table 21. 
 Key events, the year/s in which these occurred, and the initiators of these events are shown in 
columns 1-3 of the table. Some events were repeated, i.e. they occurred in more than one year. 
Events are grouped into the relevant components of the IOR. 
 Further information on each key event is provided in the Comments & Sources of Evidence 
column of the Table (column 6). 
 There were 15 types of key events which occurred altogether 25 times during the reference 
period and which were associated with ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts on dimensions of the IOR  
 There were 3 explanations (‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’) associated with the ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts on the IOR 
dimensions. These explanations are presented in full notation in the Table – further information 
about the notation of each explanation is provided in the narrative. These explanations are set 















In Table 21: ‘Events’ in the IOR include all those events over the reference period which in their 
entirety led to all of the instability or threatened instability impacts on the dimensions of the IOR 
over the reference period i.e. the 114 stability impacts which are shown as either U’ and ‘TRI’ in 
Table 3(i). Some events have also been included where although the eventual outcome of those 
events was a ‘stable’ stability impact there had been a significant threat that an unstable or 
threatened instability outcome could have been brought about instead.  Each event is grouped 
according to the dimensions on which the ensuing stability impacts occurred. ‘Year’ and ‘Initiator of 
Event’ refers to when Events were initiated and the initiator(s)/s of those Events. ‘IOR Dimensions’ 
are the relevant dimensions of the IOR on which there was an instability or threatened instability 
impact. ‘Comments and Sources of Evidence’ consists of brief statements about the context of the 
Events and the sources of evidence of these. ‘Explanations of IOR Instability Impacts’ are the 
explanations of the instability (‘U’) and threatened instability (‘TRI’) impacts on the dimensions of 
the IOR which were presented in the previous sections of Chapter 6. 
 
In Table 21 there are three explanations of ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts: 
 
A. [{RD(IOR) * HD(MG)}, HD(IOR)]   
B. [{RD(IOR) * (In/effectiveness of Negotiation Strategy/Coalition)}, HD(IOR)] 
C. [NHS(Demand Growth/Demand Decline/Placement Capacity Constraint)]         
 
Explanation A was defined in the previous section. The constituent variables in this explanation are a 
combination of (i) power imbalance in the IOR, in favour of the GM, between MU and the GM (ii) 
historical dependence processes at MG and IOR levels. 
 
Explanation B is also a power explanation. In this explanation however, the events took place under 
conditions akin to bilateral monopoly. Under those conditions the relative power of the sides in the 
negotiation was unstable; the relative power of each side depended largely on the in/effectiveness 
of the power dependence responses of the negotiating parties. 
 
In Explanation C, it was events exogenous to the MG viz. changes in overall NHS resources and 
consequent demand for healthcare workforce education, which were decisive for impacts on IOR 
stability rather than the power balance between the buyer and supplier at IOR or MG levels.     
 
From inspection of Table 21, there were 25 IOR ‘Events’ associated with ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts. The 
GM initiated 21 of those events, MU initiated 3 events, and jointly the GM and MU initiated one 
event. In most of the GM initiated events, the GM was responding to events which were exogenous 
to the MG as well as exogenous to the IOR. However, the GM also initiated some of the IOR events 
on its own initiative: from 2007, all of the GM initiated events in the contracts and price components 
of the IOR were part of its VFMMAX ECR strategy for IORs in the MG. 
 
A map of which of the explanations - A, B, and C - accounted for which of the ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts on 
each of the IOR dimensions over the whole of the reference period is given in Table 22 below. 
 
Caption to Table 22 
 
 In the Table are shown the explanations, A, B, and C which were associated with each of the TRI 
and U impacts (colour coded orange and red respectively) on the IOR dimensions in each year of 
the reference period 1995-2013. The explanations are fully defined in Chapter 6. Example: on 






impacts on that dimension for the years 1996/97 to 2008/09. Explanation B was associated with 
the TRI impacts in the years 2009/10 to 2012/13. 
 Question marks (?) in the Table show where there were insufficient data to determine an 
explanation – this was the situation on dimensions 9, 10, 12 and 14 for 1995/96 and on 
dimension 12 for 2009/10 and 2010/11.On IOR dimension 14 more than one explanation was 
associated with the TRI stability impacts for the years 2003/04 to 2012/13. This was because 
dimension 14 encompassed a range of sub-dimensions each of which potentially had different 
sources of instability associated with them and consequently, potentially different drivers of 
instability. 
 On IOR dimension 11 (OBC Risk) explanation B was associated with stability of the IOR on that 
dimension being maintained for the years 2010/11 to 2012/13. Details of how this came about 
are given in Chapter 6 in the account of Power Game 3. 
 By inspection it can be seen from the Table that explanation A accounted for the majority of the 
TRI and U stability impacts – particularly in the contracts and price components of the IOR. 




Explanations A and B were associated with 87 of the 114 ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts on dimensions in the 
contracts, price and performance components of the IOR. Explanation C was associated with the 14 
‘TRI’ impacts on dimensions 7 and 8 in the outputs components of the IOR. On dimension 14 of the 
performance component of the IOR for the years 2006/07 to 2012/13, five TRI impacts were 
associated jointly with explanations A and C, and four TRI impacts were associated jointly with 
explanations A, B, and C. These were cases of over-determination. 
 
In general, it was the exercise of power by the GM which was decisive for most of the ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ 
impacts in the IOR over the reference period: explanation A was associated with c. 75%, explanation 
B with a further c. 5%, and explanation C with  c. 15% of the U and TRI impacts. There were 







 All of the ‘TRI’ impacts in the contracts component of the IOR were associated with 
explanation A. 
 All of the ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts in the price component of the IOR and most of the TRI 
impacts in the performance component of the IOR were associated either with explanation 
A or with explanation B in which the GM was a key player either formally or informally 
(Table 21: 1995 Tender Negotiations, 2009 BMP Negotiations). 
 Although the ‘TRI’ impacts on dimensions in the outputs component of the IOR were 
associated with explanation C, the GM was still a key player in some of the relevant events. 
For example, in the years of exceptional NHS demand growth (1997, 1998, and 2000) the 
GM and MU were effective collaborators in avoiding IOR performance instability resulting 
from the sudden surges in demand. This was also the case in 2009 when the MU and the GM 
collaborated to smooth the effects of the NHS placement capacity shortfalls on a forced 
temporary large reduction in MU supply. The GM was also an important player both in 2006 
and in 2011 in facilitating implementation of the policy decisions to lift the ring-fencing of 
the MPET budget and to focus the subsequent reductions in its demand onto non-medical 
education.    
 
MU’s power dependence responses in the IOR are summarised for each year of the reference period 
in Table 15. In general, MU’s power dependence responses to ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts varied in the 
components of the IOR as well as during the reference period. Until 2007/08, on dimensions in the 
contracts and price components MU after initially trying to negotiate with the GM on its own to 
prevent the instability and threatened instability impacts, eventually accepted the increased risks 
and cost burdens and to manage these either by cross- subsidisation from MU’s non-NHS activities 
or/and by cost reductions and productivity improvements. From 2008/09, MU joined in coalitions 
with other suppliers in the MG in attempts to prevent the ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts. Again, when these 
attempts did not succeed MU managed the ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts by a mix of cross-subsidisation, cost 
reduction and productivity improvements. 
 
MU’s power dependence responses on dimensions 7 and 8 in the outputs component of the IOR 
were different. On dimension 7 MU and the GM worked together to mitigate ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts, 
mainly through the GM giving advance notice of output demand changes, and in the 2009 event by 
the GM agreeing to MU’s request to smooth a temporary reduction in demand over 2 years. On 
dimension 8, MU’s power dependence responses were mainly cost reduction. In 2006 MU 
established detailed cost control management processes in regard to its NHS activities and using 
these managed its costs on a month to month basis for the rest of the reference period.      
 
Finding (4) : Instability and threatened instability in the IOR over the reference period were 
brought about mostly by the exercise of power by the GM and by the power dependence 
responses of MU. The exercise of power by the GM in the IOR consisted partly of responses to 
events exogenous to the MG, especially to exogenous shocks to the MG, which occurred during the 
latter part of the reference period (2005-2009). In the last 5 years of the reference period (2008-
2013), the GM also exercised power on its own initiative to bring about changes in the IOR as well 







6.6.2 An Overall Explanation of IOR Instability and Threatened Instability 1995-2013 
 
All three explanations argued above are applicable to ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts on dimensions of the IOR 
which occurred in 2009: explanation A to the continuing TRI impacts on dimensions 2-4 and 6 arising 
from the 2008 LEC; explanation B to the TRI impacts on dimensions 12, 10 and 14 arising from the 
outcome of the 2009 BMP negotiations; and explanation C to the TRI impacts on dimensions 8 and 
14 arising from the continuing trend of decline in NHS demand, and on dimensions 7 and 14 arising 
from the NHS placement capacity constraint. Thus, depending on the year of the reference period in 
which ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts occurred, and also the dimensions of the IOR on which they occurred, 
any one or more of the explanations could be valid. 
 
Even for ‘U’ or ‘TRI’ impacts on a given dimension in the same year, the three explanations are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, explanations B and C are relevant to the TRI impact on 
dimension 14 in 2009 – a case of ‘over-determination’. Explanation C may also be related to either of 
the other two explanations (A and B) over time. For example, the lifting of the ring-fence of the 
MPET budget in 2005 which was a response to constraints on NHS budgets generally and which led 
to the start of a declining trend in output quantities demand from 2006 (explanation C in respect of 
stability impacts on dimension 8) also led to the GM exercising its MG power to delay the 
implementation of the BMP both in 2005 and in 2006 (explanation A in respect of stability impacts 
on dimension 10).  
 
However, excepting dimension 14 in the years 2009/10 to 2012/13, explanations A and B are 
mutually exclusive as explanations of stability impacts on the same dimension at a given point in 
time. In each of these explanations there are different underlying assumptions about the power 
imbalance between the GM and MU in the IOR. The differences in these assumptions reflect the 
different conditions under which the IOR existed in respect of price determination processes, viz. 
whether these conditions were those of MG or those of bilateral monopoly. Thus in explanation A, 
conditions of MG are assumed under which there is a power imbalance between the GM and MU 
(configuration 3 in Figure 1); in explanation B, conditions of bilateral monopoly are assumed under 
which there is an unstable power balance between the GM and the coalition of which MU was a part 
(configuration 9 in Figure 1). But over time explanations A and B can be related. For example, the 
outcome of power game 3 where explanation B was relevant was one of the factors which led to 
power game 4, in which explanation A was relevant to the outcome of that game and the 
consequent stability impacts. 
 
In regard to dimension 14 in the years 2009/10 to 2012/13, at the same time that conditions of 
bilateral monopoly prevailed in relation to the price related sub-dimensions of this dimension, 
conditions of government monopsony prevailed in relation to the contract and output sub-
dimensions. Hence, while explanation B was relevant to the TRI impacts on the price sub-dimension, 
explanation A was relevant to the contract sub-dimension and explanations A and C were relevant to 
the TRI impacts on the output sub-dimensions of dimension 14. 
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that an overall explanation of the instability and threatened 
instability of the IOR over the reference period as a whole should incorporate all three of the 
explanations set out earlier. This overall explanation could be expressed as: 
 









U/TRI(IOR)T = The instability and threatened instability in dimensions of the IOR over the selected 
time period (T); 
 
Explanation A = [{RD(IOR) * HD(MG)}, HD(IOR)]; 
 
Explanation B = [{RD(IOR) * (In/effectiveness of Negotiation Strategy/Coalition)}, HD(IOR)]; 
 




It is concluded that instability and threatened instability in the IOR during the reference period were 
due mostly to a power imbalance in the IOR, in favour of the GM, between the GM and MU. The 
source of that power imbalance was a combination of: 
 
 The resource dependency of MU on the IOR 
 The conditions of government monopsony and bilateral monopoly under which the IOR existed. 
 
MU’s resource dependency was created at the outset of the IOR through the commitment by MU to 
the specialist dedicated resources entailed in its role in the IOR. In the first half of the reference 
period, this resource dependency increased as the IOR grew in size and relative importance to the 
financial operating position of MU while at the same time most of the conditions of government 
monopsony under which the IOR had been created also persisted. 
 
In the second half of the reference period the IOR declined in size; however, from MU’s standpoint 
the IOR still continued to be important to the financial operating position of MU so that MU’s 







Chapter 7    Summary 
 
This Chapter is in four sections, 7.1 – 7.4. Section 7.1 is a brief summary of the overall approach, 
perspective, concepts and frameworks used in the inquiry. Sections 7.2 7.4 are summaries of the 
findings of the research. Section 7.4 is structured into the same time periods used in Chapter 6 for 
the interpretation of the IOR in/stability over time: 1995/96; 1996-2004; 2005-2007; and 2008-2013. 
 
7.1 Approach, Perspective, Concepts and Frameworks 
 
The overall approach used in the inquiry was an agent-centred historical institutionalism (Bell 2011): 
the contract-based IOR, which was the empirical focus of the inquiry, was defined as a micro-level 
institution (Hennart 2008) and situated within a macro-level institutional environment the 
conditions of which were mostly those of MG (Blair and Harrison 2010, Barnett 2009, Stucke 2013). 
The perspective taken in the inquiry was a power perspective (Huxham and Beech 2008, Lukes 2005, 
Morriss 2002, Foucault 1988 and 1983) which centred on the resource dependence of the 
organizations in the IOR (the GM and MU), specifically their mutual dependence and relative powers 
in the IOR (Emerson 1962, Casciaro and Piskorski 2005), and their exercise of those powers (Emerson 
1962). A theoretical framework which integrated this power perspective with concepts of historical 
dependence (Page 2006) within an agent-centred HI approach (Bell 2011) was constructed (Chapter 
2, Figure 2) and used for the development of explanations about the in/stability over time of the 
IOR. 
 
An important part of the inquiry was the development of a concept of IOR in/stability over time. 
After a review of the IOR literature it was concluded there was no standard concept of IOR stability. 
To enable more nuanced understandings and explanations of IOR in/stability over time a multi-
dimensional concept of IOR stability over time was developed; a grounded theory approach was 
used to do this (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978) and a concept of IOR performance stability 
from the standpoint of the organizations in the IOR was developed on 14 dimensions (Chapter 3, 
Tables 1 and 2, Exhibits 1-5). A conceptual framework based on the theoretical framework was also 
developed (the EEAPOC framework – Figure 3); this was to guide the development of ‘thick 
descriptions’ of how IOR stability impacts came about on each of the 14 dimensions. For the period 
2008-2013, analysis of IOR in/stability impacts was framed in terms of power games. This part of the 
methodological procedure extended the analysis of the exercise of power in the IOR to include 
specific ‘moves’ and ‘tactics’ used by the GM and MU. This analysis was framed in terms of power 
games, and, arguably, could be seen as a practical application of Foucault’s ideas about the nature 
and ubiquity in social relationships of power struggles, power inequality and power asymmetry.    
 
7.2 Origins, Initial Conditions and Persistence 
 
Question set 1 of the inquiry was: 
 
What were the origins and initial conditions of the NHS-HE inter-sector institutional arrangements 
and of the IOR? What were the conditions of these arrangements over the reference period? 
 
The inter-sector institutional arrangements were found to be the outcome of a confluence of events 
in the late 1980s in the NHS and HE sectors, and in the development of professionally qualified non-
medical occupations and their regulation. The relevant events are summarised in Tables 5(i) – 5(iii). 
These events were associated with perceptions of, and conclusions drawn by policy makers, 
professional body regulators and the receivers of healthcare regarding: (i) functional requirements in 






practitioners in non-medical roles, particularly in regard to requirements for practice which was 
‘evidence based’ (iii) organizational requirements, initially in regard to the independence of the 
education providers from the day to day operational demands of the healthcare service and later in 
regard to opportunities for consolidation of apparent synergies between Colleges of Health and HEIs 
and (iv) IOR requirements. 
 
In respect of IOR requirements: as part of a plan to introduce an internal market into the NHS the 
government had reviewed the arrangements which should be made for education and training of 
the NHS healthcare workforce. It was assumed in the government’s review - WP10 (1989) - that the 
principle of ‘contractual funding’ should apply to the education provision and that there should be a 
purchaser-provider split. Both the principle and the way it was to be applied were compatible with 
the arrangements and objectives of the internal market about to be introduced into the NHS; the 
principle of contractual funding had already been introduced into the HE sector in the previous year 
(1988). Thus the NHS-HE inter-sector IORs that would eventually develop were also envisaged as 
based on market based arrangements to promote competition and (it was assumed) bring about 
greater efficiency in healthcare workforce education outputs. 
 
In effect, WP10 functioned as a critical juncture which brought together the key preceding events in 
the NHS and HE sectors as well as the implementation of Project 2000 (the latter was the outcome 
of policy proposals which had been made by the Judge Committee in 1985 and by Project 2000 in 
1986 concerning non-medical workforce education). The establishment of what became the MG in 
non-medical education was the direct result of the decisions, based closely on WP10, which were 
taken shortly thereafter and given legislative effect under the NHS and Community Care Act 1990. 
 
The IOR also originated as the outcome of a confluence of events. These events are summarised in 
Table 5(iv) and partly in Table 5(i). GMs were designated as the NHS organizations responsible for 
implementation of WP10, specifically the mergers of the Colleges of Health with HEIs, and the 
establishing of the IORs in the new MGs. They did this initially through initiating and management of 
competitive tendering processes. After an initially failed competitive bid for Barnet College, MU 
eventually negotiated with the relevant GM a merger between MU and NLCHS. 
 
The initial conditions of the NHS-HE inter-sector arrangements in which the IOR was established 
were found in the inquiry to satisfy all of the conditions of MG. It was also found that the IOR 
continued to exist mostly under those conditions for the reference period.  Some of the rules of the 
IOR changed during the period, specifically in respect of price determination so that from 2007 on 
dimensions of price the IOR existed under conditions of bilateral monopoly. However, from 2011 
these conditions of bilateral monopoly began to be contested by the GM and in 2012 the GM was 
able to finalise new IOR contracts with all of its suppliers in the MG in which the suppliers (including 
MU) agreed in respect of price determination in the IORs an intention to negotiate with the GM a 
move away from the conditions of bilateral monopoly to conditions of MG (power game 4 outcome). 
 
Finding (1): The IOR investigated in the inquiry originated under conditions of MG and continued to 
exist mostly under those conditions for the whole of the reference period.  
 
7.3 IOR In/stability over Time, Performance and Stability Risk 
 
Question 2 of the inquiry was: 
 
What were the IOR key outcomes and consequences for IOR in/stability over the reference period in 







The findings of the inquiry about the in/stability impacts on the IOR for each year of the reference 
period and for each dimension of the IOR are summarised in Table 3(i); analyses of these impacts are 
summarised in Tables 9 and 10. From MU’s standpoint the IOR was ‘threatening to enter a range of 
instability’ throughout the reference period. MU achieved some of its objectives: IOR dimensions 5 
and 13 were stable throughout the reference period from which it can be inferred that MU achieved 
its objectives on output quality. For a part of the reference period MU also achieved (i) its output 
quantities objectives (IOR dimension 8) whether for growth in outputs (1995/96-2002/03) or at least 
broadly to maintain output levels (2005/06) (ii) its financial objectives (IOR dimension 12) for neutral 
or positive FEC (2011/12-2012/13) (iii) its contracts objectives (IOR dimensions 1-4 and 6) especially 
for the period 1995/96 – 2003/04. 
 
However, analysis of IOR stability over time from MU’s standpoint showed that this reduced over 
the reference period (Tables 9 and 10). Over the period 1995/96 to 2004/05 the IOR was stable on 
most of its dimensions. Then from 2005/06 with the first of the one year interim contracts the IOR 
was stable on less than half of its dimensions. This situation continued to the end of the reference 
period even after the IOR pre-registration contract once again became a 5 year contract in 2008/09. 
From MU’s standpoint the reduction in IOR stability over time occurred in risk dimensions 1 – 11. In 
1995/96, the IOR was stable on 9 of these dimensions; in 2012/13 at the end of the reference period 
the IOR was stable on only 4 of these dimensions. The reduction of IOR stability in these dimensions 
had occurred in the contracts and output components of the IOR.     
 
Finding (2) : The IOR tended to become less stable over time from the standpoint of the supplier 
(MU); reductions in IOR stability occurred in dimensions of risk relating to the future performance 
of the IOR. 
 
As reflected in the stability impacts on IOR dimension 13, apart from its abortive attempt in 2010 to 
introduce OBC (on a programme completion basis) the GM achieved all of its IOR performance 
objectives over the reference period including contract compliance by MU, outputs quality and 
quantities ‘delivered’ by MU, and VFM. 
 
Finding (3) : From the standpoint of the GM, IOR performance stability was maintained throughout 
the reference period. This suggests that from the GM’s standpoint, IOR performance stability can 
coexist with a reduction, from the supplier’s standpoint, in IOR stability on dimensions of risk. 
 
7.4 Events, Responses, Historical Dependencies and IOR Stability Impacts 
 
Question set 3 of the inquiry was: 
 
3. How did in/stability over time in the IOR come about? Specifically, how were IOR relevant events, 
both exogenous and endogenous to the IOR responded to by the organizations in the IOR and what 
were the impacts of these events on the in/stability over time of the IOR? 
 
The IOR relevant events are summarised in Tables 5(i) – 5(iv), 4(i), 4(ii), 11 - 13. The power 
dependence responses made by the GM and MU to those events and the consequent stability 
impacts on the IOR are summarised in Table 15. Details of specific responses (‘moves’) made by the 
GM and MU as well as by other relevant actors during the period 2008-2013 are summarised in 
Tables 17-20; the contexts and frames of the power games in which those moves were made are 
summarised in Table 16. The types of historical dependencies in the IOR relevant to the stability 






The following narrative summary is structured into the same time periods used in Chapter 6 for the 
interpretation of the IOR in/stability over time: (i) 1995/96 (ii) 1996-2004 (iii) 2005-2007 (iv) 2008-
2013. These sections are followed by a short concluding section, section (v), in which a summary is 




The IOR relevant events for the year 1995/96 are summarised in Tables 5(i)-5(iv). IOR stability impact 
assessments for 1995/96 are summarised in Table 5(v). 
 
As shown in Table 5(v) the IOR was stable on 10 of its dimensions in 1995/96. Instability or a 
threatened instability was in price related dimensions – this included the threatened instability on 
dimension 14 which was due entirely to the shortfall of price against MU’s FEC (dimension 12). How 
the IOR stability impacts in 1995/96 came about was mainly as an outcome of the NLCHS/MU 
merger negotiations between the GM and MU in late 1994 which established the IOR. However, 
other events preceding those negotiations functioned to determine the contractual form of the IOR 
and also many of the terms of the IOR contract finally agreed by the GM and MU. Under the 1990 
NHS and Community Care Act the GM was charged with the implementation of WP10 by establishing 
contract-based IORs through a competitive tendering process. By the time of the GM – MU 
negotiations in 1994, that process had already been concluded and a contract template for future 
IORs in the MG established. It is also likely that many of the terms of the 1995 IOR contract were also 
determined by the preceding competitive tendering process and that these largely accounted for the 
stability impacts in 1995/96 on IOR dimensions 1-9 and 11. 
 
The 1994 GM – MU negotiations were crucial however, for the stability impact on IOR dimension 12 
and consequently also on IOR dimensions 10 and 14. MU substantially under-priced its IOR offer to 
the GM. This had been brought about partly because of mistakes which MU had made in costing its 
offer for NLCHS. The size of this pricing shortfall was perhaps compounded by MU also deciding to 
offer a ‘market entry price’, i.e. a price which the GM would almost certainly accept and thereby 
help to ensure MU’s entry to the NHS education market. 
 
7.4.2 1996 – 2004 
 
The IOR relevant events for the period 1996-2004 are summarised in Table 11. The power 
dependence responses made by the GM and MU to those events and the consequent stability 
impacts on the IOR are summarised in Table 14(i). 
 
As shown in Table 11, except for dimensions 1, 7 and 8 the stability impacts on all of the IOR 
dimensions remained the same during the period 1996 – 2004. How these stability impacts came 
about was due to a number of factors and events, the relevance of which varied depending on the 
particular IOR dimension affected: 
 
 IOR dimensions 1-4, 6, 9 and 11: The duration of the IOR contracts and their specified terms 
and conditions. The duration of the IOR contracts in the period 1996-2006 was either an 
annually rolling 3 year contract or in the case of the 2000 pre-registration contract, a fixed 5 
years duration. Neither the GM nor MU sought any changes to the terms and conditions of 
these contracts, so that the stability impacts on these dimensions continued mostly to be 
the same over the period. 
 
 IOR dimension 5: The review of Project 2000. The main outcome of the review was to 
establish a new specification for the pre-registration outputs in the IOR. It was MU’s 
effective compliance with these new requirements which brought about a continued stable 







 IOR dimensions 7, 8: Commencing in 1997, there was a substantial growth in the resources 
allocated by government to the NHS. This growth was reflected in the objectives of the NHS 
Plan 2000 and sanctioned in the Health and Social Care Act 2000. There was a substantial 
growth in the NMET and MPET budgets during the period which fed through to the GM’s 
demand for output quantities in all IORs in the MG, including the IOR with MU. 
 
 IOR dimension 10: A change in the basis on which price was determined. In 1996 the IOR 
contract price for the education provision was on a unit price basis. The unit prices were 
based on the 1995 contract price. 
  
 IOR dimensions 12 and 14: The outcome of the 1996 negotiations on price between the GM 
and MU was to set the unit price based at a level relative to the 1995 price which was 
different only in regard to a standard cost inflation factor used for the NHS. This had the 
effect that the disadvantageous outcome to MU of the 1995 negotiations was replicated in 
1996 and became locked in for the subsequent years of the period. 
 
The power dependence responses of the GM and MU remained the same over the period 1996 – 
2004 (see Table 14(i)). The GM continued its extraction of rents from the IOR while MU continued to 
cross-subsidise the IOR from its other activities and/or from increasing the indebtedness of the 
University. The latter point was particularly the case for the last 5 years of the period, 2000/01 to 
2004/05. During that period MU’s overall operating position declined sharply, from an operating 
surplus to turnover of c. 3.1% in 1995/96 to an operating deficit to turnover of c. (8.7%) in 
2004/05.443 This deterioration in MU’s operating performance combined with the volume growth in 
the IOR since its inception – c. 19% growth in volume terms between 1995/96 and 2004/05444 - 
meant that by the end of this period the resource criticality of the IOR to MU had increased 
substantially. 
 
7.4.3 2005 – 2007 
 
The IOR relevant events for the period 2005 – 2007 are summarised in Table 12. The power 
dependence responses made by the GM and MU to those events and the consequent stability 
impacts on the IOR are summarised in Table 14(ii). 
 
As shown in Table 12, in this period the stability impacts on most of the IOR dimensions was either a 
threatened instability or unstable; this contrasted with the previous period (1995-2004) during 
which the IOR had been stable on most of its dimensions. How these stability impacts came about 
was due mainly to the GM’s power dependence responses to events which were exogenous to the 
IOR, viz.: (i) a restructuring of the GM in 2006 (ii) a ‘financial crisis’ in the NHS in 2005/06. During the 
last year of the period (2007), the GM also took some important decisions which ultimately were to 
have further impacts on the stability of the IOR. 
 
 IOR dimensions 1, 2, 4, and 6: the restructuring of the GM in 2006 coincided with the expiry 
of MU’s NHS contracts. The outgoing GM and the new GM in its first year offered a 
succession of 1 year ‘interim contracts’ to MU so as to provide time for implementation of 
the reorganization of the GM to take place ahead of new long term contracts with MU 
being arranged. Consequently this became a period of ‘drift’ in the IOR. The impact of these 
short term contracts was a threatened instability on dimensions 1 and 2. In regard to 
dimensions 4 and 6 the GM took the opportunity to omit clauses from the interim contracts 
                                                             
443 Source: MU Annual Reports and Accounts 1995/96 – 2004/05 –Archive 18. 






which had previously been included in MU’s long term contracts about responsibilities of 
the GM for placement and for annual variations in the GM’s outputs demand to be subject 
to output floors and ceilings; the effect of these omissions was a threatened instability on 
dimensions 4 and 6. 
 
 IOR dimensions 3, 5, and 13: there were no changes in the interim contracts which affected 
the stability impacts these dimensions. There were no changes to the contract information 
and management compliance requirements (dimension 3);  MU continued effectively to 
adapt its curriculum and education output to the changing requirements of the regulatory 
professional body (dimension 13), adequate notice of which continued to be the norm 
throughout the reference period (dimension 5). 
 
 IOR dimensions 7, 8: In response to a ‘financial crisis’ in the NHS in 2005 the GM lifted the 
ring fencing on its designated education budget (MPET/NMET) and diverted monies from 
that budget to cover the deficits arising in the service budgets of the NHS Trusts in its area. 
The GM reduced its demand for education outputs which was never subsequently restored. 
The GM collaborated with MU so that the implementation of the reduction in the GMs 
demand was managed to allow MU sufficient time to adapt (IOR dimension 7). However, 
there was a negative impact on dimension 8 as the reduction in the GM’s demand in 2006 
was the start of what became a long term decline in the GM’s outputs demand (dimension 
8) which continued for the rest of the reference period. Further consequences were to 
establish a principle of ‘affordability’ from the GM’s standpoint which was interpreted to 
allow the GM the freedom to prioritise the immediate demands of health service budgets 
over the longer term requirements for NHS workforce supply and development. 
 
 IOR dimensions 10, 12 and 14: Another exogenous event which was important to the IOR 
was the introduction of a BMP for non-medical education programmes. In 2004, motivated 
partly by concerns that HEIs might not continue to respond to NHS requirements for non-
medical education due to under-pricing of their provision relative to their FEC, and partly so 
as to strengthen NHS management control of VFM obtained from education outputs 
procured by the NHS GMs, the DH agreed to the introduction of a BMP. GMs throughout 
England were allowed some discretion by the DH regarding when the BMP was to be 
implemented for each of their areas. Using the principle of affordability from the GM’s 
standpoint which had been established around that time (see above on dimensions 7 and 
8), MU’s GM made maximal use of the discretion it was given by the DH and refused MU’s 
requests to implement the BMP in 2005 and in 2006, though the majority of other GMs in 
England had done so). When eventually the GM did implement the BMP two years after the 
first mooted date, it did on a phased basis only, as a result of which the full benefit of the 
BMP would not be received by MU (and the other HEIs in the MG for a further two years, in 
2009/10. As a result of all this the stability impacts on dimensions 10, and 14 during the 
period 2005-2007 continued to be a threatened instability and on dimension 12 continued 
to be unstable. 
 
 IOR dimensions 1, 2, 4 – 6, 9 and 11: In 2007, at the same time as deciding to begin 
implementation of the BMP, the GM indicated to HEIs in the MG, including MU that it would 
not implement the contract which was designed to be associated with the BMP – the NSC – 
and would instead propose a new contract. The one year interim contract offered to MU 
for 2007 was the same as the previous interim contracts excepting that in the 2007/08 






implement (IOR dimension 3). As a result the stability impacts on dimensions 1, 2, 4 – 6, 9 
and 11 continued to be the same as they were in 2006/07.   
 
In comparison with the previous period, the range of power dependence responses of the GM and 
MU increased during 2005-2007. The GM continued to extract rents from the IOR and MU continued 
to cross-subsidise the IOR. In this period the GM also exercised discretion on BMP implementation 
and changed the rules of the IOR through the interim contracts on several of the IOR dimensions (1-
2, 4 and 6). In response MU accepted the increased risk and burdens in the IOR on those dimensions, 
initiated an internal cost reduction programme, and a capacity improvement programme with its 
placement providers. MU also supported the CoDH in its lobbying activity in regard to the lifting of 
the ring fencing by the GMs of their MPET/NMET budgets. 
  
7.4.4 2008 – 2013 
 
The IOR relevant events for the period 2008-2013 are summarised in Table 13. The power 
dependence responses made by the GM and MU to those events and the consequent stability 
impacts on the IOR are summarised in Table 14(iii). 
 
As shown in Table 13, in this period the stability impacts on most of the IOR dimensions was a 
threatened instability. In overall terms the stability of the IOR was similar to what it had been in the 
previous period; there was also in both periods a similar pattern of stability impacts on the 
performance and outputs components of the IOR. At the start of the period 2008-2013 the pattern 
of stability on the contracts and price component dimensions was also similar to the previous 
period. However, by 2013 the contracts component had become relatively less stable with a 
threatened instability on all of its dimensions, while the price component had apparently become 
less unstable on two of its dimensions. 
 
As in the previous period, 2005-2007, events exogenous to the IOR were important to how the 
stability impacts in the period 2008-2013 came about. One of these events was the restructuring of 
the GMs in 2006: whereas in the period 2005-2007 a consequence of this event had been to 
introduce a period of drift in the IOR, in 2008 a further consequence started to become apparent, 
one which was to have an enduring impact on the stability of the IOR. The restructured GM of 2006 
was a pan-London GM where previously there had been five GMs. Because of this larger geographic 
area the new GM had a much larger overall education budget than previous GMs. Whether because 
of greater resources to manage that budget, or/and because the budget was sufficiently large for 
the GM to be held relatively more accountable for the VFM obtained from the eventual allocations 
of that budget, or/and because the GM had an immediate problem of streamlining the management 
of what previously been five different management organizations in London, or because of all of 
those factors, in 2007 the GM initiated a strategic review of the MG. The outcome of that review was 
a plan by the GM to introduce a new ‘Education Commissioning Regime’ (ECR) for the MG. The ECR 
was predicated on the principles of ‘World Class Commissioning’ which were in turn similar to the 
rationale that had underpinned the introduction of the internal market in the NHS in the 1990s. 
These principles were encapsulated by the GM in the formulation of its overall aim for the ECR, 
which became expressed in VFM terms as the maximisation of education outcomes per £ spent. 
 
The ECR was developed by the GM into a set of 4 connected projects which included a new ‘London 
Education Contract’ (LEC) for the IORs in the MG, a new contract and performance management 
(CPM) system, which eventually evolved to become a ‘quality and contract performance 
management (QCPM) system’, a new planning system which explicitly integrated NHS workforce 







Other events exogenous to the IOR which were important to how the IOR stability impacts in the 
period 2008-2013 came about included (i) the global financial crisis of 2007/08, as an eventual 
consequence of which the ‘Nicholson challenge’ for annual savings of £15bn - £20bn on NHS budgets 
to be made by 2015 was to have an impact from 2010/11 on all NHS budgets including the MPET 
allocation (ii)  a review of the BMP in 2007/08 and the outcome of the subsequent national 
negotiations on the recommendations made in that review and (iii) the financial performance of MU 
overall, which continued an improvement in that performance which had commenced in 2006/07 
and which from 2011/12 reflected relatively substantial operating surpluses being made by MU. 
 
All of these events (including the ECR projects) were played out in the IOR during the period 2008 - 
2013 in a series of four power games initiated by the GM. Three of these power games (games 1-3) 
were zero sum games; the fourth power game was a zero sum game in most respects. In all of these 
games there was conflict between the aims and objectives of the GM and those of its suppliers 
(including MU). A summary description of each game - the players and their objectives, the stakes, 
and the level at which it was played - is given in Table 16. Details of the moves in each game are 
given in Tables 17 – 20. Summaries of what each power game was about are now given. This is 
followed by a summary of the overall outcomes of the games.  
 
Power Game 1 – IOR dimensions 1-4, and 6: power game 1 was about what the rules of the IOR 
should be on dimensions 1-4, and 6. The objectives of the two sides - the GM on one side and the 
members of the LDHG including MU on the other - on these dimensions were incompatible.445 
Differences also existed between the two sides in regard to IOR dimension 10; however, there was 
some ambiguity at the time about these differences, the significance of which was not to become 
apparent until this power game had been concluded and another power game took place in the 
following year (power game 2 in 2009).446  
 
Power Game 2 – IOR dimensions 12, 10, 9: although ostensibly about the actual level of the 
BMP/unit price (IOR dimension 12) power game 2 was also about the principles underpinning the 
BMP (IOR dimension 10), the basis of price in relation to innovation (IOR dimension 9) and the 
integrity of the agreements reached nationally on price between the DH and the representatives of 
the HEIs (UUK and CoDH).447 
 
Power Game 3 – IOR dimension 11: this power game was about an attempt by the GM to transfer 
risk in its IORs in the MG (including the IOR with MU) to its suppliers, specifically the financial risks to 
the organizations in the IOR associated with student attrition (IOR dimension 11). The proposal on 
OBC put forward by the GM in May/July 2010 (moves M1, M2, and M4 in Table 19) was for an OBC 
defined on a programme completion basis. In effect, this meant the GM was seeking to change the 
basis of price in its IORs from a ‘months completed’ basis to a ‘3 year programme completed’ 
basis.448 
 
Power Game 4 – IOR dimensions 8, 7, 11, 10, and 3: this game was initially about the 
implementation of a relatively substantial reduction in the GM’s output quantities demand and a 
reallocation of the reduced demand between its suppliers with the possibility that arrangements 
with some of the existing suppliers were terminated and some new suppliers appointed. As shown in 
                                                             
445 See Table 16 for the objectives of the players in this game and the sources of evidence for those objectives. 
446 See Table 16 for the relevant objectives of the players on IOR dimension 10 in power games 1 and 2, for the 
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447 See Table 16 for the objectives of the players in this game and the sources of evidence for those objectives. 






Table 16, the GM’s objective was to accomplish these reductions and reallocations as quickly as 
possible (IOR dimensions 8 and 7); the HEIs (including MU) wanted implementation of the demand 
adjustments to be delayed by one year.449 Some of the HEIs (including MU) hoped that other NHS 
reorganizations including an expected restructuring of the GM might eventually lead to the dropping 
of the reallocation part of the demand adjustment and thereby the threat to their future security of 
supply in the MG would be reduced. 
 
However, once play in it was under way, power game 4 was also used by the GM as a means of 
accomplishing additional objectives: (i) to get a negotiation on OBC (IOR dimension 11) back on to 
the agenda for all IORs in the MG (ii) simultaneously with the OBC objective to move away from the 
BMP altogether (IOR dimension 10) and in doing that to take the process of price determination 
away from the national level and bring it back into the MG where the GM would be the sole 
negotiator for the buying side (iii) to increase the GM’s control and surveillance of ‘quality’ processes 
in all IORs in the MG (IOR dimension 3).  
 
Overall outcomes of power games 1 - 4: the outcomes in power games 1, 2, and 4 were: (i) the GM 
achieved all of its objectives (ii) the suppliers, including MU, did not achieve any of their objectives. 
The outcome in power game 3 was different: MU and its coalition partners achieved their objective 
of preventing the implementation of OBC as a new basis of price. However, while the GM did not 
achieve its objective in this game, the setback (from the GM’s standpoint) was perhaps only 
temporary: later, in power game 4 the GM exercised its discretion in initiating a tendering process, 
as part of which it formulated a new prospective contract for its IORs. One of the terms of that 
contract, which would become operative once the successful bidders had been formally appointed 
was that OBC was formally put on an agenda for future negotiation in the MG. 
 
The consequent impacts of the outcomes of the power games on the in/stability of the IOR are 
summarised in Table 13. The years and relevant dimensions on which the stability impacts occurred 
for each power game were: 
 
- Power Game 1: 2008/09; dimensions 1-4, and 6 
- Power Game 2: 2009/10; dimensions 12, 10 and 9 
- Power Game 3: 2010/11; dimension 11 
- Power Game 4: 2012/13; dimensions 8, 7, 11, 10 and 3 
 
Power Games Moves and Strategies: How the stability impacts came about in the power games can 
be understood in terms of the moves made by the principal players in each of the games and the 
underlying strategies they employed. The moves made in the games are summarised in tables 17 – 
20. The strategies used by the players were:   
 
The strategy of the GM in power game 1 was initially to consult with HEIs in the MG on a collective 
basis. 450 The strategy of the HEIs was collectively through the LDHG to make counter-proposals to 
the GM. In response the strategy of the GM was to conclude the game with a series of individual 
meetings with its suppliers, including MU and thereby to use its monopsony power to get the HEIs 
individually to accept its proposals.451 Thus, initially this game was played under conditions of 
bilateral monopoly; however, later on the game was played under conditions of MG and the 
outcomes of the game were determined under those conditions. 
                                                             
449 See Table 16 for the objectives of the players in this game and the sources of evidence for those objectives. 
450 See Table 17, moves 1 – 5. 







Power game 2 was played under conditions of bilateral monopoly at a national level. The strategy of 
the GM in this game 2 was to exploit ambiguities in the rules of the NHS-HE inter-sector 
arrangements and in doing so to veto an agreement on price which had previously been reached in 
national level negotiations. In response the HEI representatives lobbied HENSE and the DH by 
disputing the substantive basis on which the GM exercised its veto. However, at the same time the 
HEI representatives also agreed to the DH request for new negotiations to take place. 
 
The strategy of the GM in power game 3 was to conduct a consultation process with the HEIs 
collectively in the MG and in that process to advocate its OBC proposals. Later, at a decisive stage in 
the process the GM proposed that OBC be piloted in HEIs (see Table 19, move M10). In response to 
the initial moves in this game by the GM, MU initiated and led a campaign of opposition to the 
introduction of OBC using a dual strategy of coalition with other LDHG members and intensive 
focussed lobbying both at MG and HE-NHS inter-sector levels. A key part of MU’s strategy was to 
educate/inform LDHG members and influencers at NHS-HE inter-sector level about OBC (as defined 
by the GM) and its implications.452 In effect this game was also played under conditions of bilateral 
monopoly. 
 
The strategy of the GM in power game 4 was (i) to exercise the discretion it had under the LEC to 
terminate its IOR contracts in the MG
453 (ii) to initiate and complete a process of tendering in the MG 
(iii) to use the tendering process as a means by which the GM negotiations with its prospective 
suppliers would be held with each of them individually. The HEI’s strategy was collectively to try to 
persuade the GM to delay the execution of its plan; the HEIs also lobbied the DH and eventually also 
a member of the HENSE group (see Table 20, moves M5, M6 and M10). Ultimately however the HEI 
coalition was unsuccessful in its objectives and the outcomes of the game were determined under 
conditions of MG.  
 
7.4.5  How did in/stability over time in the IOR come about?  
 
In regard to the above question (research question 3) the following was the key finding of the 
inquiry:   
 
Finding (4) : Instability and threatened instability in the IOR during the reference period were 
brought about mostly by the exercise of power by the GM and by the power dependence 
responses of MU. The exercise of power by the GM in the IOR consisted partly of responses to 
events exogenous to the MG, especially to exogenous shocks to the MG, which occurred during the 
latter half of the reference period (2005-2009). In the last 5 years of the reference period (2008-
2013), the GM also exercised power on its own initiative to bring about changes in the IOR as well 
as in the MG which were consequential for the stability of the IOR.  
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Chapter 8    Conclusions 
 
This Chapter is in three sections. In the first section a summary is given of the conclusions drawn in 
the inquiry about why the in/stabilities found on the dimensions of the IOR came about. The second 
section consists of a statement of the thesis developed in this dissertation about why the instability 
and threatened instability in the IOR came about. In the third section, a short story is told of the 
journey in government monopsony of the IOR over the reference period. 
 
8.1 IOR In/stability 1995 – 2013    
 
The overall question of the inquiry was: 
 
Why did in/stability over time in the IOR come about? 
 
The conclusions drawn in response to this question about the in/stability on the dimensions of the 
IOR are summarised below. The summary is structured into same four time periods used in Chapter 
6 (1995/96; 1996-2004; 2005-2007; 2008-2013) and followed by an overall conclusion about 
instability and threatened instability in the IOR over the whole of the reference period. The summary 
Tables referred to in Chapter 7 are also relevant in this section, viz. Tables 5(i) – 5(iv), 4(i), 4(ii), 11 – 




Why the IOR stability impacts in 1995/96 came about was due to a combination of factors: 
 
 Stable impacts on dimensions of the IOR were associated with compatibility in some of the 
objectives of the GM and MU and a mutual dependence. An overriding objective of the GM 
was to implement WP10, initially through establishing IORs with HEIs; a key objective for MU 
was growth. Both of these objectives could be met provided an MU/NLCHS merger was 
negotiated successfully and an IOR established between the GM and MU. 
 
 Historical legacies, mainly from a competitive tendering process which had established 
terms and conditions in other IORs in the MG. These initial conditions were consequential for 
stability impacts on IOR dimensions 1-9 and 11. 
 
 Instability and threatened instability impacts on dimensions 12 and 10 of the IOR were 
associated with a conflict in the objectives of the GM and MU on pricing. Although it can be 
argued that objectively there was no power imbalance between the GM and MU before the 
IOR was established, it is possible that MU top management perceived that there was a 
power imbalance in favour of the GM: MU was anxious to develop a significant presence in 
the NHS education market and the IOR would be a means to do that; however the GM may 
have had in addition to MU, other HEI options for the NLCHS merger. 
 
An alternative explanation is that the stability impact on dimension 12 and consequentially also on 
dimensions 10, 13 and 14, may have been a random outcome of the 1994/95 contract negotiations 
between the GM and MU. Whatever the underlying explanation for these stability impacts, what the 
power dependence responses of the GM and MU on these dimensions amounted to was an 
extraction of rents in the IOR by the GM and a cross-subsidisation by MU of its NHS contracts from 







8.1.2 1996 – 2004 
 
Why the IOR stability impacts over the period 1996 – 2004 came about was due to a range of 
factors: 
 
 Stable impacts on dimensions of the IOR were associated with compatibility in some of the 
objectives of the GM and MU and a mutual dependence. This was particularly relevant to 
IOR dimensions 5, 13 and 14 where the objectives of the GM continued to include MU IOR 
performance compliance with its requirements on outputs quantities and quality. MU’s 
objectives continued to include enhancing its reputation (which it could do through 
compliance with the GM’s requirements on outputs). The substantial growth in the GM’s 
demand for output quantities during the period also helped to reinforce the mutual 
dependence between the GM and MU on IOR dimensions 7 and 8. 
 
 Instability and threatened instability impacts on dimensions of the IOR were associated with 
conflict in some of the objectives of the GM and MU and a power imbalance, in favour of the 
GM, between the GM and MU in the IOR. This was relevant to price dimensions of the IOR, 
particularly dimensions 12 and 10, and also to the IOR performance from MU’s standpoint, 
dimension 14. Efficiency in procurement continued to be a key objective of the GM. From 
the GM’s standpoint this meant a continued application of unit prices equivalent to those 
which had indirectly been established as part of the outcomes of the 1995/96 negotiated 
tender. MU’s objective in the 1996 negotiations on price was to establish price on a basis 
which would cover MU’s FEC. That MU failed to achieve its objective on price can be 
explained in terms of a combination of its resource dependence in the IOR and the relatively 
greater power of the GM in the MG context of the IOR. In agreeing to the merger with NLCHS 
which established the IOR in 1995, MU had entered into relatively substantial new resource 
commitments of a specialised nature, i.e. resources which could not be deployed 
economically outside of the IOR. In effect, once MU had committed to the IOR it had also 
entered a MG as a result of which a power imbalance between the GM and MU, in favour of 
the GM had been created. This power imbalance was potentially relevant to any areas in the 
IOR in which there were conflicts of objectives between the MU and the GM. The resource 
criticality of the IOR to MU grew further when in 1996 MU acquired a new site (at Archway) 
to be used almost entirely for its NHS contracts activities. 
 
 The effect of historical dependencies in dimensions of the IOR: these were relevant to IOR 
dimensions 1-6, 9-12, and 14 of the IOR. As already noted neither the GM nor MU sought 
any changes during the period 1996 – 2004 on dimensions 1-9 and 11. Thus the lock-ins of 
historical dependence provided on these dimensions of the IOR within individual IOR 
contracts continued to apply over successive IOR contracts during the period. In regard to 
dimensions 12, 10, and 14 there were self reinforcing processes of historical dependence 
which operated in addition to and in combination with, the power imbalance between the 
GM and MU noted above. The annual recurrent budgets set for the GM took its previous 
year’s expenditures as a baseline. Since the GM’s expenditures in its IORs were mostly 
predicated on a unit price basis then beyond adjustments for inflation and volumes the ‘unit 







8.1.3 2005 – 2007 
 
Why the IOR stability impacts over the period 2005 – 2007 came about was due to a range of factors 
which was similar to the previous period. However, the relevance of each of these factors across the 
IOR dimensions was different. 
 
Compatibility in some of the objectives of the GM and MU and a mutual dependence: as in previous 
periods this factor was particularly relevant to IOR dimensions 5, 13 and 14 where the objectives of 
the GM continued to include MU IOR performance compliance with its requirements on outputs 
quantities and quality. MU’s objectives continued to include enhancing its reputation (which it could 
do through compliance with the GM’s requirements on outputs). Although the GM’s demand for 
output quantities had reduced, the size of that reduction did not affect the mutual dependence 
which the GM and MU had on these dimensions of the IOR. 
 
Conflict in some of the objectives of the GM and MU and a power imbalance, in favour of the GM, 
between the GM and MU in the IOR: as in the previous period 1996-2004, this factor was relevant to 
price dimensions of the IOR, particularly dimensions 12 and 10, and also to the IOR performance 
from MU’s standpoint, dimension 14. The factor continued to be relevant for the same reasons: (i) 
the persistence of the conditions of MG as the overarching context of the IOR meant that the power 
imbalance between the GM and MU, in favour of the GM, continued (ii) efficiency in procurement 
continued to be a key objective of the GM (iii) a unit price (or ‘unit of resource’) which would cover 
MU’s FEC continued to be an objective of MU. The emphasis which MU placed on its FEC objective 
increased as a result of its sustainability review of its NHS contracts in 2006. MU’s operating 
performance generally was also a factor: it was this which had prompted MU’s sustainability review 
in the first place and it was also this factor which motivated MU top management in 2006/07 to 
initiate a major cost reduction programme on all of its activities including its NHS activities. The IOR 
continued to be resource critical for MU, even more so in a context where MU’s overall survival was 
in the balance; in 2005/06 MU had sustained the largest operating deficit in its history, c. (£17.7m) 
or c. 13.5% of its income for that year.454 In its 2006 sustainability review MU estimated that the 
contribution from the IOR to its overheads was c. £5.6m with the potential for that to increase with 
the implementation of a cost reduction programme.455 Given all this the power imbalance in the IOR, 
in favour of the GM, which had existed throughout the previous period, had increased further by 
2006. Given this, MU concluded that it had no viable option open to it other than to accept the GM’s 
refusals in 2005 and again in 2006 to implement the BMP, and also to accept the GM’s offers of 
interim contracts in 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
 
The effect of historical dependencies (HDs) in the IOR: the impact of the interim contracts on HDs in 
the IOR was to change the relevance on several of the IOR dimensions. The lock-ins provided by the 
interim contracts was of short duration: this is reflected in Table 14 (ii) in the new type (FG) of the 
HDs compared with the previous period on dimensions 1, 2, 4, and 6. However, HDs continued to be 
the same on several of the other IOR dimensions: the GM and MU continued to be ‘specification 
takers’ of the requirements of the regulatory professional body output on output quality (IOR 
dimension 5);  the arrangements under previous contracts in relation to contract compliance 
information and review continued (IOR dimension 3). On dimensions 9 and 11 the initial conditions 
of the IOR continued to apply – neither the GM nor MU sought changes on those dimensions. The 
founder HDs on dimensions 10 and 12 also continued to apply in 2005/06 and in 2006/07. With the 
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GMs decision to implement the BMP, new founder HDs on these dimensions were created in 
2007/08. However, on all of these price related dimensions 9-12 it was the power imbalance 
between the GM and MU which was the main factor which determined the stability impacts on 
those dimensions (along with MU’s operating performance on dimension 12); the HD which was 
relevant to these dimensions was not the HDs created under the IOR contracts (though the latter 
were necessary). Rather, it was the HD of the conditions under which the IOR had existed from the 
time it was established, i.e. the conditions of MG which was important since it was the conditions of 
MG which was one of the two sources of the power imbalance in the IOR in favour of the GM. 
 
8.1.4 2008 – 2013 
 
Why the IOR stability impacts came about from each of the power games during this period can be 
explained as a combination of (i) the balance of power between the GM and the HEIs (including MU) 
and (ii) the strategies used by the players in the games, in particular the effectiveness of these 
strategies in changing the balance of power between the GM and the HEIs (including MU). 
 
In power games 1 and 4 the strategies used allowed the GM eventually to negotiate with its 
suppliers (including MU) on an individual basis. Under those conditions the GM could exercise its MG 
power in the negotiation processes in the games and take advantage of the resource criticality of the 
IORs to its suppliers (including MU). 
 
In power games 2 and 3 the HEIs acted collectively throughout so that the conditions under which 
the games’ negotiations took place were equivalent to those of bilateral monopoly. Under bilateral 
monopoly the relative power of the buyer and supplier is considered in micro-economic theory to be 
relatively equal but at the same time potentially highly dynamic and unstable (and, given the high 
level of mutual dependence of the buyer and supplier on each other, potentially equating in these 
games to configuration 9 in Figure 1) and consequently that the outcomes of zero sum games are 
indeterminate; decisive factors in the outcomes of power games under conditions of bilateral 
monopoly include the resilience and strength of coalition groups and the effectiveness of their 
negotiating strategies. ‘In practice, the outcomes of bilateral monopoly depend on economic logic, on 
the relative power of (the buyer and supplier groups), on the skill and preparation of the negotiators 
and partly on luck’.456 The negotiating strategy of the HEIs in power game 2 proved to be ineffective 
perhaps because in agreeing to new negotiations on the BMP, the HEI representatives had already 
conceded key outcomes of the game. 
 
In power game 3 however, the HEIs led by MU quickly became well informed and strongly united in 
their resistance to the GM’s OBC proposals. From MU’s perspective, the stakes of the game were so 
high that termination of its IOR and exit from the MG altogether was potentially a good option in the 
event that the GM proposals were implemented. In that context, the power balance between the 
GM and MU in their IOR was different from what it was in other contexts of the IOR and also 
uniquely different from what it had been in the history of the IOR up to that point: in power game 3 
the GM could no longer rely on its standing as the GM in the MG as an important source of its power 
since exit from the MG had become a realistic option for MU to consider – the costs to MU of 
pursuing that option would still be high but those costs were likely to be lower even within a 
medium term horizon than the costs to MU from persevering with its IOR under conditions of OBC as 
defined by the GM i.e. on a programme completion basis. Consequently, when a different option to 
OBC became available to the GM to achieve its FSWT objectives, it terminated power game 3 and 
initiated what became power game 4.  
                                                             






8.2 Thesis - Instability and Threatened Instability in the IOR 1995-2013 
 
A summary of the explanations developed in this inquiry about the instability and threatened 
instability of the IOR over the reference period is given in Table 21. Three explanations – A, B, and C - 
were given which, over time, could be related to each other. A summary of which explanations - A, 
B, and C - accounted for which ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts on each of the IOR dimensions over the whole of 
the reference period was given in Table 22. Two of these explanations, A and B, were power 
explanations: ‘explanation A’ was relevant to conditions of MG; this explanation accounted for c. 75% 
of the instances of instability and threatened instability in the IOR over the reference period. 
‘Explanation B’ was relevant to conditions of bilateral monopoly; this explanation accounted for a 
further c. 5% of the instances of instability and threatened instability in the IOR over the reference 
period. Based on the analysis presented in Chapter 6 which led to these conclusions, the thesis 
developed in this dissertation is: 
 
Instability and threatened instability in the IOR over the reference period were due mostly to a 
power imbalance in the IOR, in favour of the GM, between the GM and MU. The source of that 
power imbalance was a combination of: 
 
 The resource dependency of MU on the IOR; 
 
 The conditions of MG and bilateral monopoly under which the IOR existed. 
 
8.3 A Journey in Government Monopsony 1995 – 2013 
 
The NHS-HE inter-sector arrangements for non-medical education were designed in 1989 by the 
authors of WP10 and enacted in the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act. The intention of 
government policy makers was to create a level playing field between the health service providers in 
the NHS so that an overall aim of ensuring a well functioning internal market in the NHS could be 
achieved; the plan to take education and training out of the quasi market for the NHS and establish a 
separate quasi market with centralised funding was a by-product of that aim.  Contracts were to be 
established between education providers (which in effect became HEIs such as MU) and those with 
delegated responsibility to act as buyers for the NHS of non-medical education and training (which in 
effect became the GMs). By about the mid 1990s the arrangements had become fully implemented. 
 
However, these arrangements had amounted to the creation of a MG in non-medical education for 
the NHS professional workforce in England and thus it was under those conditions that the IOR 
between the GM and MU was established in 1995. The impact of those conditions on stability in the 
IOR soon became apparent when, in 1996, MU failed to achieve any of its objectives on contract 
price and accepted what became a long-term extraction of rents from the IOR by the GM. However, 
the IOR was stable on all of its non-price dimensions and this stability continued for several years. 
The period of 1997 to 2004 was a period of substantial growth in the NHS overall as well as in NHS 
education budgets. The dominant ethos in the NHS-HE inter-sector relations in non-medical 
education was one of ‘partnership’ and responsive collaboration. Due to this, MU was successful in 
achieving both its output growth as well as its output quality performance objectives in the IOR. The 
GM too, was successful in achieving its objectives which, after the MG had become fully and 
successfully established by 1998, were to maintain the status quo on price and to secure compliance 
with its demands on output quantities and quality. 
 
2005-2007 was a period of great turbulence in the environment of the IOR. Factors in this turbulence 
included a ‘financial crisis’ in the NHS in 2005 and a restructuring of the GM in 2006. As a result of 
these developments, the period 2005-2007 became a period of drift in the IOR. On many dimensions 
of the IOR which had previously been stable, a threatened instability became the norm. This was 






2005-2007, the contracts in the IOR were successive one year ‘interim contracts’. These 
developments in the IOR contracts were brought about by the exercise of power by the GM. The 
principal source of this power was the conditions of MG under which the IOR existed. MU’s resource 
commitment to the IOR was also important, and even more so than at the start of the IOR in 1995: 
MU had sustained substantial operating deficits over the years 2000/01-2005/06; these combined 
with the growth in the student FTE volume of the IOR, meant that MU had become very reliant on 
the contribution to its overheads which came from its NHS contract activities. 
 
By 2008 the turbulence in the environment of the NHS which had characterised the previous 3 years 
had subsided – the financial affairs of the NHS were in relatively good order and the new GM had 
become established. However, in practically all respects the threatened instability in the IOR 
continued. The restructuring of the GMs in 2006 resulted in a new GM with responsibilities for a 
pan-London MG. This MG (in which MU was one of the suppliers) was far greater in scope than 
previous MGs. Thus the non-medical education and training budget for that MG, which was the 
consolidation of what previously had been 5 separate budgets, had greater visibility with those 
responsible, like the GM, for the management of NHS resources. At the same time as this was 
brought about, new initiatives were taken to improve buying (‘commissioning’) throughout the NHS. 
This was particularly evident in the WCC initiative which was launched in December 2007 and the 
FESC arrangements which had been launched a year earlier. 
 
Against this background, the new pan-London GM with the support of external consultants, 
McKinsey and Company, reviewed education commissioning in the MG. The outcome of that review, 
in December 2007, was a strategy for the GM to maximise VFM in education commissioning and a 
detailed implementation plan for that strategy.457 That strategy, which consisted in 4 related 
projects to bring about a new ECR for the MG, had implications for stability impacts on all of the 
dimensions in the contracts and price components of the IOR. The implementation of that strategy 
was played out in a series of 4 power games (power games 1-4) over the period 2008-2012. These 
games were initiated by the GM and were mostly zero sum games. In only one of these power 
games did the GM fail to achieve its objectives (power game 3). 
 
The 2007/08 world financial crisis, the subsequent  ‘Nicholson Challenge’ in 2009 and the 
curtailment of NHS budgets in real terms (that is when the underlying and continuing growth in the 
demand for healthcare was taken into account) which began in 2010, functioned to add to the 
financial pressures on the GM during the last years of the reference period. The consequences of all 
this included an acceleration in the trend of decline in the GM’s outputs demand which had 
commenced in 2006 and also partly prompted the GM to initiate power game 3.  
 
Thus the instability and threatened instability in the IOR which had marked the period 2005-2007, 
continued in the period 2008-2013 and had also taken on a new meaning. Instead of being mostly 
the consequence of a response by the GM to turbulence in its environment, which over time could 
have positive as well as negative impacts on stability in the IOR, the instability and threatened 
instability in the IOR also resulted from a deliberate strategy of the GM to manage the MG, using its 
power to extract as much benefit as it could from the IORs in the MG. 
 
Compared with 1995 when it was established, the IOR had by 2013 become a substantially riskier 
venture from the standpoint of MU. The instability and threatened instability had become deeply 
rooted and was sustained not only by the implementation of policies of austerity in the macro-
economic environment but also by the GM’s exercise of power on its own initiative to ‘maximise’ 
VFM in the ECR it had designed. Many of the seeds of that instability and threatened instability had 
been sown long before, in the 1989 White Paper, WP10.  
                                                             










The second aim of the inquiry is dealt with in this Chapter. The overall research question here was: 
 
5. How should conflict in principal-agent relationships such as in long term contract-based IORs, be 
managed so that sustainable outcomes from the standpoints of all relevant stakeholders are 
brought about? 
 
Taking as given the context of the IOR over the reference period (including the origins and 
persistence of the MG and its macro, NPM, context) the Chapter is structured into six sections: (i) 
Principal-Agent theory (PAT) is defined (ii) strengths and limitations of PAT are outlined (iii) taking 
account of the key outcomes of the MG and the IOR over the reference period, a critique is made of 
the MG approach to public sector management (iv) a brief update (to January 2016) is given on 
developments affecting the MG since the end of the reference period (v) current substantive issues 
are summarised and recommendations for policy and management are made (vi) a short discussion 
about the recommendations made, in particular about whether the key assumptions underpinning 
the forecast stability outcomes are utopian or represent a political choice.     
 
9.1 Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) 
 
Principal-agent theory (PAT) is concerned with the relations between a principal (P) and an agent (A) 
‘who are engaged in cooperative behaviour but have different goals and differing attitudes towards 
risk’ (Eisenhardt 1989). In PAT: ‘the unit of analysis’ is the contract between P and A; the ‘focus’ is ‘to 
determine the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship’ (Eisenhardt 1989) 
given assumptions about: 
(i) People are assumed to pursue their self-interests by trying to maximise their utility functions, 
have bounded rationality and be risk averse. 
(ii) Organizations (as principals and agents) are assumed to have partial goal conflict and define 
effectiveness in terms of an efficiency criterion. Efficiency includes the efficient organization of 
information and the appropriate sharing of risk bearing costs. 
(iii) Information is assumed to be asymmetric between principal and agent while at the same time 
to be purchasable as a commodity.458 
 
Given an assumption that both P and A seek to maximise their individual utilities from their 
principal-agent relationship (PAR), then in PAT different goals become an issue particularly when it is 
‘difficult’ or relatively expensive for P to verify what A is doing. Without timely and appropriate 
information on the latter, P is exposed to opportunist behaviours by A such as ‘shirking’. Even if the 
risks inherent in a given PAR can be defined and agreed, differences in the respective attitudes of P 
and A  toward those risks raises the issue of how the risks should be shared between them. 
 
Thus, according to Eisenhardt (1989), ‘the heart of agency theory is the goal conflict inherent when 
different individuals with different preferences engage in co-operative effort and the essential 
metaphor is that of the contract’. Eisenhardt suggested that PAT and political (or power) models of 
organizations were similar in that ‘both agency and political perspectives assume the pursuit of self-
interest at the individual level and goal conflict at the organizational level. The difference is that in 
political models conflicts are resolved through bargaining, negotiation and coalitions – the power 
                                                             






mechanisms of political science. In agency theory they are resolved through the co-alignment of 
incentives – the price mechanism of economics’459. In the IOR investigated in the inquiry, conflicts 
between the GM and MU could arise on each of the 14 dimensions of the IOR. For example, from 
the standpoint of the GM the minimisation of risks on dimensions 1-7 and 9-12 would necessarily 
result in an increase in risk for MU; from the standpoint of MU, the converse applied. In regard to 
dimensions 13 and 14, to the extent that the risk preferences of MU and the GM differed then even 
on these dimensions there was a potential conflict between the organizations.  
 
9.2 Strengths and Limitations of PAT 
 
 9.2.1 Strengths of PAT 
 
Practical potential of PAT: Within this overall NPM context a key strength of PAT perceived by policy 
makers has been its potential for practical use to achieve objectives of efficiency in the public sector. 
PAT ‘specifies a range of monitoring, information eliciting and performance appraisal techniques’ 
(Olssen & Peters 2005). These techniques are aimed at determining ‘the best’ structures and 
processes in PAR, particularly in regard to ‘the best’ form of contract between principal and agent, 
the ‘best’ way of motivating agents to perform well, and the ‘best’ way of specifying & monitoring 
contracts by principals to guard against agent opportunism. 
 
Relevance of Risk, Bounded Rationality and Information: A further strength claimed for PAT has 
been its recognition of the relevance of risk, bounded rationality and the importance of information.  
 
 9.2.2 Limitations of PAT 
 
Criticisms of PAT have mainly concerned (i) the substantive validity of PAT (ii) the ways in which PAT 
has been applied (iii) limitations on the attainment of ‘efficiency’ (iv) structuration impacts  
 
(i) Substantive Validity: it has been argued that PAT does not adequately reflect the nature of the 
reality to which it has been applied. An important assumption in PAT concerns how PAR conflicts are 
resolved. According to Eisenhardt (1989), it is through the ‘co-alignment of incentives’ that conflicts 
between a principal and an agent in a PAR are resolved and that this ‘price mechanism of economics’ 
is different from ‘the power mechanisms of political science’.460 This implies that relative power and 
its exercise have no place in PAT; even if as Foucault suggested power is ubiquitous it would seem 
that power as part of an explanation of PAR outcomes is excluded in a PAT perspective. However in 
practice might not the price mechanism which brings about the ‘co-alignment of incentives’ also 
involve the operation of a power mechanism? For example, take the case where a contract between 
a principal and an agent was established by competitive tender and where no second stage 
negotiation was involved. Everything that needed to be specified was specified for the ultimate 
contract was completely in the tender. In such circumstances it is conceivable that an explicit rule 
specified price mechanism might operate automatically as part of an overall system of contract 
determination. But in reality different types of tender are possible, these being open, selective and 
by negotiation. ‘Power mechanisms’ are by definition associated with the latter two types of tender 
and sometimes open tenders have a second stage which involves a negotiation between the 
prospective principal and agent. 
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Furthermore, in circumstances where there is already an existing contract between a principal and 
an agent which is due to expire, either an extension of the contract or a contract renewal might be 
made. In those cases it is possible that negotiation processes between the principal and the agent 
become the decisive processes leading to contract determination. Thus over time negotiation and 
hence power mechanisms might figure prominently in a PAR. Even where contracts are destined to 
expire and new contracts awarded on the basis of a new open tender, it is often the case that the 
existing agent starts from a good position relative to its potential competitors, at least in terms of 
potentially having more information as well as more relevant recent experience of the area which is 
the subject of the tender.  
 
A further criticism of the validity of PAT concerns its apparent neglect of the environmental context 
of principal-agent relationships (PAR). According to Arrow (1985) PAR ‘typically ignores socially 
mediated rewards & systems of ethics’. Consequently the three-way interaction of P, A and their 
respective environments was neglected and over time might be omitted entirely. This could be 
important because, as shown in figure 1, a range of imbalances of power can be associated with a 
range of market contexts, from monopsony to monopoly. Indeed it can be argued that under any 
conditions of mutual dependence, even those where there is a balance of power between the 
principal and potential agents, that power mechanisms will inevitably be present.  
 
Irrespective of the existence or otherwise of relations of mutual dependence, Chang (2010) has 
argued that ‘free markets’ do not exist; markets rely for their functioning on the existence of 
regulatory institutions and on political processes and institutions for the enforcement of the latter.  
Here the ubiquity of the regulatory context also implies the ubiquity of power and of relations of 
power in markets. Markets thus conceptualised are ‘political artefacts’ (Chang 2010); the power-free 
‘perfect market’ exists only as a utopia.461 
 
An implication of the above points is that in so far as power mechanisms are not included and the 
environmental context of PARs is neglected or understated, then PAT approaches to, and 
explanations of, conflict resolutions in PARs may have limited validity empirically. 
 
(ii) Application of PAT: it has been argued that in practice the application of PAT has been 
fundamentally deficient. For example, Perrow (1986) criticised PAT for being ‘one-sided’. For a 
theory which was supposed to be about the relationship between a principal and an agent, PAT in its 
application nonetheless neglected many of the potential realities when these were considered 
consistently from the standpoints of all of those in a PAR, in particular from the standpoint of the 
agent. According to Perrow (1986) in the application of PAT: (i) failing appropriate pre-emptive 
measures, the principal was assumed to be at the mercy of the agent (e.g. in relation to agent 
opportunism such as allegedly evidenced in the propensity of the agents to shirk) (ii) monitoring of 
PAR outcomes was assumed to be available to, or only done by, the principal (iii) organised action by 
agents was absent. Perrow argued that none of these assumptions were realistic. 
 
Another criticism of PAT in practice was that the key concept of ‘efficiency’ may be inadequately 
defined and/or inadequately scoped. Potential or actual conflict between principal and agent in a 
PAR begs questions about what constitutes ‘efficiency’ in a PAR. From whose standpoint is 
‘efficiency’ in a PAR to be defined? In determining criteria of ‘efficiency’ how should the respective 
objectives of the principal and the agent be weighted, particularly where there are conflicts between 
the principal and the agent in their objectives from time to time and in particular contexts? What 
                                                             






account should be taken of PAR impacts outside of the PAR (i.e. of externalities) and of unintended 
consequences? 
 
To the extent that in PAT the environmental context of a PAR is neglected then the concept of 
efficiency may also be inadequately scoped. For example, the compliance of an agent with the 
wishes of a principal may depend on the power the agent has in its resource markets – an agent may 
be able to exploit its workforce as a means of surviving the transfers of wealth in the PAR from the 
agent to the principal which the principal has been able to extract due to the agents resource 
dependence on the continuation of the PAR. 
 
(iii) Limitations on the attainment of ‘efficiency’: even if a concept of ‘efficiency’ is clearly defined 
and adequately scoped within a PAT framework, it is moot whether in practice the attainment and 
maintenance of efficiency in a PAR will be robust. Enders et al (2013) have argued that factors such 
as bounded rationality, changing political beliefs and goals, path dependencies, political 
compromises and organizational characteristics will place limits on the extent to which objectives 
generated in a PAT framework will be attained. Take two factors for example, imperfections in 
information and the potential for change in the balance of power in PARs. In regard to information: 
Stiglitz (2001) and others have argued that information is not simply the transaction cost assumed in 
the classical competitive model (and as stated above also assumed in PAT): ‘The most fundamental 
reason why markets with imperfect information differ from those in which it does not is that actions 
(including choices) convey information, market participants know this, and this affects their 
behavior’.462 In reality, even a small imperfection of information can have a profound effect on the 
nature of the equilibrium such that there might not be equilibrium at all.463 ‘Under the imperfect 
information paradigm, markets are almost never Pareto efficient’.464 
 
In regard to the balance of power in a PAR: over time whether on particular issues and/or in 
particular contexts there is the potential for the balance of power in a PAR to change. To the extent 
that power shifts occur then so too may the distributional outcomes of a PAR also change. Not only 
might such changes impact on the attainment of ‘efficient outcomes’ they might also function to 
change the rules of the game so that what has previously been defined as ‘efficient’ might also 
change. 
 
(iv) Processes of structuration can function to bring about mutually reinforcing impacts on PARs 
and on their environments: a feature of the limitations of PAT which have been set out above is 
how much they have the potential to go beyond being merely additive, but also to be mutually 
reinforcing. The ubiquity of the exercise of power in the determination of conflicts in PARs may 
function to establish and maintain relatively narrowly based and/or one-sided definitions of 
‘efficiency’ in PARs. The environmental context of PARs may be an important source of asymmetries 
of power in PARs. These two factors (the exercise of power in PARs and the environmental context 
of PARs) may come together over time in processes of structuration: once they are established, PARs 
may function to reproduce the same environment which enabled the institutionalisation of 
asymmetries of PARs in the first place. 
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9.3 Critique of MG as an Approach to Public Sector Management 
 
In the following the IOR of the inquiry and the conditions of MG under which it was conducted are 
taken as an example of a PAT approach to public sector management.465 This approach is evaluated 
in three parts. In part one the focus is on the key advantage claimed for a PAT approach, viz. 
outcomes efficiency. The actual outcomes of the MG approach are summarised and the question 
asked whether these outcomes were an example of optimal efficiency? In part two the validity of 
the PAT approach is examined. Here the focus is on how the outcomes of the MG came about, in 
particular to examine how the assumed conflicts in the PAR were managed. Were these conflicts 
‘resolved’ as assumed in PAT by the operation of the ‘price mechanism’ or if not resolved by the 
price mechanism, how were these conflicts resolved if they were resolved at all? In part three the 
main conclusions from parts one and two are brought together and an overall evaluation made of 
the MG approach.  
 
 9.3.1 MG and IOR Efficiency Outcomes 
 
‘Efficiency’ in the MG and the IOR is defined on four parameters of in/stability: 
- Risks and the allocation of risks in the IOR on dimensions 1-6 
- Price and Performance – IOR dimensions 10, 12 and 14 
- Outputs Quality Performance – IOR dimension 13 
- Outputs Quantity – IOR dimensions 7-8 
 
The efficiency outcomes in the MG and the IOR on these four parameters are summarised in Table 23 
below. At IOR level, a threatened instability (TRI) was the main overall outcome on three of the four 
parameters: on contract risks and outputs quantity for the last seven years of the reference period 
and on price for the whole of the reference period. The outcomes at MG level were similar (here 
some of the outcomes data were estimated). On outputs quality the outcome was stability at IOR 
level for the whole of the reference period, and predominantly there was stability also at MG level.
466 
 
If efficiency is defined taking account of both the HEIs and the GM standpoints then overall these 
outcomes do not support the claim that would be made for a PAT approach that the most efficient 
outcomes were brought about by the MG. However all of the TRI outcomes were such only from the 
standpoint of the HEIs. Thus, if efficiency was defined only from the GM’s standpoint then the 
‘stable’ outcomes on outputs quality arguably represented good value for money. That begs the 
question whether this narrow definition of efficiency was appropriate. In practice this would to some 
extent depend on how the HEIs (including MU) managed the risks associated with TRI outcomes and 
whether in managing those risks there were consequential costs – costs which would not necessarily 
figure if only a GM centred definition of efficiency was used. This issue is considered in the next sub-
section. Before that however it should be stated that for the first half of the reference period (1995-
2004) the outcomes on the contract risks and output quantity parameters were predominantly 
‘stable’ at both IOR and MG levels. The move to a threatened instability on those parameters was not 
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associated with a change in outputs quality – the outcome on the latter had been ‘stable’ and 
continued to be so.  
 
Caption to Table 23 
 
 In/stability impacts are colour coded: amber (threatening entry to a range of instability) and 
green (stability) for each of the four parameters for the relevant years. Example: For ‘Risks’ at 
IOR level the dominant stability impact for the years 2005-2013 is shown as ‘TRI’. 
 In/stability impacts on two levels are shown, at MG and at IOR levels respectively. IOR level 
assessments are drawn directly from the findings of the research inquiry and summarised in 
Tables 3, 11-20. MG level stability impact assessments were based on secondary data drawn 
from many sources, including GM published assessments of MG performance covering the years 
2007-2013 (Archive 13-15, NHS London 2011, Health Education England Pan-London Quality and 
Education Unit 2014), and published price reviews by JM Consulting in 2003 and 2008. Two of 
the stability impact assessments at MG level - for Price and for Outputs Quality covering the 
years 1995-2006 – were best estimates from the available data and were inferred mainly from 
the findings of the National Audit Office 2001 review and the JM Consulting 2003 price review. 
However both of these estimates are believed to be reliable. 
 With regard to the stability impact assessments generally at MG level: IOR contracts and pricing 
terms were uniform in the MG during the last 6 years of the reference period, 2007-2013 For 
most of the reference period changes in output quantity allocations of demand to its suppliers 
made by the GM were also uniform. Given the similarity in the costs base of suppliers - 
particularly in direct costs where there were closely prescribed standard curricula and curricula 
delivery (e.g. standard SSRs enforced by the relevant professional bodies) - it is believed that the 
MG level assessments shown in Table 23 are robust.  
 Types of power dependence responses made in the IOR by MU and the GM are shown for three 
of the four parameters (risks, price and output quantities) for the relevant years in which these 









 9.3.2 Conflict Management and Resolution 
 
As already evidenced and discussed in Chapter 6, the TRI outcomes in the IOR and the MG were 
strongly associated with the GM exercise of power and the power dependence responses of MU – 
the different types of responses involved and the parameters with which they were associated at MG 
and IOR levels are summarised in Table 24. GM exercise of power included: 
- For the period 1996 – 2009 a conscious exploitation by the GM of the under-pricing by MU 
in 1995. 
- GM transfer of contract risks to MU through the instigation of one year interim contracts for 
the period 2005-2007 
- GM delay to the implementation of the BMP in 2005 and 2006 consequently continuing its 
rent extraction from MU on the price dimensions of the IOR 
- GM initiating the reneging by the DH of the price agreement reached with the CoDH in 
2008, again with significant consequential losses to all of the university education providers 
in the MG, losses which continued on a recurrent annual basis to the end of the reference 
period (and beyond) 
- GM in concert with all other GMs in England and with the approval of the DH acted to lift 
the ring fencing of the MPET budget and subsequently transfer MPET resources to service 
budgets while at the same time substantially reducing education demand for output 
quantities. 
- GM rejecting the new National Standard Contract in 2006/07 and instead continuing to 
reject initiating and implementing the London Education Contracts (2008 and 2012) which 
consolidated a number of the risk transfers to the universities which had begun with the 
interim contracts in 2005. 
- GM attempt in 2010 to transfer further risk (related to student attrition) to the university 
education providers (including MU). Following frustration of that attempt the GM exercised 
its discretion to put that potential transfer back on to the future agenda for its 
‘management of the supplier landscape’. 
 
Each of these exercises of power by the GM was followed by power dependence responses from 
MU. These responses included cost and productivity improvements e.g. reductions in staffing 
consequent on reductions over the long-run in GM outputs quantity demand.  Given the shortfall of 
the unit price relative to its FEC, MU’s also responded in ways which were driven by the requirement 
for survival rather than by the requirements of efficiency e.g. internal MU cross-subsidy and the 
acceptance of increases in the risks associated with its IOR. Productivity improvements were also 
sometimes associated with increased risks e.g. reducing staff-student ratios to levels which were 
outside the parameters set by the professional bodies; imposing restraints on the pay of MU staff 
over the period 2009-2013 though the acceptance and implementation at local level of national 
agreements on pay. Costs to MU were associated with all of these responses, particularly cross-
subsidies which though external to the IOR were directly due to the exercise of power by the GM. 
 
In addition to these internal accommodating types of responses to the GM exercise of power, MU 
also sought to manage the external environment of its IOR e.g. by lobbying and coalition formation 
(see power game 2). What was common to all of these responses, the internally as well as the 
externally orientated responses, was the conflict on resources between the GM and MU/universities 
which stimulated them. What was also common to these responses and to the GM actions which 
provoked them was that they were manifestations of struggle between the GM (as principal) and the 
universities (as agents). These conflicts were not resolved through an impersonal price mechanism. 






interactions of the GM with the universities, MU and decision makers and influencers (such as the 
DH and JM Consulting) in the environment of the MG. 
 
 9.3.3 Evaluation 
 
The practical application of PAT as part of an NPM approach to NHS-HE relationships was evident in 
the IOR and the MG. The main technique used – contractual funding – which was widely drawn and 
detailed from the outset of the IOR had by the end of the reference period became comprehensive 
in scope and also more detailed. In so far as the IOR as well as the MG functioned consistently to 
produce outputs of the requisite quality over the whole of the reference period then it could be 
claimed that the NPM approach functioned positively in regard to one of the key objectives in the 
commissioning of non-medical education. However this quality outcome came at a high cost to MU 
and to the other university education providers in the MG, and involved risks being borne by those 
providers which became higher over the course of the reference period to the point that on most 
dimensions of their IORs a threatened instability became the norm. All of the potential limitations in 
theory of a PAT approach to NPM which were outlined earlier in this Chapter (see sub-section 9.2.2) 
came to life in the substantive application of PAT both in the MG and in the IOR. For example:   
 
 The efficiency objective of PAT was defined in the context of the MG by the GM in December 
2007; as stated in Chapter 6 the objective was defined in VFM terms as the maximisation of 
education outcomes per £ spent. However this was a relatively narrow definition of efficiency: 
only the GMs commissioning costs were included. The definition of efficiency was also 
sufficiently general as to permit a wide interpretation of its meaning and application. Thus it was 
no problem to the GM to agree the DH lifting of the ring-fencing of the MPET budget in 2005 and 
then to divert funding which had been designated for workforce education to NHS service 
budgets so that NHS Trusts could be kept out of going into recurrent deficit for the budget year 
and the pretence of progress toward the transformation of Acute Hospital Trusts into 
economically viable stand-alone Foundation Trusts could be maintained. 
 As Perrow (1986) had observed in theory about PAT, the MG and the IOR were indeed one-sided. 
Rather than the GM/Principal being at the mercy of the HEIs/agents, the reverse applied in 
practice. Conflicts between the GM and the HEIs, including MU, were not resolved by the ‘price 
mechanism of economics’ but were managed by mechanisms of power. Unit price (the UoR) 
itself was determined over the whole of the reference period largely by the asymmetry of power 
between the GM and the HEIs/MU. The consequences of all this was rent-seeking by successive 
GMs and a rent extraction not just of economic rents but also of HEI/MU quasi-rents. At no point 
during the reference period did any GM express any concern about the potential economic 
unsustainability from the suppliers’ standpoints of this state of affairs. 
 
Block and Barnett (2009) were right to claim that the concept of government monopsony was a 
useful concept, that is in terms of the coherence of the concept and its potential applicability in 
practice – the establishing of the MG throughout England in the early 1990s and their subsequent 
maintenance and development over a 20 year period is evidence of that usefulness in practice. 
However, on the evidence of this research inquiry Block and Barnett (2009) were also right on one 
other point: ‘government monopsony ...describes a reprehensible economic system’.467 Given the 
evidence of MG outcomes in this inquiry, it is the writer’s opinion that MG should not be an approach 
used to manage NHS-HE IORs nor more generally should it be used to manage higher education. 
  
                                                             






9.4 Update (January 2016) on NHS-HE Inter-sector Institutional Outcomes and Arrangements 
 
The last year of the reference period was 2013. The purpose of this section is to provide an update 
(to February 2016) on developments and outcomes which have taken place since the end of the 
reference period – March 2013 - and thereby to set the scene for the substantive recommendations 
for policy and management which are made in the last section of this Chapter (section 9.5). 
 
MG and IOR arrangements:  In April 2013 the NHS was restructured. As part of this restructuring the 
10 MGs throughout England were rationalised into one, national level, MG. This MG was initially 
designated as a ‘special health authority’, Health Education England (HEE). Later, with effect from 
April 2014 HEE became a ‘Non Departmental Funding Body (NDPB)’. As an NDPB, HEE was 
technically independent of ministers and government and at arm’s length from the DH. 
 
Thus in 2015 there were 64 universities (HEIs) in England which had a contract based IOR with the 
new GM (HEE).468 In return for the provision of education to agreed standards, HEE paid HEIs for 
costs of their provision at an agreed national tariff, the BMP. About 75% of the IORs had contracts 
based on the 2010 National Standard Education Framework Agreement (NSEFA); in the other 25% of 
the IORs the contracts were either the 2008 or the 2012 versions of the London Education Contract 
(the LECs).469 Under the terms of all of these contracts the HEIs were not allowed to charge tuition 
fees to their students; all funding came from the allocation to Nursing and Midwifery education and 
training (NMET) within the MPET Education and Training Levy (MPET). The MPET funding, which was 
held by HEE, was an allocation from the overall annual recurrent budgets to the NHS in England. 
 
A continuing story of instability: In July 2013, NHS England announced that in addition to the 
Nicholson Challenge, a further (£30bn) p.a. needed to be saved by 2020/21 if the NHS was to avoid 
going into deficit.470 To bring about this saving, a year on year ‘efficiency improvement’ target of 4% 
p.a. to 2020/21 was set for the NHS. In October 2014, NHS England in its 5 year forward view 
restated the (£30bn) savings target and proposed that if government was immediately to fund c. 
(£8.5bn) of the gap then the remainder of the projected deficit could be avoided by an achievable 
‘efficiency improvement’ in NHS operations of c. 3% p.a.471 
 
In late 2013, HEE opened negotiations with the HEIs represented by the CoDH and UUK, on the BMP. 
HEE eventually proposed a 4% real terms cut to the BMP for 2014/15.472 HEE justified their proposal 
on the grounds of what was thought to be ‘affordable’ within the budgeted resource context of the 
NHS in England and that no providers to the NHS should expect to be exempt from the efficiency 
improvement requirements that had been set for the NHS in England generally.  473 This proposal was 
                                                             
468 Walsh and Jelfs (2015) 
469 These estimates were computed using data from the following sources: MPET and NMET Budgets 1997/98-
2012/13: FOI Response from the DH, August 2013; NHS London (2007). The approximate percentages relate to 
the relative size of the IORs by output volume and value, and not to the number of those IORs.  
470 Source: NHS England (2013) ‘The NHS belongs to the people: a call to action’. Available at: 
http://www.england.nhs.uk/2013/07/11/call-to-action/ Accessed March 2014. 
471 Source: NHS 5 Year Forward View, October 2014, p. 36. Available at: http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/5yfv-web.pdf Accessed November 2014 
However, at no previous time in its history had the NHS recorded an efficiency improvement of greater than 
1% in any given year so it remained a moot question as to whether a 3% p.a. efficiency gain was a realistic 
target. 
472 Source: HEE letter to UUK 4th March 2014 – Archive 55 






rejected by CoDH/UUK on two grounds.474 Firstly, CoDH estimated that there was a shortfall of c. 
(11.4%) of the BMP from estimated standard cost had already developed by 2013/14 - the 4% cut 
proposed by HEE would increase that shortfall further to c. (15.4%).475 With the prospect of further 
4% cuts to the BMP to come in future years CoDH/UUK concluded if those cuts were implemented, 
then most HEIs eventually would find their NHS contracts had become financially unsustainable. 
 
Secondly, CoDH/UUK pointed out that the proposed cut to the BMP would be in breach of the 
(NSEFA),476 specifically by not implementing the 5 yearly review of the BMP which under the terms 
of the NSEFA was due to have been carried out in 2013. 
 
In October 2014 after escalation processes in their negotiations had been invoked, HEE and 
CoDH/UUK reached an agreement that the BMP was to remain at the same level in nominal terms as 
it was in 2013/14 for the period 2014-2016.477 However, this was regarded by CoDH/UUK as ‘a 
holding agreement’ only: HEE had not agreed the 5 year review of the BMP be carried out; until that 
was done it was likely that the BMP funding shortfall would continue to increase with the potential 
consequence that eventually the output quality of the HEIs in their IORs would be impaired and/or 
that HEIs would find their IORs had become financially unsustainable. 
 
A further source of instabilities was in the IOR contracts: HEE had also proposed in its negotiations 
with CoDH/UUK several changes to the existing NSEFA.478 These proposed changes reflected 
significant shifts from HEE to the HEIs in the burdens and risks to be borne by each of them under 
their IOR contracts and also in the rights of HEE to determine simultaneously both future BMP (price) 
as well as output demand levels. UUK/CoDH rejected these proposals and altogether raised several 
‘key areas of concern’ with HEE about the changes which HEE had proposed.479 At the end of the 
2014 BMP negotiations HEE maintained its intention to implement new contracts for all of its IORs 
with HEIs which would become effective from 2016/17. 
 
Lobbying by CoDH/UUK in 2014/15 and the 2015 ‘Autumn Statement’: during 2014 and 2015 CoDH 
and UUK with assistance from the writer lobbied the Department of Business Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) and HM Treasury (HMT) for a new funding model for non-medical education.480 In June 2015, 
the CoDH and UUK issued a joint statement which called on the government ‘to consider urgently 
whether the current system of NHS-funded grants can be moved to a system of student loans’.481 
CoDH/UUK also asked that in changing to a student loan system that safeguards be put in place 
relating to student recruitment, particularly in regard to widening participation objectives and 
mature students; CoDH/UUK also suggested in regard to attracting newly qualified staff into careers 
in the NHS and social care that consideration be given to ‘offer repayment of part of a student’s loan 
after a given period of service’.482 
 
                                                             
474 Source: CoDH Policy Bulletin 21st March 2014 – Archive 54; CoDH/UUK report to members 27th February 
2014 – Archive 52 
475 Source: CoDH/UUK (2014) ‘BMP Funding Gap 2007-2014’ – Archive 11  
476 Source: Email 8th January 2014 from Director of Policy, CoDH to BMP Steering Group – Archive 57. 
477 Letter from HEE to UUK dated 14th November 2014; copy of letter included in Archive 72.  
478 Source: Email 8th January 2014 from Director of Policy, CoDH to BMP Steering Group – Archive 57. 
479 Source: UUK/CoDH Report of Key Concerns (January 2014) – Archive 53 
480 Over the course of 2013-2015 in his role as Senior Policy Advisor to the CoDH the writer produced several 
briefing papers about the BMP and the current relationship between the NHS and HE in non-medical 
education, including Walsh and Jelfs (2015) and Annex B to this dissertation (June 2015). 
481 CoDH/UUK (June 2015) 






The outcome of this lobbying was a decision by the government to move the funding model for non-
medical education tuition fees as well as student support, to the HEFCE funding model with effect 
from 2017/18. The decision was confirmed in the Autumn Statement by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer on 12th November 2015 when it was announced that from 2017/18 government funding 
(‘direct funding’) of ‘nursing students’483 would be withdrawn and replaced by student loans – in 
effect non-medical students/graduates would become liable be liable to pay the costs of their 
tuition.484 At the same time the cap on the recruitment of ‘nursing students’ would be lifted. 
However the government plans did not mention safeguards relating to widening participation and 
mature students, and there were no plans to allow NHS employers to fund repayment of student 
loans on the basis of NHS service.485 Thus when they are implemented the main effects of these 
policy changes will be (i) to bring to an end the MG in non-medical education (ii) establish the same 
type of funding for non-medical education subject areas as for other subject areas in the HE system. 
 
9.5 Substantive Issues, Scenarios and Recommendations for Policy and Management 
 
In this section substantive issues associated with the current and planned HE-NHS inter-sector 
arrangements are discussed and some recommendations for policy and management are made. 
 
 9.5.1 Substantive Issues 
  
(i) Financial sustainability of the current regime: the government MPET funding of non-medical 
education is based on recurrent annual budgets. Since the lifting of the ring-fencing of the MPET 
budget in 2005, these budgets have proven susceptible to short run exogenous shocks. One of the 
consequences has been an incentive for the GM to exercise its MG power to extract quasi-rents from 
its suppliers and to be erratic over time in its demand for output quantities. The cuts to education 
commissions at pre-registration level over the period 2010/11-2012/3 were one example of where 
demand quantities were tailored to fit budgets constraints exogenously determined rather than 
geared to meet NHS workforce needs.486 
 
(ii) Student recruitment and retention: the withdrawal from 2017/18 of government support for the 
funding of tuition fees and maintenance grants for pre-registration degree level non-medical 
students could substantially affect student recruitment and retention. Non-medical students are 
different from most other undergraduates in two important respects: (i) the length of their courses 
during the year – typically nursing students have 42-45 week programmes for each of the 3 years of 
their degree, 50% of which time is spent in placement with healthcare providers. This means that 
these students have relatively little time left over to earn while they study. At the end of a 3 year 
programme the outstanding debt incurred during their 3 years of study could easily amount to c. 
£60k and somewhat more for the 25% of non-medical students who study and train in London (ii) c. 
61% of those accepting a nursing place the non-medical student body in 2014/15 were aged over 
21.487 In 2013/14 applications to full-time degree programmes fell by 8.0% decrease in the 21-24 age 
                                                             
483 ‘Nursing students’ was a popular shorthand description for all students in non-medical occupations. In 
numbers terms these comprised mostly nursing students. In addition to the latter there were also midwifery 
and allied health professions students. 
484 HM Treasury (2015) 
485 A £200m allocation was made to the DH to be used to assist in the implementation of the changeover to 
the new system. However the allocation was non-designated so that no specific earmarking for widening 
participation and mature students was made; in any event the allocation was a one-off allocation, not a 
recurrent budget. 
486 Source: Council of Deans of Health (2015) 






bracket and 10.5% decrease in the 25+ age bracket, a pattern which was also found in 2012/13 when 
the biggest shift to student loans was made.488 Studies of student attrition in non-medical subject 
areas have consistently shown that financial factors were a significant factor. This should be 
expected to be of particular relevance to mature students where financial burdens associated with 
their age and stage of the life cycle may be greater than for other younger graduates.  
 
(iii) Graduate retention in healthcare occupations employment: although the earnings of new 
graduates in healthcare occupations are typically above average for all graduates, the lifetime 
average earnings of those graduates would on average be expected to be less. HMT and other 
analysts estimate that the RAB charge for nursing students would be c. 70% - 75%. With in service 
attrition rates amongst registered nurses already reported to be at relatively high levels and 
increasing, the issue arises whether with increased debt many graduates would leave nursing at an 
even earlier time, especially from now on given that their graduate status might provide more 
opportunities to migrate to other careers.489 
 
(iv) Matching HE outputs with NHS workforce manpower requirements: the history of this over the 
whole of the reference period and to the present (2016) has been one of ‘boom-bust’ in education 
commissioning (CoDH 2006) and one of a ‘stop-go’ recruitment pattern from outside of the UK to 
make up shortfalls in the NHS manpower when domestic supply was insufficient to meet demand.490 
It is most uncertain what the impact will be of the removal in 2017/18 of the cap on student 
recruitment to non-medical programmes, especially when that change is combined with the changes 
to student support and the other factors noted above. One area of concern will be recruitment to 
specialist non-medical occupations where only relatively small variations in numbers of graduates 
could have significant effects. Another concern will be to ensure minimum numbers of graduates, for 
example in midwifery, where there is relatively less flexibility for healthcare providers in the short 
run to tolerate a situation where actual staffing levels are running at well below the guidelines for 
‘safe staffing’. 
 
(v) Full coverage of HEIs’ FEC: the ‘settlement’ reached between the CoDH and BIS/HMT was for the 
2017/18 UoR for nursing to be equal to the current 2015/16 standard assumed fee of £9000 plus 
£600. The existing differentials with higher priced programmes (such as Midwifery and Radiography) 
existing under the BMP would be preserved. However, it is likely that that UoR (£9600) would still 
leave a funding gap in 2017/18 on HEIs FEC of c. 5% - 8%. Furthermore, at the time of writing the 
HEFCE was querying with the CoDH whether the UoR agreed with BIS was too high and should be 
reduced. These points underline the importance in the forthcoming negotiations with the HEFCE, for 
the universities to have good information about the costs of their provision at requisite levels of 
quality, information which is accepted by government agencies such as the HEFCE as valid and 
robust. With fair comparisons with all of the subject areas in its purview to be taken into account, 
the HEFCE’s concerns and caution on this matter are perhaps understandable. 
 
(vi) Allocations of burdens and risks in HEI contracts: the actual allocations of burdens and risks 
between the GM and MU were found to an important source of threatened instability in the IOR. 
The new HEFCE contract promises much improvement in this area. Nonetheless, given the distinctive 
characteristics of non-medical education it should be helpful to the future stability of the HE-NHS ISR 
to tailor the HEFCE teaching contract in some areas. 
                                                             
488 Source: IOC (2014), pp 16-19 
489 It was only as recently as 2013 that it became compulsory for all non-medical students aspiring to 
professional registration required a degree. Before 2013 the professional entry bar had been set at ‘advanced 
Diploma’ level.   







(vii) Allocations of responsibilities for placements: this is one of the putative areas referred to in the 
allocations of burdens and risks. It deserves to be mentioned here specifically because of the relative 
importance of placements in the education provision in non-medical subjects. Indeed it is arguable 
that placements and their successful integration with the academic part of the education provision is 
the cornerstone of the HE-NHS ISR. The main threat to the quality of the ISR has been whenever the 
short-run needs of the service have been allowed to trump the quality of the placement and the 
mentoring guidance and support given to the student while in placement. 
 
(viii) HEI IOR management effectiveness: the importance to HEIs of managing the external 
environment of their IORs was an underlying theme in the inquiry. Information was seen to be 
important in enabling HEI management to understand the performance of their IORs on many 
dimensions, including dimensions of risk. Valid, robust, relevant and timely information was also 
important in providing a starting point for the development of strategies in inter-HEI collaboration 
and for influencing key decision-makers.491 
 
 9.5.2 Scenarios and Recommendations for Policy and Management 
 
Three scenarios of stability impacts on each dimension of the IOR in 2017/18 are presented in Table 
24 below. In scenario one it is assumed that the HEE contract framework proposals were 
implemented. Scenario two has been constructed on the basis of the policy which underpinned the 
announcement in the 2015 Autumn Statement i.e. the planned changeover to the HEFCE contract in 
2017/18 on the terms that were agreed between BIS and the CoDH. These terms include future 
funding for tuition fees and student support coming from student loans. Scenario three has also 
been based on the changeover to the HEFCE contract with the difference from scenario 2 that the 20 
recommendations summarised in Table 25 have been accepted and implemented; an important part 
of these recommendations is a full review of the funding model and a recommendation that 
government funding of non-medical tuition fees and student support be continued. Taking stability 
in the IOR level of the inquiry as a proxy for stability of IORs generally in non-medical education as 
well as for stability at HE-NHS ISR level, recommendations are made for both ISR and IOR levels.    
 
For background information and comparative purposes, stability impact assessments are shown for 
each of the 14 dimensions of the IOR covering years starting in 1995/96 until 2012/13. 
  
Caption to Table 24 
 
 Against a history of in/stability impacts in the IOR over the reference period, and taking account 
of developments following the end of the reference period in the NHS-HE institutional 
arrangements, three in/stability impact scenarios for 2017/18 are presented: 
i. In scenario 1 it is assumed that a national contract framework for IORs proposed in 2013 
by HEE would become the new national standard contract for all non-medical IORs in 
England. 
ii. In scenario 2 it is assumed that a new national standard contract for all IORs would be 
closely based on the existing HEFCE teaching contract. In scenario 2 it is also assumed 
                                                             
491 A example of the importance of credible valid information to HEIs in putting their case for higher fees 
occurred in November 2014 in the review by the Higher Education Commissions of the £9000 fees cap. In its 
report the Commission concluded: ‘Universities see ... the cap on tuition fees, as a threat to their continued 
sustainability ... however the Commission has not been presented with strong evidence from universities that it 
costs more than an average of £9,000 to deliver good quality courses’. Source: Higher Education Commission 






that funding arrangements would be on the basis of a combined student loans and 
HEFCE supplement as agreed between BIS and CoDH/UUK and which was the basis of 
the announcements made in the 2015 Autumn Statement. 
iii. In scenario 3 it is also assumed that a new national standard contract for all IORs would 
be closely based on the existing HEFCE teaching contract. In scenario 3 however 
additional assumptions are made about the UoR and about government funding: the 
UoR would be based on the HEFCE price group B; funding of tuition fees and student 
support would continue to come from government - tuition fees would initially be the 
liability of students under the student loan system. However the liability for tuition fees 
would pass to NHS employers once students had served an agreed period in the NHS. 
NHS employers would be funded by government for this purpose by a fully ring-fenced 
education fund; student support would continue to be funded as under the current 
(2015/16) system, i.e. by a combination of student grants and loans.    
 In scenario 1 a further decline in the stability of HEI NHS IORs is forecast, including actual 
instability on price dimension 12 and IOR performance from the HEI standpoint (dimension 14). 
 In scenario 2 an improvement of the stability of contract dimensions is forecast. On output 
dimensions 7 and 8 a threatened instability is forecast. As in scenario 1, instability on price 
dimension 12 is forecast. Instability impacts are forecast for the first time to affect both 
performance dimensions (dimensions 13 and 14). The latter is associated with the combined 
impact of the forecast instability on price dimension 12 and the forecast threatened instabilities 
on output dimensions 7 and 8. 
 In scenario 3 a ‘stable’ outcome is forecast on 13 of the 14 dimensions of the IOR. Only on price 
dimension 9 is a threatened instability forecast. The key differences between scenario 3 and 
scenario 2 are: (i) the HEFCE UoR to HEIs is set at a level which equals the assumed standard 
costs to the HEIs of their education provision at the requisite level of quality (ii) the government 
continues to fund the HEIs’ tuition fees and continues to provide maintenance grants to students 









Under scenario 1, the HEE contract framework scenario, the impact of the HEE NSEFA proposals 
from MU’s standpoint is forecast to reduce slightly the riskiness of the contracts and output 
components of the IOR. The impact on the price component would be substantially to increase the 
riskiness (to MU) on three of its four dimensions (9, 10 and 11) and to bring about an actual 
instability on the fourth dimension (12). 
 
The cumulative impact of these impacts on the IOR overall is forecast in scenario 1 to make the 
performance of the IOR from MU’s standpoint (dimension 14) unstable. At the same time it is 
forecast that the IOR would continue to be stable from the GM’s (HEE’s) standpoint. The underlying 
assumption here is that MU would for 2017/18 cross-subsidise the IOR from its other non-NHS 
income generating activities in the University. It is assumed that MU would also meet the demands 
of the GM on outputs quality, quantities and contract compliance. Looking beyond 2017/18, an issue 
from MU’s standpoint would be for how much longer and to what extent it could continue to cross-
subsidise its NHS IOR. 
 
Under scenario 2, the HEFCE Contract and student loans scenario, the IOR becomes stable on all of 
the dimensions of the contract component. Altogether these impacts would mean a reduction in risk 
to MU when compared with scenario 1. However on two dimensions of the outputs component 
(dimensions 7 and 8) the IOR is forecast to become less stable and on both performance dimensions 
the IOR is forecast to become unstable. The main reasons for the forecast instability are firstly, the 
transfer of a relatively substantial financial burden to students and graduates that, compared with 
the average of graduates from other subject areas are less able to bear such burdens, and secondly, 
the continuation of a shortfall of price against MU’s FEC. In regard to the latter while some cross-






desirable,492 the relative size of the student body involved in non-medical means that such cross-
subsidies would also be relatively large. As such they should be expected to place an increasing 
strain on attainment of requisite quality in all subject areas of the university’s teaching portfolio. 
 
Scenario 3 is also constructed around the implementation of a HEFCE contract. But in scenario 3 it is 
also assumed that government funding of tuition fees (via NHS employers once graduates had 
served an agreed time in NHS employment) and student support would continue. The outcome of 
that combination of HEFCE contract and government support is forecast to result in stability on 13 of 
the 14 IOR dimensions. 
 
Achievement of the stability forecast under scenario 3 would require that all of the substantive 
issues listed in the previous sub-section are addressed. A summary of these issues, the 
recommendations to address them and the rationale for those recommendations, and the key 
assumptions underlying the forecast stability outcomes in scenario 3, are outlined in Table 25 below.      
 
Caption to Table 25 
 
 Eight substantive issues (i-viii) forecast to be associated with the new funding regime for non-
medical education are summarised. 
 Recommendations to address these issues are made to policy makers and HE management. 
These recommendations are made for different institutional levels and at organization level: 
i. Inter-sector level i.e. NHS-HE 
ii. IOR and organization levels i.e. for all IORs between the relevant funding organization 
and each individual education provider and for each organization individually 
 One of the key objectives of the recommendations at inter-sector level is to reduce the 
asymmetries of power associated with the current funding regime. The latter is to be achieved 
by abolition of the current government monopsony in non-medical education and replacing it 
with institutional arrangements in which more of the relevant stakeholders have meaningful 
opportunities to participate in shaping outcomes. 
 An important recommendation at inter-sector level is to move away from the existing MPET 
funding model, which is tied to NHS overall recurrent funding, to a  new funding model which is 
geared to maintaining a long-run sustainability for all of the key stakeholders and which is also 
better able to absorb sudden exogenous shocks. The new funding model proposed is a 
combination of the current HEFCE funding model which is linked with the current student loans 
system, and an NHS employers’ funding model. The NHS employers funding would be triggered 
once graduates had served in employment for an agreed period in NHS service. The NHS 
employers funding would be ring-fenced, designated, and come from government. 
 The effectiveness of the proposed new institutional arrangements will depend on the quality of 
participation in the relevant institutional processes by all of the key stakeholders. For this reason 
the proposal regarding stakeholder education is believed to be important. 
 The viability of scenario 3 and the forecast stability outcomes under that scenario are founded 
on two key assumptions, viz. the overall adequacy of funding of the HE and NHS sectors to meet 
the needs for teaching, research and healthcare at the requisite levels of quality. These 
assumptions are shown in the Table as directly relevant to some of the recommendations at 
inter-sector level.  
 The objectives of the recommendations at IOR and organization levels are: 
                                                             
492 Hillman (October 2014) argued that cross-subsidies were not inherently bad. However, Hillman did not 
address the point about cross-subsidies of subject areas where the number of students was relatively large 






i. To help bring about a sustainable allocation of risks and burdens between the relevant 
organizations in an IOR 
ii. To encourage HEI management further to develop a risk management approach to 
managing their IORs 
iii. To encourage HEI management to develop the information and intelligence base 
essential to enable them to operate effectively, particularly in managing the external 
















Source: Walsh (2015) 
 
9.6 NHS-HE Inter-sector Relationship Stability: Utopia or a Political Choice? 
 
Implementation of the 20 recommendations made under scenario 3 is forecast to bring about a high 
level of stability in NHS-HE ISR and IOR. But scenario 3 relies on 2 key assumptions: adequacy of the 
funding of the NHS and adequacy of the funding of the HE sector. Why are these assumptions 
relevant? Are they important? Are they realistic? 
 
Adequacy of funding of the NHS: as noted earlier, the education provision in non-medical 
programmes is distinctive in the proportion of students’ time spent in practical placement. An 
essential part of the placement provision, apart from the placement itself, is the mentoring support 
provided to the students and in turn the support provided by the NHS organization to the mentor 
function. The history of placement provision from the outset of the NHS_HEI organizations 
collaboration in the 1990s has been a tension between the demands of the service and the resource 
requirement for mentoring and placement support. In times of NHS resource constraint this tension 
has manifested itself in declines in placement capacity and in the mentoring support provided 
(mentor staff generally have service duties as well and normally those service duties on average can 
account for 60% or more of the average time of a qualified mentor). Consequently when there are 
resource shortfalls on the NHS budget the consequences for placements have been direct: capacity 
has been lost due to ward closures and qualified mentor time per student has been cut back (and 







Thus while some insulation of placements from service resource issues can be effected, in general a 
complete independence of the placement experience and provision from the demands of the service 
cannot be made. For that reason it will always be important for the quality of the education 
provision that the NHS itself is adequately funded (and adequately staffed with good organization 
infrastructure and support processes). 
 
Adequacy of the funding of the HE sector: the adequacy or otherwise of the funding of HEI-NHS 
IORs has been a constant theme in this inquiry. The consequences of inadequate funding of IORs 
have included cross-subsidisation from the rest of the university. However, the relevance of funding 
adequacy can also go in the other direction. For example if a university is inadequately funded in its 
general teaching and research then it should not be expected that the non-medical IORs are shielded 
from the fall-out of such underfunding: HEI infrastructure will be curtailed, buildings not repaired 
when they should, ‘soft’ services (such as counselling) cut back or even abolished, hardship funds 
reduced etc. The general reputation of a university will also affect the relative quality of the students 
it can attract, affect the level and quality of support it can provide to its students and ultimately 
affect its student retention and progression. 
 
Utopia or a political choice: given the relevance and potential importance of the key assumptions it 
might be objected that the recommendations being made are not realistic, that a utopia is being 
assumed. Additional to the extra funding involved in implementation of the recommendations 
(which is relatively small compared with the total public sector recurrent expenditure for England) 
are assumptions about sustainable funding linked to stability outcomes for two substantial sectors of 
the UK economy, the NHS and HE sectors. In this time of austerity it might be argued by some that 
‘priorities have to be set and hard choices have to be made; higher education in England cannot be 
expected to be insulated from the need for the nation to tighten its belt’. Notwithstanding the 
importance of non-medical qualified professional staff to the NHS - as pointed out by the CoDH and 
UUK these staff comprise c. 75% of the qualified professional staff in the NHS493 - it might also be 
argued that ‘a need to reduce the public sector net deficit means that risks have to be taken and in 
the context of the HE-NHS ISR that means non-medical students have to be made liable for the full 
costs of their higher education’. 
 
However, whose belt is to be tightened and to what end is ultimately a political choice and it is not 
at all clear that the right choices are currently being made by policy makers with regard to the 
funding of the higher education of non-medical students. Although the degrees of political freedom 
of non-government stakeholders in this matter may be relatively small there should still be 
opportunities for struggle in a quest to bring about a more equitable and sustainable distribution of 
resources with better outcomes for students, graduates, patients, HE and NHS organizations. CoDH 
and UUK are continuing at this time (February 2016) to negotiate with the HEFCE for a sustainable 
UoR in non-medical education and for safeguards to be devised and implemented in regard to 
widening participation and the needs of mature students. It would be helpful in their efforts in these 
areas if they were supported by other stakeholders representing the NHS employers, NHS 
professional staff, students and graduates.         
                                                             










In Table 26 below is a summary of key issues covered in the inquiry, claims made in the literature 
and in this dissertation about those issues, and recommendations for further research to be carried 
out.  Reflecting the structure of the dissertation and the sequence in which the argument was 
developed these issues, claims and recommendations have been grouped into five categories: (i) 
Approach (ii) Theory (iii) Concepts and Methodology (iv) Empirical and (v) Critique.  
 
Caption to Table 26 
 
 ‘Research Key Issues’ are those issues which were identified in the inquiry as important. The 
definitions of issues 1-3, 5 and 9 were taken directly from the literature. Issues 6 and 7 were 
defined by the writer. 
 ‘Claims in the literature’ are brief summaries of the main points made in the relevant 
literature.494 
 ‘Claims in the inquiry and contribution’ are those made by the writer and are of three types: 
- Claims (1 and 5) which are in support of claims previously made in the literature 
- Claims (7 and 8) which are based on, but at the same time go beyond previous research 
- Claims and contributions (2, 3, 4, 6 and 9) which are made only by the writer and are 
based on the findings and conclusions of the inquiry. 
 ‘Recommendations for further research’ are made in respect of most of the claims made, 
reflecting in part the exploratory nature of the inquiry and the lack of previous research into MG. 
Some of these recommendations are prompted by the single case history focus of the inquiry 
and an implication of this that further research should be carried out so that explanations about 
the in/stability of IORs generally under conditions of MG can be validated. 
  
                                                             
494 Given (i) the key issues listed here range across many categories, from ‘Approach’ to ‘Critique’ (ii) the lack 
of previous empirical research into MG and (iii) the interdisciplinary nature of the inquiry, then references to 
‘the literature’ are not to a single body of literature on a single subject but to different literatures on subjects 













10.1 Further Research Recommendations: Development of an HI - Power Paradigm 
 
The recommendation to incorporate a time dimension is common to all of the recommendations for 
further research set out in Table 26: recommendation 1 is about focussing HI approaches at micro-
institutional level to develop explanations of endogenous radical institutional change; 
recommendation 2 concerns the further development of an agent-centred HI; recommendation 4 
involves the use of RDT within an HI approach; in recommendation 5 the use of power game analysis 
in regard to relationships over time between agents is suggested; in recommendation 6 it is 
proposed that concepts of stability in IOR should include dimensions related to time or which imply 
time as a dimension (such as risk); recommendations 7 and 9 also involve a time dimension whether 
by means of constructing case histories or by the use of ‘stability over time’ concepts. 
 
Following Mahoney and Thelen (2010) it is also recommended that HI approaches to micro-
institutional research (e.g. at IOR level) are used in conjunction with a power distributional 
perspective. In such research the use of multi-dimensional concepts of institutional phenomena such 
as the concept of IOR in/stability over time used in this inquiry may help to develop deeper insights 
and more valid explanations of a range of micro-institutional outcomes whether such outcomes 
function to maintain an apparent status quo or are the precursors to transformational change. 
 
10.2 Further Research Recommendations: Contribution, Critique and Accountability 
 
As stated in Chapter 3, the concept of IOR in/stability over time which was developed in this inquiry 
was a normative concept; the criteria of what was ‘stable’ or ‘unstable’ were taken directly from 
each of the organisations in the IOR, inferred from their stated objectives and grounded in their 
practices in the IOR. In ascertaining and explaining the stability impacts in the IOR (in each of the 14 
dimensions which were examined) there was an affinity in this inquiry with ‘evaluation research’. 
The criteria of evaluation used in the critique in Chapter 9 were based on those used by the GM and 
MU in the IOR (risk apportionment, financial sustainability, quality and quantity of outputs). For the 
recommendations for policy further criteria were added, firstly to take account of the interests of 
other key stakeholders in HE-NHS inter-sector relationships and secondly to take account of the 
ubiquity of power and the reality of ‘institutions as distributional instruments laden with power 
implications’.495 These further criteria were drawn from previous research and policy prescriptions. 
However, for future policy formulation and implementation it is important that any set of evaluation 
criteria is deemed to be relevant and valid by all of the key stakeholders. For that reason it should be 
assumed that evaluation criteria such as those used in Chapter 9, would need to be reviewed, 
updated where necessary, validated and weighted. 
 
There is also a matter of accountability: some of the further research recommended in Table 26, 
particularly recommendations 7 and 9 should help to provide greater transparency about the 
management of the public sector and the outcomes of such management. Greater transparency 
should, it is hoped, help towards the development of a practical and genuinely democratic 
accountability of the management of some of our important institutions. 
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I have been a general manager and general management consultant in the private and public sectors 
in England for 30 years. For the past 22 years I have had senior management level roles in Higher 
Education. Since 2013 I have been a Senior Policy Advisor to the Council of Deans of Health (CoDH). 
Prior to joining the DBA programme at Bath in 2004, my higher education had included an 





I believe that my DBA programme has been helpful to me in my management practice. Perhaps the 
most significant development has been to encourage me to develop a systematic focus on 
management of my organization’s external environment. More generally the DBA programme has 
introduced me to a range of intellectual frameworks which have functioned to guide my 
management practice and which I also believe have helped me to manage intra-organisational 
change programmes more effectively. 
 
In the second part of my DBA – the research inquiry – I learned some lessons about ‘doing research’. 
These lessons related to (i) distinguishing levels of analysis (ii) scoping a research inquiry (iii) defining 
core concepts and (iv) the practicality of different approaches to data analysis    
 
A.2 From Monitoring to Management of the External Environment of the Organization  
 
Perhaps the greatest personal impact of my DBA journey was to stimulate a change in my approach 
to management. Prior to commencing my DBA, my management roles and practice had been 
focussed intra-organizationally. To the extent that the external environment featured in my 
management practice this was mostly in terms of monitoring that environment rather than seeking 
directly to manage it and influence the turn of events. However, in Part 1 of my DBA programme 
(2004-2011), I learned how HEIs could be regarded as highly open systems, with multiple 
stakeholders and with multiple objectives. As part of my DBA learning, the writings of Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978, 2003) about the importance of managing the external environment of the 
organization were helpful in introducing me to a range of strategies that could be used by 
management and the relative appropriateness of those strategies in different contexts. That learning 
coincided with a time when the IOR began to be affected significantly by external events, including 
the NHS financial crisis of 2005 and the outcome of the BMP negotiations in 2009 (power game 2). I 
began to ask how I could influence that environment to the benefit of MU. 
 
Consequently, in 2010, prompted by the combination of my DBA stimulated intellectual 
development and partly by a need to respond to threats from the external environment to the 
continued viability of the IOR for which I had responsibility, I included management of the external 
environment as a major part of my role at MU. A specific action I took in this was to initiate power 
game 3. In this game I found myself for the first time in my career in management taking a 
leadership role in managing the environment of the IOR in coalition with other organizations. That 
experience included working with management in those organizations in building a consensus about 
the need for change and the potential for combined action to bring about that change. Specific 






sharing of information, the lobbying of external influencers (including an Associate Director of the 
HEFCE for London, Kent and the East of England who was also a member of HENSE) while at the 
same time maintaining an effective quality, level and timeliness of communications within the 
coalition. All of this seemed to function sufficiently well so that coalition members were happy to 
allow me to take a lead role on their behalf in negotiations with the GM (July and September 2010 in 
power game 3). 
 
My current role with the CoDH is about helping the 85 member organizations of the CoDH to 
manage their external environment; I believe that my DBA journey has played an important part in 
equipping me to make a positive contribution in this role to the members of CoDH. 
 
A.3 Intellectual Frameworks and the Management of IOR 
 
The DBA journey has also been developmental for me at an intellectual level; the nature of 
consensus and the types and sources of power in organizations became topics of interest to me from 
my early days on the programme and have remained so since. Important influences on my 
intellectual and management development in the DBA journey included Lukes (1975), Morriss 
(2002), Emerson (1962), Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010). The insight 
that different relations of power, characterised as ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, can be present in an 
IOR on different dimensions of that IOR and how those relations might change over time was helpful 
I believe in encouraging a greater flexibility in my thinking about practical problems in the 
management of collaboration. 
 
A.4 Distinguishing Tactical and Strategic Outcomes and the Potential for Transformative Change  
 
I learned to distinguish tactical outcomes such as particular negotiated outcomes on price (e.g. the 
non-implementation of the BMP in 2005 and 2006) from strategic outcomes where structures had 
been changed or were about to change (such as in the 2012 LEC regarding the future process of 
price determination in the IOR and in the MG generally). More importantly perhaps, I learned to be 
alert to the different potential for enduring and transformational change which could result from 
those outcomes. A negotiated outcome on price might in one context bring about a temporary state 
(such as the outcome of the OBC negotiations in 2010) while in another context the outcome could 
have enduring consequences and signal a transformative impact on the IOR (such as from the 1996 
price negotiations between MU and the GM). My researches into the MU-NHS IOR and the 
opportunity for critical reflection in the development of my thesis have been at the root of this 
learning – looking at outcomes from a time perspective and being able to assess those outcomes as 
either strategic or potentially strategic or as simply tactical has been directly influenced by the 
historical approach taken in my research. 
  
A.5 Management of Intra-organizational Change Programmes  
 
My HE management role during the time I was on part 1 of the DBA programme (2004-2011) 
included responsibilities for the design and implementation of three restructurings of University 
administrative staff. The DBA experience, including the DBA assignment tasks and interactions with 
student colleagues helped me, I believe, to manage those change programmes more effectively. For 
example, an influential part of my learning was the feedback I received on one of my early DBA 
assignments in which I was encouraged critically to reflect on a change programme which I had 
managed. I believe that reflecting about how the programme could have been better managed and 
what lessons were to be learned from the outcomes functioned to help me manage subsequent 











A.6 Lessons Learned about ‘Doing Research’ 
 
A.6.1 Levels of Analysis and Focus of the Inquiry 
 
At the beginning of the inquiry I defined the research problem as about the in/stability of 
monopsony in general; I expected that research into the in/stability of the IOR would become a 
means by which instability in monopsony could be evidenced and plausible explanations for that 
instability constructed.  However, it subsequently became apparent that this way of conceptualising 
the research problem potentially confused three levels of analysis of in/stability which needed to be 
kept distinct: 
 
 A macro level about monopsony generally 
 An intermediate level about the particular monopsony within which the IOR was established 
and operated 
 A micro level about the IOR of the inquiry. 
 
I concluded eventually that the focal ‘institution’ of the inquiry should be the IOR and not an 
institution either at the intermediate or at the macro levels. An implication of this was that the 
findings of the inquiry and the explanations of those findings in so far as they might be relevant 
either to other IOR in the relevant monopsony or to monopsony generally, should be regarded as 
exploratory; further research at all levels of analysis would be required if wider generalisations were 
to be made. Thus the lessons learned here concerned the relevance and importance of different 
levels of analysis and that conclusions drawn in relation to one level of analysis might need to be 
redrawn when research was conducted at other levels of analysis. 
 
A.6.2 Scope of the Inquiry 
 
One of the main surprises to me was the extent to which the environment of the IOR needed to be 
taken into account in the interpretation and explanation of IOR in/stability. As the importance of the 
environment of the IOR to the in/stability outcomes of the IOR became more apparent, i also began 
to appreciate more fully the distinctions that needed to be made between the different levels of 
analysis. An important outcome in the inquiry of this understanding was the IOR itself came to be 
defined as the focal institution for the inquiry. It also became apparent that if the IOR outcomes 
were to be adequately explained then the relations between the IOR and its relevant institutional 
contexts at both intermediate and macro levels, also needed to be understood in depth. The 
development of the latter understandings did however give rise to an unforeseen benefit, which was 
that it became easier subsequently to make specific suggestions about a future research agenda, 
particularly if the latter was aimed at instability issues at intermediate as well as at macro levels. 
 
A.6.3 Definition of Concepts 
 
Here the lesson learned was about the need for precision in defining core concepts of the inquiry 
and, in the case where those concepts were multi-dimensional, the advantages for subsequent 
analysis in defining carefully and consistently the relations and potential relations between those 







 The recognition that the intermediate institutional context of the IOR was government 
monopsony, not monopsony generally was important to arriving at an appropriate 
appreciation of the impact on the IOR of its intermediate institutional environment  
 Specifying the relations between the 14 dimensions of the concept of IOR stability was an 
important step in the inquiry along the road to my gaining a fuller appreciation of the 
potential relevance of risk as an overall factor relevant to IOR in/stability, both in its 
description and subsequently in its explanation. 
  
A.6.4 Practicality of different approaches to data analysis 
 
When initially the analytical framework for the inquiry was designed and prior to any processes of 
data categorisation, data selection and data reduction had been carried out, it was expected that 
data analysis would at the outset involve the coding of data according to some predefined 
conceptual scheme. Such an approach had been set out by the writer in his DBA assignment 4. 
However, it became apparent subsequently that this approach would have been impractical:  
potentially hundreds of thousands of data items would have required coding, and to safeguard 
against validity threats arising from erroneous coding of data from such a large dataset, considerable 
resources would have been required. 
 
A simpler more robust analytical procedure which was congruent with taking a more holistic 
approach to historical analysis was available. Thus rather than an approach to data analysis which 
attempted to start at the particular datum level, the approach adopted was to start at a higher level 
, viz. at the level of the typology of the IOR and proceed by way of a grounded theory approach to 
develop operational concepts for the theoretical framework that had been constructed. The key 
processes involved in data analysis then became the categorisation of the data rather than the 
coding of all of the data elements and associated with this the construction of descriptive historical 
narratives which bound the relevant data together (both in place and in time) and in effect also 
guided data selection and data reduction in the construction of those accounts. It was important 
that the data categorisation process had regard to a descriptive sense of the data rather than be 
based on an atomistic level of data analysis where whatever ‘meaning’ in the data had once existed 
would have been distorted. In effect, the sense to be made of the data from a holistic standpoint 
could have been lost because the analytical lenses had initially been set to focus at low a level, viz. 
on the millions of the individual data elements). 
 
One of the benefits to the inquiry of taking this more holistic approach to data analysis was that it 
became easier to develop interpretations of the IOR which took account of changes occurring in its 
intermediate and macro environments, i.e. at higher levels of analysis. Stories became easier to 
construct about that environment, its origins and historical development. It was also found that this 
holistic approach was amenable to strategies to mitigate the attendant validity threats to the 
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 Prices
 Formal Oversight of ISR; Communications and Reviews of IORs
 HENSE, UKHEAC; LETBs, Contracts Strategic  Reviews, Pricing Reviews (BMP)
Articulation of the Overall Context with the
HE – NHS ISR and its constituent IORs is effected 









Macro-economic events & policies combined with continuing rise in need & demand for healthcare 
have functioned to threaten the stability of HE – NHS IORs on key dimensions ...
Consequences Forecast to 2020
 BMP Shortfall on HEI Standard FEC from 2005/07 Increasing Shortfall
 Quantities Shortfall on NHS Demand or Need from 2005/06 Continuing Uncertainty
 HEIs IOR Contracts Risk Burdens: Increase in London from 2005/06 HEIs’ Risk Burdens Increasing 
nationally from 2016
NHS Funding 2009 - 2015
Education CommissioningPrices/UOR Quantities/Outputs
HE – NHS IOR Contracts
What impact will instability &/or threatened 
instability on HEI – NHS IORs have on overall 








A History: Origins of the ISR
 Project 2000
 Evidence-based practice
 Rebalancing the needs of service and the requirements of healthcare workforce education
 Schools of Nursing to Colleges of Health
 NHS Reforms
 ‘Working for Patients’ (1989 White Paper) – the internal market
 NHS and Community Care Act 1990
 Working Paper 10 (WP 10, 1989)
 Creating a level playing field for the internal market
 Centralisation of education funding
 Regional self-sufficiency
 Education demand to become employer-led
 Principle of Contractual Funding in the English Higher Education System








A History: Development of HE – NHS IORs
 Implementation of WP 10 1993 - 1997
 Education contracts
 Tendering & mergers – Colleges of Health & HEIs
 NHS Reorganisations relevant to Education Contracts
 RHAs → NHS Executive (1996)
 Employer led consortia (c. 1997/8)
 Workforce Development Confederations (2000) → Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) (2002/4)
 SHAs reorganisation (2006)
 Health Education England (HEE) (2013)
 ‘National Contracts’
 National Standard Contract (2006)
 National Standard Education Framework Agreement (2010)
 The National Benchmark Price (‘BMP’)
 National Audit Office (2001) → JM Consulting (2002/03) → DH (2004) → Implementation 2005/07
 Reviewed 2007/08








A Case History: Middlesex University (MU) & the NHS Education Commissioner (GM)
Scope and Methods
 Boundaries
 Reference Period: 1995 – 2013
 Institutional & Organisational Environment: DH; NHS Organisations; NMET, MPET/NMET;  
UKCC/NMC; HEFCE; UUK; UKHEAC; HENSE; CoDH; LDHG; MU
 ‘Product’ Scope: Pre-registration and Post-registration Nursing & Midwifery
 Relative significance over the reference period to MU and the GM
 c. 7% - 11% of MU students 
 c. 10% - 15% of GM commissions in relevant products
 Methods
 Secondary data; MU historical archives; IOR contracts, performance & strategic reviews, student numbers; 
planning & policy documents – IOR, GM & MU levels; formal communications – GM & MU, MU internal
 Access: MU – full; GM – public domain mainly but also communications with LDHG; Sector & inter-
sector levels – public domain plus some privileged access especially via CoDH and LDHG
 Overall method: a diachronic case history; a preliminary c. 90k descriptive history was produced, validated 
by member checks, and then used as resource in the production of the c. 110k case history dissertation
 Validity threats identified & mitigated 
 Threats: (i) constructs validity (ii) data limitations (iii) researcher bias (iv) reactivity
 Mitigation strategies: (i) use of established theory; use of grounded theory for operational constructs 
(ii)  production of ‘thick descriptions’ & drawing on expertise of researcher (iii) member checks of the 







A Case History: Middlesex University (MU) & the NHS Education Commissioner (GM)
Methodology (i): concepts of IOR stability, instability, and threatened instability were defined:
 IOR stability over time (‘S’) was defined as a condition in which an IOR maintains a sustainable 
performance from the standpoints of the organizations in the IOR. This is a normative definition 
which assumes S is important to the organizations in the IOR; external funding from the taxpayer  
of HE – NHS IORs  implies that S is also important to other relevant organizations and agencies 
but which are external to the IOR. Other assumptions in this definition of S:
 IOR performance risks, and burdens associated with those risks, are allocated sustainably between the 
organizations in the IOR and managed by them.
 Demand and supply in the IOR continually adapts to changes in the environment of the IOR, e.g. through 
changes in demand or by processes of cost reduction or by innovation in production technology.
 Adverse shocks to the IOR whether these arise exogenously to, or endogenously in the IOR are absorbed 
in the IOR so that conditions conducive to a sustainable performance of the IOR from the standpoints of 
the organizations in the IOR are maintained. 
 An IOR is in a range of instability (‘U’) when its sustainable performance and/or the sustainable 
performance of the organizations in the IOR are impaired and there is a significant likelihood that 
impairment will continue.
 An IOR is entering a range of instability (‘TRI’) when there is a significant threat to the 
impairment of its sustainable performance and/or to the sustainable performance of the 







A Case History: Middlesex University (MU) & the NHS Education Commissioner (GM)
Methodology (ii): the concept of IOR stability was defined on 14 dimensions; these are summarised below.
These dimensions and their operationalisation were grounded in the empirical reality of the IOR.
For further details please see inserts - slides 10 and 11 (Tables 1 and 2).
1. Duration
2. Termination
3. Compliance – Information; Management & Review
4. Placement Responsibilities
5. Output Specification
6. Output Floors and ceilings
7. Size of Short Run Variability of Output Quantities
8. Trends in GM Demand for Output Quantities
9. Basis of Price – Innovation
10. Basis of Price – Full Economic Costs
11. Basis of Price – OBC Risk
12. Actual Price v MU’s Actual/Planned FEC
13. IOR Performance – GM standpoint





















A Case History: Middlesex University (MU) & the NHS Education Commissioner (GM)








A Case History: Middlesex University (MU) & the NHS Education Commissioner (GM)
Findings contd.:
• The IOR tended to become less stable over time from the standpoint of MU; reductions in 
IOR stability occurred in dimensions of risk relating to the future performance of the IOR.
Table 9 Stability Impact Assessments of the IOR Dimensions 1995/96 – 2012/13
S TRI U
1995/1996 10 3 1
2004/2005 8 5 1
2005/2006 6 7 1
2007/2008 5 8 1
2008/2009 5 8 1
2012/2013 6 8 0
• From the standpoint of the GM, IOR performance stability was maintained throughout 
the reference period. This suggests that from the GM’s standpoint, IOR performance 
stability can coexist with a reduction, from the supplier’s standpoint, in IOR stability 








A Case History: Middlesex University (MU) & the NHS Education Commissioner (GM)
Empirical Conditions
• Origins and Initial Conditions
• The Institutional Environment 
• IOR Dynamics
• Historical Trajectories IOR level
• IOR Exogenous Events
Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks
 Historical Institutionalism (HI)
 Government Monopsony (MG)
 Resource Dependence Theory (RDT)
 Historical Institutionalism (HI)
 Context : IOR Analysis
The theoretical and conceptual frameworks were used to interpret and explain IOR stability, threatened 
instability, and instability over time i.e.
How and Why:  I/S (IOR)T?
To ensure coherence and consistency in the interpretations and  explanations, the various theories and 
concepts were integrated. Some of this integration is illustrated in the next three figures.
Figure 2 depicts the relationships between the main concepts, theory and empirical conditions
Figure 1 depicts the main concepts and formal relations between those concepts in RDT
Figure 3 is an unpacking of the relationships in Figure 2 to show these from a processes standpoint















Figure 2 notes 
 
 MG & IOR Origins, Formation: & Initial Conditions this included the historical events and 
processes leading to the establishing of the MG and subsequently of the IOR. 
 IOR: this included the components of Agency as defined earlier, viz. the IOR, the Resource 
Dependence relations between the IOR Agents, IOR Agency & IOR Events. 
 External Environment & Events: this included all of the constituents of, and relevant events in 
the institutional environment as defined earlier, viz. the macro institutional environment, the 
NHS and HE inter-sector institutional arrangements (including the MG once that was formed), 
and organizations, including the organizations in the IOR. 
 IOR Outcomes & In/stability: this included the IOR key outcomes and consequences for 
in/stability of the IOR. 
 Historical Dependence: this included the various forms and types of historical dependence 
which over time shaped IOR agency and also agency in the macro-institutional environment of 
the IOR, including agency in the MG.    
 
The dynamics between the component parts of the framework are shown by line arrows, these 
indicating directions of ‘influence’, ‘shaping’, or ‘determination’: 
 
The MG originated out of, and was formed as a result of, a confluence of events and macro policy 
developments in the external environment (the NHS sector, the HE sector, and the macro 
institutional environment). Subsequently, the IOR (between the GM & MU) also originated from 
events in the external environment – mainly in the respective NHS education buyer and university 
organizations. The formation of the IOR was the outcome of negotiations between the GM and MU 
and in which the resource dependence relations between those organizations were an influential 
factor. The relations of resource dependence between organizations in an IOR can be substantially 
different before an IOR is established between them compared with after that event, for example 
where the commitments made by one organization as a consequence of entering into the IOR were 
relatively more substantial than the commitments made by the other organization. 
 
Once the MG and IOR were established, IOR Resource Dependence became one of the key factors in 
influencing, shaping, or determining IOR Agency, Events, Outcomes and In/stability; other key 
factors shown in figure 2 were (i) forms and processes of Historical Dependence which initially might 
arise from the IOR and also be rooted in its Initial Conditions particularly as shaped by the MG, and 
which functioned to influence and shape the choices available to IOR Agency at all levels of the IOR 
(dimensions, components, & overall) and (ii) the External Environment, particularly the MG, which 
functioned to shape and partly determine power imbalances in IOR Resource Dependence. Events in 
the external environment, particularly where these occasioned ‘critical junctures’ in NHS – HE inter-
sector policy formulation, could also be a key factor over time in changing the effect on IOR stability 
impacts of the Initial Conditions shaped by the MG and/or changes to the types, forms and stability 
impacts of Historical Dependence processes on the IOR dimensions, components and overall. 
Historical Dependence processes were also potentially relevant to the MG and to Events in the 
External Environment including Events in the MG; hence the line arrows between Historical 
Dependence and the External Environment & Events are shown as two-way. 
 
The ‘Power Over’ dotted line arrows indicate where either or both of the IOR agents had the ability 
to accommodate to the demands of each other and/or to influence or change the structure of power 
dependence relations between them. For example, the dotted line arrow from the IOR to the 
External Environment indicates where either of the organizations in the IOR might undertake 
‘balancing operations’ or even ‘unbalancing operations’. 
 
While mainly a dependent factor, IOR Outcomes and in/stability over time might also impact 
recursively as an influencing factor: this is shown in figure 2 as line arrows of feedback to the IOR, to 







Notes: H, M, L is an ordinal not an interval scale. approximations to some market structures can be made
using the above scheme: MG approximates to Configuration 3, Oligopsony to Configuration 2, Bilateral
Monopoly to Configuration 9; Monopoly to Configuration 7, Oligopoly to Configuration 4, Imperfect








Figure 1 Notes 
 
Figure 1 is based on Emerson’s theory of dyadic power, in which it is assumed that the power of MU 
over GM (or of GM over MU) is inversely proportional to the dependence of GM on MU (or of MU on 
GM). It is also assumed that the dependence of one actor on the other is a function of ‘resource 
criticality’ and the availability of alternative actors of ‘critical resources’. Thus MU (or GM) is 
dependent on GM (or MU) in proportion to the need of MU (or GM) for resources that GM (or MU) 
can provide and inversely proportional to the availability of alternative actors that are capable of 
providing the same resources to GM (or MU). In Figure 1: 
 
 The first dimension of dyadic power - ‘power imbalance’ - is defined as the difference in power 
of each actor over the other; the second dimension of dyadic power – ‘mutual dependence’ - is 
defined as the bilateral dependencies in the dyad. 
 
 The level of dependence of MU on GM increases along the x axis; the level of dependence of GM 
on MU increases along the y axis. 
 
 Nine different potential configurations of power imbalance and mutual dependence between 
actors MU and GM are depicted. Dyads in the green shaded boxes are power balanced but with 
different levels of mutual dependence; the lowest level of mutual dependence is in configuration 
1, the highest in configuration 9. 
 
 In dyads above the diagonal green shaded boxes (configurations 4, 7 and 8), power imbalance 
favours actor MU. Conversely, power imbalance favours actor GM in dyads below the diagonal 

















Figure 3 Notes (i) 
 
 Macro Institutional Environment & Events: this included institutions and events at the macro 
level of the political, economic, social and technological environment of the health and higher 
education sectors. ‘Institutions’ at the macro-societal level were defined as ‘the basic norms, 
rules, conventions, habits and values of a society’ (Hollingsworth 2002, North 1990). 
 
 Health and Higher Education Institutional Sectors & Events: this included relevant organizations 
and events in the health and HE sectors e.g. the organizations in the MG, the relevant funding, 
professional and regulatory bodies (such as the Nursing and Midwifery Council, the Higher 
Education Funding Council of England, the Quality Assurance Agency), and lobbying groups such 
as the Council of Deans of Health and the London Deans of Health Group). Also included were 
the relevant healthcare occupations for which education was provided in the MG. 
 
 Health and Higher Education Inter-sector Institutional Arrangements: these were the 
governance and funding arrangements between the NHS and HE sectors. In this research inquiry 
these included principally the NHS healthcare workforce education monopsony (the MG) and 
also the relevant inter-sector co-ordinating groups (such as the Health Education National 
Strategic Exchange). They also included the funding models and regulatory frameworks and 
processes which were relevant to healthcare occupations and healthcare workforce education. 
 
 IOR Agency: this comprised (i) the IOR Agents (including their ideas, aims and objectives, their 
perceptions of the other IOR agents, their perceptions of the force of external norms and 
constraints, and their expectations of IOR outcomes); in this inquiry the IOR agents, as 
organization level agents (see Chapter 2) were the GM and MU (ii) the IOR (which included the 
formal (contractual) arrangements governing exchange between the IOR agents, and their 
power-dependence relations with each other) (iii) IOR Events (which included the exercise of 
power by IOR agents). 
 
 IOR Key Outcomes: these included the product/service outputs of the IOR, the prices paid for 
IOR product/service output, and the specific contract mechanisms and contracts in the IOR 
governing the relations of exchange between the GM and its suppliers 
 
 IOR Performance: this was the performance of the IOR from the perspectives of the IOR agents 
(e.g. in relation to their objectives and expectations) and included measures used by the IOR 
agents in their evaluations of the IOR and of its performance. 
 
 Consequences for IOR in/stability over time: this concerned the impact on the in/stability of the 










Figure 3 Notes (ii) 
 
IOR Agency was assumed to be driven by the ideas, aims and objectives of the IOR agents. These 
ideas, aims and objectives may have varied according to issues and contexts – they were not 
necessarily either wholly or partly economic. The capacity of IOR agents to achieve their aims was 
dependent on their Powers (‘Power to’ and ‘Power over’). Whether, when and how IOR agents used 
their powers was mediated by their expectations of potential outcomes and the perceived risks of 
the choices open to them. These expectations and perceptions of risk of IOR agents were affected by 
IOR agents’ perceptions of other IOR agents (e.g. by the perception the IOR supplier had of the GM) 
in particular of the intentions of other IOR agents, the extent to which their interests were mutual 
and their expected behaviour. The expectations of IOR agents of potential IOR outcomes might also 
have fed back to modify their perceived interests and goals and also their perceptions of the 
congruence of their interests and goals with those of other IOR agents (e.g. as between a supplier 
and a GM). IOR agents might have exercised their powers either strategically or habitually; for 
example, an IOR agent’s expectations of outcomes might have been so well formed on particular 
issues and in particular contexts that the social reality was ‘taken for granted’ and the IOR agent’s 
conduct was habitual. An important influencing factor on the exercise of power by IOR agents was 
assumed to be their perceptions of the force of norms and constraints whether within these were 
within their own organizations or in the institutional environment. 
 
The Institutional Environment of the IOR, particularly the macro institutional environment was 
assumed to be important in ‘determining’, ‘shaping’, or influencing IOR agency and its components. 
For example, an important source of the powers of the GM in the IOR was the Health-Higher 
education inter-sector institutional arrangements, i.e. the MG which became the institutional 
arrangement within which context the IOR was originated, developed, and conducted.   IOR agents 
might however also have influenced or shaped their institutional environment to some extent. The 
latter was represented by the dotted line arrows ‘Power over’ between IOR Agents and their 
institutional environments at sector level. Each IOR agent might have influenced other IOR agents 
including their institutional environment; for example, the GM might have influenced the MG 
institutional arrangements. 
 
IOR Key Outcomes & Performance: these were the outcomes of IOR agency as shaped by the 
power-dependence relations between IOR agents and by the institutional environment and events.    
 
Consequences for IOR in/stability: these followed on from IOR key outcomes and performance. 
 
Processes of feedback: these processes arose from IOR key outcomes and performance and the 
consequences for IOR in/stability; they included resultant feedback from the IOR to all constituents 
of the environment (i.e. including the macro institutional environment, the health and higher 
education sectors, and the health and higher education inter-sector institutional arrangements); 








A Case History: Middlesex University (MU) & the NHS Education Commissioner (GM)
The main underlying conditions of MG are:
• From the GM’s standpoint there is perfect substitutability of individual sellers/suppliers
• From the sellers’ standpoint no alternative buyers are or will become available; within a given time horizon, 
sellers are unable economically to develop substitutes for their outputs to the MG for which prospective 
alternative buyers would be available
• Sellers’ individual exit costs from the monopsony are relatively high
• Sellers’ individual supply curves, as well as the aggregate supply curve for the MG, are upward sloping and 
usually relatively inelastic
• Sellers usually do not act in concert, whether by informal collusion and/or by formal coalition. 
Definitions: Monopsony; Government Monopsony (MG)
• Monopsony has been defined as the economic condition where there is one buyer (the ‘monopsonist’) and 
many sellers ‘of a well-specified good or service’. Blair & Harrison (2010)
• MG is similar to monopsony in all respects with the further characteristic that the standing of a MG as a 
monopsony is protected by statute or government regulation.
• Some MG operate as quasi–markets (QMs). QMs are similar to conventional markets in that the provision 
of a service is undertaken by competitor providers; under MG, QMs are different in that the GM is financed 
from resources provided by the state instead of from its own resources. Le Grand & Bartlett (1993)  
Where sellers facing a single buyer join together in a coalition and act in concert, the resulting 
market arrangement is a bilateral monopoly. But where the agreements of the coalition are not 







A Case History: Middlesex University (MU) & the NHS Education Commissioner (GM)
• The reference period, 1995 – 2013, consisted of  three distinctive sub-periods. The characteristics 
of these sub-periods reflected material developments in the environment of the IOR as well as 
material changes in the contracts of the IOR.
 1995 – 2004: Growth; Mutual Dependence to Resource Dependence & Historical Dependence
 2005 – 2007: Exogenous Change; Drift & Adaptation
 2008 – 2013: A Critical Juncture; Exogenous Shock & Decline; Power Games
• ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ in the IOR over the reference period were brought about mostly by the exercise of 
power by the GM and by the power dependence responses of MU. The exercise of power by the 
GM in the IOR consisted partly of responses to events exogenous to the MG, especially to 
exogenous shocks to the MG, which occurred during the latter part of the reference period (2005-
2009). In the last 5 years of the reference period (2008-2013), the GM also exercised power on its 
own initiative to bring about changes in the IOR as well as in the MG which were consequential 
for stability on dimensions in the IOR.
 For further details please see inserts – slides 24-27
Findings contd.:
• The IOR originated under conditions of MG and continued to exist mostly under those 
conditions during the reference period.
 Processes determining contracts, outputs and prices were in their final stages usually conducted between 
the GM and individual sellers. The exceptions to this occurred in the later part of the reference period when 
from 2009 the sellers acted in concert in processes of price determination. The effect of this was that on 
dimensions of the price component of the IOR, the conditions under which the IOR existed became those of 
bilateral monopoly.









IOR Context 1995 – 2013: Persistence of the Conditions of MG 
 
The provision of non-medical education by HEIs to the NHS continued to be made mostly under 
conditions of MG on a quasi-market basis for the whole of the reference period 1995-2013: 
 
1. There was a single education buyer (the GM) whose standing was protected by government 
regulation and whose resources came entirely from the state. 
 
2. The education product for pre-registration education (which accounted for c. 90% of the activity 
by volume and value in the MG) continued to be ‘well specified’ both in terms of content and 
delivery, by the relevant regulatory body; consequently from the buyer’s standpoint different 
suppliers continued to be substitutable for each other. The potential substitutability of sellers’ 
outputs generally also remained, particularly in terms of the potential for healthcare workforce 
employers to source registered non-medical professionals from outside of the UK. 
 
3. No alternative buyers for outputs from the specialised resources (mainly academic staff) of the 
suppliers became available. The potential cost of the transformation (via retraining) of those 
resources so that they could be redeployed by the suppliers to alternative uses continued to be 
uneconomic. Under their IOR contracts with the GM, sellers continued to be barred from charging 
tuition fees to their students; thus, the entire income to sellers, such as MU, from their NHS 
contracts activities continued to come from the GM. 
 
4. As a consequence of the persistence of the conditions under 2 and 3 above, the individual supply 
curves and the aggregate supply curve in the MG continued to be upward sloping and relatively 
inelastic over the reference period. 
 
5. There were many sellers as well as many potential sellers in the geographic area defined for the 
GM over the course of the reference period. This remained the case even when GM restructurings 
took place and the geographic area covered by the GM was redefined; for example, in 2012 for the 
region applicable to the IOR there were c. 12 potential higher education providers of adult nursing 
pre-registration programmes and 9 actual providers. 
 
6. Processes determining contracts, outputs and prices were in their final stages usually conducted 
between the GM and individual sellers. The exceptions to this occurred in the later part of the 
reference period when from 2009 the sellers acted in concert in processes of price determination. 
The effect of this was that on dimensions of the price component of the IOR, the conditions under 
which the IOR existed became those of bilateral monopoly. However, as will be discussed below in 
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Explanations of IOR ‘S’, ‘TRI’, and ‘U’:
An overall explanation of  IOR in/stability over time is summarised in the expression:
I/S(IOR)T = f [{RD(IOR) * HD(MG)}, HD(IOR), ...]
where:
• I/S(IOR) is the stability, threatened instability, and instability of an IOR
•T is the selected time period
• RD is the resource dependence  in the IOR (particularly MU’s resource dependence on the IOR)
• HD(MG) are historical dependence (HD) processes at MG level (particularly the impact over time of the 
underlying conditions of  MG on the balance of power between MU and the GM)
• * (the asterisk) denotes the combination of resource dependence (RD) with HD processes at MG level
• HD(IOR) are historical dependence processes at IOR level. These processes were established mostly via the 
IOR contracts and persisted for the duration of those contracts
• ... (the dots) denote other variables which could be relevant to the in/stability of the IOR e.g.
 demand from the NHS for newly registered non-medical professional staff
 placement capacity
 compatibility in the objectives of the GM and MU
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Explanations of  ‘TRI’ and ‘U’ impacts on the IOR during the reference period
• 25 events  were identified which resulted in TRI or U impacts on the IOR during the reference period. The 
total number of these impacts which occurred in each year came to 114 (out of a possible 252).
•Three explanations, (A, B, C) of these TRI and U impacts were developed :
 Explanation A = [{RD(IOR) * HD(MG)}, HD(IOR)]
 Explanation B = [{RD(IOR) * (In/effectiveness of Negotiation Strategy/Coalition)}, HD(IOR)]
 Explanation C = [NHS(Demand Growth/Demand Decline/Placement Capacity Constraint)]
•TRI and U impacts under Explanation A occurred under conditions of MG
•TRI and U impacts under Explanation B occurred under conditions akin to bilateral monopoly. Under those 
conditions the relative power of the sides in the negotiation was unstable; the relative power of each side 
depended largely on the in/effectiveness of the power dependence responses of the negotiating parties.
•TRI and U impacts under Explanation C: here it was events exogenous to the MG e.g. changes in overall NHS 
resources and consequent demand for healthcare workforce education, which were decisive for impacts on 
IOR stability rather than the power balance between the buyer and supplier at IOR or MG levels
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Explanations of  ‘TRI’ and ‘U’ impacts on the IOR during the reference period
• Explanations A and B were associated with 87 of the 114 ‘U’ and ‘TRI’ impacts on dimensions in the contracts, 
price and performance components of the IOR
• Explanation C was associated with the 14 ‘TRI’ impacts on dimensions 7 and 8 in the outputs components of 
the IOR
• 9 ‘TRI’ impacts were associated with explanations A and/or B, and C on dimension 14 of the performance 
component of the IOR for the years 2006/07 to 2012/13 (these were cases of ‘over-determination’).
• Of the ‘TRI’ and ‘U’ impacts in the IOR over the reference period:
 Explanation A was associated with c. 75% of the impacts
 Explanation B was associated with a further c. 5% of the impacts
 Explanation C was associated with c. 15% of the impacts
There were insufficient data to explain the remaining c. 5% of the impacts
• For details of the TRI and U impacts and their associated explanations at IOR dimension level please see insert 
- slide 32 (Table 22) 
Conclusion: In general, it was the exercise of power by the GM which was decisive for most 
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Overall Conclusion
• Instability and threatened instability in the IOR during the reference period were due mostly to a power 
imbalance in the IOR, in favour of the GM, between the GM and MU
•The source of that power imbalance was a combination of:
The resource dependency of MU on the IOR
The conditions of government monopsony and bilateral monopoly under which the IOR existed.
• MU’s resource dependency was created at the outset of the IOR through the commitment by MU to the 
specialist dedicated resources entailed in its role in the IOR.
 In the first half of the reference period, this resource dependency increased as the IOR grew in size 
and relative importance to the financial operating position of MU while at the same time most of the 
conditions of government monopsony under which the IOR had been created also persisted.
 In the second half of the reference period the IOR declined in size; however, from MU’s standpoint 
the IOR still continued to be important to the financial operating position of MU so that MU’s resource 




















 A HEFCE Contract Framework Scenario
 Recommendations









Macro-economic events & policies combined with continuing rise in need & demand for healthcare 
have functioned to threaten the stability of HE – NHS IORs on key dimensions ...
Consequences Forecast to 2020
 BMP Shortfall on HEI Standard FEC from 2005/07 Increasing Shortfall
 Quantities Shortfall on NHS Demand or Need from 2005/06 Continuing Uncertainty
 HEIs IOR Contracts Risk Burdens: Increase in London from 2005/06 HEIs’ Risk Burdens Increasing
NHS Funding 2009 - 2015
Education CommissioningPrices/UOR Quantities/Outputs
HE – NHS IOR Contracts
What impact will instability &/or threatened 
instability on HEI – NHS IORs have on overall 
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Risk Management
• Risks and burdens in IOR contracts are reviewed overall and also on the dimensions of an IOR from the 
standpoints of each of the organizations in those IORs
• HEIs individually review their level of resource dependency on their NHS IORs and develop strategies to 
manage that resource dependency
With no other buyers available such strategies might include HEIs deliberately seeking to limit the 
growth of their NHS IORs and to increase the flexibility of their resources bound up in them, 
particularly in respect of non-staff fixed assets 
Costs
•To enable them to gauge their IOR resource dependency, HEIs should cost their IORs to FEC level, ideally 
using a validated actual cost methodology which also includes a realistic detailed attribution of overhead costs
 Credible information about HEI costs is becoming increasingly important in HEI operations generally 
(not just NHS education). In its review in November 2014 the Higher Education Commission 
concluded: ‘Universities see ... the cap on tuition fees, as a threat to their continued sustainability ... however the 
Commission has not been presented with strong evidence from universities that it costs more than an average of 
£9,000 to deliver good quality courses’.
•An in depth review of the BMP is completed
To be credible review needs to be carried out by an independent organization with an acceptable and 
acknowledged standing in completing such reviews
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• Differences between HEIs in their objectives, perceptions of and attitudes to risk, and competitive potential
 Costs and productivity – current and potential
 Economies of scale
 Relative weighting of short-run and long-run objectives
 Level of current resource dependence
Perceptions of, and attitudes toward risk
Available strategies e.g. cross-subsidisation, cost reduction, creation and use of countervailing power
• Persistence of significant power imbalances between the GM and individual HEIs under conditions of MG
 It is always open to the GM to seek further rent extraction
• Conditions of bilateral monopoly are inherently unstable and more so if the environment affecting funding is 
itself unstable 
• Standard Pricing based on some principle e.g. price should reflect an accepted standard FEC of HEIs in 
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Pricing – Under a standard pricing system,  how should actual prices be determined? 
• Current system (2013/14) – national level negotiations using current prices as baseline
Or
• Previous system (2008, 2009) - national level negotiations using outputs of  a recent cost review as baseline
Or
Or
• Unilateral determination of prices by HEE (proposal by HEE, clause 14.1 of draft NSEFA, October 2014)
Issues
• Drift downwards from ‘standards’ has been the norm since BMP introduction in 2005-2007
• How should risks of student attrition be borne? Inter-related preliminary questions here include:
What are the risks of student attrition?
What is their variance over time? By programme? By cohort? By HEI? By student characteristics on 
entry? ... 
To what extent are these risks controllable? How? By whom? 
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Contracts: Duration; Termination;  Monitoring & Management; Placement Responsibilities  
•The overall length of the contract duration of an IOR should be specified to allow both the HEI and the GM 
to make sustainable economic adjustment to situations in the event the contract is not renewed or extended 
beyond the specified duration date.
 In 2008 the London Deans of Health Group proposed to the GM that the IOR contracts be annually 
rolling 5 year contracts
• Excepting under conditions of material breach, the minimum notice required for full or partial termination 
of an IOR contract should allow both the HEI and the GM to make sustainable economic adjustment in the 
event of such termination being made
 From the standpoint of many HEIs it is unlikely that such a notice period would be less than 2 years
•The burdens associated with contract monitoring and management are set appropriately so as to avoid the 
creation of unproductive deployment of resources, including unnecessary duplication
 Proposals made by UUK/CoDH to HEE on 29th September 2014 could be taken as a starting point 
for simplification and streamlining of the current system of quality assurance monitoring
• In allocation of placement responsibilities distinctions should be made between (i) securing placements from 
an already established placement capacity (ii) establishing of new placement capacity and (iii) maintaining of a 
placement capacity volume and quality
 (i) Should primarily be the responsibility of the HEIs. HEE would have a supporting role
 (ii) Should primarily be the responsibility of HEE. HEIs would still have a supporting role
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• Health & Social Care need and demand will continue to grow relatively strongly, e.g. 
exceeding GDP growth
• Macro-economic pressures will continue and may even intensify
• Given these factors pressures on NHS service and education budgets will continue, at least to 
2021. This prognosis has been declared as “certain ” by relevant decision takers
• Under the existing regime it continues to be open to HEE to exercise its monopsony power, 
or under conditions of bilateral monopoly to use its influence, to obtain outcomes on price 
which will continue to be disadvantageous to the HEIs (such as the outcomes of the 2014 BMP 
negotiations). Given continued pressures on its resources arising from the exogenous factors 
noted above, it is likely that HEE  would exercise its power in this way
• Under the existing funding regime it is probably unrealistic to expect that  a sustainable 
settlement on price from the standpoint of the HEIs will be made in the foreseeable future
Even if all recommendations (1) – (4) are implemented:
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Assumptions
• Overall, the quality and innovation requirements and standards for nursing, midwifery and AHPs will 
continue at current (2014/15) levels or will continue to rise
This includes requirements from the UK regulators that pre-registration education programmes are 
delivered through approved education institutes (AEIs) and that in practice these will continue in the 
majority to be HEIs.
•At individual healthcare occupation and education programme level, the requirements for quality and 
innovation will continue to change over time (e.g. changes in the standards specified by professional bodies). 
 Consequently, it is also assumed that flexibility of response of key stakeholders to meet changing 
requirements for quality and innovation will continue to be needed. 
•The replenishment of the NHS professional workforce over time will continue to be predicated mainly on 
the supply of newly qualified professional staff. Indigenous (country) self-sufficiency in workforce supply will 
continue to be a strategic objective for the NHS.
• Healthcare students will continue to make a contribution to service, particularly in the final year of their 
courses. 
* The rest of the presentation dealing with alternative futures under a new regime is closely based on a paper by Walsh & 











• Healthcare occupations: nursing; midwifery; most AHPs
• Education mode and level: full and part time education and training programmes leading to registration in 
the relevant healthcare occupation
• Funding streams: education tuition fees; placement provider grants; student bursaries and grants
Outside of scope:
• Education level: Post-registration (CPPD) programmes
• Placement funding streams: MADEL; SIFT
• Funding levels (quantum) for each funding stream
Complexities
• Single v Plural Models
 NHS funded & self-funded students
• Student characteristics
Mature Students (demand; diversity; attrition; attitudes to debt)
In-programme service contribution
Occupational lifetime earnings potential & loans repayment potential
• Programme characteristics
 Length of programmes & in-course student earnings potential
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Specification
The current funding model (“status quo”) and potential alternatives were specified on 6 dimensions:
• Scope: this concerns what is to be funded under the model, including types and level of education 
programmes and the intended coverage of that funding (‘funding streams’), whether for tuition fees, 
placement provision or student support
• Funding Sources: this specifies the funder(s), and gives indicative details of the extent to which each 
funder is to fund particular funding streams
• Financing: this outlines the arrangements by which the funding from each of the funders could be financed.
• Overall Funding: this concerns how the overall level of funding is to be determined
• Tariff Levels or ‘units of resource’: this concerns how the tariff levels within each of the relevant 
funding streams are to be determined
• Implementation: this concerns potential issues in the implementation of new models and some ideas 
about how these could be managed
Not specified:
•Accountability (e.g. in setting standards about, and the monitoring of, ‘value for money’) 
• Review (e.g. evaluations of actual performance of a model using impact assessments).
 Both of these dimensions could be dealt with when the potential implications of new models for 
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Options (for further details please see insert slides 46 and 47)
Table 1         -          Summary of Funding Models Options:     Funders and Funding Streams
Key: T = Taxpayer/Government; G = Graduates; E = Employers of healthcare workforce
 ------------------ Funding Stream  ---------------
Tuition Fees Bursaries/Maintenance Placement
Funding Model Title
0 Status Quo T T; G T
1
Student Loans - Group B Tuition Fees 
plus Supplement
G G; T T
2 Student Loans - Group C Tuition Fees G G; T T
3
Student Loans & Employer Levy (i) - 
Group B Tuition Fees plus Supplement 
(with fees cap)
G; T; E G; T T
4
Student Loans & Employer Levy (ii) - 
Group B Tuition Fees plus Supplement 
(with fees cap)
G; T; E G; T T
5 Private Providers' Employer Levy G; E G; T T
6 Student Loans - Flexible Tuition Fees G T T
7
Student Loans & Employer Levy - 
Flexible Tuition Fees
G; E T T
8
Employer Levy & Government Grants (i) 
(with fees cap)
E; T T; G T
9
Employer Levy & Government Grants (ii) 
(with fees cap)
E; T T; G T
10
Private Providers' Employer Levy (with 
fees cap) 
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Evaluation Criteria
From a review of  the relevant literature, including previous impact assessments of  tuition fees funding 




• Funding Flexibility & Responsiveness 
Healthcare Need and Demand





 Long-run Sustainability 
•Efficiency
 Cost Efficiency, Consistency and Transparency
Value for Money
 Economic Efficiency
• Perceived Fairness & Equity
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(1) Legal compliance:  model is lawful in accordance with current relevant legislation, case law and general principles of administrative law. 
The model takes full account of the equality and diversity requirements on disability; ethnicity; gender; age; sexual orientation & religion or 
belief
(2) Comprehensiveness:The model should have the capability of dealing with the funding requirements of the whole system
(3) Healthcare Need & Demand: model has funding flexibility and responsiveness to changes in need and demand for healthcare. The model  
is effective in taking account of future changes in workforce planning and the career frameworks of the relevant occupations and roles. The 
model incentivises innovation in healthcare workforce education and training
(4) Student Recruitment and Retention: model should be compatible with objectives to recruit and retain good quality students up to the 
point of qualification.
(5) Widening Participation:  model should be compatible with objectives to widen participation in healthcare programmes by students from 
a wide range of backgrounds.
(6) Funding adequacy: funding levels should be adequate to ensure that the objectives of the funding can be fully met. These objectives 
include ensuring education outputs are of the requisite quality so that future needs of healthcare, particularly for excellent patient care, can 
be fully met. This also means that funding levels should adjust smoothly on an agreed basis to changes in costs.
(7) Funding Sustainability – Short-run Affordability: Funding obligations (levies; contributions) should be within the ability of the 
responsible funders to pay when required to do so. Funding obligations should be within the designated capital and/or revenue budgets or 
options available for the economic securing of any additional funding required.
(8) Funding Sustainability – Long-run: funding obligations and the risks associated with those obligations should be sustainable for the 
responsible funders over the long-term. Ability to pay should not be impaired by potential exogenous shocks or events, the potential 
negative impact of which are estimated to fall within the parameters agreed in ‘what if?’ stress tests.
(9) Efficiency - Cost efficiency, Consistency & Transparency:  model should be cost efficient to administer and manage. This includes 
administrative feasibility and the clarity of rules to the relevant stakeholders. The rules of the model should also be interpreted and applied 
consistently over time.
(10) Efficiency - Value for Money (VFM): model should enable adequate VFM as measured by the proportion of students initially 
registered on a programme that enter healthcare employment after graduation, relative to the eventual employment outcomes in comparable 
occupation specific education programmes.
(11) Efficiency – Economic : model should promote economic efficiency e.g. eliminate of free riding; promote improvement in 
economically rational healthcare workforce planning ; avoid resource market distortions associated with funding of education and training 
through general taxation;  improve resource mix in the delivering of healthcare
(12) Perceived Fairness and Equity:  the funding obligations arising from application of the model are perceived by the key stakeholders to 
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Raw Evaluations
Using assumptions about costs per fte for nursing pre-registration education provision of the requisite quality, 
some initial evaluations of the status quo model and of 10 model options were made. These evaluations were 
made using 10 of the 12 criteria, and were ‘raw’ in that no weightings were given to individual criteria and no 
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Conclusions from Raw Evaluations
Walsh  & Jelfs (2015), p. 40:
‘Ten funding model options in addition to the current, ‘status quo’, funding model were specified and initial, 
indicative, ‘raw’ evaluations of these models completed. The conclusions drawn from analysis of these initial 
evaluations were’:
• ‘The models based on capital financing may have substantial advantages over the current funding model, 
noting that the current model was evaluated to be deficient on 5 of the 10 evaluation criteria used to gauge 
the performance of the models.’
• ‘It should be possible to reduce the current burden on the taxpayer while also effectively addressing the risks 
to the future quality of nursing, midwifery and AHP education and ultimately the quality of patient care.’
• ‘However, there remain numerous issues for discussion and debate. These include: 
Whether there are distinctive characteristics of the students on these courses that have a material 
bearing on the funding model
The merits or otherwise of a single versus a plural funding system
The articulation between a future funding system and workforce planning. 
Whatever the conclusion, however, we are convinced that an open debate and a strategic 
plan for transition, rather than continued ad hoc fragmentation,
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Recommendations
Walsh  & Jelfs (2015), p. 41:
• A new funding model for nursing, midwifery and AHP education is developed and implemented which 
improves on the current model and meets the future needs for improved quality and innovation in education 
and ultimately improved quality of patient care.
•To underpin any future model, a new zero-based costing exercise for pre-registration nursing, midwifery and 
AHP education should urgently be carried out in order to ensure that future decisions on funding levels and 
models are based on good evidence.
•To enable this, a co-ordinated programme of consultation with all key stakeholders and other relevant parties 
is initiated and managed to a conclusion.
•The consultation programme should include :
 the identification of funding model options 
 the identification of model evaluation criteria, their relative weighting, and a minimum rating on 
each criterion that would satisfy screening 
 the stakeholder evaluations of agreed model options 
 the validation of those evaluations 
 exploration of the articulation between funding models and workforce planning.
• A project plan is devised and resourcing agreed for the consultation programme.
•The above is completed in time for implementation of an agreed new funding model to commence by no later 
than 2017/18.
•An important part of the implementation will be to ensure any new model arrangements are compatible with 
relevant management and accountability structures in the NHS and HE.
 
